What we have seen in Iran in the past year is more than a European will see in his whole life. I read this sentence on an Iranian’s X (formerly Twitter) page a few months ago. Interestingly, on my last trip to Iran, a taxi driver said exactly the same thing and mentioned that he was tired of reading the news.
Indeed, Iran has experienced such extraordinary times in the past year that this year can be described as the longest for the country in several decades. Any one of the events Iranians experienced in 2024 would have been a historic milestone for any country. But in 2024, Iran experienced all these events together.
Perhaps the most important feature of 2024 is that the problems experienced will be carried over to 2025 without the slightest solution. This makes it uncertain whether Iranians will have a calmer year next year than they did in 2024.
So, what were the most important events in Iran last year?
Domestic politics:
Parliamentary elections:
The 12th Majlis elections of the Islamic Republic of Iran were held on 1 March 2024 and as expected, the conservatives managed to gain a majority in the Majlis. Only 40 per cent of eligible voters turned out for the election, the lowest turnout in the political history of the Islamic Republic. This was a major turning point in the political history of post-revolutionary Iran. Opponents saw it as a symbol of popular disenchantment with Iran’s current political system, while the pro-government camp interpreted it as a message of protest from the Iranian people to the government.
The disqualification of many reformists, and even critical conservative parliamentary candidates by the Council for the Protection of the Constitution, preventing them from taking part in the elections, was seen as the main reason for these political reactions. The poor economic situation was also seen as another reason.
Many believed that the 12th Parliament was designed to be the most harmonious and cooperative with the government of then President Ibrahim Raisi. The extremely low voter turnout in large cities and the higher turnout in smaller cities was interpreted as an indication of changes in the political sociology of Iranian society.
Election of the Assembly of Experts:
Simultaneously with the parliamentary elections, the Iranian people elected 88 mujtahids, whose nominations had been approved by the Council for the Protection of the Constitution, to the sixth term of the Assembly of Experts (Majlis-e Khobregan).
According to Article 107 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Assembly of Experts is made up of ‘qualified’ faqihs who are responsible for electing and dismissing the Leader and monitoring his conduct. Each term of this Assembly lasts 8 years and is of particular importance as it is responsible for overseeing the behavior of the Leader and, in the event of the death of the current Leader, selecting the next Leader.
Many believe that given the age of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the next leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran is likely to be elected by the members of the Assembly of Experts in its sixth term. Therefore, the Assembly of Experts elections in this term are more important than in previous terms.
Perhaps because of this importance, the Council for the Protection of the Constitution, which is tasked with approving the nominations of representatives to the Assembly of Experts, has conducted a very strict vetting process this term, rejecting the nominations of those who have previously served multiple terms in the Assembly of Experts, such as former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani.
It is believed that this strict vetting process was carried out in order to create a more unified structure in the Assembly of Experts and to minimize controversy and disagreement in the selection of the next Leader.
Death of the President
On 19 May, when all the news agencies were analysing the end of the political stalemate between the two neighbouring countries following the inauguration of the joint Kizil Kalesi border dam in the presence of the Iranian and Azerbaijani presidents, the news suddenly broke of the ’emergency landing of the presidential helicopter’.
An hour later, it was discovered that the communication line of Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi and the accompanying delegation had been cut. Also, on board the helicopter was Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdullahiyan, Governor of East Azerbaijan Malik Rahmati, Governor-Faqih Representative of East Azerbaijan Province Seyyed Mohammad Ali Al-Hashim, Commander of the Presidential Protection Unit and three pilots.
The rescue operation was hampered by the dense forest and poor weather conditions (rain and dense fog). Various drones, search and rescue teams and trained search dogs were used, and it took 15 hours to obtain definitive information on the condition of the President and his entourage. The news of the President’s death was finally confirmed the following morning.
The president’s death came at a time when he was seen as one of the contenders for the future leadership of Iran, and many believed that the new Majlis would give full support to his government.
On the one hand, the death has led to foreign policy uncertainties at a time of escalating tensions between Iran and Israel over events in Gaza, and on the other it has raised the possibility of an assassination attempt on the president. Although the official state reports have explained that the main cause of the helicopter crash was dense fog and bad weather conditions, the public is not convinced by the following questions Why did only the helicopter carrying the President and the Foreign Minister crash, and why was the helicopter not located for 15 hours?
Early presidential elections:
Following the death of Ebrahim Raisi, presidential elections were held with 6 candidates, based on Article 131 of the Iranian Constitution, which stipulates that “in cases such as the death, resignation, illness or dismissal of the President of the Republic, the interim Presidential Council is obliged to ensure the election of a new President within fifty days at the latest, and during this period it assumes the presidential powers except for the referendum”.
This election was also overshadowed by the process of eliminating candidates by the Council for the Protection of the Constitution. One reformist candidate stood against 5 conservative candidates. Many prominent figures from the reformist or moderate conservative wing were disqualified and could not take part in the elections. From the reformist wing, only Masoud Pezeshkian, former Minister of Health and a member of the cabinet of Mohammad Khatami, the leading figure of the reformist movement, managed to participate in the elections.
Pezeshkian won 53.6% of the vote, defeating his ultra-conservative rival Said Jalili, and was elected president. He campaigned on promises to abolish the morality police, economic reforms and a diplomatic opening.
The reformist movement continues to support Pezeshkian’s presidency, viewing the conservative representatives in parliament as a minority elected with little public participation. However, according to the election results, Pezeshkian received the direct support of only 25% of the population. The success or failure of the Pezeshkian government will be discussed in another article.
Ongoing economic crisis:
In 2024, as in previous years, Iran continued to struggle with the economic crisis. The value of the national currency fell by 100% in one year, and the inflation rate continued to hover around 40%, according to the Central Bank. This situation has become a chronic disease of the Iranian economy. From 2020 to the end of 2024, the value of the Iranian national currency fell from 13,000 to 89,000 divisions to $1. In other words, Iranians have seen their currency depreciate by more than 600 per cent in the last five years, with a significant portion of this loss occurring in the last year. Most worryingly, there is no hope that this situation will improve.
The devaluation of the national currency and the resulting inflation and uncontrolled price increases have fueled public discontent, which has only deepened over time.
Energy crisis:
Another issue that has emerged as a major concern in Iran since the summer of this year and has been at the top of the agenda in recent weeks is the energy shortage and the inability of the country’s electricity and gas infrastructure to meet demand. Iran faced frequent electricity and water shortages this summer and repeated power cuts in the winter. The energy crisis has also resulted in air pollution due to the irregular operation of power plants, which has caused and continues to cause environmental crises.
Experts believe that the lack of infrastructure investment in the country’s energy sector, especially the heavy sanctions and mismanagement by government officials in recent years, are the main reasons for this situation. This problem is likely to become more complex in the coming year, with significant social and political consequences.
Improvement in civil liberties:
With a reformist president in power and given the significant protests in Iran last year over the headscarf issue, state repression of women’s dress appears to have decreased significantly in 2024. In recent weeks, some popular messaging apps that were blocked last year have been made available, signaling an improvement in civil liberties.
Foreign policy:
Throughout 2024, Iran’s foreign policy was heavily influenced by the Gaza war. The escalation of Israel’s military operations in Gaza in the early months of the year, and their escalation into an unprecedented genocide, showed that the conflict would be protracted and would have consequences for Iran.
As the war dragged on, analyses in Iran fell into two main groups: The first group argued that Iran should not fall into Israel’s war trap. According to this group, by provoking Iran, Israel was trying to turn the war in Gaza from a confrontation with the defenseless people of Gaza into a confrontation with Iran. In this way, Israel would be able to ignore its genocidal crimes in Gaza and win the support of an international coalition from the United States and Europe by portraying itself as the victim. This group argued that Iran should engage in a minimal conflict with Israel and that Israel should not be allowed to draw Iran into a wider war. They saw Iran’s current economic difficulties, popular dissatisfaction with the government, the death of the president and internal political changes, possible attacks on Iran’s oil infrastructure and the cutting off of Iran’s main sources of income as the main reasons for avoiding war.
The second group argued that Israel had decided to destroy Iran’s influence in the Middle East and that Iran should inflict heavy blows on Israel. According to them, if Iran did not react seriously against Israel, it would pay a much higher price for this war in the future. This group believed that by inflicting heavy blows on Israel, Iran would be making a strategic choice between life and death, but that avoiding conflict with Israel would lead to an inevitable collapse in the future. This group argued that Iran was capable of striking hard blows against Israel, that Iran had demonstrated its technological capability in ballistic missile attacks, and that it could provide an important deterrent against Israel by shifting its nuclear strategy towards the production and testing of atomic bombs.
The events of the past year show that Iran has favored the view of the first group but has not refrained from some attacks against Israel.
The main developments in Iran’s foreign policy over the past year can be summarized as follows:
First military operation against Israel: The conflict between Iran and Israel has been going on at the security level or through proxy groups for the past few decades. However, on 14 April 2024, Iran finally carried out a direct missile operation in response to the Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus. This operation was dubbed “Operation True Promise-1”. The operation has been described as the first direct confrontation between Iran and Israel, the world’s largest drone strike, and the largest missile strike in Iran’s history.
In Operation True Promise, Iran launched more than 300 drones and missiles into the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories. Some of these missiles are said to have penetrated Israel’s defense systems and hit important military targets such as the Nevatim airbase.
The operation was carried out in response to the Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus on 1 April. The Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces made it clear that the reason for this operation was that Israel had crossed Iran’s red lines and attacked the Iranian consulate in Damascus. Seven people were killed in this Israeli attack, including Mohammad Reza Zahidi, a senior commander of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.
Iran’s mission to the UN stated that this military operation was carried out under the right of self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.
Many experts have said that this operation was not intended to harm Israel, but rather to demonstrate Iran’s ability to overcome Israel’s missile defense systems and its ability to deliver a direct blow to Israel.
Assassination of Haniyeh in Tehran:
Ismail Haniyeh, head of the political bureau of Hamas and one of its leaders, was assassinated by Israel on 31 July 2024 at 01:37 in Tehran, accompanied by his bodyguard. Haniyeh was assassinated as he was returning to an accommodation centre of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards after attending the swearing-in ceremony of Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian.
As well as being a major security disaster for the Iranian security services, it meant that Israel had crossed every possible red line. The assassination was seen as a serious loss of face for Iran.
Operation True Promise:
On 1 October 2024, Iran carried out a second missile attack against Israel, Operation True Promise-2. This attack came two months after the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and in the wake of increased Israeli attacks on Hezbollah’s command center. In particular, it was carried out four days after an airstrike that killed Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah Southern Front Commander Ali Kirki and Deputy Operations Chief of the Revolutionary Guards Abbas Nilforshan.
The operation involved the launch of 200 ballistic missiles, hypersonic Fateh and Khybershiken missiles from areas around Tehran, Kashan, Tabriz, Shiraz, and Kermanshah.
This operation was seen as a real show of Iranian strength against Israel and created an important national unity in Iranian society. Iranians, regardless of their political and ideological affiliations, saw this operation as an act of defending their national honor.
Israel’s attack on Iran:
On 26 October 2024, Israel launched three waves of air strikes on Iran under the name of “Operation Days of Penance”. These strikes continued throughout the night and into the morning in several Iranian provinces, causing limited damage according to Iranian officials. Israel said the strikes were in response to ‘months of continuous attacks’ by Iran and its proxies, as well as Iran’s rocket attack on Israel in October 2024. In this operation, 4 members of the Iranian air defense forces were killed.
Although this attack caused no visible destruction in Iran, it was seen as a new page in the history of the Iran-Israel conflict, as it was the first time that Israel had launched a direct military attack on Iranian territory.
The nuclear impasse continues:
Although the confrontation between Iran and Israel has overshadowed attention to the Iranian nuclear issue, Iran faces a dangerous reality: According to the 10-year agreement adopted by UN Security Council Resolution 2231 in 2015, if Iran is found to be in violation of the nuclear deal, previous UN sanctions can be automatically reimposed within 60 days at the request of any permanent member if the 5+1 Commission notifies the UN Security Council.
As the 10-year term of the nuclear deal nears its end, European countries and the United States are seeking to accuse Iran of violating its nuclear commitments, thereby portraying Iran as a threat to global security and seeking to reinstate UN sanctions. A few weeks ago, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi described this situation as a potential crisis for Iran and warned that it could have serious consequences for Iran. (It is not a far-fetched prediction that we will hear much more in the coming months about the automatic sanctions mechanism known as the ‘trigger mechanism’ or ‘snapback’).
This situation will be further complicated by the re-election of Donald Trump as US President.
Weakening regional position:
Although Israel failed to make noteworthy progress on the ground in Lebanon and was forced to retreat, it managed to deal a major strategic blow to the Lebanese resistance and thus to Iran by assassinating the Hezbollah leadership. The subsequent departure of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from the political scene and the rise to power of anti-Iranian groups in Syria meant that Iran severed its land link with Hezbollah and weakened its logistical support line to Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other resistance groups. These developments weaken Iran’s regional position and power and will continue to force Iran to seriously reconsider its regional policies.
…
Throughout 2024, Iran managed to end the year without a major crisis, although it had an eventful year in domestic politics. However, Iran faced serious crises in its foreign policy, which will lead to a future change in Iran’s regional and international policies. This political change will also mean a change in the actions of some groups associated with Iran, leading to new developments in regional dynamics.
2025 will undoubtedly be a challenging and volatile year for Iran and a year of difficult choices.
