European defense autonomy and Germany’s military role enter a turning point

On May 27, the 27 EU countries approved a massive plan to strengthen the European defense industry, signaling a shift in Europe’s defense policy from relying on the U.S.-led NATO system to pursuing independent self-reliance. This major shift will also be partially endorsed at the NATO summit to be held at the end of the month, where a significant increase in defense spending is expected to be approved. Meanwhile, Germany—holding dual status as both the EU’s political leader and economic engine—is, for the first time since World War II, deploying permanent troops overseas on a large scale. This marks its departure from a long-standing homeland defense stance to a role as a vanguard of European defense. These three major developments symbolize the disintegration of the Western bloc as the world has known it, indicate a restructuring of Europe’s security landscape, and raise long-term public concerns about Germany and Russia entering direct conflict and Europe falling into another large-scale war.

At the Brussels meeting on May 27, the European Council formally approved one of the EU’s most ambitious defense plans ever—”European Security Action”—which will officially take effect on May 29. According to the plan, the EU will raise €150 billion from financial markets and lend it to member states to support defense industry development, boost military equipment production, and improve and optimize overall EU military and strategic capabilities.

The €150 billion investment is only the first step and just part of a much broader rearmament strategy for the continent. The European Commission plans to eventually raise €800 billion over the next decade. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described this as a “once-in-a-generation moment” and a decisive step toward Europe’s strategic autonomy.

Under the plan, member states can receive loan support when purchasing weapons through joint procurement procedures. To qualify, at least 65% of the project’s components must come from the EU, EU candidate or potential candidate countries, or countries with EU security defense agreements, including Norway, the UK, Moldova, Ukraine, Iceland, Switzerland, North Macedonia, Albania, and even Asian countries like Japan and South Korea.

This means non-EU manufacturers like the U.S., Turkey, and the UK can only participate to a limited extent—capped at 15% per project, or 35% under stricter conditions such as prior collaboration with EU contractors or pledging to switch to EU contractors within two years.

To reinforce EU technological sovereignty, a central agency will ensure that no third country can remotely control equipment produced in Europe. This restricts U.S. software firms from participating in EU drone programs developed under the plan. Additionally, to ensure economies of scale, interoperability, and prevent fragmentation of the European defense industrial base, member states must generally procure jointly with at least one other state to be eligible for loans—though exceptions exist for solo procurement.

The first tranche of €150 billion will prioritize artillery ammunition, missiles, drones, air defense systems, military transport aircraft, cyber defense, and AI. Analysts believe this focus addresses shortages and depletion in conventional weapons stockpiles caused by the Russia-Ukraine war, and supports Ukraine’s ongoing war effort.

The massive EU defense budget is seen as a necessary response to historic global upheaval—a major step toward strategic autonomy, diplomatic independence, and military self-reliance. It also reflects the widening rift between Europe and a U.S. increasingly driven by Trump-era isolationism. EU leaders believe the U.S. has abandoned Ukraine and even Europe through rapprochement with Russia. They no longer rely on America as a security umbrella, nor expect the U.S. to rescue Europe in the event of war as it did in WWI and WWII.

Meanwhile, NATO Secretary-General Rutte hopes that at the June 24–25 summit, members will agree to raise military spending to 3.5% of GDP by 2032, with another 1.5% for related expenditures—totaling 5% of GDP, twice the long-standing U.S. target of 2%. Excluding the U.S., Canada, and Turkey, the other 29 NATO members are in Europe—so this means Europe must significantly boost its defense budgets, preparing for a future where the U.S. may fully abandon NATO.

During Trump’s first term, the U.S. pressured some EU nations to hit 2% spending by threatening to dissolve NATO. Now, Trump 2.0 demands even more—doubling the ratio to 5%. After mediation by new Secretary-General Rutte, NATO foreign ministers on May 14 discussed and compromised on the “3.5% + 1.5%” plan: 3.5% for armed forces, 1.5% for war-related infrastructure. This would increase NATO Europe’s military spending from $476 billion in 2024 to $1.15 trillion in seven years. Germany alone would quadruple its defense budget from €52 billion to €215 billion.

The doubling of NATO military spending is clearly not solely the result of direct pressure from the Trump administration, but rather a consequence of the “European panic” triggered by the U.S. shifting the burden and working off its job. Although unwilling, NATO’s European partners are forced to face a chaotic reality and an uncertain future. Major changes in the world order are an undeniable historical process, the decline of American power and its waning willingness to lead are growing trends, and Russia’s geopolitical pressure is both immediate and enduring. These three factors have gradually turned Europe’s strategic autonomy, diplomatic independence, and defense self-reliance from ideals and slogans into conscious and voluntary strategic choices.

As the third barometer of Europe’s strengthening defense power, Germany—the strongest EU member and NATO European partner—has taken new historic steps in military construction, autonomy, and posture. It has boldly carried out the post-World War II breakthrough move of deploying a restructured armored unit permanently abroad for the first time.

On May 22, Germany’s Bundeswehr 45th Armored Brigade was officially deployed to Lithuania, a NATO ally on the Baltic Sea and one of the “frontline countries.” This brigade, specially formed for overseas combat, is a mechanized unit with a full strength of about 5,000 troops, expected to be fully deployed by 2027. It will be stationed at the Rukla Military Base near Lithuania’s capital, Vilnius—only 20 km from Belarus, a Russian ally. Lithuania borders Belarus and Russia’s Baltic exclave Kaliningrad, and the Suwałki Gap connecting Lithuania and Poland is considered the weakest point of NATO’s eastern defense.

German Chancellor Merz stated at the brigade’s inauguration ceremony that this step signifies the Bundeswehr “entering a new era” and that “we are taking NATO’s eastern flank defense into our own hands.” He reiterated Germany’s commitment to NATO’s collective defense and promised that Germany would assume responsibility and “not let European allies down.” Lithuanian President Nausėda called the move a “milestone” for NATO’s security architecture and for Europe. On the 26th, Merz publicly emphasized that Germany and its allies will no longer limit the range of weapons supplied to Ukraine. On the 28th, Merz promised visiting Ukrainian President Zelensky to help develop long-range missile systems.

In response to Germany stationing armored troops near its border, lifting missile range restrictions in line with the U.S., UK, and France, and assisting Ukraine in developing long-range missiles, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov warned Germany on the 28th not to repeat the mistakes of the two World Wars. He stressed that “Germany’s direct involvement in the war is obvious; it is sliding down the same slope that led to its collapse twice in the last century.” Dmitry Medvedev, Vice Chairman of the Russian Security Council, stated that Germany’s equipment and experts are directly involved in operations against Russia. Therefore, Germany is effectively a participant in the Ukraine conflict and has once again become an enemy of Russia.

On March 21, Germany’s Federal Council approved a €500 billion fiscal package, marking a departure from its long-held “debt brake”-centered fiscal conservatism, allowing large-scale government borrowing to invest in defense and infrastructure. The German parliament amended the Basic Law to remove limits on defense and cybersecurity spending. The 2025 defense budget will increase by €100 billion, and total defense spending over the next decade may reach €1 trillion. This is aimed at modernizing the under-equipped Bundeswehr and significantly boosting Germany’s defense strength and combat readiness. According to Reuters, NATO will also ask Germany to add seven more brigades—about 40,000 troops—to its NATO contribution, aiming to raise the total force defending against Russia to 35 to 50 brigades. This alone will require Germany to quadruple its current air defense capacity.

After Taking Office, Merz Quickly Deployed Troops to NATO-Russia Confrontation Zones, Raising Historic Concerns

After taking office, Merz swiftly decided to station troops in the frontline areas where NATO confronts Russia and made bold statements such as allowing Ukraine to use Western weapons to attack Russian territory. These actions not only escalate the military confrontation between Germany, Europe, and even the NATO bloc with Russia, but also easily evoke painful memories of the two world wars—especially the tragic lessons of Germany and Russia waging war over control of the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea.

Germany was the source of both World Wars. After World War II, its territory was fragmented, militarism and Nazi ideology were thoroughly eradicated, and the U.S. stationed heavy troops there for strategic containment. Germany was integrated into NATO’s collective defense system, which maintained European peace and security for decades. Based on the lessons and reflections from the two world wars, post-war Germany maintained a low level of armament, lacked an independent military-industrial production system, and pursued a pacifist foreign policy for a long time.

After the Cold War, as the U.S. continued its strategic retrenchment and shifted its military focus to the Asia-Pacific, and the UK exited the EU, Germany—growing stronger—became one of the EU’s dual political engines alongside France and the bloc’s unmatched economic powerhouse. Its status as a great power has continued to rise, as has its determination and role in promoting European strategic autonomy, diplomatic independence, and defense self-reliance. While Germany is unlikely to start another European war on its own, its increasing will to lead Europe toward defense independence by supporting Ukraine adds more tension and volatility to its relationship with Russia. If Merz’s government continues down this path, it could lead to open conflict with Russia. A German-Russian war would inevitably invoke NATO’s Article 5, dragging the entire alliance into a world war with Russia.

Professor Jiang Feng, a well-known expert on European and German issues, once said: “The concept of ‘reason through culture’ that emerged a few years ago was Europe’s contribution to international political thought, but it has now been nearly forgotten—replaced by the militarization of diplomacy and security policy. This militarization has become a central topic in European and German political debate… German diplomacy needs the courage to give Kant’s vision of ‘perpetual peace’ a new space in today’s era. Trying to create more security and peace through more weapons and larger military exercises may backfire.”

Facing the massive shocks brought by “Trump 2.0,” a desperate Europe appears to be resolutely marching toward a “post-American” era—toward a “European path” of strategic autonomy, diplomatic independence, and military self-reliance. Europe is preparing to give up the dividends of the long-enjoyed “peace under American rule,” aiming instead to shape a “New Continent” formed by a Europe-Russia bipolarity and restore a shattered Ukraine as part of a “New West.” However, this ambition is far from realistic, and a new, balanced solution must be sought.

Germany, the country that launched two world wars and suffered two national catastrophes, now stands at a new crossroads: should it insist on expanding NATO and maintain long-term strategic confrontation with Russia, or cut its losses and reach a comprehensive peace with Russia to jointly build a Europe of lasting peace, comprehensive security, and shared prosperity? This question not only tests the Merz government’s political will and strategic calculation but also its historical judgment and wisdom.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.