Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis travels to Ankara today to discuss a new chapter and a positive agenda with Greece. Technically, this is the counterpart of President Erdogan’s visit to Athens in recent months, but it does not look like an ordinary return visit. The Greek prime minister was interviewed by a Turkish newspaper (Milliyet, 12 May) and President Erdogan by a Greek newspaper (Kathimerini, 12 May). The tone of both leaders is cautious and attentive. Obviously, they are trying to achieve ‘something new’.

As someone who has been closely following the Turkish-Greek tensions, crises and periods of détente from time to time, I have no intention of adding water to the cooked pot; however, since I do not know exactly what the cooked pot is, for whom, how and by whom it is being cooked, I would like to share some of my concerns and my thoughts/evaluations on how these problems, which I have been pondering for years, can be resolved.

First of all, it is necessary to analyse why and how this period of softening was reached. As you may recall, after a series of crises in the second half of 2020 (the Idlib crisis with Russia in January-February 2020 and the Libya crisis with Egypt in the summer of 2020), we found ourselves in a full diplomatic-military crisis with Greece. As a result of the wrong and ideological foreign policy that we have been insisting on for years, we have turned the whole region against us, made enemies of countries like Egypt and Israel, which have always been neutral in the Greek-Turkish issues, and even made Athens dream of taking us on militarily. Why not?

How and why did Greece go from confrontating Turkey in the Aegean to confront Turkey today?

If Turkey clashes with Egypt over Libya – a very serious scenario in the summer of 2020 – and Israel supports Egypt in the armed conflicts, why should Greece not carry out a fait accompli operation in the Aegean against Turkey, which seems to be feuding with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates at the same time? Moreover, in such a scenario, even France could ‘sell’ Greece enough Rafale fighters overnight. Even Armenia could have extended its front against Azerbaijan through Tovuz, and Turkey could have been shown the error of its ways. When the 15 July coup attempt took place in the summer of 2016, Athens complained that it was not sufficiently prepared to carry out such a military operation. I should also note here that in those years, when I tried to explain that such isolation was contrary to the spirit of the art of foreign policy and that we needed a serious review, I was subjected to a lot of lamentations by the so-called foreign policy experts (!).

In the end, Ankara had to realise that the flawed policies it insisted on pursuing, as if it were a finalist in a competition to create the best example of the worst foreign policy, were unsustainable. The rapid transformation of normalisation between Turkey and Russia into ‘rapprochement’ led to the historic victory of Azerbaijan, which Turkey had fully supported in the forty-four-day war, while Ankara quickly restored its relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and even Israel. What is more, it did so in the space of a year. Although Syria remains the limping leg in this series, its remarkably balanced and cautious policy towards the upcoming Ukrainian war, especially since the second half of 2021, has once again shattered Greece’s crude dreams.

For Mitsotakis and Greece, an adventure in the Aegean against a Turkey that has restored its relations with Egypt and Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean, opened new and clean pages with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and improved its relations with Russia in every field, while Athens’ relations with Moscow plummeted during the Ukrainian war, would have been literally suicidal. There is no doubt that Athens has studied what happened to Armenia when it attacked Tovuz. President Erdoğan’s statement that “we can come suddenly one night” should not be taken lightly. This is where the 2023 earthquake came to the rescue. Just as in 1999, this time Greece sent rescue teams, and both the Turkish and Greek media seized on the issue, making it the beginning of a positive agenda and a new page in politics.

New risks in a new period

In Turkey, where the Greek issue is not a serious agenda in domestic public opinion, decision-makers are always at ease when they talk about reconciling with Athens and solving the problems, because the problems with this country are not used to make a premium in our domestic politics. Even during the time of this government, which made foreign policy a domestic agenda, this issue was not used very much. But that is not the case with Greece. In what can be called an abuse of democracy, every party and every government has used the issue of Turkey to the hilt, publicising every problem with its content, Greek theses and red lines.

As a result, a negotiation process based on give and take has become almost impossible for Greek governments. That is why Greek governments always cling to this excuse. The worst thing is that Europe and America, which often mediated these negotiations, flattered all the politicians/decision-makers by saying ‘you are a big state, don’t compare yourself with Greece, you can be more generous’. This should not happen this time. If there is to be a positive agenda with Greece – and Athens knows very well that the reality of the multipolar world is in favour of Turkey and against Greece – then we should not allow our problems with Greece to be addressed within the Turkey-EU agenda or based on Turkey’s EU membership perspective, as if it actually exists. In short, the problems should be addressed through bilateral negotiations and outside the framework that has so far been polluted/poisoned by the Turkey-EU acquis.

As Dendias said in Ankara, the issue for Greece is simple: Ankara must recognise Greek Cyprus as the Republic of Cyprus, as enshrined in the EU-Turkey acquis through the efforts of Athens and with the complicity of all EU member states that do not want Turkey to become a member, and accept that the only problem in the Aegean, in line with Greek theses, is to refer the issue to the Hague Court of Justice or arbitration to determine where the continental shelf runs between the easternmost Greek-dominated islands and the Turkish mainland. Other issues, such as Greece’s claim to 12 miles of airspace in violation of international law, the arming of islands with non-military status, islands with undetermined status in the Aegean, the issue of adjacent islands and rocks, etc., are all fabricated by Turkey in order to open Greece’s rights to discussion, and Greece refuses to negotiate on these issues.

Wouldn’t it be nice to create appeasement?

It may be possible, but it also involves serious risks. For example, if we can achieve a détente with Greece in the Aegean, without compromising an inch on our thesis that the Cyprus problem should be solved on the basis of two states, so much the better! But such a détente should not take place if, as we have always done, we show unnecessary courtesy by saying that we should not frighten or offend Athens, and if we accuse each other internally of being those who want a solution and those who do not want a solution, And if we start accusing each other internally as those who want a solution and those who do not want a solution, because it will lead to compromising the steps to be taken towards the recognition of the TRNC, as well as justifying the thesis of the pro-federationists within the TRNC that ‘we told you so, Turkey will say a few words about two states and then take a step back’.

It should not be forgotten that in the last century of the Empire, Greece always managed to win both when it was at odds with the Ottoman Empire and when it was friendly with it. The reason for this is that Europe often took a pro-Greek stance. Atatürk put an end to this cursed period. After the Second World War, Ankara was always vigilant on the Cyprus issue and the Turkish-Greek problems that spread from there to the Aegean and did not allow the West to take initiatives in favour of Greece. However, it must be admitted that this policy could be maintained until the second half of the 1990s, when the EU issue was sold to Turkey through a massive media campaign, and in the two decades that followed, Turkey’s Cyprus and Greece policies were almost turned upside down within the European Union process. The recent caution and the advantages and benefits of multipolarity should not be wasted on a non-existent EU perspective.

7 months have passed… The phrase “as much as necessary” used by American officials has been replaced by “as much as we can”… American Congressmen, who would have rushed to the Congressional benches in the morning to vote for the aid package if Netanyahu had been allergic to spring, were no longer able to show the same enthusiasm when it came to Ukraine. At least some of the Republicans…

Over time, this particular group started to get in the good graces of the rest of the Congress. They said, “You’re throwing Putin a lifeline.” “You’re siding with the enemies of the United States,” they said. They probably also said “the arms industry is hungry”, but they said it quietly. But this conservative faction did not say “Noah says Noah”. They even sacked Kevin McCarthy, their own Speaker, who had hinted that he would make a deal with Biden for future packages, without blinking an eye. Meanwhile, time was running out. Ukraine was running out of ammunition and was retreating a little further on the ground every day.

CIA director Burns issued a grim prescription: “If this package is not passed now, Ukraine will not live to see 2025”.

As you know, the leader of this group was Donald J. Trump. The populist leader argued that the unconditional money given to Ukraine should be spent on issues of direct concern to Americans, such as border security and infrastructure needs, and many thought this stubbornness would be short-lived. “After the first of the year, Ukraine will begin to feel the lack of ammunition,” the Pentagon said. Then it would be resolved somehow in December, wouldn’t it?

The meetings in Congress were very heated. The Republicans wanted extra money for border security and tax cuts for the rich. Both were unacceptable to the Democrats. Mike Johnson, the new Republican spokesman, who had arrived after a lot of fighting within his party, was stamping rejection on Biden’s monthly packages before he even opened his eyes.

By December, there was no sound from the package. By February, Johnson was still calling the new proposals “stillborn”. Ukrainian President Zelenski had already raised the tone of his complaint. At this rate, a Russian summer offensive could lead to a serious disaster.

Persuasion tours

If the four years of Trump’s rule have taught his opponents anything, it is that he is not a man of principle. If the conditions were right, the former president could be convinced of anything. They started with Israel. They put support for Israel and Ukraine in the same package. But who were they fooling? How many brave Democrats could there be who would say no to aid for Israel? Of course, this could not be an offer that would “scare” the Republicans in return for support for Ukraine. And it didn’t. Support for Israel reached the White House without much fuss at the Congressional tables.

The border security issue was a dangerous adventure for the Democrats. Caving in to the Republicans would have alienated their own voters. The Muslim vote had already been lost on the Israel issue, and Biden could not risk more.

The picture that now emerged was grave for Biden’s plans for Ukraine. Obviously, Trump’s intention was to prevent the approval of this package until after the elections. Thus, Biden would go into the elections with the Ukraine disaster on his back and would surely be defeated.

Then something happened. First, Mike Johnson’s language changed. Suddenly he started talking about “what would happen if we left Ukraine in the middle”. When Marjorie Taylor Greene (MTG), known as the radical Trumpist of Parliament, smelled “betrayal”, she gave Johnson an ultimatum: “Don’t forget McCarthy, don’t you dare!”.

But unlike MTG, Trump thought differently this time.

The former president said: “We’re tired of giving gifts.We might consider lending money to Ukraine”. Although this comment suggests that Trump was somehow persuaded, it still sounded odd. As the war entered its third year, Ukraine’s economy was in shambles. To pay its soldiers, it had to receive $8 billion a month from the West. If the war ended today, it would take $500 billion to rebuild the country. If I went to a bank in my situation and asked for a loan, I would probably be laughed at. But Donald Trump, the author of The Art of the Deal, is obviously convinced.

Who am I kidding, of course he wasn’t convinced. But he must have got something out of it. But what was it?

What does Trump want?

We are in a period where Biden and the Republicans, who were in favour of supporting Ukraine, have realised that nothing can be done despite Trump. Whether they like him or not, there is a populist figure they have to convince. To understand what Trump might want, we need to go back five years, to the Ukraine issue that started the debate about Trump’s impeachment in 2019.

While there was talk of Biden running in the 2020 election, Trump started going through old notebooks.Remember the famous Biden son laptop incident? Hunter Biden was working for an oligarch’s energy company in Ukraine and used the power of his father, who was Vice President at the time (i.e. the whole of the US), to get rid of the prosecutor who was after the company’s owner. Trump was aware of this at the time and made plans to beat Biden in the election.

Meanwhile, just like today, aid packages for Ukraine were waiting in Congress. The amount of aid was much smaller and the public did not focus on it. But the package was not approved simply because Trump did not want it.

He called Zelenski. “You had a very fair prosecutor.It’s a shame,” he said.He asked Zelenski to appoint a prosecutor to go after Biden. It was the only way he could get the aid he was holding up in Congress released. The incident escalated.Because of that speech, the question of Trump’s impeachment erupted.But it told us what Trump could demand in such a position.

Fast forward to today. The Wall Street Journal reports that Trump has had two important visits in a month. One was, of course, Johnson, the Speaker of the House, and the other was Andrzej Duda, the former President of Poland. Duda, a leader known as a Trumpite, was also a good friend of Trump’s. They must have thought that a right-wing populist would understand the language of the right-wing populist, so they organised such a meeting. Duda explained the gravity of the situation to Trump. Johnson found a more effective vein.

In fact, Trump said: “If I am elected, I will bring peace in one day”. How would he do that if Ukraine were defeated today? Ukraine had to hold out at least until Trump took office. For some reason, CIA director William Burns said the package would keep Ukraine alive until 2025. If Trump wins, his inauguration will be in January.

Before we forget, there are also Trump’s ongoing lawsuits. It is rumoured that the money he has earmarked for his campaign could run out as a result of these lawsuits. Trump may have made a deal over Ukraine in order to avoid both financial damage and the blockage of his electoral path.

In conclusion, although Trump is popular today because of his isolationist and “America First” ideology, his policies are based on his personal interests. While 101 Republicans supported the package that Trump did not oppose, 112 voted against it. So despite everything, the isolationist wing does not even listen to Trump when it needs to. The former president’s order of importance is as follows: Trump first, then America, and Israel can squeeze in depending on the situation. Ironically, even in this equation, America is ahead compared to Biden’s order of importance.

Iran’s retaliation against Israel has once again revealed the wonderful products of our conspiracy theory industry. I have no doubt that we will be in the top three in the world without having played a game, and if we are on form we will be playing either a Middle Eastern or Balkan country in the final. If conspiracy theories were an exportable product, we would certainly be in the top five in the world in terms of per capita income.

In fact, the tensions between Iran and Israel are literally a game of chicken. In reality, the Iranian regime is just one of Israel’s puppets. The government in Tehran pretends to be against Israel, but behind the scenes it is working with it. If it can mobilise hundreds of drones, why doesn’t it hit important Israeli targets? Or why has no one been killed in Israel?

Of course, I know that there is no point in trying to refute them; but it is impossible not to regret that these conspiracy theories can be voiced uncontrollably in a significant part of the media, as an indicator of the intellectual level of our country. Listening to them, I feel like saying: ‘Hitler was also a Soviet agent. Stalin recruited him early on. The Second World War was already a central piece. Hitler’s aim was to ensure Germany’s defeat and to take control of the Soviet Union’s vast Eastern European territories’. Incidentally, the fact that the Soviet Union alone suffered 27 million deaths (one and a half times the population of Turkey, which was eighteen million in 1945) is a minor detail. It is not likely to disprove my conspiracy theory. Besides, there is no one around to ask these questions.

Codes of Iranian retaliation

In essence, Iran responded to the Israeli attack on its embassy in Damascus with more than adequate retaliation. More than adequate because Iran could have hit some Israeli targets outside Israeli territory. In fact, in recent months it had hit some sites in northern Iraq allegedly used by Israeli intelligence. But this time it targeted Israeli territory directly. And it should be underlined immediately that this is the most comprehensive attack on the entire territory of Israel since its establishment, taking its place in military-political history.

As for the claim that Iran did not or could not use weapons that could have inflicted greater damage on Israel, the answer to the first question is directly related to Tehran’s aversion to a regional war. From the Iranian point of view, the clock is ticking in its favour because Iran’s influence has grown enormously in Iraq and Syria – supposed democracies that Washington, with not very clever calculations, destroyed simply because they were anti-Israeli. In these two countries, groups known to be pro-Iranian and calling themselves the Axis of Resistance have gained power, while the Hezbollah movement, which was born in Lebanon as a result of Israel’s policy of nothing but violence, has established full contact with Iran through Syria. Add to this the strengthening of the Ansarullah movement in Yemen and the gradual Hezbollahisation of Hamas, i.e. its transformation into an effective resistance organisation, and Iran seems to have placed Israel under a serious siege in the region.

As multipolarity irreversibly restructures the world balance, Israel’s main supporters, the US and Europe, calculate that they will suffer a serious loss of power and sphere of influence, and they are not wrong in their calculations. There is no doubt that the decline in the power of the US and the collective West will reduce Israel’s room for manoeuvre in the Middle East. Moreover, Iran, which is said to have reached the final stage in its efforts to build nuclear weapons, has no reason to want a regional war. On the contrary, it is Netanyahu and Israel that want a regional war and are trying to drag America into it, because the Tel Aviv government, having achieved nothing that could be considered a success (the rescue of hostages, the capture/killing of prominent Hamas leaders, etc.) in its genocidal ethnic cleansing operation in Gaza, which for the first time has been strongly criticised even by Western public opinion, sees its salvation in dragging Iran into the war. This is why he is carrying out his provocations against both Hezbollah and Iran.

Netanyahu is also using provocations against Iran in order to draw the American administration, which does not want a war with Iran, into the conflict. The recent bombing of the consulate in Damascus was designed to do just that. Iran has therefore had to build up its strike capability on nuances (an area in which conspiracy theorists are very poor). In other words, it had to respond, but it had to do so in coordination with the United States in a way that would not lead to a major war. That is exactly what Iran did over the weekend. Hundreds of drones and Hezbollah’s rapid fire, which began as they approached Israeli airspace, must have been designed to keep Israel’s so-called Iron Dome air defence system busy with more targets than it could handle. Taking advantage of the vacuum created by this saturation, ballistic missiles apparently caused serious damage to critical Israeli airfields (Nevatim and Ramon).

Moreover, it appears that Iran did not hit these airfields with hypersonic missiles, because if it had, the details of an important weapon in Tehran’s inventory would have been revealed and Israel, on the one hand, and the United States, the United Kingdom and their allies, on the other, would have begun a feverish study of what could be done against this weapon. In other words, Iran seems to have applied the most important rule of strategy and retaliated without showing all its cards. It has shown Tel Aviv that it can strike anywhere in Israel without using hypersonic missiles.

CNN ezzle

It is also clear that there is nothing serious in Iran’s claims that the attention of anti-Israel or Israel-critical public opinion or Western states, which was focused on Gaza, has suddenly turned to the Iran-Israel conflict and that Gaza has been forgotten. Such rhetoric is based on the assumption that Israel has stopped or will stop its operations in Gaza. But after this retaliation, in which Iran has shown Israel what it can do, eyes will turn back to Gaza. On the one hand, if the Israeli offensive in Gaza is suspended or stopped, this would be a serious point in Iran’s favour because it would put it in the position of being the country that protects/rescues the people of Gaza from Netanyahu’s genocide. On the other hand, if the Israeli offensive continues, all eyes will turn there again.

There is also a contradictory situation in Western countries between public opinion, which is increasingly critical of Israel, and the governments that support Israel, and this situation is likely to continue. In other words, we are talking about a Western world that will not/cannot stop supporting Israel, whether Iran retaliates or not. From this point of view, we can conclude that Iran has given a nuanced response when balancing this issue with the demands of its own public opinion for retaliation. The retaliation was both sufficient and did not lead to a regional war. So Netanyahu did not win.

The repercussions of Iran’s retaliation in regional politics showed once again that it has not received, and is unlikely to receive, political support from the Arab countries. While Jordan actively defended its airspace against Iran directly with Israel and the United States, the rest of the Arab countries, with the exception of Syria, did not allow the passage of Iranian drones and missiles. This shows that the Arab countries are in favour of treating the Palestinian issue as their own family problem. These Arab countries, which are negotiating and struggling with Israel and America on the Palestinian issue, consider the attempts of non-Arab Muslim states to take a central role in the Palestinian issue with political Islamist slogans and religious justifications such as Islamic brotherhood as an intrusion of others into their legitimate sphere, and there is no doubt that there are lessons to be learned from the Turkish government, which has shown its willingness to be active on this issue on every occasion.

For the time being, the possibility of a regional war seems to have been averted, but it is almost impossible to predict what provocations Netanyahu or any other Israeli government might resort to if it wants to launch an all-out war against Iran, dragging America into it. There is no Israeli political formation/government on the horizon that would internalise a two-state solution by taking serious steps backwards in Palestine, taking into account the possibility of diminishing American aid in a multipolar world. On the other hand, while those in Gaza are being subjected to genocidal ethnic cleansing, the Palestinians in the West Bank, whose homes and lands are being confiscated, who are constantly oppressed and persecuted, have no choice but to resist. The region is likely to remain a hot zone of conflict in a multipolar world until the US presidential election. If Trump is elected and translates his ideas into foreign policy, the regional equation could change significantly.