The news that came one after another this week seemed to indicate that there was/would be a dangerous drift in the foreign policy that we established before the Ukraine war started and I have repeatedly described as careful/balanced. The news agencies first reported Zelensky’s visit to Turkey and President Erdoğan’s remarks that Ukraine deserved NATO membership. Then came the news that Zelensky took five neo-Nazi Azov commanders back home with him. Meanwhile, appeared photos of the new Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan having a meeting with Mustafa Cemiloğlu (Kırımoğlu), the symbol of the Crimean Turks’ struggle during the Soviet Union and currently on the side of Kiev in the struggle between Russia and Ukraine, with the flag of the ‘Republic of Crimea’. While the Kremlin declared that the release of the neo-Nazi Azov commanders by Turkey was a violation of the previous agreement between Ankara and Moscow, the first reports that Putin’s planned visit to Turkey had been canceled hit the news, but subsequent updates did not seem to confirm this negative scenario. It was understood that the two leaders were likely to meet in the coming days, but the timing had yet to be determined.
The first question that came to mind was whether all this would end the rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow with a sudden swerve. Considering the huge commercial-economic relations, the construction of nuclear reactors, regional political cooperation, and the vast potential in the military and defense industry, it can be said that the rapprochement between the two capitals, which has been built with great care and caution, cannot be easily terminated, and even the issues that caused problems, where the initial tension was caused by misunderstandings, can be overcome. However, in bilateral and multilateral relations, care must be taken to be predictable. Sudden decisions can lead to swings and loss of trust in bilateral relations.
UKRAINE’S NATO MEMBERSHIP AND NEO-NAZI AZOV COMMANDERS
President Erdoğan’s remarks on Ukraine’s NATO membership may not be interpreted as Turkey’s desire and full support for Ukraine to join the Western military alliance. They could be interpreted as Turkey’s indirect use of the veto card on Sweden’s NATO membership, in the sense that Ukraine was once promised, but it did not materialize. Or, it could be interpreted as underlining that there are many differences between deserving to be a NATO member and joining the alliance. Moreover, it should be underlined that Biden himself said that there was no consensus among the allied countries regarding Ukraine’s entry into NATO; therefore, Ukraine could first fulfill the criteria by ‘democratizing’ and then this issue could be addressed and even the US could take Ukraine under its protection as it does in its relations with Israel.
In short, while Ukraine’s NATO membership seems unlikely in the short and medium term, talking about Ukraine’s deserving membership of the alliance may not cause a strategic development that would shake relations with Russia. Indeed, NATO responded positively to not only Ukraine’s but also Georgia’s applications for NATO membership at the Bucharest summit in 2008, and on August 8 of the same year, Russia launched a five-day military campaign against Saakashvili-led Georgia, signaling what might happen in Ukraine in the next phase. In short, while this statement may have caused some confusion in Moscow, it does not necessarily mean a rupture of ties with Moscow, because it may have been used as a way of expressing some ambivalence within NATO and criticizing Turkey for being unfairly singled out over Sweden, and this seems to be the initial reaction from the Russian side.
But the release of the commanders of the neo-Nazi Azov battalion seems to have made it very difficult even for diplomats to justify what was said and done. It is understood that they were released under the condition that they would remain in Turkey until the end of the war within the framework of the prisoner of war exchange between Russia and Ukraine mediated by Ankara, but allowing them to return to Ukraine would mean that they would start fighting against Russia again, which could create a somewhat troubling situation in bilateral relations. For Moscow, it could also cause some damage to trust in Ankara, and in particular in President Erdogan, but it would not be irreparable, because the set of common interests between Ankara and Moscow is too broad to be sacrificed to such an event. The Kremlin spokesperson’s statement that the Erdogan-Putin summit may take place in the coming days, but that it has not yet been scheduled, i.e. that the meeting has not been canceled, can be taken as an indication that Turkey-Russia relations will continue to gain momentum despite everything.
On the other hand, although it is not easy to understand why Erdoğan gave the commanders of the neo-Nazi Azov battalion to Zelensky, it seems possible to make some speculations. For instance, Erdogan may have wanted to focus the discussions within NATO on Ukraine instead of Sweden, both by saying that Ukraine deserves to be a member of the alliance and by giving these neo-Nazis to Zelensky, Erdogan may have tried to show the Western world that Turkey is not anti-Ukrainian. Considering the impact of the previous sale of Bayraktar UCAVs to Ukraine on Western public opinion, he may have focused on a similar outcome. While the thesis that Russia and Putin fully supported Erdoğan during the election campaign is true, it could also be a move to show how independent he can act in determining and implementing his own policy despite the good bilateral relations. And despite all this, he may have preferred to act with a sense of confidence that he can reach an agreement/reconciliation by personally discussing this issue with Putin, relying on the close friendship and friendship he has developed. Moreover, the fact that Putin will come to Ankara after Zelensky may also be related to a new mediation initiative of Turkey between the parties that has not been made public. And Erdogan may have acted in such a way in order to lure Zelensky towards a peace initiative, both because of his reputation in Putin’s eyes and because of the trust relationship he has built with the Russian leader by calling the Kremlin and openly supporting Putin during the critical hours of the recent Wagner Rebellion.
ANKARA-MOSCOW RELATIONS CAN SURVIVE THESE EVENTS WITHOUT A CRISIS
It would not be wrong to think that behind closed doors, diplomats are making these and similar explanations and trying not to radically disrupt bilateral relations, which are very important for both countries, and that they are trying to prepare the summit between Erdogan and Putin. We have to think that Russia, which is quite skillful in distinguishing between the important and the unimportant, will endeavor not to spoil relations with Turkey, which is perhaps the most important state after China and India these days. In other words, the well-established bilateral relations between Ankara and Moscow can survive these events without turning into a crisis, and these relations can even be made even more deep-rooted with some new steps to be taken.
After all, Moscow seems to appreciate the extensive relations Turkey has managed to establish with Russia despite being a NATO member. These nuances can be seen in every Kremlin step that directly concerns Turkey. There is almost no reason why the meeting between Erdogan and Putin after the Vilnius NATO summit should not be followed by steps that will further solidify relations between the two countries. For example, in addition to economic initiatives that will make the two countries inseparable, such as the renewal of the Grain Corridor agreement in the first place, then accelerating Turkey’s efforts to become an energy and even grain hub, it would be more logical to focus on solving the refugee problem and eliminating the PKK/PYD/YPG terrorist threat by concluding the Turkey-Syria reconciliation with the help of Russia. In the meeting between the two leaders, Russia’s recognition of the TRNC could even be discussed, a step Moscow could take that would not only bring back the years of the War of Independence in Turkey-Russia relations but also deepen the Turkey-Greece rift within NATO, which would mean huge strategic gains for the Kremlin.
We can get a lot from Russia, which is engaged in a life-and-death struggle with the West, and for us, a Russia at odds with the West may even seem like the ideal Russia. The same can be said for the West, i.e. a West at odds with Russia may be the ideal West for Turkey. However, it is important to remember that in this struggle between the two sides, Russia should not lose and probably will not lose, because a Russian loss, even if it is a slim possibility, means the end of multipolarity and the return of the rampant American/Western hegemony. The prevention of PKK/PYD statehood in Syria, the protection of Turkey’s territorial integrity, the realization of a two-state solution in Cyprus, the protection of our rights and interests in the Aegean against Greece – everything that comes to mind first and foremost will only be possible through multipolarity. It is also important to remember that in this struggle with the West, Russia is actually fighting for the whole world, which wants multipolarity and is completely fed up with the unipolar American/Western hegemony. It is in the interest of both sides that our policies of caution and balance, which have so far been built on all these sensitive elements, be maintained with the same subtleties. In February-March 2011, we experienced our Syria policy in February-March 2011, and we all saw the catastrophe that it caused, as a result of sudden swings and drifting to the other extreme overnight, leaving aside a foreign policy built on years of accumulation and gains. It is clear as day that we do not need new swings and disasters…
