Joint RIAC-CEBRI report exposes deep structural imbalances in Russia-Brazil relations

A joint report by the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and the Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI), titled “Brazil and Russia Relations: Political Convergence and Economic Development,” states that relations between the two countries are characterized by a structural imbalance and a paradoxical gap between major political ambitions and weak commercial-economic results.

Experts from both nations approached the current economic relations through differing lenses. Russian analysts emphasized the depth and resilience of ties in certain sectors despite mounting external pressures.

Meanwhile, CEBRI experts defined the relationship as a model of “incomplete cooperation,” shaped by periodic diplomatic alignments driven by advocacy for a multipolar world order on the international stage, paired with economic ties that remain highly vulnerable to external challenges.

Brazilian experts outline structural barriers to relations

CEBRI analysts identified the collapse of the Soviet Union, the establishment of BRICS, and the conflict in Ukraine as the primary drivers of modern Russian-Brazilian relations. According to their assessment, none of these factors have enabled the parties to fully realize their cooperation potential.

Domestic instability in Russia during the post-Soviet period, combined with economic reforms in Brazil, led to a prolonged mutual distance between the two nations.

While acknowledging that the creation of BRICS offered an opportunity to deepen cooperation, the Brazilian experts stated that expectations ultimately outpaced concrete results.

Structural constraints and political shifts within Brazil prevented political consensus from translating into sustainable cooperation.

Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s victory in the 2022 presidential election influenced the nature of the rapprochement with Russia.

Although analyses of United Nations voting records show both countries taking similar positions—thereby reinforcing their image as advocates for a multipolar world order—the report noted that this alignment is cyclical rather than structural in nature.

The experts noted that while military operations in Ukraine have prompted Russia to seek new partners and have reinforced Brazil’s role as a pragmatic mediator in a fragmented international system, opportunities to deepen bilateral economic cooperation remain limited.

Major Brazilian corporations are unable to operate fully in the Russian market due to the risk of secondary sanctions that could be imposed by their US and European partners.

The majority of trade routes between the two countries have been disrupted by sanctions. The world’s largest maritime shipping companies, including the Swiss-Italian joint venture MSC, Denmark’s Maersk, France’s CMA CGM Group, and Germany’s Hapag-Lloyd, have refused to transport Russian cargo.

Despite an increase in trade volume, the structure of bilateral trade remains highly asymmetric. Brazilian partners noted that this situation reflects mutual economic complementarity rather than a genuine diversification of trade ties. Brazil’s exports to Russia consist predominantly of agricultural products. In recent years, soybeans accounted for 33%, meat for 28%, and coffee for 18% of these exports. Conversely, Russia’s exports to Brazil rely on a narrow group of strategic commodities, primarily diesel fuel, fertilizers, and industrial raw materials. Fertilizers constitute approximately 75% of Russian shipments to Brazil, underscoring the concentration of trade in a single sector. Brazil’s National Fertilizer Plan, adopted in 2025, aims to reduce import dependency over the next decade, which is identified as a factor that could weaken future bilateral trade flows.

According to data from Brazilian analysts, Russia was not among Brazil’s primary arms suppliers during the 2021–2025 period. Despite Brazil’s refusal to participate in anti-Russian sanctions and its decision not to send weapons to Kyiv, defense relations between the two countries have assumed a largely symbolic character since the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) between the two economies also remains marginal, according to Central Bank of Brazil data. In 2024, Russia’s cumulative FDI in Brazil was recorded at $38.73 million, representing just 0.0044% of the country’s total inbound foreign investment. During the same period, Brazil’s investments in Russia stood at $1.69 million, accounting for a mere 0.00038% of total foreign investments.

CEBRI analysts concluded that Russia-Brazil relations present a model of selective and irregular engagement, characterized by a persistent gap between political ambitions and economic outcomes. The most prominent convergence is observed in periodic diplomatic contacts, while cooperation remains limited in areas requiring institutionalization and long-term coordination. This asymmetric economic structure leads to an unequal distribution of benefits.

Divergent proposals presented to advance cooperation

Brazilian experts noted that the fundamental challenge in advancing relations lies in restructuring the pattern of economic and technological interdependence. The report stated: “The countries must move away from a model of relations predominantly based on the trade of natural resources and low-value-added goods.”

CEBRI analysts proposed the following conditions to establish a balanced and sustainable partnership:

• Diversifying bilateral trade,
• Increasing mutual investments,
• Developing cooperation in high-technology sectors,
• Strengthening engagement in the service sector,
• Expanding cooperation in more complex branches of the manufacturing industry.

This process envisions the gradual opening of the Russian economy to foreign investment, including Brazilian capital, alongside measures to facilitate the access of Brazilian products to the Russian market. Furthermore, according to CEBRI experts, increased Russian investment in Brazil’s technology sectors could strengthen Brazil’s productive potential.

In contrast, Russian analysts argue that deepening cooperation is possible by expanding commercial interaction in traditional sectors where Russia holds distinct competitive advantages. Projections indicate that Brazil’s demand for fertilizers will increase by 20% by 2030, and the role of its agro-industrial complex, which accounts for 25% of the country’s GDP, will become even more critical. Increasing the market share of Russian companies in fertilizer production and establishing full-cycle production-logistics chains could turn Brazil into a hub for expanding shipments to other Latin American countries.

Russian experts link the diversification of the export structure to the implementation of joint investment projects and the deepening of high-tech cooperation. The utilization of online e-commerce platforms to promote consumer goods by Russian small and medium-sized enterprises is also highlighting itself as a new and rapidly growing area of interaction.

Russian experts listed the most promising areas of cooperation as follows:

• Oil and gas exploration and production,
• Exploitation of uranium and lithium deposits,
• Fertilizer production and modernization of oil refining facilities,
• Agricultural trade,
• Renewable energy sources and the green economy,
• Aerospace industry and nuclear energy,
• Transportation and logistics,
• Information technologies,
• Defense industry.

Regarding the joint production of uranium and lithium in Brazil, the Brazilian government is currently conducting negotiations with the Russian company Tenex, a subsidiary of Rosatom. The report noted that Russia is prepared to share its experience in developing peaceful nuclear technology and to support the implementation of artificial intelligence, digital government services, and automation solutions across various fields. Significant potential was also identified in municipal-level interactions, including smart city technologies, as demonstrated by ongoing contacts between the municipalities of Moscow and Rio de Janeiro.

Russian analysts also pointed to the necessity of establishing alternative payment mechanisms to bypass Western sanctions. Potential options include processing payments through third countries, using national currencies in bilateral trade, and partially transitioning to the Chinese yuan for settlements on Russian exports.

Ultimately, the authors of the report concluded that the complementary nature of the two economies and their shared interest in strategic autonomy demonstrate that, despite the irregular structure of their relations, significant untapped potential remains to be realized.