The International Criminal Court (ICC) has enlisted independent investigators to examine allegations of sexual harassment against Prosecutor Karim Khan.

The accusations against Khan surfaced as the ICC evaluated Khan’s request to issue arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant over alleged war crimes in Gaza.

Finnish diplomat Päivi Kaukoranta, who leads the ICC’s oversight body, stated that an external investigation was initiated after reports surfaced that Khan had acted inappropriately toward a female colleague. Normally, such matters are managed by the court’s internal audit, but Khan personally requested that the Independent Supervisory Mechanism (ISM) oversee the case. Kaukoranta explained, “In light of the case’s unique circumstances, the ISM’s victim-centered approach, and the potential for conflicts of interest, the ISM agreed to the exceptional use of an external investigation.”

Khan denied the allegations, stating, “I have previously called for an investigation into this matter and welcome the opportunity to participate in this process.”

The investigation coincides with the ICC’s deliberation over Khan’s request to issue warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity related to Israel’s actions in Gaza.

While Khan’s move was supported internationally, it drew criticism from the Biden administration and U.S. Congress. The U.S. House of Representatives recently passed legislation that sanctions individuals affiliated with the ICC, including judges and their families, underscoring the U.S. policy of opposition to ICC jurisdiction over Israel.

Reports have also surfaced regarding Israel’s alleged threats toward ICC officials. In May, The Guardian revealed that Khan’s predecessor, Fatou Bensouda, was pressured in “a series of secret meetings” with Mossad chief Yossi Cohen, a close ally of Netanyahu. Cohen reportedly advised Bensouda to “drop the war crimes investigation,” allegedly warning her, “You don’t want to be involved in anything that could endanger your safety or your family’s safety.”

Khan has since noted he faced pressure before submitting his application for the arrest warrant.

Former Trump aides have cautioned Israeli ministers not to assume Trump’s unconditional support for West Bank annexation in a potential second term, according to The Times of Israel.

At least two officials from Donald Trump’s previous administration advised Israeli ministers to temper expectations about Trump’s support for Israel’s annexation of the West Bank. Sources close to the discussions indicated that while annexation is not off the table, Israeli leaders should avoid viewing it as a “foregone conclusion.”

The message was delivered in meetings and discussions held in the months leading up to Trump’s recent presidential victory. However, some far-right cabinet members remained undeterred. On Monday, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich declared that 2025 would mark “the year of sovereignty in Judea and Samaria [the West Bank]” following Trump’s re-election. Last week, National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir also asserted that “the time for sovereignty has come.”

On Friday, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu announced Yechiel Leiter as Israel’s next ambassador to the United States. Leiter, a former settler leader, is known for his support of West Bank annexation and opposition to a Palestinian state.

In a statement to The Times of Israel, an anonymous Israeli official said Trump’s former advisers have not ruled out his potential support for annexation. However, they indicated it could jeopardize Trump’s broader foreign policy priorities, including countering Iran, competing with China, and ending the war in Ukraine. Trump would likely need the support of key Gulf allies—notably Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—to achieve these goals. Unconditional support for Israeli annexation, however, could risk backlash from these regional allies.

In 2020, Trump’s peace plan proposed annexing all Israeli settlements while leaving open the possibility of a Palestinian state in other areas of the West Bank. Although Prime Minister Netanyahu had hesitations, settler leaders and officials like Smotrich celebrated Trump’s recent victory as a chance to realize annexation plans.

A former Trump adviser told an Israeli minister that Trump’s support for Israeli sovereignty would likely come with more conditions than in 2020. After the Palestinian Authority rejected Trump’s “Peace to Prosperity” proposal in 2020, the Trump administration and Israel began planning a partial annexation of the West Bank. However, this initiative was set aside when the UAE agreed to normalize relations with Israel.

The U.S. commitment to the UAE to delay Israeli annexation efforts expires at the end of 2024. Still, a former Trump official told The Times of Israel that a major shift in U.S. support for annexation should not be expected. “If any shift happens, it would need to be part of a process,” the official commented.

Jason Greenblatt, Trump’s former Middle East envoy, reinforced this message, stating:

“I think it’s important that those in Israel who are celebrating President Trump’s victory do so because of his strong support for Israel, as evidenced by many historic achievements during his first term. Some Israeli ministers are assuming that expanding Israeli sovereignty in Judea and Samaria is an automatic done deal and will happen as soon as President Trump takes office.

I suggest they take a deep breath. If I were advising these ministers, I would strongly urge them to focus on working closely with Prime Minister Netanyahu to strengthen U.S.-Israel relations and address the significant threats facing Israel. The time for discussions around Judea and Samaria will come, but context and timing are crucial.”

Indian diplomat J.P Singh, who is in charge of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan affairs in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, visited Kabul recently and held enormous meetings and discussions with senior Taliban officials, including Defense Minister Mullah Yaqoob and Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi. Although many details of these meetings have not been published, the Times of India in a report on this trip called it a “fundamental progress” in the relations between India and the Taliban.

The Ministry of Defense of the Taliban also said that the two sides emphasized their common desire to expand bilateral relations, especially in the fields of humanitarian cooperation and other issues, and expressed their interest in strengthening more interactions between Afghanistan and India.

The Times of India has evaluated this meeting as a “strategic change in India’s approach to Afghanistan”; in the sense that the Taliban’s repeated assurances that Afghanistan’s soil will not be used against India, probably influenced India’s decision to increase its interactions with Afghanistan under the control of the Taliban.

This shows that the Taliban, after taking control of Afghanistan, do not shy away from any attempt for international and regional recognition as well as interaction with the regional and world powers, that is just for the purpose of legitimizing their ruling.

India’s relations with the Taliban and its challenges for the country’s regional strategies is a complex and multifaceted issue that requires a more detailed analysis.

After the Taliban’s control of Afghanistan and the fundamental change in the political and security equations of the region, India also sought to review its policies towards Afghanistan and the Taliban. This relationship, although designed to protect India’s immediate interests in the region, is undoubtedly not without significant strategic concerns.

India’s instrumental policy in Afghanistan

India’s foreign policy in Afghanistan was not originally based on the values ​​of the Non-Aligned Movement and its historical relations with Afghanistan. This has become more intense especially after the coming to power of the Hindu Nationalist Party led by Narendra Modi. Since Modi’s party came to power, India’s policy towards Afghanistan has become more of a political game focused on short-term interests. In this policy, the element of enmity with Islam and negation of cultural and historical relations with the Muslim countries of the region has become a decisive element.

Joint secretary of India’s Ministry of External Affairs, J.P. Singh, meets with acting Afghanistan defense minister of Taliban Muhammad Yaqoob Mujahid.

As tensions escalate between Pakistan and the Taliban, known as Pakistan’s former proxies, India is once again considering using Afghanistan as a tool to counter Pakistan. In this framework, while establishing relations with the Taliban on the one hand, on the other hand, India seeks to create more tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to somehow achieve its goals against Pakistan.

India’s policies in this regard have not only led to the consolidation of the Taliban’s power in Afghanistan, but have also indirectly fueled the expansion of tensions and instability in the region. The instrumental use of Afghanistan and the escalation of differences between Afghanistan and Pakistan have generally been the defining element of India’s foreign policy.

India has always tried to use every opportunity to weaken Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan, even if this leads to the strengthening of extremist groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). This approach is not only harmful for India in the long run, but it can turn the region into a clash of strategic and security interests, which will not benefit any of the countries in the region.

India’s transactional and dual policy in Afghanistan

India has always abandoned its allies in Afghanistan and has never acted as a strategic partner during difficult times, especially after the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in 15 August 2021 at least.

This is evident from India’s behavior towards Dawood Khan’s government, Dr. Najibullah and his government members and even Hamid Karzai and his government members who had close relations with India and considered India as their natural ally. After the Taliban came to power, India cut ties with these people, which shows the instability and lack of loyalty in India’s foreign policy. Even when Afghanistan needed vital and strategic help, India did not stand by the people of Afghanistan as a strategic ally.

This fact can be seen in India’s severance of relations with Hamid Karzai and members of his government who strongly trusted India. This move of India even shows lack of commitment to strategic cooperation and disloyalty to diplomatic principles.

India prevented Afghan students from entering the country even in critical situations when Afghan youth needed support, and many Afghan students who were studying in Indian universities were not allowed to finish their studies.

Unlike Pakistan, India has never been loyal to its allies in Afghanistan as strategic partners. Even when many Afghans were trying to escape from Taliban rule, India closed its gates to them and many people who took refuge in India did not have their visas extended.

Security challenges and threats

Strengthening India’s relations with the Taliban can bring new security threats to Afghanistan in the long run. One of the most important risks arising from these relations is the strengthening of (TTP), which has now become one of the serious threats to the security of Pakistan and the region.

TTP has had influence in the border areas of Afghanistan since the past, and even in some areas, it is difficult to separate them from the Afghan Taliban. This influence and links have made the Pakistani Taliban to enjoy a powerful position and, regardless of the official relations between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan, they have organized themselves and organized complex attacks inside Pakistan.

India must understand that this situation could even be considered as a serious threat to India itself, because TTP can become a symbol of inspiration for Islamic extremist forces inside India and endanger India’s security by expanding the scope of violence and instability in the region.

Long-term consequences and strategic problems

In the long term, strengthening India’s relationship with the Taliban will lead to other regional actors, including Pakistan, taking advantage of this situation to weaken India’s position. This approach can strengthen extremist ideologies and asymmetry in India’s policies towards Afghanistan.

The Taliban, who present themselves as a “legitimate” government, will use these relationships to strengthen their international standing. While this can introduce India as an unstable actor without a clear policy in the region.

Already, Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif said that instability in Pakistan was fueled by an “Indian proxy war”, pointing to regional rivalries as a key factor. Asif also described the use of Afghanistan’s territory for attacks on Pakistan as an “action of aggression” following a deadly explosion in Quetta of Pakistan that killed at least 26 people, including 16 soldiers and 61 others received injuries.