Russia

Lukyanov says Russian public wants peace, but not at any cost

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In an interview on the Harici YouTube channel, Professor Fyodor Lukyanov of Moscow’s Higher School of Economics, who also serves as editor of Russia in Global Affairs and moderates Russian President Vladimir Putin’s annual address at the Valdai Discussion Forum, offered a detailed assessment of the latest diplomatic efforts surrounding the war in Ukraine, divisions within NATO and the US administration, and the domestic mood in both Russia and Ukraine.

Speaking with Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal, an international relations professor and host of the programme Strategic Compass, Lukyanov expressed cautious scepticism about whether recent negotiations between Russian and US officials can produce a lasting breakthrough.

Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal opened the discussion by pointing to two recent rounds of talks: a lower-profile meeting in Abu Dhabi involving Russian, US, and Ukrainian representatives, followed by a high-level round in Moscow chaired by President Putin alongside US President Donald Trump’s negotiators, Jared Kushner and Witkow, without Ukrainian participation.

Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal noted that the agenda appeared unusually broad, covering a new security architecture for the whole of Europe, an issue Western countries had long declined to discuss.

“I have ambivalent feelings vis-a-vis this process”

Responding to Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal’s observation, Lukyanov said that while the expansion of the diplomatic agenda marks a notable shift, he remains uncertain about its outcome. “As far as the current intensification of the diplomatic process is concerned, I have ambivalent feelings vis-a-vis this process,” Lukyanov said. “On the one hand, of course, this is a significant change in the agenda, as you rightly pointed out. This time, actually for the first time since maybe Istanbul talks in March 22, there is a wider agenda, wider framework including the issue of security arrangements in Europe at large, including of course security guarantees for Ukraine, Russia, and all involved.”

Lukyanov explained that Moscow’s security concerns predate the 2022 invasion by decades, tracing them back to the end of the Cold War between 1989 and 1991. “The security system in Europe as it emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact has never been satisfactory for Russia,” he said. “Of course, at the beginning of this process and during the 90s, Russia was not in the position to seriously reject what has been proposed by Americans and NATO, and this system was de facto equal to the idea that NATO is the security system in Europe. So all the rest should not matter. NATO is the ideal framework, and that would be even fine with one significant nuance that Russia has never been considered as a part of this system.”

He recalled that in the early years of his presidency, between 2000 and 2002, President Putin directly asked NATO representatives whether Russian membership in the alliance could be discussed. According to Lukyanov, that question “provoked all the time totally confused reaction from the NATO side,” with officials treating the idea as “something absolutely out of question.”

When Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal remarked that other countries linked to NATO as partners were eventually admitted as full members while Russia was not, Lukyanov agreed that there had been a “significant degree of hypocrisy in 1990s” surrounding NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme. “NATO and Americans in particular said that we have this Partnership for Peace program and that’s actually Russia is equal as others, very significant and respected partner, respected part of this system. Why are you angry?” Lukyanov said, adding that many in Moscow understood even then what the arrangement meant in reality. Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal compared that dynamic to Türkiye’s long-standing relationship with the European Union, describing it as a theatrical game in which neither side believed accession would happen. Lukyanov responded that in Türkiye’s case, the hypocrisy was even greater because Turkish officials were repeatedly told to work on themselves before any decision would be made.

“We have this split inside the NATO community”

Turning back to the current negotiations, Lukyanov emphasized that the willingness of the US side to discuss the Ukraine crisis within a broader European security framework represents a major departure from previous decades. “The very fact that Americans this time, not Europeans, but Americans finally said that yes, it should be discussed, I mean the Ukrainian crisis should be discussed as part of broader framework of security problems in Europe, and actually Russia has a point in insisting on that,” he said. “This is of course a significant, very big shift compared to what we heard the years, if not decades before.”

Lukyanov attributed this shift to the Trump administration’s changing view of NATO, noting that Trump and his inner circle “don’t see a lot of value in NATO anymore.” However, he warned that this perspective is “absolutely out of touch with the European position.” According to Lukyanov, European leaders such as Kaja Kallas and Friedrich Merz continue to insist, just as they have for years, that “it’s not Russian business to discuss NATO” and that “NATO is the only legitimate security system in Europe. Russia should accept it or should be defeated now.”

As a result, Lukyanov said, “we have this split inside the NATO community.” Yet he doubted that this divide would yield concrete results, explaining that his ambivalence stems from the belief that Trump, whom he described as politically weaker than he was three or four months ago, will be unable to impose his views on European allies and Ukraine. “He failed to do it before. Most likely he will fail this time even more,” Lukyanov said.

“We should not have illusions that Trump is on the Russian side”

Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal then raised the issue of apparent divisions within the US administration itself, noting that while President Trump and his close associates appear eager to end the war and pursue future economic and political cooperation with Russia, the CIA seems to be acting independently by backing Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian refineries. He asked whether this reflected genuine internal conflict or a coordinated “good cop, bad cop” strategy.

Lukyanov replied that all of those explanations might coexist, but cautioned against misreading Washington’s motives. “First of all, what I wanted to stress, we should not have illusions that Trump and his narrow circle with maybe Vance that they are on Russian side. So of course not,” he said. “They are interested to end this conflict for their domestic reasons, for reasons of their political positioning in the United States. And to a certain extent, yes, I think Trump is sincere and his envoys, they are sincere, as Putin said a couple of days ago. They are sincere in their willingness to do something.”

At the same time, Lukyanov noted that US intelligence sharing with Ukraine cannot occur without White House approval. He acknowledged that Trump’s return to the White House brought a major change by halting new US financial aid to Ukraine, but argued that this reflects a broader shift in US politics rather than Trump’s personal stance alone. “Even if Democrats will be in power again, I mean in the Congress starting from January or in the White House starting from 2029, Americans have no appetite to pay more,” Lukyanov said. “They are very happy with the new idea that Europeans should pay for everything and they can just earn on that.”

Ultimately, Lukyanov suggested that the Trump administration’s position on Ukraine remains vague. “They probably believe that in general they would love to help this conflict to be stopped. But it does not mean that they are ready to pay significant price, I mean not only in terms of money, but in terms of political efforts and political capital to stop it,” he said, adding that the conflict is “not that important for Trump and Trumpists as some people in Moscow, for example, thought at the beginning.”

“Russia started to fight in a full scale and we see results”

Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal next asked about the evolution of Russia’s military approach. He noted that Moscow initially acted with restraint, framing the campaign as a special military operation out of concern for Ukrainians, whom President Putin described as the same people as Russians, before shifting to heavier military action in recent months following intensified Ukrainian attacks on civilian targets in Russia. He asked whether the outcome would ultimately be decided on the battlefield.

Lukyanov prefaced his answer by noting that he is not a military specialist, but agreed that Putin’s initial approach was aimed at limiting damage to Ukrainian society. “For quite a long while the basic approach of President Putin was to keep it limited, to try to deliver as little damage to Ukraine as a society as possible, probably because of his deep conviction initially that it is the same nation and it’s like a civil war almost,” Lukyanov said. He added a personal caveat: “By the way, I’m not absolutely sure that I buy this idea. So I had my doubts from the beginning whether we are really the same nation with Ukrainians. It’s a complicated historical cultural phenomenon.”

When the initial expectation of a short, efficient operation failed to materialize, the conflict settled into a long war of attrition. According to Lukyanov, the turning point came after Ukrainian forces stepped up strikes on Russian infrastructure, including civilian infrastructure. “Then Putin decided to put aside all limitations and Russia started to fight in a full scale and we see results,” Lukyanov said. “I will be the last person to say that this is a good result because we see a lot of destruction, we see a lot of suffering, but unfortunately this is the logical development of what we saw before.”

Addressing whether everything will be decided on the battlefield, Lukyanov argued that the very definition of a battlefield has changed. “Contemporary war, contemporary environment is completely different. We see actually no line, no border between war and peace anymore. Some people call it hybrid war,” he said. “There is really comprehensive confrontation on all fields where non-combatant, non-military dimensions might be even more important than the battlefield.” Because of this shift in the nature of international conflict, Lukyanov said he expects an increase in mutual efforts to undermine each other’s basic capacity to resist rather than dramatic territorial breakthroughs.

“Europeans have no ideas, but that Russia should be strategically defeated”

Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal asked whether the Russian leadership, having outlined its peace proposals and root causes of the conflict to Washington, expects the US to push European allies toward a breakthrough.

Lukyanov said that Moscow has indeed placed a significant stake on the current US administration, noting that even figures like Marco Rubio, whom he described as “far from being big friend of Russia,” approach the Ukraine issue very differently from the Biden administration. “That’s about a different view of Trump administration what role America should play in international affairs, and he tries to define this role primarily through reconfiguration of relationship with allies, not with opponents in the first line,” Lukyanov said.

While many in Moscow, including President Putin, expected Trump to push Europeans toward a more constructive stance, Lukyanov pointed out that Trump failed to do so after the Anchorage meeting. “One of reasons is that Europeans actually, they learned how to deal with Trump. They learned what should be said to him to make him happy while doing exactly opposite things,” he said.

Lukyanov also argued that Trump’s leverage is diminishing following a heavy Republican defeat in the midterm elections, which he described as a referendum on Trump personally. With domestic political battles, potential inquiries, and the 2028 presidential race beginning in January 2027, Trump’s capacity to act abroad will likely shrink. At the same time, Lukyanov noted that Europeans recognize Washington will not increase its support for Ukraine while Trump is in office, meaning Europe must shoulder the financial burden despite having “no money at all at this moment.” That financial pressure, he argued, is the only reason European leaders now want to join the negotiations, either to slow them down or to “torpedo” them. “The problem, what Russian side says all the time is that Europeans, unlike Trump and even unlike some of Ukrainians, Europeans have no ideas, absolutely no ideas, but that Russia should be strategically defeated,” Lukyanov said.

“When people say that they want peace, they want peace but not at any cost”

Responding to Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal’s question about the domestic mood in Russia and European predictions of an imminent Russian collapse, Lukyanov acknowledged that fatigue is real. “I would be unsincere with you if I would insist that everybody here is happy that this war continues,” he said. “Of course, society is tired and the ruling group, those who are in charge, they are even more tired because they work since quite a significant amount of time. They work in a situation of stress, and this stress is increasing because of military activities and strikes inside Russian territory and so on.”

However, Lukyanov stressed that war weariness should not be mistaken for a willingness to capitulate. “Russian society is very much willing to achieve a peaceful solution. Having said that, don’t misunderstand me. It does not mean that public opinion and society are in favor of giving up or stopping or even freezing the situation as it is now. It’s not the case. When people say that they want peace, they want peace but not at any cost.”

He dismissed Western and Ukrainian expectations of a Russian societal collapse, saying he sees no signs of it in the foreseeable future. While there are differing views inside Russia on how to end the conflict, with some favouring more active diplomacy to engage Trump and others advocating greater mobilization for a decisive military strike, Lukyanov noted that the public recognizes the war has already lasted longer than the Soviet Union’s Great Patriotic War in the 1940s. “Again, it’s not about to give up. It’s about to win,” he said.

“The resource of Ukrainian society is getting thinner and thinner”

Finally, Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal asked Lukyanov for his assessment of Ukrainian society, pointing to reports of widening social cracks and forceful conscription on the streets.

Lukyanov cautioned that he is not a specialist on internal Ukrainian affairs and that reliable information is scarce because Ukraine is largely cut off. Still, he said open data and social media indicate that “the forceful mobilization of people produces ever higher anger in the Ukrainian society,” alongside troubling reports involving mobilized recruits and units such as the Azov battalion. “So seems that the resource of Ukrainian society is getting thinner and thinner,” he said.

Even so, Lukyanov doubted that Russia’s infrastructure strike campaign would immediately force Ukrainians to surrender. “In this regard I agree with Putin that we are very similar. I mean Russian people and Ukrainian people are very much similar, if not the same, and if we never give up, why should they?” he asked. “That’s why I think that at least at this point probably Ukrainian society will hold on.” He added that increasingly dictatorial behaviour by Ukrainian authorities could eventually trigger domestic troubles, though he said he was not qualified to judge whether those conditions have already arrived.

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