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Who has won?

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A while ago, when Syria still had a state, I had the opportunity to correspond with a Kurdish nationalist on a social network. I was arguing (and I still hold this view today) that independence under the US umbrella actually meant nothing more than a neocolonial dependency relationship. He, however, had taken the traditional rhetoric of Kurdish nationalism (“it’s a tactic”) up a notch and believed (and probably still does) that the US possessed unique and invincible power, not just in a specific historical period, but throughout history—or at least throughout the history of imperialism. I’m adding the phrase “history of imperialism”; there was no place for imperialism in his words. So, the issue was no longer a matter of “tactics” at a certain stage (and in those circles, that word has always meant a lack of strategy), but had directly become a matter of siding with a superhero in the world order—that is, being on the side of the one who always wins and always will win.

Thus, our correspondence extended to other historical periods before that day, and eventually, we arrived at World War II. And then, an assertion I encountered for the first time genuinely stunned me: he acknowledged that the Soviet peoples had suffered great losses, but this, he claimed, did not mean at all that the Soviet Union had won the war. On the contrary; the US had won the war through its alliance politics, military tactics, and economic superiority, and moreover, had achieved this without suffering great losses, which pointed to an immense political talent, thereby reinforcing the power of the victory.

This is, in the most fundamental sense of the concept, a purely ideological stance, because historical truth has been completely turned on its head.

No one, neither during Soviet history nor today, presents the number of casualties as the measure of victory. That would be an idiotic assertion anyway, because throughout history, there are many victories where the victorious side suffered far greater losses than the defeated armies. That doesn’t mean the defeated actually won. Victory in a war is achieved when one of two conditions—which are actually two different expressions of the same thing—is met:

  1. Enemy armies are physically destroyed;
  2. The enemy’s will to fight is broken.

The number of casualties gives an idea about the intensity, brutality, savagery, and lawlessness of the war; it indicates its nature. But casualty rates are completely irrelevant to the outcome of the war.

1) Physical annihilation of the enemy

On June 22, 1941, the balance of forces on the western border of the Soviet Union was roughly as follows (I am quoting this based on relatively recent research; older sources show the fascist alliance as overwhelmingly superior in the balance of forces):

Fascist Alliance Red Army Modern Weapons Ratio Ratio in Modern Weapons
Soldiers 4,369,500 3,262,851 1:1.3
Artillery and mortars 42,601 59,787 1:1.3
Tanks and SPGs 4,364 15,687 ~2,500 3.6:1 1:2.1
Combat aircraft 4,795 10,743 1,540 2.2:1 1:3.1

Ostensibly, the Red Army was far superior to the enemy in terms of tanks and combat aircraft; in reality, the situation was different. Within the entire tank inventory, the legendary T-34s were still very few (at most 1,200), as were the SU series self-propelled gun systems (at most 300), and moreover, not all of them were at the front line. In contrast, in the fascist alliance, if one doesn’t count the almost dysfunctional Panzer Is and the Czech-made Pz series, which the Germans did not much trust, the number of all tanks and Stug III type self-propelled gun systems was over 2,500. Of the total combat aircraft, only 1,540 were new planes capable of dealing with the enemy, and most of these were destroyed in the first week due to the rapid advance of enemy forces.

In short, the fascist German forces and their allies were far superior in terms of troop numbers, technology, equipment, and materiel.

Another aspect of the balance of forces is this: 3.3 million of the Wehrmacht’s total 4.12 million combat personnel (including the SS) were deployed to the Eastern Front. This constitutes 80 percent of the combat troops. Similarly, 84 percent of tanks and self-propelled artillery systems, 67 percent of artillery and mortars, and 80 percent of combat aircraft were on the Eastern Front.

Try to picture this: This war machine had occupied all of Europe; countries not occupied were fascist collaborators. British forces and their allies had been ignominiously chased out of Dunkirk. In Europe, there were only local resistance movements, mostly organized by communists. And the German army, with almost 80 percent of its entire strength, had attacked the Soviet Union.

In Germany alone, a total of nearly 18 million people were mobilized and fought in the ranks of the Wehrmacht. Approximately 5.5 million of them died on the battlefields and in prisoner-of-war camps. Nearly 80 percent of military deaths occurred on the Eastern Front.

In contrast, nearly 35 million people were mobilized in the Red Army throughout the war. Of these, 8.7 million died or went missing. More than 3 million of these were deaths in concentration camps.

Therefore:

While Germany’s civilian losses constituted about 25 percent of its total losses (7.4-8.5 million), the Soviet Union’s civilian losses constituted 60 percent of its total losses. In contrast, about 30 percent of the German army’s total combatants throughout the war were killed in clashes with the Red Army. About 15 percent of the Red Army’s total combatants throughout the war were killed in clashes with fascist armies.

In other words, the Red Army ended the war in a “positive” manner (in Clausewitz’s terms) by destroying 30 percent of the enemy.

2) Breaking the enemy’s will

Starting immediately after the Stalingrad debacle, from the spring of 1943 onwards, a series of secret peace talks were held in Switzerland between fascist German officials and Westerners, primarily Americans. I will not delve into conspiracy theories; presumably, at this stage, no faction in the US, even if inclined, could risk a separate peace. However, for fascist Germany, attempts to narrow the enemy front due to defeats on the Eastern Front were becoming increasingly necessary.

Even after Normandy in June 1944, the center of fascist resistance was the Eastern Front. This is evident from the numbers. Already at the Tehran Conference (November 28 – December 1, 1943), the Soviet Union’s insistence on its allies opening a second front in Europe had weakened because the self-confidence to destroy the enemy single-handedly, albeit at a heavier cost, had been reinforced by the victories gained.

Therefore, the common refrain in Western secondary school textbooks does not reflect reality: (At the Tehran Conference) “The Soviet Union agreed to launch a major offensive against Germany from the east.” (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Pub., Module 11, World War II.) Yet, by this time, the victory at Kursk had been won, Kyiv had been liberated; there was only one month left to break the Leningrad blockade, and only three months left to cross the USSR borders at every point on the Ukrainian front. In other words, the Red Army was already on the offensive in all directions. Moreover, according to much research, the Normandy landings had not paralyzed the fascist armies, nor did the Red Army’s advance gain extra momentum because of the Normandy landings.

Not even the suicide of their “beloved Führer” on April 30th, nor even the morning of May 8th, had completely broken fascist Germany’s will to resist. Perhaps the most concrete indicator of this is the story of Göring’s surrender to the Americans. It is generally assumed that Göring was immediately arrested; this is not true: he was arrested only the next day, with the definitive fall of Berlin, because the will of the fascist beast was completely broken only at that moment.

3) “History falsifiers”

While working on this article, I had the opportunity to look at 10th and 11th-grade history textbooks in the US and Britain, as well as another high school supplementary textbook in Britain (“Russia and its Rulers”). (This last one is surprisingly objective compared to the others.) There is no information in these about the countries’ losses in the war. The answers to the questions of who destroyed the enemy, who broke its will, and who paid the price for it are somewhat vague, and inevitably, within that vagueness, it is glaringly obvious that the US and Britain are cast in the role of saviors.

Still, when their history books are placed side-by-side with ours [Turkish textbooks], one must admit that their formulations are much more skillful. The creators of the US and British curricula, at least until now, have tried not to appear as captive to anticommunist hysteria as ours, whose every sentence, starting from these lines, is almost entirely wrong: “The USSR was no different from Germany in terms of human rights violations.” (From the 12th-grade “Contemporary Turkish and World History” textbook by the Ministry of National Education [MEB]).

But why this falsification of history?

A few days ago, I came across an interview with Daniel Simić, president of the Republika Srpska journalists’ association. Simić rightly lamented the erasure of history: “Americans are already like that; but for the average Western European reader too, D-Day is the sole and most important event of World War II. The heroism and sacrifices of the Russians and other peoples of the Soviet Union are disregarded… The battles of Stalingrad and Kursk are generally described in the West as ‘events on the Eastern Front’; but every bomb dropped by the Allies on Germany is presented as a heroic act leading to victory against Hitler.”

This is a pustule of mass ignorance. There is such a difference between writing history and making it. Then those lies create narcissistic buffoons, each more ignorant than the last, and one of them comes out and says something like: “We will never forget that Russia helped us win World War II by losing almost 60 million people.” (Trump wrote this on his blog on January 22nd.)

4) Qualitative leap

But there is a difference between the past and today.

A few months ago, they demolished the monument erected in Tallinn in memory of the Red Army and USSR Baltic Fleet soldiers. In the same days, the “reputation” of the Estonian legionnaires in the Waffen-SS 20th Division was being restored. For the aggressive “little instigators” [a Turkish idiom, “küçük enişteler,” referring to minor but troublesome actors, often with a sense of being meddlesome relatives or associates, ed.n.] of the Baltics, this kind of fascist vandalism has now become routine practice.

The Baltics are a miniature Europe.

In many European countries, including Moldova, there are discussions about banning or at least restricting May 9th Victory Day celebrations, associating them with “Kremlin propaganda.” Instead, celebrating May 8th is often proposed; there are also those who want that day to be declared a day of mourning for all “victims” who died between 1939-1945, including the dead of the Wehrmacht and its fascist allies, a “Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation.” Previously, distortions or denials mostly concerned singular events in the war; today, the emphasis is shifting towards completely denying the decisive role of the USSR in the liberation of Europe and the world, and in the defeat of fascist Germany.

This is a qualitative leap in history falsification. The primary reason underlying this was stated by Marshal Zhukov to Marshal Rokossovsky in Berlin in 1945, where the fascist beast was dismembered: “We saved them, and for that, they will never forgive us.” In other words, at least some of them are burning with the desire to take revenge for being saved.

But more important than this is the following: today, it’s as if a new dawn has broken for the flea market [a Turkish idiom, “bit pazarına nur yağıyor,” meaning what was once considered worthless is now being prized, ed.n.], and European leaders are, apparently, studying the experiences of the 1930s and 1940s more closely. Why shouldn’t war be the way out of the crisis? Isn’t suppressing general dissatisfaction through violence and directing aggression towards others a wonderful solution?

But perhaps, we should congratulate them for finally showing sincerity. Declaring Bandera—the leader of a gang of fascist murderers who killed not only Jews, socialists, communists, and Russians, but also citizens of the Polish state, one of the Kyiv regime’s staunchest allies—a hero and howling his slogans in front of his portrait is no small measure of sincerity, indeed.

Who won the war? The Red Army won, the Soviet peoples won, the leadership of the Bolshevik party won, Russian patriots won… But not only them. We won! Because the war against fascism was our war too, the victory was our victory too.

Opinion

Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid

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Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt

In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.

Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.

For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.

We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.

In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.

This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.

The Problem of Proxy Wars

During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”

Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.

The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.

However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.

The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.

In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”

The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.

Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.

At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.

These distinctions matter.

Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.

Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?

The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.

Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.

Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.

The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.

The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?

That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.

The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.

There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.

The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.

The Economics of Fear

The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?

Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.

One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.

A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.

This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.

More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.

The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.

When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.

America After Iran

In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.

The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.

The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.

The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.

This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.

The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.

The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.

America Is Changing From Within

The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.

The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.

Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.

They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.

This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.

A Dinner for Dialogue

One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.

We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.

The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.

Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.

Very often, it begins around a single table.

Istanbul’s Larger Message

The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.

The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.

This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.

The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.

It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.

Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.

For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.

The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.

For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.

It was not an attempt to erase differences.

It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.

At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.

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Opinion

A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West

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Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.

It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.

Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.

Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?

It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.

As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.

In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.

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Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria

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At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.

This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.

US moves in the Mediterranean

Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.

Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.

The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.

Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.

Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.

Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?

Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.

Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.

So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?

Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.

Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?

In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.

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