Interview
‘China’s breakthrough no miracle, but result of patient development strategy’
Rémy Herrera, a researcher at the University of Panthéon-Sorbonne and the National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS), the largest research centre in France and the largest basic research centre in Europe, assessed China’s development dynamics from the past to the present.
A former consultant to the OECD and the World Bank, economist Rémy Herrera is also a former secretary of the World Forum for Alternatives (WFA) and a member of the International Crisis Observatory (OIC).
One of France’s leading Marxist economists and one of the most important critics of neoclassical economics, Rémy Herrera analyses not only the financial and socio-economic causes of the crises of capitalism, but also the countries that have adopted different development models by choosing alternative political-economic approaches to capitalism. In his work, Herrera takes a historical perspective on economic developments in Asia and Latin America, particularly in China and Cuba, and challenges the Eurocentric approach of the neoliberal school in its economic analyses of developments in these countries.
Remy Herrera answered Ferhan Bayır’s questions on the Chinese economy.
Let’s start with your books on China. Based on your research and observations during your visits to China, how do you interpret the much-discussed Chinese miracle?
Many people who comment on the high growth rate of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) that has been observed for decades use the term “miracle” to describe this phenomenon. In my view, it is not a miracle, but rather the result of a development strategy that has been planned and patiently and effectively implemented by the state and senior officials in successive Communist Party-led governments in this country.
Almost everywhere, in academic circles and in the dominant mainstream media, we read and hear that the “rise” of the Chinese economy is due solely to its “opening up” to globalisation. I would like to add that such rapid growth was only possible thanks to the efforts and achievements of the Maoist era. This opening up to globalisation has been strictly and continuously controlled by the Chinese authorities. It is only under this condition (control) that the opening up to globalisation can be considered to have contributed to the country’s undeniable economic success. This opening to globalisation has been able to have such a positive impact on China in the long term because it has been fully consistent with a coherent development strategy and has been subject to the imperatives of meeting domestic objectives and domestic needs.
It must be clearly understood that without the development of such a development strategy, which was clearly the work of the Chinese Communist Party, and – it must not be forgotten – without the energy expended by the Chinese people in the revolutionary process of implementing this development strategy, if the Chinese Communist Party had integrated the country into the world capitalist system, it would inevitably have led to the complete destruction of its national economy, even of its own existence, as has happened in so many other countries of the South and East. We must remember one fundamental point: For more than a century before the victory of the revolution in October 1949, “opening up” for the Chinese people meant first and foremost capitulation, destruction, exploitation, humiliation, decadence and chaos.
How does China’s success differ from Western development models?
The success of the development strategy implemented by the Chinese government and the many positive effects it has brought to the people of this country stand in stark contrast to the failure of the neo-liberal economic policies implemented in Western countries, which have generally been economically, socially, culturally and even morally disastrous for workers in the countries of the North.
Let me give a concrete example. The strength of Chinese state-owned enterprises is that they are not managed like Western international companies. Listed on the stock exchange and operating according to the logic of shareholder value, share appreciation and rapid return on investment, which requires maximising dividends paid to owners, these Western companies operate by squeezing a chain of subcontractors, local or international. But Chinese state-owned groups do not behave in this way. If they did, they would be acting in a way that would harm local small and medium-sized enterprises and, more broadly, the entire national industrial fabric. The compass that guides the majority of China’s large state-owned enterprises to profit or become profitable is not the enrichment of private shareholders, but the prioritisation of productive investment and customer service. Ultimately, it does not matter to Chinese SOEs that their profits are lower than those of their Western competitors, as long as they serve higher, long-term or national strategic interests, including stimulating the rest of the local economy and looking beyond the immediate vision of profit generation.
Can this model be defined in terms of a neoclassical or neo-Marxist model?
First of all, I believe that the Chinese do not see their development strategy as a “model”, nor do they seek to impose or export their development strategy. They simply believe that there are certain lessons to be learnt by different peoples of the world, but that different peoples with their own specific historical, social and cultural conditions should determine the ends and means of their own development. This perspective is also very different from the Western vision, which wants its “model” to be followed by all the countries of the world.
Neoclassical models have no place in China. Allow me to add that neoclassical economics, which is the hegemonic current or mainstream in economics today, serves no other purpose than to provide a theoretical and pseudo-scientific justification for the implementation of neoliberal policies, an ideology that opposes the practice of social justice and the development of public services. In reality, neoclassical economics is not a science but a science fiction or, as I have argued in a recent book (Confronting Mainstream Economics for Overcoming Capitalism), an ideology that claims to be scientific.
On the other hand, I believe that Marxism has not yet been overcome scientifically. I do not think that Marxism has any serious competitors today. Marxism remains relevant, not least because we still live in a world where the capitalist system is globally dominant, although there have been significant changes, and where a careful explanation of these changes is needed. Despite the numerous attacks on Marxism since its emergence, and despite the repeated claims that it is obsolete – that it is dead – Marxism is enduring, resilient, I would say “indestructible”, and at the same time Marxism is the main theoretical reference point for those thinking about the ways and conditions for a better world. Despite its frequent dogmatisation and the disappearance of the USSR and the Soviet bloc, sometimes to its detriment, Marxism today retains its essence and remains an irreplaceable reference for those struggling for socialism. It is therefore not surprising that it remains an important theoretical reference for China.
Has China based the implementation of its economic model on theoretical foundations?
I would say that the Chinese development strategy, aimed at maintaining and deepening the socialist transition, is based on a theoretical combination of elements drawn from both the main philosophical currents of traditional Chinese thought (especially Confucianism and Taoism, but also various other currents) and a mixed Marxism reinterpreted and modernised in the Chinese style. But it must be understood that this theory is closely linked to the analysis of practical experience. All this (the aforementioned theoretical structure and the analysis of practical experience) has made it possible to provide answers and appropriate solutions to today’s challenges and, in particular, to the many contradictions arising from them.
The Chinese concept of “socialism of the new era” is patient, persistent, concrete, pragmatic and effective, and at the same time it is not Manichaean (evaluating situations and things in a dualism according to absolute principles of good and evil, without nuances and intermediate states); it knows the long term and is not afraid of confronting contradictions or oppositions (e.g. those related to individual initiative or entrepreneurship), which are seen as complementarities and potentials rather than exclusions and substitutes.
One of the lessons to be learnt from “Chinese Marxism” is the idea of seeking harmony between opposites, within man, between people, between man and nature. Chinese political discourse emphasises ‘social harmony’ and ‘stability’ as fundamental values, and the search for ‘compromise’ and ‘consensus’ as the means to achieve them.
There are many concepts in Chinese Marxism which differ from the concept of “class struggle” in Western Marxism, and which Western Marxism generally views with suspicion as characteristic of conservative regimes. To ignore these concepts is to forget their special meaning in Chinese thought as “reconciliation of opposites” and “positive dialectics”. These concepts mean, for example, that there is a dynamic balance between individual self-interest and social needs, between individual and collective interests, and between needs and moral demands. To simplify, we can say that since Mao, the Chinese have believed in a form of progress based on spiral development that tends to smooth out and mitigate contradictions. In this context, socialism ceases to be a project of perfection (a vision alien to Chinese thought, a vision that rebels against the absolute) and becomes a process of construction in motion.
How would you assess the similarities and differences between China’s economic model and that of the post-World War II Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe or the Balkans?
For some years, the People’s Republic of China maintained a “Soviet-style economic model”, which was introduced immediately after the victory of the October Revolution in 1949. However, the PRC abandoned this model when it broke away from the USSR in the early 1960s. After joining the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or COMECON) in 1950, China left in 1961 and decided to formulate its own development strategy, on its own and for itself. And, frankly, it did so much more effectively than the Soviet Union or the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
Between 1978 and 1982, China faced a series of economic problems that reflected the difficulties of the post-Mao transition and the implementation of the so-called “opening-up” structural reforms. In particular, the period 1985-1986 saw the introduction of the 1984 tax reform, which was one of the turning points towards a market economy. Then, during the collapse of the USSR and the Soviet bloc, there was a very short-lived experiment that could be described as “neo-liberal”, which was quickly interrupted and abandoned, but the result of this experiment was a sudden and severe economic downturn in 1990-1991, accompanied by an explosion of corruption. It must be acknowledged that the Chinese central government has since fought corruption with great vigour and some success. Fortunately, China has rejected the neo-liberal option that has devastated so many economies around the world. And it has chosen to maintain socialism, which today provides a measure of prosperity for the vast majority of its population.
To what extent do Western Marxists who claim that China has adopted capitalist methods correctly assess China’s financial/wealth growth?
In debates among Western Marxist writers, the vast majority of authors argue that the Chinese economy is capitalist. David Harvey, for example, says that he sees the Chinese economy as “neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics”, where since the 1978 reforms there has been a kind of market economy with more and more neoliberal components, operating within a framework of centralised control that he describes as very authoritarian. I disagree with him. Panitch and Gindin analyse the consequences of China’s integration into the world economic system and see it less as an opportunity for China to redirect global capitalism than as a repetition, this time by China, of the “complementary” role previously played by Japan in providing the United States with the capital flows necessary to maintain its global hegemony, which in turn has led to a tendency in China to liberalise financial markets, eliminate instruments to control capital movements and weaken the foundations of the power of the Chinese Communist Party. I think these writers are wrong.
Other Marxists, Chinese or foreign, certainly fewer in number but no less important, continue to argue that the political-economic system currently in place in China, although comparable or close to “state capitalism”, leaves open a wider range of possible trajectories for the future. For my part, I take this idea so far as to argue that the Chinese system today still contains the essential elements of socialism. Once this has been said, the interpretation of the nature of this system becomes compatible with “market socialism”, which in my view still rests on pillars that clearly distinguish it from capitalism. For my part, I would say that although there are capitalists in China (and there are many billionaires), it is not possible to describe the Chinese system as capitalist. Of course there are elements of “state capitalism”, but I prefer to speak of the Chinese system as “market socialism”, or rather “socialism with the market”. I think we have to take the Chinese seriously when they talk about “socialism with Chinese colours”. This is not just propaganda; it is a reality, it is their reality.
At the monetary and financial level, for example, it is worth noting that the Chinese authorities have been able to cope with the power of the financial markets, but they have also been able to build a “great wall of money” by defending the national currency, the yuan. They have managed to put money at the service of development. Very powerful strategic planning, whose techniques have been made more flexible, modernised and adapted to today’s needs, and thus much more effective, is a distinctive feature of the socialist path. State control of the currency and of all the major banks is a sine qua non, as is close supervision of the activities of financial institutions and of the behaviour of foreign companies operating in the country. Once again, it is the state that controls capitalism in China, not the other way round. At least that has been the case so far.
What is the significance of Deng Xiaoping for China today? Is there a connection or disconnection between Xi Jinping’s political and economic decisions and those of Deng Xiaoping?
Deng Xiaoping’s definitive rise to the pinnacle of power began in August 1977 with the 11th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and the subsequent push for deep economic reform that began in late 1978. Deng’s idea was not to abandon socialism, but to find ways to lift the vast majority of Chinese out of poverty and enable the country to achieve what the establishment called a “moderately prosperous” society. Since Xi Jinping, the development strategy has been reaffirmed as socialist, and the country’s overall policy orientation has been more in favour of the less affluent sections of the population and the less developed regions of the country.
The difficulty in understanding “Chinese socialism” stems from the refusal of its leaders to interpret it as the banalisation of scarcity or the “sharing of misery”. What the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party sought to do, and succeeded in doing, was to lift the great mass of the Chinese people out of poverty under Mao and up to the level of a “moderately prosperous” society under Deng Xiaoping. Since then, as a logical continuation of the revolution, their desire has been to pursue a socialist transition in which the vast majority of the population now has access to prosperity, especially a wide range of consumer goods, and can enjoy abundance. Wouldn’t that be killing two birds with one stone and proving that socialism can and must overcome capitalism?
Could you elaborate on China’s economic growth?
It is wrong to say, as we often hear, that the high growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) in the Chinese economy is due to the capitalism adopted since 1978. Quite the opposite. Economic growth has been high because the Chinese state, under the authority of the Communist Party, has managed to prevent capitalism from taking control of the country and, as a positive reflection of this, has redistributed wealth throughout society on a large scale. I should add that, even if we want to believe that the Chinese system is capitalist (which I do not), it would be wrong to claim that China’s high growth has only been observed since 1978. This is because the country’s economic growth was already very, very high under Mao, much higher than in any other country with a planned economy, and even higher than in many industrialised Western countries. Western leaders want to hide this fact because it is unbearable for them to admit that a socialist country can be successful, especially more successful than capitalist countries.
I have to say that the goal of the Chinese Communist Party is not to take over everything economically, but to maintain political control over everything. The two are not synonymous. Chinese leaders have repeatedly said that the coexistence of public and private activities, both encouraged within a mixed, hybrid system, is the chosen means to develop the country’s productive forces as much as possible and raise the level of development. The use of all means, including attracting foreign capital and importing advanced technologies, is not aimed at abandoning socialism, but at improving the living conditions of the population and deepening the process of socialist transition begun in 1949. Paradoxically, China remains a developing country, as evidenced by its still modest GDP per capita. This process will be long, difficult, full of contradictions and risks, and its course remains largely uncertain. However, I think it is worth stressing that this system still has many features that are clearly different from capitalism and which, in my opinion, are related to the realisation of a socialist project and the potential for its reactivation, which leads us to recommend taking the speeches of the country’s political leaders seriously.
Does China’s meeting with President Biden signal a shift from economic dominance to a more pronounced political presence in the international arena, especially in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, and in its attitude towards Russia? Does China want to become the centre of a multipolar world?
China has no desire to replace the United States as the world’s dominant power. China has neither the will nor the mentality to do so. On the other hand, it is clear that China is trying to contribute to the construction of a multipolar world, as opposed to the unipolar world in which the United States has so far ruled unchallenged (and admittedly in a highly aggressive manner). China’s leaders seek universal peace and balance in international relations. But it is clear that they will defend their country’s sovereignty without submitting to foreign domination.
Regarding the “trade war” between the US and China, we have co-authored a paper with Chinese authors entitled “Turning One’s Loss Into a Win? The US Trade War With China in Perspective’, which we co-authored with Chinese authors, shows that the ratio of labour hours integrated into trade between the two countries since 1978, compared to the same amount of trade exchange, is higher in China than in the US, and that there is an unequal exchange of value between them in favour of the US and to the detriment of China. In other words, the fact that China has run an increasing bilateral trade surplus over the last decade should be seen in the light of the fact that (according to our calculations) it has benefited the United States in particular in terms of the labour hours included in exports.
In such a paradoxical context, the outbreak of the trade war against China in 2018 can be interpreted as an attempt by the US administration, then led by President Trump, to slow down the slow and steady deterioration of the US trade advantage vis-à-vis its main emerging rival, China.
How is China organising international economic relations for a multi-power world to counter US dominance? Given the examples of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the BRICS, can a global payment system be created in the near future to counterbalance the dominance of the US dollar?
China has realised that the two pillars of US domination of the world capitalist system are military and monetary. That is why it has actively participated in the creation of strategic alliance networks such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and economic alliance networks such as the BRICS grouping. He also realised that these two pillars are interdependent and therefore fragile. That is why he launched a number of innovative and bold initiatives.
I refer to some of them in another book (Money, published by Palgrave Mcmillan). For example, China is planning to challenge the prevailing order in the oil market, of which it is the world’s largest importer. Since 2018, China has decided to promote yuan-denominated oil futures contracts on the Shanghai International Energy Exchange, which is accessible to foreign investors, in order to compete with references such as London Brent and New York West Texas Intermediate (which set the standard for defining crude oil prices and futures contracts for this commodity on Wall Street), which were undisputed in this field until this year.
In this context, China and Russia (already forming an economically dynamic – and militarily deterrent – alliance that could be a reliable counterweight to the United States) have decided to launch a new global alternative currency, called “petro-yuan-gold”, which could displace the dollar. Petro-yuan-gold is a global currency project based on oil, a basic commodity, and linked to gold, a feat no longer within Washington’s reach. Indeed, China’s advantage lies not only in its high GDP growth rate, but also in the fact that it is the world’s largest producer and buyer of gold, with Russia in third place, ahead of the United States. In 2018, Beijing took the initiative to promote a broad oil-yuan-gold trading facility on the global energy exchange. Then came the implementation of metal-yuan-gold. China offered to exchange the yuan it receives for gold for oil supplies and metal purchases. These events will have a significant impact on the global system.
Having persuaded Iran and Saudi Arabia to engage in diplomatic talks, can China achieve similar success in resolving the conflicts between Russia and the West, as well as the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict?
China has, of course, been playing an increasingly important and positive role in defusing existing international conflicts for a number of years. We saw this recently in the war in Ukraine between NATO and Russia, led by the United States, and then in the war between Israel and Palestine, supported by the United States and the European Union. Not long ago, we saw China speak out to prevent the outbreak of a conflict between Iran and Pakistan. We can think of China as the voice of many countries of the South that are seeking the path of development and not the path of war. That is why it is so important to analyse carefully what China wants and says.
China’s international strategy is based on five principles: 1) respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; 2) mutual non-aggression; 3) non-interference in internal affairs; 4) equality and mutual benefit; 5) peaceful coexistence. One would have to be in bad faith not to recognise that China’s statements on preserving peace and promoting the peaceful resolution of existing conflicts are being respected. And it must be remembered that China has never in its modern history pursued an expansionist colonial policy. Today, it does not want to revive the climate of the “Cold War”, which is contrary to the concept of peace among nations. China opposes all military alliances and has never joined a military coalition, not even against ISIS. It has not established any military bases abroad, except for one in Djibouti, which it presents as a “simple logistical facility” in a sensitive maritime location. The contrast with the Western powers, especially the United States, which has a history of coups and military interventions, is striking. “Cooperation” is the keyword of Chinese policy, along with the priority given to development and the “win-win” principle.
Can China take a more proactive stance in promoting regional and global peace in the midst of the US war economy? How should the Belt and Road project be assessed in this situation?
The military-industrial complex plays a crucial role in the economy of the United States, but it has also reached an extremely worrying dimension, threatening what the West likes to call “democracy” (which it respects less and less at home and almost never beyond its borders). With more than half of the world’s military expenditure and more than 1150 military bases around the world (I calculated this in my article “Notes on US Bases and Military Staff Abroad”), the United States is in an economic crisis, in a difficult situation and is gradually pushing the whole world towards total war. They are more and more openly expressing their desire to shift the axis of new conflicts to the Far East, especially to Taiwan. China must resist this US provocation and push towards war, but at the same time it must defend its interests and territory. Taiwan is one of them. Reunification therefore remains a priority for Beijing. The US administration is fuelling the arms race that once brought the USSR to its knees. But the escalation of this dangerous race is no longer enough to influence a China in good economic health and armed with a sufficient deterrent.
More generally, it is important to understand that capitalism, trapped in a systemic crisis, can no longer find solutions to its problems through the logic of maximising immediate profits and is becoming more dangerous. Between company bankruptcies and mass unemployment, stock market crashes and banking instability, the likelihood of a worsening of the systemic crisis of capital is extremely high today. All the conditions are in place for the contradictions in the system to become even more pronounced, especially since very few reforms have been carried out since the 2008 crisis. The most urgent issue at the moment is to put an end to the “organisation” of the world system through war under the domination of the United States of America. The defence of peace is a priority. Consequently, we must pull the plug on the war machine operated by the financial oligopolies by subjecting it to public and democratic control.
This is where the great project of the Silk Road comes in, already partially implemented: land routes – the “Belt” – and sea routes – the “Road”. This cooperation is of particular interest to Asian countries, because China has neighbours, both near and far, such as in the Middle East, that do not have sufficient investment for their development, and also because China sees advantages that could stimulate the development of its own western provinces, which are lagging behind in terms of development compared to those on China’s eastern coast. African countries are also interested because they are the ones most affected by “underdevelopment” (as the West calls it). We cannot say that this cooperation is perfect, as it focuses more on the supply of raw materials, but it is very important for African countries that China provides infrastructure, builds hospitals and roads in exchange for the supply of raw materials.
The Silk Roads go all the way to Europe, which creates resentment because it comes from a strategic competitor. If the European economies are in principle capable of developing themselves and have sufficient investment, why do some of them welcome Chinese investment so much? The reason is obvious: the governments of European countries with economies in recession or even in decline, victims of neo-liberal austerity, debt reduction, spending cuts and privatisation imposed by the European Union, are ready to sell their assets to the highest bidder and see Chinese investment as a means to develop themselves. China has made many investments outside the European Union, particularly in the Balkans. It is therefore not surprising that 17 Eastern and Southern European countries, 11 of which are members of the European Union, have joined the Silk Road initiative.
The Silk Road does not stop at the Euro-Asian continent and Africa. Cooperation with the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean is already well advanced, especially with the poorest countries in the region. Development assistance is provided mainly through the Silk Road Fund (a sovereign wealth fund) and loans from public banks at favourable interest rates. However, China does not want to be the sole financier of this project and wants to involve all countries that are able to participate in these loans, and which, unlike the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, do not impose politico-economic conditions on the countries they finance, in loans for infrastructure that will form the basis for rapid development.
This is what led to the creation of the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank, which today has almost a hundred members (France, Germany and the United Kingdom are members of the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank, but the United States of America, which, unlike the IMF and the World Bank, cannot control it, is obviously not a member; China, the bank’s largest shareholder, explicitly excludes its veto).
All in all, the Silk Road has grown enormously in just a few years: 124 countries, representing two-thirds of the world’s population, and 24 international organisations have signed agreements.
He should insist that it be made clear that this project is intended to exclude all political considerations. It is an initiative “open to all countries” with no other objective than common development. But there are also partnerships that focus on economic cooperation and the construction of multilateral trade zones, as in the case of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which will create the largest such zone in the world, with three billion inhabitants and 30% of world GDP. And in such partnerships, US hegemony will be challenged, especially as trade and investment will no longer be conducted in dollars but in national currencies.
Finally, we are realising that it is capitalism itself that has become unsustainable. It is obvious that this system, which is essentially dedicated to infinite and unlimited accumulation, is incompatible with a finite and finite planet. Capitalism destroys any kind of social harmony with the logic of creating ever greater inequalities. China claimed to achieve development by controlling these dynamics of capitalism. But now it is these dynamics that have to be limited. “Chinese” market socialism will have to gradually move away from capitalism if it is to realise a truly alternative path for humanity. This is the real goal; according to the Chinese authorities, and more explicitly today, certain features borrowed from capitalism are borrowed to be used “until the bridge is crossed”, they are not a long “detour” in the socialist transition on the road to communism.
Some of the author’s related works:
HERRERA, Rémy (2023), Dynamics of China’s Economy: Growth, Cycles, and Crises, (book’s coauthor with Zhiming Long), 375 p., December, Leiden/Boston: Brill. ISBN : 978-90-04-52402-6.
– (2023), Value, Money, Profit, and Capital Today, (book’s editor), 328 p., September, London: Emerald, ISBN : 978-1804-55-7518.
– (2023), La Chine est-elle impérialiste ?, (book’s editor), 192 p., February, Paris: Éditions Critiques, ISBN: 979-10-97331-45-0.
– (2023), « Turning One’s Loss Into a Win? The US Trade War With China in Perspective », (article’s coauthor with Zhiming Long, Zhixuan Feng and Bangxi Li) Research in Political Economy, n° 39, p. 31-50, London.
– (2023), « La Chine (vue de France), une inconnue ? Sur les contradictions, la dialectique, la morale et le socialisme », (article’s coauthor with Tony Andreani and Zhiming Long), Revue de Philosophie économique, vol. 24, n° 1, p. 167-189, Paris.
– (2022), Money – From the Power of Finance to the Sovereignty of the Peoples, (book’s author), 337 p., August, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN : 978-981-19-28475.
– (2022), Confronting Mainstream Economics for Overcoming Capitalism, (book’s author), 347 p., July, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN : 978-3-031-05850-9.
– (2021), Imperialism and Transitions to Socialism, (book’s editor), 272 p., September, London: Emerald, ISBN: 978-18-00437-05-0.
– (2021), « Guerre(s) et crise(s) globales : sur leurs relations systémiques », (article’s author), Marchés & Organisations, vol. 2021/2, n° 41, p. 139-155, Paris.
– (2021), « Is China Transforming the World? », (article’s coauthor with Tony Andreani and Zhiming Long), Monthly Review, vol. 73, n° 3, p. 21-30, New York.
– (2019), La Chine est-elle capitaliste ?, (book’s coauthor with Zhiming Long), 196 p., February, Paris: Éditions Critiques. ISBN : 9791097331139.
– (2013), “Notes on US Bases and Military Staff Abroad,” (article’s coauthor Joëlle Cicchini ), Journal of Innovation Economics & Management, 2013/3, n° 42, p. 147-173, Brussels.
Retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel and military analyst Daniel Davis discussed the US military operation against Iran, decision-making mechanisms in Washington, US-Israel relations, transformations in modern warfare doctrine, and the global balance of power in an interview with Harici Media.
Answering questions of Harici Editor-in-Chief Tunç Akkoç regarding the Iran war, retired Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Davis stated that the US administration lacks an achievable military strategy on the ground. Davis said: “I would say the US has a desire, not a strategy. It wants to subjugate the Iranian side, corner them, seize control of the Strait of Hormuz, prove they pose no threat to anyone in the region, and ensure they never possess nuclear weapons. That is our desire. But there is no strategy to achieve any of these goals.”
Drawing on his past military experience, Davis detailed the geographical and technical challenges on the ground: “As a soldier with direct combat experience, having gained combat experience in some of these mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan, for example, I know that many of the mountains inside Iran belong to the same mountain category. I knew what a difficult military task it would be to conquer a country as large as most of Western Europe, where such mountain ranges cover the entire western front. Therefore, I knew you could do nothing on the ground. However, I also knew that you could not subjugate a country with this kind of defense capacity and of this nature through air power alone.”
Pointing out that Iran’s defense infrastructure spans many years, Davis continued: “You cannot do this, especially when they have anticipated this for twenty years and made all kinds of preparations by constructing underground caves, production facilities, and storage facilities, and developing production capabilities for their unmanned aerial vehicles and missiles. There is no way you can defeat them. Because such facilities were designed not only to withstand all our strike missiles, such as Tomahawk, Jasmine cruise missiles, PSM, or ATAC, but also to survive. Most are capable of surviving nuclear explosions as well. I have been inside some of these here in the US. I have been in some physically located beneath a mountain. I know they were specifically designed when constructed to withstand the largest nuclear weapons the Soviet Union might possess. The ones there are of the same kind. If you know before embarking on an act of starting a war that the enemy is this large, possesses these types of defenses, and everyone knows these are resistant to our non-nuclear conventional munitions, why would you start a war to force them into something you clearly cannot achieve?”
Addressing the assumptions behind the war decision, Davis said: “I think this is a fantasy stoked by Benjamin Netanyahu. It was said, ‘If we assassinate their leaders, the same thing will happen as happened to Maduro in Venezuela. You went there, captured him, and disabled him; when you did that, you took control of the entire government, they basically handed the country over to you, and the same will happen here.’ Anyone who thinks Venezuela is like Iran has paid attention to nothing. The culture, history, religion, experiences, and everything that has transpired over the last 47 years are radically different from those in Venezuela, and you do not have an insider to facilitate the process as we had in Venezuela. But President Trump appears to have thought this way.”
“When he started the war on February 28, he sealed our fate; we lost this war”
Pointing to inconsistencies in US President Donald Trump’s decisions and the trajectory of the operation, Davis stated: “This situation is proof that he is stuck. Because, in my view, when he started the war on February 28, he sealed our fate. We lost this war. Even if it is ongoing right now, there is no logical way for us to win it. Because we cannot eliminate the trump card held by the Iranian side.”
Stating that military pressure mechanisms are insufficient, Davis explained: “We still have our missiles, aircraft, aircraft carriers, and all such elements. That is why it appears feasible. It is thought, ‘Maybe if we make a good enough deal, or put enough pressure on them, or impose a blockade and leave the public in a dire enough position to change the government’s mind.’ This is a fantasy. This is the only thing President Trump has. Because if he were acting based solely on military reality, strategic reality, and cultural and religious reality, he would know this was an unwise move, but he does not know.”
Describing Trump’s negotiation approach and the breakdown of the reached agreement, Davis used the following expressions: “He is a transactional individual who wants relationships resolved overnight. For example, during the memorandum of understanding period, this duration was to be 60 days. After starting the war, no achievable military objectives remained. Whatever your desires were, you can no longer reach them because you have confronted reality. Now he is trying to find an exit route, but even within this understanding, he cannot arrive at a rational and consistent perspective. Any rational person would think that when the memorandum of understanding was signed on June 17, it provided him with an exit route. You implement the terms of this memorandum, the crisis is resolved, the dual blockade is lifted, and the Strait of Hormuz could reopen.”
Addressing the clauses of the agreement text and subsequent developments, Davis said: “The terms Trump signed stated that Iran had administrative control of the Strait of Hormuz but could not demand any transit fees for 60 days. Iran accepted this, but accepted only one condition: the ‘for 60 days only’ stipulation. Subsequently, they publicly announced that they would collect fees later, but not during these 60 days. The US was not mentioned in the text in any way. We had no say. The authority to decide how operations would run was left to Iran together with Oman. We gave them 30 of the 60 days to prepare their plan for this. But after four or five days passed, the US suddenly declared a new southern corridor together with Oman.”
Detailing the process of reversing the decision, Davis noted: “While a step to reopen the strait had been agreed upon, traffic had risen to approximately one-third of pre-war levels, and many shipments had passed directly on the first day, Trump personally turned back this development toward finding a reasonable exit route from the unfolding disaster. According to reports from some sources in Washington, he came under intense pressure from pro-war figures in his inner circle and those on the Israeli side. He backed down under this pressure and modified the terms by inserting himself into the fifth paragraph. He never made Israel implement the first paragraph, which covered Lebanon and envisioned a ceasefire on all fronts. We did not even give them 30 days; we intervened before five days had passed. Trump has a goal, fails to reach it, puts forward another condition, and then withdraws that as well. He is very easily manipulated; he reaches a decision, then someone speaks with him, and he changes his mind.”
Recalling that a similar situation occurred in relations with Saudi Arabia, Davis said: “He said he made a great deal with Saudi Arabia, and the next day he changed the condition by saying, ‘as long as they sign the Abraham Accords.’ Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, announced that this was not part of the agreement and had never been discussed. This situation shows that President Trump constantly makes concessions when pressured. On this basis, how can any agreement be reached with the US? This situation means that no military or diplomatic exit point remains because he does not permit it.”
“Control is no longer an economic matter; it is a national security imperative”
In response to a question about whether a mutual exit opportunity remains from the current impasse, Davis said: “We had the memorandum of understanding; we had secured this agreement. However, President Trump and his Secretary, Scott Bessent, said, ‘as long as it is a deal we like, we want a new deal.’ You already had a deal; what deal are you talking about now? Why would the Iranian side negotiate a new deal that differs from an agreement made two months ago? This is completely illogical. The Iranian side holds military superiority through its missile cities and half a dozen alternative methods to control the strait. As their official authorities stated on social media, control of the strait is no longer merely an economic matter; it is a national security imperative because it is the only tool with which they can balance their American adversary, who is far stronger militarily.”
Evaluating the impact of the oil crisis, Davis stated: “Strategic Petroleum Reserves are declining. This situation has prevented a crisis so far, but it cannot cover products like jet fuel, diesel, and fertilizer. If it continues this way and the problem is postponed, the reserves will be depleted one day, and economic activity cannot be sustained without oil. Pressure is on President Trump, and the Iranian side is aware of this. They know the blockade will harm them, but they have calculated that they can endure much longer and deeper pain than our side. This is an existential matter; they know that if they surrender their only trump card to an unpredictable president, they will be attacked again later.”
“Reflexive support for Israel in society has been broken”
Touching upon relations between the US and Israel, Davis said a clear divergence has begun in American society. Davis noted: “In the past, across all segments of society and all generations, it was reflexively said, ‘Of course we are pro-Israel, they are our democratic ally.’ This situation continued until the Gaza process following October 7. Israel was attacked on October 7, and no one found it strange that it responded. However, what happened afterward created problems. Israel used this opportunity to destroy the Gaza Strip, increase pressure in the West Bank, bring in new settlers, and discuss annexation.”
Describing the rift between political elites and the public, Davis explained: “There is a major divide in America. Elites are unaffected by genocide or the killing of women and children in the West Bank and Gaza; they close their eyes, arguing that Israel is an ally. However, the eyes of the American public are not closed. They see human suffering on social media and do not carry the memorized assumptions of the past. These elites are not merely bought with money; for decades, they genuinely believed that our interests and Israel’s interests were one and the same. In their minds, saying something negative about Israel is equivalent to saying something negative about the US. Younger generations in particular, and a growing portion of all generations, recognize that our interests are not the same.”
Drawing attention to the cost of the war to the US, Davis noted: “We elected President Trump to apply the America First principle, not Israel first, Britain first, or Germany first. There is anger against those who sacrificed America’s needs by entering the war. According to figures reflected in the public domain, at least 600 Americans were injured; according to what I have heard, this number is over a thousand. Money has been spent, our facilities have been damaged, and our aircraft destroyed; around 40 to 50 of our aircraft were damaged or destroyed. Our bases were ruined and will likely never be rebuilt. We have also lost our geopolitical influence in the region. I doubt that relations with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait can return to their former state. Because the foundational assumption of this entire structure was that we could protect them; we could not even protect ourselves.”
“We are still living as if it were 1992”
Evaluating the shift in military technology, Davis stated that the US has lost its traditional military superiority. Davis said: “A large number of people in America are still living as if it were 1992. The Soviet Union had just collapsed, China was a peasant army developing militarily and economically, and we held absolute dominance following Operation Desert Storm. We are no longer in 1992. The Russians corrected their mistakes after the initial phase of the Ukraine war in 2022; they became a much stronger land force, missile, and drone force. China, meanwhile, reached immense technological and industrial capacity.”
Explaining the current situation through the example of Iran, Davis said: “We thought we could crush Iran like a fly, but we could not do so due to their missile cities and technologies. If we cannot eliminate Iran, what can we do against China or Russia, which possess power far beyond that? We have fallen behind in categories such as hypersonic missiles and the new Oreshnik missile. When I saw the Bayraktar TB2 vehicles used by the Turks in the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan war, as someone with an armored unit background, I understood that the nature of war had changed. The US, meanwhile, talks about producing 300,000 drones by 2030. In an environment where tactics change every six weeks on the Ukrainian and Russian battlefield, our systems remain extremely slow. Ukrainian soldiers mocked the tank platoon manual published last year, saying that with these methods, one could not survive on the battlefield for even ten minutes.”
“The idea of containing China is a fantasy”
Criticizing the US military approach toward China, Davis evaluated: “There is talk of a strategy to militarily contain China. Will you prevent their activities within their own borders, their technological developments, or the expansion of their military? You cannot stop a country with a strong economy and a massive population. We can achieve no result other than entering a war with China in the Asia-Pacific region and losing it. China’s shipbuilding capacity is approximately 200 times ours; they are vastly superior to us in artillery ammunition, aircraft, and missile production. Our methods left over from the Cold War no longer work. What we need to do is keep our own defense strong and ensure deterrence, not spend billions of dollars in the region to establish forward bases that will be hit.”
Touching upon the potential for diplomatic relations between the two countries, Davis said: “I think President Trump personally knows that going to war with China is unwise. However, the Pentagon and the military-industrial complex view China as a constant enemy, demanding more budget, more bases, and more missiles every year. No one considers diplomacy. Yet we can develop peaceful, stable relations with China based on mutual benefit, even if not friendly. Regarding Taiwan as well, I think leaders realize after seeing what occurred in the Middle East and Ukraine that help will not come, and they will adopt a more cooperative stance by withdrawing independence rhetoric. China does not want to start a war; it desires a model similar to Hong Kong. Even if a conflict breaks out in the worst-case scenario, it is between China and Taiwan; the US should not choose to join the war and lose.”
Emphasizing that the arms lobby inside the US maintains its power, Davis stated: “The military-industrial complex remains extremely powerful and holds all levers of power. They maintain control through members of Congress, the media, and public relations networks; I see no sign that this structure is weakening.”
“They did not want someone who would tell the truth about Israel”
Providing information about the process surrounding the cancellation of his appointment within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Davis recounted the issue in these words: “When Tulsi Gabbard came to me and asked me to become the number three executive in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, I said I would be honored to serve my country. However, I stated that I had openly opposed the policies pursued by Israel since October 7 and the war in Gaza and Lebanon, and that these views might not be welcomed within the administration. She thought my accurate past analyses would compensate for this situation. One of my duties was to present the daily intelligence briefing to the president.”
Describing the stage at which his candidacy was withdrawn, Davis said: “Articles against me appeared in the Israeli press and American media. I never hid my views; I said Benjamin Netanyahu’s policies were harming Israel and dragging us down as well. I advocate the ‘America First’ principle, but there are many people within the administration who say ‘Israel First’ and have zero tolerance for any criticism directed at Netanyahu. They did not want someone who would tell the truth regarding Israel. The process expanded following posts by figures like Laura Loomer. On the day I passed the CIA polygraph test and was set to begin duty, Susie Wiles was informed that I had put the president in a difficult position regarding the Russia-Ukraine war. While Trump was saying there would be a ceasefire, I stated on my program that Vladimir Putin would not agree to a ceasefire given his current advantage. Although I stated that I supported a ceasefire, this was made a pretext, and my appointment offer was withdrawn,” completing the interview.
In an interview with Harici Media, Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, stated that global unipolarity is coming to an end, transitioning into an increasingly multipolar order.
Parsi addressed shifting global power dynamics, US foreign policy toward China, structural domestic pressures in Washington, and the strategic miscalculations surrounding the ongoing US conflict with Iran.
Parsi noted that while many analysts declare the arrival of a post-American world, the transition will not be an abrupt moment. Instead, he described a phased emergence where it becomes clear that no single superpower possesses deterministic influence over global affairs.
Parsi observed that many governments have been slow to internalize this reality or adjust their policies accordingly, creating the superficial illusion that a unipolar system remains intact. “Whether it’s fully multipolar or other configurations, we can be debated. What I think is clear is that the unipolarity is coming to an end,” Parsi said.
“Unipolarity is an aberration, an abnormality”
Regarding Washington’s readiness for a multipolar world, Parsi asserted that the US political establishment remains unprepared and has historically denied the shift. He recalled that during the first two years of the Biden administration, describing the world as multipolar was dismissed as a Russian propaganda narrative.
However, Parsi highlighted a shift under US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who stated in a February 2025 interview that unipolarity was an anomaly. Parsi explained, “He actually went further. He said that unipolarity is an aberration, an abnormality, a historical accident. If you believe that it’s a historical accident, if you believe that it’s an abnormality, then I think it comes from that, that any effort to try to restore unipolarity should be rejected.”
Addressing US policy toward China, Parsi noted that despite the summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, there is no structural indication that Washington views Beijing as a potential partner rather than a rival.
He contrasted the Biden administration’s aggressive posture—which assumed an existential struggle for dominance—with the Trump administration’s softer but poorly planned approach.
Parsi argued that neither power can decisively defeat the other, making mutual coexistence and co-governance essential to avoid a catastrophic zero-sum confrontation.
“An effort to indefinitely contain China is a recipe for disaster”
Parsi rejected the feasibility of military containment against Beijing, warning of severe consequences. “I think an effort to indefinitely contain China is a recipe that will bring about great power competition and a confrontation between the US and China that is going to be completely disastrous,” Parsi stated.
He observed that despite significant US strategic errors, such as the conflict with Iran, China has exercised restraint rather than exploiting American vulnerabilities. Parsi argued that if Beijing were dead-set on aggressive power competition, it would have acted differently.
Economically, Parsi argued that containing China through tariffs or Soviet-era containment models is a losing proposition.
Unlike the Soviet Union, which maintained an isolated economic model, China is deeply integrated into global trade and serves as the primary trading partner for most nations, including those in Latin America such as Brazil. Parsi emphasized that economic containment is unviable against a state with such vast global integration.
“This confrontation will be the deadliest conflict in human history”
Evaluating the risk of the “Thucydides Trap,” Parsi criticized the Washington foreign policy establishment for its structural inability to envision peaceful coexistence.
He noted that the political culture in Washington is built around zero-sum competition and conflict rather than diplomatic management.
Parsi emphasized that while historical precedents exist, humanity is not bound to repeat them, particularly when the stakes involve existential risks. Parsi warned that an unmanaged confrontation between the US and China “would be the deadliest conflict in human history if it is allowed to happen,” threatening human survival itself.
Parsi attributed this narrow strategic focus to structural domestic forces, particularly the US military-industrial complex and influential lobbying groups. Working alongside the grand strategy of liberal hegemony, these forces require US military dominance worldwide, especially in Asia.
Parsi explained that institutional inertia makes it extraordinarily difficult for Washington to alter its strategic trajectory.
“The US had an unrealistic plan A and no plan B”
Turning to the conflict with Iran, Parsi asserted that Washington lacks a coherent strategy, having relied on an unrealistic plan that failed within the first three days.
He stated that the US expected a swift regime collapse or surrender within four days, but faced horizontal escalation from Iran, including threats to the Strait of Hormuz and regional strikes.
“The United States had a very unrealistic plan A and no plan B, and it’s been stuck in that situation ever since,” Parsi said, adding that Washington has been improvising and executing tactical operations without strategic success.
Parsi attributed President Trump’s shifting decisions on Iran to this absence of strategy and his personal demand for immediate results. When military action failed to yield swift progress, Trump turned to diplomacy, only to lose patience within three weeks and resume military strikes. Parsi questioned whether the global community could afford a superpower acting in such an erratic manner.
“Without Israel’s push, there would not have been a war with Iran”
Addressing Israel’s role, Parsi stated that Israeli pressure was a decisive factor in driving US policy toward confrontation with Iran.
“Without Israel’s push, there would not have been a war with Iran. Without Trump agreeing to the Israelis, there would not have been a war with Iran. Both of them were needed,” Parsi remarked, noting that Israeli efforts since 1995 elevated Iran into a primary US national security concern disproportionate to actual US interests in the region.
Parsi identified a growing divergence between US and Israeli interests in the Middle East. While the US benefits from reducing its regional military footprint of 50,000 troops, Israel requires continuous US military presence and intervention to maintain a favorable regional balance of power.
Parsi noted that this divergence has created a visible rift between Washington and Tel Aviv following the poor execution of the war and subsequent diplomatic maneuvers.
“Israel’s standing amongst the American public has plummeted”
Parsi highlighted a major shift in American public opinion regarding Israel, noting that sympathy for Palestinians has surpassed sympathy for Israel across almost every demographic category, except Republicans over the age of 65.
He attributed this decline directly to Israel’s military actions in Gaza and its perceived role in drawing the US into a disastrous war with Iran, which mirrored earlier public grievances over the Iraq War.
Regarding a resolution to the conflict, Parsi stated that a dignified exit for both the US and Iran remains possible, though the window is narrowing due to personal hostility and political miscalculations.
Finally, addressing Trump’s political image, Parsi clarified that Trump was never strictly anti-war, but rather anti-risk.
He explained that Trump entered the conflict because Israeli officials convinced him that war with Iran posed little risk and would be concluded within 100 hours. Parsi concluded that had Trump not been misled into believing the operation would be a swift success, he would not have initiated it.
Conflicting statements from the US and Iran regarding the potential resumption of diplomatic negotiations have emerged, while ongoing tensions in the Strait of Hormuz have once again brought global energy concerns to the fore.
Addressing these developments on the Harici live broadcast of Strategic Compass, international relations scholar Prof. Dr. Hasan Unal and Alptekin Dursunoglu, journalist, author, and Editor-in-Chief of Yakin Dogu Haber (YDH), evaluated the internal, regional, and strategic dimensions of the conflict. The discussion focused on the shift in Iran’s military doctrine, the political strain within the US administration, the economic vulnerability of Gulf monarchies, and the broader realignments reshaping Middle Eastern geopolitics.
Why did Trump step back from a decision to launch a new attack on Iran?
Opening the discussion, Prof. Dr. Hasan Unal offered a sharp critique of the political rhetoric originating from Washington, contrasting executive declarations with the tactical outcomes on the ground. Unal argued that public statements made by former US President Donald Trump increasingly lack analytical consistency, complicating efforts to decipher official US strategy.
“He has reached a point where he tells more lies than the daily meowing of stray cats,” Unal remarked during the broadcast. “I do not know which part of his statements we ought to analyze, but if we evaluate him within a broader framework, it becomes possible to reach certain conclusions.”
Unal described the military confrontation between Washington and Tehran as an uneven cycle of escalation, noting that US forces continue to suffer casualties and incur immense financial costs without altering the strategic baseline. “The situation has effectively transformed into something like a defeated wrestler who never grows tired of wrestling; America repeatedly approaches and confronts Iran, yet the outcome is obvious from the outset,” Unal stated. He added that American military personnel are being deployed into conflict zones where national interests remain obscure: “I am certain that American soldiers there largely believe they have no personal interests at stake… and that it serves at most the interests of Israel.”
Dursunoglu contextualised the current phase of hostilities as part of an extended campaign, comparing the recent clashes to a second round of a broader regional conflict following earlier engagements in 2025. He noted that despite assertive claims from Washington regarding the destruction of Iranian military infrastructure, operational continuity on the Iranian side forced a shift in US messaging.
Reflecting on official declarations from US Central Command (CENTCOM) and executive statements following intensive strikes, Unal highlighted the internal contradictions in Washington’s narrative: “Trump claimed Iranian naval forces were sent to the bottom of the sea, the air force beyond the atmosphere, and the ground forces deep into the magma. Yet suddenly he declared, ‘I have forgiven Iran,’ while CENTCOM figures suggested they had reached ‘target saturation’—as if there was simply nothing left to hit.”
Is Iran insisting on its conditions regarding the Strait of Hormuz?
A central focus of the analysis was Iran’s response mechanism following the breakdown of initial ceasefire frameworks. Dursunoglu highlighted a significant structural transition in Tehran’s military posture, moving from traditional reactive containment to proactive deterrence across multiple theatres.
Dursunoglu pointed out that during the escalation, Iran did not restrict its target matrix to immediate points of contact. Instead, Iranian forces conducted strikes against US installations and logistical networks across the region, including facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, and Oman.
“Iran’s traditional defence doctrine was defensive and based on proportional retaliation,” Dursunoglu explained. “However, after the US halted strikes, Iran proceeded to target assets in Jordan and Kuwait without immediate prior attacks on those specific vectors. This indicates that Iran has begun executing preemptive strikes, effectively adapting its strategic posture.”
Unal underscored the severity of these strikes on regional logistics, noting that Iranian counter-strikes targeted the port of Aqaba and airport infrastructure in Jordan, alongside American operational facilities in the Gulf. “According to the accounts, Iranian forces began hitting American installations in Gulf states and Jordan within minutes of initial strikes, effectively neutralizing the operational depth the US relied upon,” Unal noted.
The operational status of the Strait of Hormuz remains a decisive point of leverage. Under previous draft frameworks negotiated through Omani mediation, administrative oversight of maritime traffic through the Strait was slated to transition to Iran in coordination with regional littoral states. However, subsequent US efforts to establish an independent naval corridor along the Omani coast triggered a fresh wave of Iranian interdictions.
Dursunoglu outlined the ongoing negotiations surrounding the maritime passage, noting that attempts to bypass Iranian oversight proved unviable for commercial shipping. Under the latest proposals under discussion via Omani channels, incoming maritime traffic into the Gulf would pass through Iranian-designated corridors under Iranian authorization, while outgoing traffic would proceed along Omani coastal waters following notification and approval.
“If an agreement is finalized on these terms, it represents an explicit recognition of Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz by the US regime,” Dursunoglu said. He noted that while initial terms provided free passage during a temporary 60-day window, long-term frameworks anticipate structured administrative mechanisms for commercial vessels. Unal added: “Whether designated as transit fees, environmental charges, or security provisions, formalizing maritime oversight secures a permanent structural advantage for Tehran.”
Under what conditions will negotiations begin?
The economic ramifications of maritime disruption have also altered the calculations of Gulf export nations. Following attempts by Saudi Arabia to engage Ansar Allah (Houthi) forces in Yemen, retaliatory actions against critical infrastructure—including the Yanbu crude oil pipeline on the Red Sea—severely constrained alternative export routes.
“By drawing Yemeni forces back into active conflict, Saudi Arabia inadvertently placed its secondary export avenues under direct fire,” Unal observed. “The vulnerability of the Yanbu pipeline demonstrates that reliance on the Gulf cannot be bypassed easily, effectively increasing regional dependence on stability within the Strait.”
Beyond the maritime domain, the broadcast addressed heavy Iranian military engagements in northern Iraq, targeting opposition groups including the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), Komala, Pak, and Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK) along the Erbil-Suleimaniyeh axis.
Dursunoglu and Unal noted that cross-border strikes destroyed substantial ammunition depots established near border regions, followed by reported ground operations conducted by specialized Iranian units.
“Iranian special forces executed targeted ground operations across the border,” Dursunoglu stated, pointing to secondary explosions captured in operational footage as evidence of extensive pre-positioned armaments.
Unal noted that these operations underscored the strategic limitations of non-state actors aligned with Washington: “The expectations placed on armed factions in northern Iraq collapsed when confronted with direct military pressure. The narrative that these groups could serve as an internal wedge against Tehran proved to be a costly miscalculation for US planners.”
Reports indicating the start of a repositioning of US personnel and heavy military equipment from bases in Iraq and the Gulf toward Jordan and Israel were identified as a direct consequence of this vulnerability. “US forces are consolidating toward Jordan and Israel because their facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait sustained structural operational damage,” Dursunoglu observed. “When a state can no longer defend its forward command centers—such as the 5th Fleet infrastructure in Bahrain—it is forced to retreat to secondary defensive perimeters.”
How effective is the pressure from Gulf countries for negotiations?
Concluding the evaluation, Unal and Dursunoglu examined the broader diplomatic landscape, focusing on security dialogues among regional powers, including Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. Both analysts agreed that any sustainable security architecture in the Middle East must incorporate Iran rather than seek its exclusion.
“How can you construct a new regional order by excluding the very nation that demonstrated the capacity to neutralize external military dominance?” Dursunoglu questioned. “An architecture that relies on Western guarantees or Israeli alignment fails to address the underlying security dynamics of the region.”
Unal reflected on the historical trajectories of Turkish foreign policy, criticizing past ideological approaches that fuelled regional fragmentation and sect-based antagonisms. He noted that realpolitik dictates close functional coordination between Ankara and Tehran despite historical differences.
“Iran’s resistance ultimately prevented the imposition of a security framework dictated entirely by external actors,” Unal concluded. “Responsible analysis requires recognizing that stability in the Middle East cannot be achieved through foreign intervention or regional fragmentation, but through direct, autonomous security coordination among the region’s core nations.”
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