Prof. Dr. Seriye Sezen, who has been following the CPC and the meetings of the National People’s Congress for almost 20 years, answered our questions about the ‘two sessions’: ‘Instead of being associated with economic problems, the Chinese leadership wanted to be in the international public eye with its policies on global problems and its foreign policy.’
This year’s meetings of China’s top legislature and top political advisory body (the National People’s Congress and the People’s Political Consultative Conference), known as the ‘two sessions’, are drawing to a close. The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference held its closing session on Sunday. The National People’s Congress will also conclude on Monday at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.
2024 is seen as an important year for Beijing, marking the 75th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China and the implementation of the 14th Five-Year Plan.
Growth target and quality economic development, financial system reform, private sector promotion and market stabilisation, new productive forces and quality development, accelerating quality opening up, ageing population and declining birth rate, military technology development were important agenda items at this year’s meetings.
We discussed the prominent discussions at the two sessions and their impact on international public opinion with Prof. Dr Seriye Sezen, a faculty member at Ankara University’s Faculty of Political Sciences and one of the closest followers of China in Turkey.
‘Attention was on the government report’
How do you assess the agenda, functioning and atmosphere of this year’s ‘two sessions’, considered the most important event in the Chinese political calendar?
This year’s meetings were the second session of the 14th National People’s Congress, which will be elected for a five-year term until 2023. It was a rather routine, business-as-usual session, with no agenda items such as major personnel appointments and legal regulations. The practice of keeping the meeting short due to the COVID-19 pandemic continued this year. As the meetings were held at a time when China’s economic problems were more on the agenda, attention was focused on the government report delivered by the Prime Minister, which included an assessment of the past year and targets for 2024.
‘An effort to be remembered for its policies on global problems rather than economic ones’
For the first time in thirty years, the Chinese premier will not hold a press conference at the end of the meeting. What do you think is the reason for this change? Is it the importance of the party leadership? Or is it what China calls ‘specialisation’?
The fact that a tradition that has existed for thirty years was not implemented this year, and that it will not be implemented during the 14th NPC term except in a special case, has attracted attention and led to various speculations. However, the ‘two sessions’ and the press conferences held in connection with them provide an opportunity for China to explain itself and its major policies to the domestic and international public. Officials at ministerial and vice-ministerial level met with the press, but the political weight and responsibility of the Premier is different.
Although the cancellation of the Prime Minister’s press conference has been associated in the Western press with the Party leadership’s priority, I disagree with this association. I think Premier Li Qiang is not in danger of overshadowing Xi’s leadership, as his predecessor Li Keqiang was. In addition, Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s press conference and statements received a lot of media coverage. This result made me think that Chinese leaders may have wanted to be in the national and international public eye with their foreign policy and policies on global issues, rather than their economic issues/problems, and thus may have tended to set the agenda according to their own preferences.
‘Optimistic realistic growth target’
What do you think about the prominent issues and decisions that have been discussed? For example, do you think the 5 percent growth target is realistic? The IMF forecast was around 4.6 per cent.
I think the 5 percent growth target is ‘optimistically realistic’. Since the legitimacy of the Communist Party of China depends to a large extent on its ability to promote economic prosperity, the leadership needs to maintain a growth rate that will sustain economic recovery. On the other hand, both the problems facing the global economy (slowing growth, regional conflicts hampering world trade…) and China’s domestic problems (insufficient demand for domestic consumption, high urban youth unemployment, population decline and ageing) suggest that this growth will be difficult to achieve. China today faces the risk of ‘ageing without getting richer’ and ‘falling into the middle-income trap’.
However, I cannot reconcile the government’s announcement of an unrealistic growth target with China’s policy of setting itself up for failure a year later. Another reason is that the announced macroeconomic and social indicators are determined after a long period of preparation, deliberation and discussion, in other words, by a rational method. The deliberations and discussions take place not only within the party, but also with the participation of experts and interested organisations. In addition, the government receives suggestions from citizens for the government report through media platforms. The report also analyses the internal and external conditions and emphasises that it will not be easy to achieve the goals under these conditions. Because it will not be easy, a more flexible expression is used for 2024, such as ‘around 5 per cent’, instead of a precise rate as in the last two years. This target is therefore not far from the IMF’s forecast of 4.6% or JPMorgan’s 4.9%.
‘No unusual increase in the defence budget’
How do you evaluate the 7.2 percent increase in the defence budget? In the Western press, it was interpreted as a sign that China’s attitude towards Taiwan would harden and its ‘aggression’ in the region would increase. On the other hand, Chinese experts argue that the projected increase is only 1.2 per cent of GDP and that it is ‘moderate and reasonable’.
There is no extraordinary increase in the defence budget; the same increase was foreseen for 2023. The average increase in the defence budget for 2018-2024 is already 7.2 per cent. Since 2015, the defence budget has increased by single digits. Since there is no extraordinary increase in 2024 compared to the past, it is a far-fetched interpretation to consider this rate as an indication that China’s attitude towards Taiwan will harden or its aggression in the region will increase.
But China needs a dynamic, globally powerful military, capable of using new technologies effectively, and it needs a defence budget to match this goal. Secondly, China’s policy on Taiwan is clear and the One China Policy has been adopted by the United Nations and the countries that have diplomatic relations with China, particularly the United States. China clearly states that it will intervene in Taiwan only under two conditions: if Taiwan declares its independence and if it is occupied by a foreign power, otherwise it is in favour of a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue. However, it is also known that the US has been pursuing provocative policies forcing China to intervene in Taiwan for the last two years and in this context, the discourse of intervention in Taiwan has been kept alive in the Western press. Therefore, it should be a logical conclusion that China should take into account the possibility of the realisation of the two conditions I have mentioned and make its preparations accordingly.
China is the second largest defence spender after the US, but its defence budget as a share of GDP lags behind many other countries. In 2022, these ratios are 3.5 per cent in the US, 2.7 per cent in South Korea, 2.2 per cent in the United Kingdom, and 1.6 per cent in China.
‘New productive forces complement the objective of quality development’
One of the most prominent themes was the concept of ‘new productive forces’ emphasised by Chinese President Xi Jinping. It has been argued that sectors focused on advanced technologies will not make a serious contribution to the Chinese economy in the short term. Is this a long-term plan? Is China investing in the future? Do you think these new forces can be realised in existing sectors?
This concept complements the goal of ‘high-quality development’ that Xi has presented as a new development model. The terms ‘innovation’, ‘science and technology’ and ‘high quality’ are frequently mentioned in the government report, and the goals of innovation, increasing total factor productivity through innovation, digital industry and transforming traditional industries into digital industries are included.
I do not see high-quality development as a new development model, but rather as an adaptation of Hu’s ‘scientific development’ model of the early 2000s. As far as I know, China is the country that has invested the most in artificial intelligence, and many plans and programmes have been drawn up under Xi that envisage a breakthrough in new technologies. China needs to do this to overcome the risks of ‘ageing without getting richer’ and the ‘middle-income trap’, and to achieve its 2049 goals. But the United States is determined to block this move. On the other hand, the problem is not only how to embody new forces in existing sectors, but also how to deal with the problems that this transformation will create for other sectors, for the workforce and for society as a whole. Therefore, the difficulties of transforming the country’s internal conditions and the competition with the US will not make this process any easier.
‘Taking the initiative in foreign policy’
Will the meeting have new implications for Chinese foreign policy? Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi sent clear messages to the US in his speech. He also stressed strong mediation on Ukraine and Gaza.
No, this meeting will not have any impact on foreign policy. Policy changes in China are not so fast, sudden and short-term. In China, the meetings where we will see macro-policy changes are the C congresses, usually held in November each year, rather than the NPC meetings. The NPC functions more as a complement to the legal process of the policies adopted at the Party Congresses and to ensure that the necessary regulations are put into practice. It is therefore necessary to follow both congresses together.
With Xi’s third term, China has moved towards a more active, initiative-taking foreign policy. Diplomatic visits, mediation initiatives and the successive publication of policy documents explaining China’s position on global issues are indicators of this policy. Wang Yi’s statements do not indicate a new discourse and policy shift, but rather a continuation of this approach.
According to your observations, are the two sessions being followed with ‘sufficient’ interest from Turkey and the world? If not, why not? If yes, what do you think is the reason for this interest?
I have been following the sessions of the CPC and the National People’s Congress for almost 20 years, and I can say that in parallel with China’s increasing weight in the international arena, these events have been followed with relatively increasing interest in the national and international media. But compared to Turkey, the international media interest is always higher. In Turkey, public and some private media organisations now have staff in Beijing. However, I still think that for a country like China, the attention paid to important political events is still insufficient and still heavily dependent on Western sources. But this is not unique to China; in Turkey, the traditional media’s interest in the outside world is generally weak.
