Opinion

Lavrov’s visit and the latest situation in Armenia: Balance or drifting?

Published

27.05.2025 11:49

Erkin Öncan, journalist

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently made a critical visit to Armenia.

Visiting Yerevan officially for the first time in several years, Lavrov met with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, and President Vahagn Khachaturyan during his visit.

In a joint press conference with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, Lavrov described Western-led security initiatives as ineffective and biased, and proposed a multipolar, inclusive security order based on international law.

In Yerevan, Lavrov reminded Armenia of its historical alliance with Russia and warned Yerevan about the possible consequences of rapprochement with the West.

Lavrov also harshly criticized France and the European Union (EU) in particular, suggesting that these actors were pursuing a destabilizing and anti-Russian agenda in the Caucasus.

However, it is also noteworthy that Lavrov did not address US-Armenia contacts and refrained from harsh criticism of Washington. This is, of course, related to the dialogue established with the Trump administration.

Lavrov’s visit took place at a time when relations between the two countries were tense. There is a palpable increase in discontent towards Russia in Armenia due to Moscow’s perceived inaction/insufficient reaction regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.

In addition, Yerevan recently suspended its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and expanded its diplomatic, economic, and military relations with France, the European Union, and other Western actors.

A ‘new page’ in Russia-Armenia relations?

This visit was followed by interpretations that ‘a new page had been turned’ in Russia-Armenia relations, which have deteriorated since the 2nd Karabakh War. However, this picture also clearly shows the ‘dilemma’ in Armenian politics.

Although Armenia’s ‘dual’ policy between Russia and the West is defined by circles close to Pashinyan as a ‘multi-vector foreign policy,’ this oscillation was actually a natural consequence of the ‘Velvet Revolution’ that brought Pashinyan to power and aimed for the Caucasus’s separation from Russia.

The political course of this country, which historically leaned towards the Russia-Iran axis and appealed to ‘Moscow’s arbitration’ on regional problems, especially Karabakh, changed irreversibly after the ‘Velvet Revolution’ in the spring of 2018, which brought Nikol Pashinyan to power.

With the Velvet Revolution, a classic color revolution, Armenia, like other former Soviet countries in the color revolution belt, was introduced to the concept of rapprochement with the West, European Union (EU) values, and ‘democracy.’ The leader of the Velvet Revolution, Pashinyan, had rejected the ‘color revolution’ analogy during the protests, stating that the movement was solely related to Armenia’s internal affairs and that there would be no change in Armenia’s foreign policy. However, when all the steps taken since the Velvet Revolution are examined, it is clear that today’s ‘multi-vector foreign policy’ actually means a pro-Western foreign policy.

This policy has undergone a significant transformation in recent years in the context of relations with Russia:

In February 2024, Yerevan announced that it had effectively frozen its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In May of the same year, it stopped paying its membership dues, in June it openly expressed its intention to formally withdraw, and last month (April 2025) it announced it would not participate in budget planning.

At the root of Armenia’s stance lies a growing dissatisfaction that the CSTO is not meeting Armenia’s security expectations. Yerevan expected Russia and the CSTO to help it in the Karabakh war.

However, Russia and the CSTO did not want to get involved in the Karabakh issue, which was ‘outside the legal borders of the alliance.’ Of course, the real reasons were discomfort with the Pashinyan government’s pro-Western course and the desire to maintain balanced relations with Azerbaijan.

Armenia’s EU path

Yerevan, criticizing Russia for the military power not provided when needed, was chronologically taking the following steps during the same period:

— April 2024: Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan signed a judicial cooperation agreement with Eurojust [the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation] in Brussels, aiming for ‘judicial unity among EU member states.’

— September 2024: Armenia and the EU launched a visa liberalization dialogue for Armenian citizens to travel to the EU for short stays without a visa.

— February 2024: At the fifth meeting of the EU-Armenia Partnership Council, a 5.5 million euro humanitarian aid agreement was made for Armenians displaced from Karabakh.

— April 2024: At the EU-US-Armenia Trilateral Summit held in Brussels, the EU adopted a Resilience and Growth Plan of 270 million euros for Armenia for the period 2024-2027.

— January 2025: The Armenian government approved a bill initiating the EU accession process.

— February 2025: Armenia joined the EU’s Cohesion Policy family and became a partner in the Interreg Black Sea Basin Programme, which aims to strengthen cooperation with countries in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and the Mediterranean basin.

— April 2025: Armenian President Vahagn Khachaturyan signed the law initiating the EU accession process, putting it into effect.

Undoubtedly, Armenia stepping up its pace in its transformation is also related to the ‘loss’ of Karabakh. The loss of Karabakh was a major defeat for Armenia, but at the same time, for the Pashinyan administration, it also signified ‘getting rid of’ another historical burden.

However, the history of Armenia’s relations with the EU goes back much further.

Armenia signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU in 1996 and became a member of the Council of Europe in 2001. Yerevan was also included in the TACIS program [Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States], a grant and technical assistance program provided by the European Commission to former CIS member countries since the 90s for ‘adaptation to a market-centered economic system,’ and received aid for a long time.

Armenia developed its relations with the EU under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, joined the Eastern Partnership initiative in 2009, and despite joining the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in 2013, it ratified the EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2017, and ‘democratic reforms’ accelerated with the Velvet Revolution.

What does the EU want from Armenia?

For Europe, Armenia’s importance is determined more by its geographical proximity to Russia and Iran than by Yerevan’s commitment to ‘European values.’

European Union membership, on the other hand, is an arduous process for which countries wait at its doors for many years, a process that only three former members of the Soviet Union – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – have been able to complete.

Besides these three countries, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia are also former Soviet countries in the color revolution belt whose politics have long been shaped by ‘EU membership,’ experiencing fierce political struggles domestically between ‘pro-Russian’ and ‘pro-EU’ factions. These similarities indicate that Armenia’s membership could also span many years.

The European Union’s primary goal seems to be the continuation of the membership process and the realization of its strategic interests during this process, rather than Armenia’s full membership. What a ‘European’ Armenia would bring to the EU is directly proportional to the goal of Russia’s geopolitical defeat.

What does Russia want from Armenia?

It is well known that one of the most important reasons for Armenia’s loss of Karabakh was the ‘lack of Russian aid.’

Although Azerbaijan’s military force ended the 28-year Armenian occupation, the most important reason for the change in this long-standing crisis in the region was neither solely Azerbaijan’s ‘Karabakh cause,’ nor Turkish UAVs [Unmanned Aerial Vehicles], nor Israeli weapons. The biggest factor leading to the region’s transformation in favor of Azerbaijan was undoubtedly the Pashinyan government and its political line.

From these perspectives, the Karabakh crisis, like all existing crises in the former Soviet space, was ‘now international,’ and its dynamics could not be considered independently of US imperialism, the famous ‘containment of Russia’ strategy, and ‘color revolutions.’

Considering the international reflection of the crisis in the region, for years we faced, in the most general terms, an Armenia-Russia-Iran versus Azerbaijan-Israel-Turkey equation. However, this equation was shaken with the Pashinyan administration.

Therefore, when looking from Moscow to Yerevan, Armenia’s place in the strategy of containing Russia is as decisive as the level of bilateral relations and Armenia’s internal political dynamics.

Looking from West to East; Moldova, Ukraine, Crimea, Georgia, Armenia, and more… In almost every country sharing the historical legacy of the Soviet Union era and having geographical proximity to the Russian Federation, color revolutions have occurred, military conflicts have taken place, and the political climates of these countries have been shaped on a ‘pro-Russia vs. pro-West’ basis.

However, despite all tensions, geographical proximity, shared history, and economic necessities have prevented these two countries from completely breaking away.

As of 2024, the trade volume between Armenia and Russia reached a historic record of 12.4 billion US dollars. This represents a 56.5 percent increase compared to 2023. In the first half of 2024, Armenia imported approximately 66 tons of gold, almost all of which came from Russia. Similarly, trade in agricultural and food products increased by 16.2 percent in 2024.

However, at the same time, figures show that Armenia’s imports from Russia have significantly increased, but its exports have decreased. While this situation is defined as ‘dependence on Russia’ by pro-Western circles in Armenia, pro-Russian circles blame the decline in exports on Pashinyan’s pro-Western policies.

Although Russia’s view of the Pashinyan administration is primarily a security issue, the Kremlin, relying on the historical and economic ties between the two countries, intends not to lose another important region in the South Caucasus to the West. This is the underlying motivation for Russia giving positive messages at the end of the day, despite all tensions.

What will happen next?

The most important agenda item on the new page Lavrov’s visit to Yerevan sought to open is the upcoming Armenian elections.

The elections, expected in 2026, will be the biggest test for the Pashinyan administration.

In a poll conducted last month by MPG ‘Politring,’ Gallup International’s official representative in Armenia, when asked “If elections were held this Sunday, who would you vote for?”, 11.5% of participants answered Prime Minister Pashinyan’s ruling Civil Contract party, 8% Robert Kocharyan’s ‘Armenia’ bloc, and 3.7% Serzh Sargsyan’s ‘I Have Honor’ Alliance.

Although Pashinyan came in first again in the telephone poll of 1100 people, more than twice the number of those who said they would prefer Pashinyan (23.7%) said they would not participate in the elections.

According to MPG President Aram Navasardyan, Pashinyan’s party has lost votes again, albeit slightly. In contrast, Kocharyan’s bloc has significantly increased its vote share.

Although the real picture will become clear 2-3 months before the elections, the 23.7% ‘hopeless’ segment is of a nature that will determine Pashinyan’s fate.

Armenia’s dual foreign policy in this uncertain domestic political climate has two outcomes: Moscow’s security umbrella versus the EU’s political and economic promises…

The Pashinyan administration is pursuing a kind of balancing act by keeping both doors open. However, a policy of balance and ‘sitting on multiple chairs at the same time’ points to very different outcomes in terms of results.

Armenia, whose options are dwindling day by day, faces the biggest task of determining which of the dual paths it is treading will lead to a more solid outcome.

The outcome will be determined at the point where Armenia’s interests and Pashinyan’s interests conflict.

Sources:

Harici

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Lavrov’s visit and the latest situation in Armenia: Balance or drifting?

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