Opinion
Is India’s Trump strategy on track?
Donald Trump remains one of the world’s most unpredictable leaders, yet India appears confident in its approach to managing relations with him. Indeed, the Indo-US relationship arguably reached new heights during Trump’s first term. Under his administration, the US became India’s largest trading partner, defense deals worth billions of dollars were finalized, and the two nations collaborated closely on shared “challenges,” notably China.
Naturally, the path wasn’t always smooth, particularly concerning trade disputes. However, many observers believe India navigated its relationship with Trump more effectively than many other nations.
What accounts for this perceived success?
Three primary factors contribute to India’s approach: economic engagement, the personal rapport between Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and India’s strategic concessions yielding benefits for the US.
Trump, often described as a transactional leader, doesn’t operate from a “grand theory” of foreign policy. Instead, he tends to evaluate relationships based on tangible benefits for the US. In this context, India’s primary offering is its expanding economy. The country’s recent growth trajectory, particularly the burgeoning middle class, holds significant interest for a leader focused on economic outcomes.
In 2017, Trump said, “Since India opened its economy, it has seen astonishing growth and a new world of opportunities for its expanding middle class.” This economic growth presented opportunities for US firms to sell to Indian companies and attract Indian investment into the US. This dynamic was evident during Trump’s first meeting with Modi in 2017: SpiceJet finalized a $10 billion deal with Boeing for over 100 aircraft, and the US agreed to sell $2 billion worth of Predator drones to the Indian military. Trump publicly commended New Delhi for these agreements.
Subsequent meetings between Modi and Trump consistently emphasized trade deals and investments. New Delhi, similar to strategies employed by other nations, highlighted India’s investments in the US and significant defense purchases, aligning with Trump’s focus on economic wins.
Despite significant differences in personality and background, Trump appeared to hold Modi in high regard. Trump has referred to Modi as “India’s Elvis” and one of the US’s “greatest friends.” Notably, Modi was the first leader Trump hosted for a working dinner at the White House in 2017. Trump also lauded Modi for his “tremendous accomplishments,” praise not typically bestowed on many other world leaders. Critics suggest Trump admires Modi’s “populist strongman” persona. Trump himself alluded to this dynamic in a 2024 podcast interview, describing Modi as a “good guy” who could nevertheless be “a real pain in the ass,” specifically referencing Modi’s firm stance regarding Pakistan.
Modi, in turn, demonstrated adeptness in managing the relationship. Large-scale events like the 2019 “Howdy Modi!” rally in Texas and the 2020 “Namaste Trump” event in India, both drawing massive crowds, clearly impressed Trump. He praised Modi as one of “America’s greatest and most loyal friends” and pledged that, if re-elected, India would “have no better friend” than the US. Trump might also view strong ties with Modi as beneficial for garnering support among Indian-Americans.
The third factor involves strategic concessions from India, resulting in perceived gains for the US. New Delhi strategically yielded on certain issues prioritized by Trump.
Illegal immigration serves as one example.
While the deportation of undocumented Indian immigrants from the US sparked some public discontent in India, the Indian government maintained a low-key response. Officially, it condemned illegal immigration and signaled its willingness to accept deportees without significant obstruction.
India also reduced tariffs on certain US products, including motorcycles and agricultural goods, addressing Trump’s vocal complaints about high Indian import duties.
New Delhi calculated that these concessions would satisfy key Trump demands. These moves were not without reciprocal benefits for India, however. Trump facilitated India’s access to high-end defense technology. He also appeared receptive to Indian priorities, such as combating Khalistani separatist groups operating in the US, and reportedly agreed to the extradition of Tahawwur Rana, sought by India in connection with the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
Recapping the first Trump term, the US became India’s largest trading partner, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) was revitalized, and Washington adopted a more assertive stance towards China. Furthermore, there was minimal US interference in India’s domestic politics. This latter point—minimal interference in India’s internal affairs—is particularly significant for New Delhi.
From New Delhi’s perspective, these outcomes suggest that “India’s game plan for Trump” is largely effective.
The potential extradition of Tahawwur Rana, sought by India as a key figure in the 26/11 Mumbai attacks (2008), represents a major Indian objective in bilateral discussions. Securing US agreement for his extradition has been a long-standing Indian demand. Joint statements often include commitments to take “decisive action” against groups threatening India’s security, which India interprets as progress on the Khalistan issue.
Discussions often include potential US commitments to streamline defense sales to India, possibly involving reviews of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which govern defense exports. Exploratory talks regarding a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement, which could open the US defense market to Indian companies, are also a recurring theme. Such developments, facilitating access to advanced defense technology, are viewed as significant gains by India.
However, these potential gains for India are often counterbalanced by US trade demands.
For years, Donald Trump has complained about high Indian tariffs on US goods. Addressing these complaints, discussions often revolve around negotiating a new bilateral trade agreement (distinct from a comprehensive free trade agreement) aimed at granting US companies enhanced market access, potentially with target dates like late 2025. The stated ambition includes finalizing such an agreement and boosting bilateral trade to $500 billion by 2030, more than doubling current levels.
Meanwhile, while the US already sells billions in oil and gas to India, a key objective for a potential second Trump administration would likely be reducing the significant trade deficit (around $50 billion) by increasing these sales further. A renewed energy partnership could position the US as one of India’s top energy suppliers.
Thus, the dynamic involves India potentially gaining access to more US defense technology while facing pressure to purchase more US energy.
However, India’s willingness to significantly increase US energy imports beyond symbolic amounts likely hinges on competitive pricing, especially compared to discounted supplies available from sources like Russia.
Nevertheless, India is already a substantial and growing customer for US goods. Imports from the US have increased significantly in recent years (e.g., by $3 billion in one recent period), with crude oil being the top commodity by value since 2019. Furthermore, New Delhi highlights its $40 billion investment in the US in recent years, supporting approximately 500,000 American jobs. New Delhi can leverage these existing purchases and substantial investments to counter pressure for further increases in imports from the US. These activities may have also helped prevent the trade deficit from widening further. Additionally, India can argue that its defense posture and role as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean region align with and advance US interests, potentially mitigating pressure to buy more US arms. India’s naval operations in Middle Eastern waters to protect shipping and its efforts to supply missiles to Southeast Asian nations as a counterweight to China further bolster this argument.
Modi has also pledged cooperation in combating illegal immigration to the US, targeting human trafficking networks. Given the political sensitivity of illegal immigration in the US, such cooperation helps assure Washington that India respects US concerns on this front.
Other potential areas of discussion or agreement include the US offer of the F-35 fighter jet, coinciding with India’s search for a 5th generation aircraft, and joint calls for Pakistan to prevent its territory from being used for terrorism.
Early in Trump’s first term, Modi was among the first world leaders hosted, following only the leaders of Israel, Japan, and Jordan—all close US allies. This sequencing signaled the importance the Trump administration placed on the US-India partnership, although immediate, concrete results were not necessarily expected at that early stage. Nevertheless, initiatives like the announced “US-India COMPACT for the 21st Century (Catalyzing Opportunities for Military Partnership, Accelerated Trade and Technology)” aim to provide a framework for strengthening the partnership.
However, significant uncertainties requiring attention persist, particularly regarding the handling of undocumented migrants and the provision of sanctions waivers. Specifically, the implications of a potential Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran, including potential reluctance to grant sanctions waivers, remain unclear for India’s strategic Chabahar port project.
Finally, India’s strategies for navigating potential trade disputes under Trump have faced criticism for being reactive or insufficient. Critics argue that some measures, such as concessions on tariffs, appear aimed at short-term appeasement rather than long-term strategic positioning, seemingly uncharacteristic of New Delhi’s usual approach. The “Make in India” initiative, designed to boost domestic manufacturing, serves as another example. Despite initial enthusiasm and Trump’s apparent support for India as a manufacturing alternative to China, its overall success has been limited, potentially dampening initial US optimism. While progress is evident in sectors like mobile phones and pharmaceuticals, broader success remains elusive. In many other sectors, competitors, especially China, present formidable challenges. More significantly, inadequate infrastructure remains a major impediment to the “Make in India” goals. Consequently, India appears to be falling short of its initial ambitions in this area. In other words, it seems that Delhi still has a long way to go.
Amid fluctuating global trade dynamics, New Delhi, prioritizing the US relationship for strategic reasons, is actively negotiating multiple bilateral trade agreements (reportedly seven). These aim to bolster India’s economic standing and tackle market access and production hurdles. Concessions are expected to vary across agreements based on strategic considerations. The political capital invested and positive rhetoric surrounding these negotiations signal a departure from past skepticism, partly driven by pressures like Trump’s focus on tariffs.
Characteristically pragmatic, New Delhi focuses on mitigating immediate risks and protecting existing market shares in both goods and services. While maintaining market share is crucial, the ultimate objective remains growth. Acknowledging India’s achievements is fair, yet its manufacturing expansion efforts have arguably fallen short of potential.
And yet, despite these challenges, the India-US relationship appears fundamentally robust.
Recent remarks by Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar offer insight:
Jaishankar stated, “Many of Trump’s priorities are working for us.”
He added, “We believe that working with the US to strengthen the international financial and economic system should be a priority.”
Furthermore, Jaishankar observed, “The US is moving towards multipolarity and that suits India.”
Opinion
Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.
Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.
For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.
We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.
In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.
This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.
The Problem of Proxy Wars
During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”
Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.
The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.
However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.
The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.
In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”
The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.
Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.
At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.
These distinctions matter.
Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.
Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?
The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.
Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.
Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.
The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.
The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?
That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.
The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.
There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.
The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.
The Economics of Fear
The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?
Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.
One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.
A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.
This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.
More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.
The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.
When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.
America After Iran
In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.
The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.
The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.
The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.
This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.
The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.
The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.
America Is Changing From Within
The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.
The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.
Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.
They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.
This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.
A Dinner for Dialogue
One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.
We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.
The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.
Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.
Very often, it begins around a single table.
Istanbul’s Larger Message
The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.
The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.
This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.
The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.
It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.
Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.
For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.
The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.
For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.
It was not an attempt to erase differences.
It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.
At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.
Opinion
A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West
Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.
It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.
Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.
Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?
It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.
As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.
In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.
Opinion
Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria
At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.
This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.
US moves in the Mediterranean
Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.
Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.
The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.
Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.
Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.
Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?
Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.
Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.
So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?
Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.
Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?
In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.
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