Central Asia’s rising role in global energy and trade

Nikola Mikovic, Journalist-writer

Central Asia’s rich energy resources and strategically important location are making it a key area of interest for major world powers. Although China, the European Union, and, to a certain extent, the United States, are seeking to increase their presence in a region traditionally within Russia’s geopolitical orbit, small and mid-sized countries from around the world are also aiming to develop closer ties with the Central Asian states.

Moscow preoccupation with the war in Ukraine has opened the door for other actors to expand their influence in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. As a result, in 2024, China’s overall turnover with Central Asia reached $94.8 billion. At the same time, it surpassed Russia to become the main trading partner of Kazakhstan, the biggest country in the region.

The European Union, on the other hand, through its Global Gateway project – which is the EU’s version of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – as well as through regular summits with Central Asian states, is also working to secure its presence in this energy-rich region. Its decision to provide emergency funds to help keep Radio Free Europe (commonly known in Central Asia as Radio Azattyq) afloat after the Trump administration stopped grants to the media outlet, clearly suggests that Brussels is more than interested in winning the hearts and minds of the local population.

Individual EU members are also showing their ambitions to develop stronger relations with the region. The best example is Italy, whose Prime Minister Georgia Meloni took part in the Astana International Forum (AIF) on May 30 in the Kazakh capital. This two-day event saw the attendance of political and business leaders from around the globe who gathered under an expanded agenda that includes climate change, energy security, and sustainability. Meloni also participated in the first-ever Central Asia–Italy summit in Astana, having come from Uzbekistan where she met with the country’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev.

During her speech at the AIF, she quoted Halford Mackinder, a British political geographer, who said that Central Asia represents one of the “pivots” around which the fate of the world revolves. Mackinder is known for his Heartland Theory, which states that control of the Heartland — with Central Asia as a key part — grants control over the entire Eurasian continent. It is, therefore, no surprise that Italy, as well as other EU members, strongly push to establish its own foothold in the energy-rich region.

But besides the European Union and China, other actors are also pursuing a stake in Central Asia. While big players like Türkiye aim to achieve at least some of their geopolitical goals in the region, other nations such as Afghanistan view Central Asian states as potential partners that can help them overcome financial difficulties.

“Over the past few years, we have managed to establish good relations with Kazakhstan, the region’s largest economy, and now we hope to strengthen economic ties between our two countries,” Muhammad Rehman Rahmani, the Taliban-appointed Chargé d’Affaires of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to Kazakhstan, told Harici in an interview.

While speaking at one of the sessions of the Astana International Forum, Nooruddin Azizi, the Taliban’s acting Minister of Industry and Commerce, said that Kabul expects Kazakhstan’s assistance in building road and railway infrastructure in war-torn Afghanistan. It is not a secret that Astana views Afghanistan as an important transit country for its exports to the South Asian markets, which is why it seeks to increase its positions in what is often referred to as “The Graveyard of Empires.”

Kazakhstan’s 2024 decision to remove the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations has created room for Astana’s potential participation in the reconstruction of post-war Afghanistan. Astana’s presence in the Taliban-ruled country would perfectly align with what Kazakhstan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Roman Vassilenko described as a “balanced, constructive and pragmatic foreign policy.”

“We have no tense relations with any country in the world, and we aim to contribute to international peace, security and stability,” Vassilenko told Harici, emphasizing that foreign direct investment in Kazakhstan reflects the country’s foreign policy priorities.

If, however, Astana manages to achieve its goal of increasing trade turnover with Afghanistan to $3 billion, it could easily become the Taliban-ruled nation’s main economic partner in Central Asia. This approach suggests that, amid the rush by major global powers to expand their influence in Kazakhstan, Astana may seek to leverage its relationship with Afghanistan to advance at least some of its geoeconomic goals.

Simultaneously, the oil-rich country of around 20 million people will undoubtedly seek to improve its own position vis-à-vis foreign energy corporations, which currently control 98 percent of Kazakh oil revenues. There is no doubt that major foreign powers operating in Central Asia aim to make similar arrangements with other regional states, as this would allow them to fully benefit from the region’s critical minerals, oil, gas, and water resources.

But will Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan have the strength to establish energy partnerships with foreign corporations in the same way that oil-rich Arab states did, where the state controls most of the revenue? From the perspective of the Central Asian nations, such an ambition should be among the top priorities of their energy policies.