Europe
Europe confronts nuclear future: French umbrella or German bomb?
Amid concerns that the US may withdraw from the continent, a debate has begun in Europe over France’s nuclear umbrella and the possibility of Germany producing its own nuclear bomb.
French President Emmanuel Macron is pursuing a proposal to bring other European countries, including Germany, under a “nuclear umbrella” based on French nuclear bombs, modeled after the US system.
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced today during the signing of a France-Poland cooperation agreement that “serious talks” on this matter are already underway. Macron announced that similar discussions will be held with other countries.
Efforts to find an alternative to US nuclear weapons are also ongoing in Berlin, and these efforts have intensified since Chancellor Friedrich Merz raised the possibility of talks with Paris and London on February 21.
Leading German media outlets have also recently raised the issue of arming Germany with its own “German bomb,” which would violate the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Two Plus Four Treaty. AfD politicians support this idea.
However, the ruling parties in Berlin are currently pushing for a “European solution.” It remains unclear how Berlin’s participation in decisions regarding the use of nuclear weapons would be ensured.
German media calls for ‘breaking old chains’
The debate over maintaining the current US nuclear umbrella over Europe or replacing it with a separate European nuclear umbrella first began last November during the US presidential elections, then reignited on January 20 with the inauguration of President Donald Trump.
From time to time, calls are made for Germany to act alone and acquire nuclear weapons. For example, an influential article published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) argued that there were “good reasons” why the Two Plus Four Treaty is “no longer valid,” given that it did not permit the Federal Republic of Germany to possess nuclear weapons, and that Germany should “break old chains.”
Around the same time, public opinion polls were published showing that while nuclear armament for the Federal Republic had not yet gained majority support, it was backed by a growing segment of the population.
German media, recalling that the production of nuclear bombs is also being discussed in other countries like South Korea and Poland, emphasized that Berlin possesses sufficient uranium enrichment technology to produce nuclear weapons.
AfD support for ‘German bomb’
More influential politicians have not yet joined the call for a German bomb. Karl-Heinz Kamp, former president of the Federal Academy for Security Policy (BAKS) and currently working for the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), recently stated that the Federal Republic of Germany has “bindingly renounced” the option of “developing its own nuclear weapons,” which is being discussed in the media.
Although Kamp argues that there is currently no politically serious voice in Berlin seeking to change this, explicit calls for the German bomb are now coming from the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party.
For example, in March, Rüdiger Lucassen, the AfD’s defense policy spokesperson in the Bundestag, said, “Germany needs its own nuclear weapons.”
The AfD member, who wants Berlin to “acquire its own nuclear deterrence capability,” stated that this should be done “within the framework of Europe’s strategic autonomy.”
This demand was echoed by Sergeant Hannes Gnauck, an AfD Member of Parliament and a member of his party’s defense working group. Gnauck said, “Germany needs its own nuclear protection shield.”
European option in practice, German bomb in emergencies
Some time ago, Thorsten Benner, director of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin, proposed a different approach.
Benner advised that “in emergencies, the basic scientific and technological capacities should be maintained to pursue a German nuclear bomb project,” but that in political practice, a “European option” should be sought.
Kamp is also insistent on this point. He notes that the Trinity House Treaty, signed between the UK and Germany in October 2024, provides for bilateral “dialogue on nuclear issues.”
French President Emmanuel Macron had also advocated for dialogue on the use of the Force de Frappe (deterrent force) to create a nuclear umbrella over the EU “at an early stage.”
Kamp now suggests that Germany could contribute to the “significant costs of France’s and Britain’s nuclear capabilities.” This would, of course, require establishing a “direct link between the nuclear weapon capabilities of both countries and the security of Germany and Europe,” and regulating this with “legally binding bilateral treaties.”
According to Kamp, this would also give Berlin direct influence over French and British nuclear weapons.
Joint nuclear war maneuvers
In recent days, Macron has given new impetus to the plan to bring EU countries under the protection of French or Franco-British nuclear weapons.
Macron has long supported this plan, arguing that French national interests, protected by French nuclear weapons, have now acquired a “European dimension.”
Paris noted with interest Merz’s statement on February 21 that “Europe may need to become more independent from the US in nuclear terms.” Merz had said he wanted to negotiate this issue with Paris and London.
Visiting Portugal at the end of February, Macron reaffirmed the “European dimension” of France’s core interests, which are central to the expansion of the nuclear umbrella.
Experts quickly advanced the public debate. For example, in early March, it was said that it would take years to produce enough new nuclear warheads to deploy nuclear weapons in other European countries according to the US nuclear sharing model.
However, it is pointed out that joint nuclear war maneuvers, for example, could be carried out in the short term.
French nuclear deterrence could be extended to Poland
The plan already appears to be gaining traction. France and Poland have signed a friendship and cooperation agreement (Traité de Nancy) that provides for closer arms and military cooperation and includes a mutual assistance clause.
This agreement is considered the counterpart to the Traités de Londres signed with the United Kingdom in 2010, the Traité d’Aix-la-Chapelle signed with Germany in 2019, the Traité du Quirinal signed with Italy in 2021, and the Traité de Barcelone signed with Spain in 2023.
The mutual assistance clause allows for discussion of extending France’s nuclear deterrence to Poland. As Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk confirmed on Friday, his government is currently conducting “serious talks” with Paris on this matter.
In an interview on Tuesday, Macron reiterated that he wants to discuss participation in France’s nuclear deterrence with “all partners who wish to do so,” and said he would intensify talks in the coming weeks and months.
Macron added that there are three conditions for his country: France will not pay for the security of others; it will not deploy nuclear weapons it needs for itself; and the decision to use the French nuclear bomb will belong solely to the President of France.
Currently, it seems unlikely that Berlin would agree to extend France’s nuclear umbrella to Germany under the condition that it has no say in any decision regarding its use.
On the other hand, the joint financing voiced by Kamp could provide a certain degree of joint decision-making.