Opinion

APEC Summit: How China Uses the Art of “Emotional Value” to Deal with Trump

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The 2026 APEC summit in Shenzhen is destined to create a symbolic, yet important, chapter in the contemporary history of diplomacy: Chinese President Xi Jinping, US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin will hold a trilateral meeting in-person during the summit, which is described by the Chinese Foreign Ministry as a meeting with “groundbreaking significance.” There are reasons to support to the argument that such a description is not an exaggeration: This is actually the first time in history that the heads of state from the three most powerful countries among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council hold a trilateral meeting.

Among these three countries, there are three noteworthy pairs of dynamics: China and the United States mark the two largest and unparalleled economic superpowers of the world; Russia and the United States mark the largest and unparalleled nuclear military superpowers of the world; and China and Russia, together, are the most powerful challengers to the current West-led neoliberal world order. Therefore, it is not an exaggeration to say that these three countries are the largest factors influencing the security and economic development of the world today, and thus this trilateral meeting, even if it is more symbolic than concrete, is destined to have profound historical significance. An important thing people can expect from this trilateral meeting is whether it can create some sort of long-term and periodic mechanisms of trilateral meetings among the heads of three states. If this meeting can establish such a long-term mechanism, that means that China, Russia, and the United States are interested in, at least symbolically, cooperating together on controlling the intensity of the competitions among them and on solving global conflicts and crisis together.

While I acknowledge that this trilateral meeting has tremendous symbolic significance, however, I do not argue that this trilateral meeting would make much concrete differences to the world order, not anything close to what the Yalta Conference in 1945 did. From the Chinese perspective, the purpose of this meeting is not able seriously construct a new platform to achieve a détente with the U.S., because the Chinese are fully aware that it cannot ever dissuade the U.S. from viewing China as its strategic rival. The purpose of this Xi-Putin-Trump meeting, in my opinion, is for China to use the “emotional value” to buy more time for China in its long-term strategic competition with the U.S.

“Emotional value” is a trendy Chinese internet-originated vocabulary that refers to the ability to provide positive emotional support, comfort, or joy to others in a relationship or social interaction. When you are not able to, or not willing to, offer actual use value (like money or other resources, for example) to someone, you can use “emotional value” to make them feel respected while refrain from actually spending resources on them. Ever since Trump’s first term in 2016 and since the first round of China-US trade war in 2018, the Chinese have been severely bothered by his unpredictable personality, and Chinese officials are often confused about how serious Trump is when he comments on trade issues. Putin’s performance, however, provided a remarkable lesson for the China on how to deal with Trump: During the Russia-Ukraine war, Putin made various comments saying that he was willing to accept Trump as a mediator in this conflict, and there were various cases that Putin spent hours talking with Trump on phone, making Trump emotionally satisfied and felt respected. Meanwhile, however, the Russian army did not halt its operations in the frontier, and Putin’s emotional “massage” for Trump actually gave the Russian army more time to advance its control of territories in the frontier.

From the Chinese perspective, Putin’s success in dealing with Trump is remarkably useful, and the Chinese quickly learned it from him: When Trump visited Beijing in May 2026, the Chinese showed great hospitality to him and his accompanies, including US Secretary of State Marco Rubio who once was sanctioned by China, and media report in China was filled with headlines such as “Rubio was amazed by the architecture of the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.” In terms of important political issues, however, there was very little achieved in this visit, and both countries did not even publish a joint communique. Trump’s visit to China in May seemed to be simply a tourist group of old people, and the Chinese did not expect any progress of China-US relations. This touristic visit of Trump, however, was seen as positive by the Chinese, because at least it appeased the unpredictable personality of Trump and Trump did not make trouble for China for at least half of a year until now. Most important, while offering emotional value for Trump in this visit, the Chinese government offered almost nothing it did not wish to offer in terms of concrete national interests of China: For example, China did not compromise on its subsidies for state corporations and AI industries, its currency policy on the yuan, its military exercise in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, and its partnership with Russia and Iran. From Chinese point of view, this is a diplomatic victory that prevented Trump from further causing troubles for China for quite a while, without any real costs in terms of national interests.

Therefore, one can understand this incoming trilateral meeting as another event in which China repeat this practice. China is not naïve to expect anything concrete from the U.S. in this meeting for two reasons. First, China is fully aware that the US has a bipartisan consensus viewing China as its major strategic rival, and this will not change in the foreseeable future. Second, after the mid-term election, the Democrats now control the Senate, and thus even if Trump is willing to sign anything with China, these agreements can be easily sabotage by the Democrats soon. Therefore, with such a low expectation, the only thing China expects from Trump now is not making troubles for China in the rest of his term.

China also understands that, with such a huge lose in the mid-term election, Trump and the Republican party must be very anxious about the presidential election in two years, and Trump desperately needs some sort of accomplishments which he can use for domestic propaganda. This APEC meeting can be a great chance for him: The Chinese will show respect for him in terms of protocols, and will likely release some positive but vague signals on trade issues that are not related to China’s core interests, such as agreeing to purchase more American agricultural products. These materials can be used by Trump for his domestic propaganda to continue rally his MAGA supporters, and meanwhile he will likely be silent on China-related issues for a while. With that time earned through offering emotional value, China will be able to get more time to further strengthening itself in military, economy, and high-technology industries, preparing itself for its long-term competition with the U.S. and for China’s own goals, such as the reunification of Taiwan.

It is important to point out that Trump is not the only one receiving this emotional value. China recognizes that its quasi-ally Putin also needs some materials for domestic propaganda too, and thus this trilateral meeting will also be an event in which China tries its best to emphasize Russia’s status still as a global power. Interestingly, in the formal statement released by the Chinese foreign ministry, instead of using the term “China-US-Russia trilateral meetings” as most international media do, the Chinese foreign ministry deliberately uses the word “China-Russia-US trilateral meetings” to offer emotional value to Putin. One can expect China and Russia to release a number of agreements and maybe a joint statement on current issues in order to demonstrate to the world that China is still standing together with Russia in the common struggle against the neoliberal unipolar world, and both countries will likely emphasize again their common goal in constructing a multipolar world, despite the fact that both China and Russia will likely provide remarkable emotional value to Trump in order to keep him calm.

Many people tend to expect changes in international relations to be a fast one marked by various milestones. In reality, however, politics never works that way, and the Chinese are clearly aware of this. China does not attempt to show its ambition in a milestone meeting, and this trilateral summit in APEC is never meant to be another Yalta Conference. Instead, the APEC will be a platform for China to promote two things: First, China will manage its stable relationship with the US, and will buy more time for itself through offering emotional value to Trump while refraining from compromising on any actual national core interests of China; second, China will use this platform to strengthen its partnership with not only its quasi-ally Russia, but also other friendly states in the developing world, in order to move forward to a multipolar world.

The Romans say that “Rome is not built in one day.” In China, more than two thousand years ago, political scholar and strategist Hanfeizi also has a famous quote says “the collapse of a huge dam starts with little holes of the ants.” The Chinese, with thousands years of experiences in politics, are patient enough in terms of their diplomacy, and understands that the erosion of the current US-dominated neoliberal and unipolar world will be a long process. This APEC meeting is not a milestone marking dramatic and sudden changes in international relations, but one of the many small steps for China to buy more time, to strengthen itself militarily and economically, and to deepen its ties with partners all over the world in a common struggle for a multipolar world order which is not dominated by the West.

*Zhang Sheng is currently a PhD candidate in Sociology at Johns Hopkins University and holds a master’s degree in Middle Eastern Studies from Harvard University. Zhang’s research interests include, but are not limited to, the evolution and transformation of China’s engagement in the Middle East, Sino-Turkish relations, and Chinese diplomacy and politics from the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 to the present. In addition, Zhang is a research fellow affiliated with several think tanks and research institutes in China and Nepal. Beyond his academic career, he is also a political commentator and columnist, frequently contributing opinion pieces and giving television interviews for various mainstream media outlets in China, Egypt, Russia, and Nepal.

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