The fact that global production and the resulting shift in values towards Asia has led all countries in the world to revise their policies towards the region, especially towards China. While the US under former President Barack Obama was defined as an ‘Indo-Pacific’ country, the attitude towards China in national security documents has gradually shifted from cooperation to competition. In line with a policy that the US interpreted as an attempt to mitigate risk and China as an attempt to ‘encircle’, the Washington administration preferred to build alliances with regional actors while raising tariff walls and accelerating the technology war. As a result of this preference, platforms such as AUKUS and QUAD were witnessed, while discussions on NATO’s expansion towards Asia or Asia’s NATO gained momentum.
Europe’s response to the rise of China, which has traditionally been part of the security architecture built by the US, has oscillated between competition and cooperation. While powers such as France, which defends European autonomy, and Hungary, which is on the periphery, have adopted a more cautious approach, Berlin is pointing to competition, provided that economic interests are protected.
The approach of the countries of the Global South to the rise of China has so far been in the opposite direction to that of the US and its allies. Countries that were founded as a result of the struggle against colonialism, that do not want to imitate the development prescriptions of Western countries, that come from different historical backgrounds and have different forms of governance, have seen China as a window of opportunity. China, which is seeking more friends in different parts of the world in the face of US policies of repression, would not only make more generous offers to these countries, but would also give them room to manoeuvre against Washington.
A new phase in China and Turkish-Islamic relations
It can be said that the Middle East and Central Asia are among the regions that are adapting to this reality, which has been described as a multipolar world. In the Middle East, the Sino-Arab Summit, the first of which was held with the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Saudi Arabia in 2022, and the Sino-Arab Foreign Ministers’ Forum, the tenth of which was held this year, are seen as symbols of politically institutionalised cooperation, while the expansion of BRICS with the countries of the region sums up the dimensions of the growing economic bond. It is also noteworthy that China has been given the role of “quarterback” in regional conflicts, in line with its growing political prestige and economic weight. Having hosted the establishment of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, China’s weight is also felt in the Palestinian issue. While the foreign ministers of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation preferred China as the first address on their Palestine tour, Hamas and Fatah sat down in Beijing for unity negotiations. It is known that the Palestinian factions, which made goodwill statements at the first meeting, decided to continue their meetings in China.
Central Asia retains its special position among the regions where relations with China are deepening. China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (C-C5), which have been meeting at foreign minister level since 2020, met in Xi’an, the starting point of the historic Silk Road, to raise their cooperation to the level of heads of state in 2023. Economics was not the only topic on the agenda at the summit, which heralded investment in the Central Corridor, which runs from China to Europe and includes Turkey. Announcing a $3.8 billion grant to the countries of the region, the Chinese side also stressed that they were a “community of shared destiny” with Central Asia, while the five countries underlined their support for Beijing’s foreign policy narrative.
Is Turkey too late?
Although Ankara has acknowledged China’s growing global influence, especially in regions that are among Turkey’s main areas of interest, the policy development process has been relatively slow. In 2019, Turkey launched a process called the ‘Re-Asia Initiative’ in the region, where China plays a central role, and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan explained the need for this policy by saying that ‘the pendulum of history has shifted to Asia’. Moreover, President Erdoğan, like other countries of the Global South, expressed the fact that the international system does not give them enough representation with the words ‘The world is bigger than five’ and did not hesitate to say that multinational platforms are insufficient to solve acute global problems.
Despite the accuracy of Turkey’s observations, which have become globally recognised, it has become clear in the meantime that the steps taken by Ankara do not correspond to an improvement in the institutional order. Turkey’s engagement with the Western world, as opposed to the Middle East and Central Asian countries, as well as its lowered economic expectations and disputes over the Uighur issue, have played a role in such a picture. Former Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu expressed this difference at the end of 2022, stating that the Turkish delegation did not want to go to the Uyghur Autonomous Region, as China had planned. In addition, the fact that most of the Turkish media’s coverage of China consisted of Western-based translations and that Turkey was not sufficiently recognised in China and China in Turkey were among the factors affecting the policy-making process.
Can Minister Fidan forge a new equation?
Like other developing countries around the world, particularly in the Middle East and Central Asia, Turkey still has time to adjust its relations with China to the new realities. In this context, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to China on 3-5 June can be seen as a valuable start in announcing Ankara’s position on issues of interest to China.
In his statement here, Minister Fidan said that Ankara and Beijing overlap on many aspects of international relations, including contentious areas such as Palestine and Ukraine; that Turkey supports China’s constructive relations with Asian and Middle Eastern countries; and that Turkey appreciates China’s role as a mediator, such as in the Saudi and Iranian peace processes.
Perhaps more importantly for China, Minister Fidan said of the arm-wrestling between Washington and Beijing: ‘The fact that the markets established by the dominant powers in the last century are changing hands again under fairer, more competitive market conditions is an outcome that must be accepted. Minister Fidan’s assessments that there is a global transfer of power and that it should be peaceful, as well as his reiteration of respect for China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, were seen as positive factors.
What are the areas of cooperation?
While Minister Fidan’s presentation of Turkey’s position sets the framework for relations in the new era, the main external developments that require cooperation between Ankara and Beijing are the Palestinian and Ukrainian crises, and the risks and opportunities that arise on trade routes.
On the Palestinian issue, Turkey and China, which advocate a ceasefire in the short term and the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital based on the 1967 borders in the long term, could play an active role in uniting the Palestinian factions to mature this solution. It is not known whether Turkey and China are coordinated, but it is obvious that they are taking parallel steps in this direction. Indeed, the Hamas delegation that travelled to Beijing for merger negotiations with Fatah had issued a statement to the international press from Istanbul the day before, saying that they wanted to unite under one roof.
Ukraine is also on the list of crises where Turkey and China can play an equation-changing role. Ankara and Beijing, which can simultaneously maintain diplomatic relations with Russia and Ukraine, have converging views on opposing the sanctions policy, representing Russia in peace negotiations and respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries. China, which has been conducting shuttle diplomacy between Moscow, Kiev and European capitals with a 12-point road map, and Turkey, which previously brought the two countries to the brink of peace in Istanbul, could play a mediating role if the warring parties, especially Ukraine, show the will to do so.
The wind blowing in Turkey’s favour on global trade routes also stands out among the dimensions of cooperation in the new period. Indeed, after the Ukraine crisis, the Northern Corridor from China to Europe via Russia lost its popularity, while the Southern Corridor, which includes Iran, became more fragile as a result of geopolitical tensions. On the other hand, the Central Corridor, centred on Turkey, has become more attractive as the Central Asian countries have largely completed infrastructure works and simplified customs procedures. The Caspian Central Corridor, which cuts the distance between China and Europe by 2,000 kilometres compared to the Northern Corridor, will remain on Turkey’s agenda in the new period. In addition, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan underlined Turkey’s comparative advantage by expressing the expectation that the Belt and Road Initiative will be harmonised with the Development Road. By stating that the Belt and Road will also provide opportunities for China, Ankara has made clear its position that China should become a partner in global trade rather than an outsider as desired by the West.
The address for cooperation: BRICS, committees, international summit and leaders’ meeting
Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s speech during his visit to China, while not as clear as Ankara’s position on hot topics and the listed areas of cooperation, also provides clues as to the platforms that can be used.
Minister Fidan’s statement that he will attend the BRICS meeting in Russia can be seen as a turning point in the institutionalisation of economic relations. BRICS, which came to the fore with President Erdoğan’s statements in 2018, represents 31 per cent of the global economy with the latest participation and includes 6 of the 10 largest oil producers in the world. The fact that BRICS, which is gaining weight every day against the G7, the so-called club of the rich, can respond to some of Turkey’s urgent needs with instruments such as the New Development Bank is one of the facts that Treasury and Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek cannot ignore. In fact, in a statement he made in 2017, Minister Mehmet Şimşek said, “In order to benefit from the projects they are going to give, you have to be a member. For this reason alone, we are seriously considering becoming a member’.
The ‘intergovernmental working committee’ announced by Minister Fidan during his visit to China is the second notable step in the context of institutionalisation between Ankara and Beijing. The appointment of Mehmet Şimşek, Turkey’s Minister of Treasury and Finance, to head this committee will help achieve results in many areas, such as correcting imbalances in the huge volume of trade, increasing investment in nuclear energy and new technologies, and further activating the Middle Corridor.
While the first meeting of the intergovernmental working committee is expected to be held in the coming months, Chinese President Xi Jinping is likely to visit Turkey. Announcing Turkey’s invitation, Foreign Minister Fidan said: “We would like to host Chinese President Xi Jinping in Turkey this year. I have once again conveyed our president’s invitation to our Chinese colleague. Xi’s invitation to visit Turkey may serve to open a new page in terms of regional order as well as bilateral relations.
On the other hand, the Uighur issue may complicate the parties’ engagement, which has been delayed compared to the Middle East and Central Asia. Minister Fidan’s visit added the definition of the cities of Urumqi and Kashgar to the disagreement over terms such as ‘crime, criminal, freedom and separatism’ that has been a problem between Turkey and China for some time. While Minister Fidan defined these two cities as Turkish and Islamic cities during his contacts, this thesis is not accepted by China. According to the White Book published by the Beijing administration, the region is presented as a continuation of ancient Chinese culture, while it is argued that the Uyghurs have separated from the Turks over time.
Although there has been no official or unofficial (through the media) reaction to Minister Fidan’s preference for a different definition from China’s, it would not be surprising if it caused some discomfort.
