From Gaza to Venezuela: The Erosion of International Rules and the Possibility of a New Regional Order

What the Gaza war revealed was not only the scale of the humanitarian catastrophe or the international community’s failure to halt acts amounting to genocide and serious crimes against civilians, but also a deeper structural flaw in the international system itself. This flaw became even more evident with the abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro—an internationally recognized head of state—an incident that can hardly be separated from a broader context in which international rules are selectively invoked or ignored according to the interests of the dominant power.

These developments suggest that the United States, as the leading actor in the international system, no longer treats the so-called “rules-based international order” as a binding framework for all, but rather as an instrumental tool—applied when it serves U.S. interests and bypassed when it becomes an obstacle to confronting emerging international powers that increasingly challenge American political, economic, and military dominance.

In this sense, Gaza does not represent an exceptional case, but rather part of a wider pattern. Efforts to advance Israeli recognition of Somaliland, despite their contradiction with United Nations resolutions and the principle of territorial integrity, similarly reflect a growing willingness to bypass established international legal norms when geopolitical and security considerations align—particularly in regions that control strategic waterways or serve as key nodes in regional and global power struggles.

A comparable dynamic can be observed in southern Yemen, where the Southern Transitional Council operates in a gray zone between de facto control and regional backing on the one hand, and international legitimacy on the other. These developments do not merely reflect the complexity of the Yemeni conflict, but illustrate how redefining political entities and borders is increasingly managed through faits accomplis, amid the absence of genuine international will to protect fragile states or impose comprehensive political solutions.

At the same time, this international conduct is contributing to greater coordination among major and emerging powers, and to renewed efforts to envision an alternative international order—one less subject to unilateral dominance and more reflective of evolving power balances. Such an order may not necessarily be more just, but it does indicate a growing recognition that the era of unipolarity is approaching its limits.

If assessments suggesting a declining likelihood of nuclear weapons use in future conflicts prove accurate—not because the threat has disappeared, but because the political and humanitarian costs have become prohibitively high even for major powers—then international competition is likely to shift more decisively toward conventional military tools, economic pressure, technological rivalry, and the management of spheres of influence. Within this framework, the region stands out as one of the arenas most exposed to these dynamics, yet it is not without options.

The region’s potential to move from being merely a theater of conflict to becoming an influential actor depends first on the ability of key regional states to transition from crisis management toward more sustainable forms of partnership. This does not imply grand alliances or ideological blocs, but rather the institutionalization of a minimum level of cooperation—particularly in security, defense, and economic domains—capable of reducing external dependency and increasing the cost of international intervention in regional affairs. Such a path, however, cannot be automatic or technical; it is a complex political process shaped by intersecting interests, divergent visions, and a long legacy of mutual distrust among regional states.

Before any meaningful regional role can be realized, the stability of the nation-state itself remains a fundamental prerequisite. Experiences in Palestine, Yemen, and the Horn of Africa demonstrate that state fragility opens the door to projects of fragmentation and political re-engineering, often justified under security, humanitarian, or developmental pretexts. Addressing internal divisions through genuine political and social settlements—ones that account for the economic and social grievances of marginalized groups—thus becomes a strategic necessity rather than merely a reformist or moral aspiration. This requires moving beyond narrow security-centered approaches toward broader frameworks that rebuild the relationship between state and society and reduce vulnerability to external penetration.

Should some regional states succeed in achieving this minimum level of internal stability and regional coordination, it becomes possible to speak of the gradual emergence of a regional bloc capable of asserting itself within the international system—not as a hegemonic power, but as an actor that cannot be ignored in matters of stability, energy, trade, and the security of strategic maritime corridors. This trajectory, however, will not be cost-free, as it will face resistance from domestic elites that benefit from the status quo, as well as containment or obstruction efforts by international powers that view regional cohesion as a threat to their interests.

Ultimately, the future of the region’s role will not be determined solely by its latent capabilities, but by its capacity to engage realistically with ongoing transformations in the international system and to convert them into carefully calculated opportunities—without falling into illusions of power or relying exclusively on narratives of victimhood. This is a long and cumulative process, marked by tension and contestation, yet it remains far less costly than continued fragility and dependency within an international order that is rapidly changing under harsher and less predictable rules.