Lebanon between the prospects of Zionist aggression and the limits of open confrontation

Khaled al-Yamani, Lebanese political commentator

Amid the gradual escalation on the southern front, the specter of Zionist aggression against Lebanon once again looms over the political and security scene. This raises legitimate questions about the nature and limits of this potential aggression, and whether it will remain confined to targeting Hezbollah or expand to include the Lebanese state and its infrastructure, as has happened in previous wars.

Available information indicates that the Zionist enemy [a term used by opponents of Israel] is experiencing a complex strategic predicament. On one hand, it has failed to achieve its objectives in Gaza; on the other, it is facing an active northern front that has imposed new equations of deterrence. In this context, the enemy’s leaders are brandishing broad military options against Lebanon in an attempt to restore their lost “prestige of deterrence.”

The nature of the aggression: A limited strike or a comprehensive war?

The scenarios under consideration range from a limited aggression focused on targeting Hezbollah positions or field commanders, to a comprehensive war that could expand to strike Lebanese infrastructure, including ports, airports, power grids, and telecommunications networks. However, past experiences—most notably the July 2006 war—show that when the enemy fails to achieve a direct military victory against the resistance, it resorts to a scorched-earth policy, applying pressure on the resistance’s popular base and the Lebanese state as a whole.

The fundamental question remains: does the enemy have the capacity to bear the cost of a comprehensive war? Indicators suggest otherwise, given the internal divisions within the Zionist entity, its economic crises, and fears that the confrontation could expand regionally.

Hezbollah’s deadline to the state: Politics before the battlefield

In this context, one cannot overlook the political step taken by Hezbollah in granting the Lebanese state a clear deadline to pursue political and diplomatic action. The goal is to achieve three key points stipulated in the ceasefire agreement from over a year ago, namely:

1. The complete withdrawal of the Israeli army from occupied Lebanese territory in the south;
2. The release of Lebanese prisoners;
3. The reconstruction of the destroyed southern villages.

This deadline is not a minor detail; rather, it reflects the party’s [Hezbollah’s] commitment to prioritizing the role of the state and its institutions. It also serves to remove pretexts from Lebanese factions opposed to the resistance—factions that have long blamed Hezbollah’s weapons for tensions and aggression and have called for their removal under the banners of sovereignty and stability.

Through this approach, the party sought to state clearly that the resistance is not an alternative to the state, but at the same time, it is not a bargaining chip that can be negotiated away or relinquished.

The weapons of the resistance: A red line

Conversely, those who assume this deadline signals Hezbollah’s readiness to give up its weapons are mistaken. The issue of disarmament is categorically rejected by the party and is unacceptable in any form, as it is intrinsically linked to a defensive role that has proven effective in protecting Lebanon and deterring the enemy.

Hezbollah understands that any new aggression will be met with a direct and painful response. It has declared its full readiness for confrontation, presenting the enemy with a clear equation: the cost of a war on Lebanon will be no less for the Zionist entity; in fact, it may be far greater and more extensive.

One of the possible scenarios that Hezbollah might implement in the face of an Israeli aggression could be as follows: in the event of an Israeli ground incursion into southern Lebanon, the response would be carried out by small units aiming to inflict the maximum possible casualties on Israeli soldiers and military vehicles. This would be accompanied by the use of drones to strike northern settlements in occupied Palestine and targets deep inside Israel. There is also the possibility of launching rockets from certain areas in Lebanon, whether from the south or other regions. Furthermore, there is a larger and more serious scenario: the insertion of assault units into the interior of occupied Palestine.

Could the war escalate regionally?

The most dangerous aspect of the current situation is the possibility that any aggression against Lebanon could become the spark for a regional confrontation. The “axis of resistance” [a term for the alliance including Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and other groups] is interconnected, and any large-scale attack on Hezbollah could prompt the involvement of allied regional forces, either directly or through other fronts. This is well understood by the enemy, as it is by the United States, which has so far sought to control the tempo of the conflict and prevent a major explosion.

Conclusion

Lebanon today stands at a sensitive crossroads. Caught between the logic of Zionist aggression, which is based on fleeing forward [attempting to solve internal problems by creating an external conflict], and the logic of resistance, which is based on deterrence and strategic patience, the Lebanese state faces a real test. It must either succeed in capitalizing on the available political window or once again leave the arena to the logic of force.

What is certain, however, is that any forthcoming aggression will not be a walk in the park for the enemy, and the equations that follow it will not resemble those that preceded it—neither in Lebanon nor in the region.