Lukyanov: The nature of Turkish-Russian relations will remain complex

We spoke in Istanbul with Prof. Fyodor Lukyanov, Research Director of the Valdai Discussion Club and Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs. At this stage, as the search for a solution in Ukraine continues, we asked him about the future of the “arm-wrestling” match between Moscow and the West. We began our conversation with the “dream project” of the 90s produced by Gorbachev: the idea of building a “Common European Home” between Russia and Europe. According to Lukyanov, this idea was utopian from the start, and the model no longer holds historical validity. Future formulas for coexistence cannot be built upon these utopian concepts.

Lukyanov argues that since the West’s goal of inflicting a “strategic defeat” on Russia persists, it is currently impossible to establish a stable security architecture. The best-case scenario reachable may be a state of “controlled balance,” similar to the Cold War.

Touching upon Türkiye-Russia relations during the interview, Lukyanov emphasizes that the vital bond between the two countries is based on pragmatism. He warns that under current conditions, attempting to transform this successful model into a “strategic partnership” would harm both sides. Stating that it is impossible to predict the state of affairs 20-30 years from now, Lukyanov believes the nature of Turkish-Russian relations will always remain “complex.” According to him, the true merit lies in managing this complexity—that is, the areas where conflicts of interest exist.

Lukyanov warns that in the pursuit of “doing better” in Turkish-Russian relations, the existing, functioning model could be lost. “We understand very well how important Türkiye’s relations with the US and NATO are,” says Lukyanov, adding that trying to change this could harm Türkiye.

According to Lukyanov, Russia prefers a Türkiye that is part of the West but possesses the capacity to defend its own interests against the West when necessary.

The responses given by Prof. Fyodor Lukyanov to Mehmet Kıvanç’s questions are as follows:

Mr. Lukyanov, thank you for your time. It might be appropriate to start with this: Why did the idea of a great “European Home” between Russia and Europe end, and is it possible to revive this idea—which was of vital importance following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 90s? Can we expect an effort in this direction in the near future, and what are your expectations?

Actually, this idea was born even before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as the father of this great “Common European Home” idea was the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev.

Following that, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the idea was somewhat reinterpreted. As the president of a superpower, Gorbachev naturally had his own views on how this structure could function. Subsequently, Russia transformed into something else.

However, contrary to what I thought 35 years ago, my humble opinion today is that this idea was, unfortunately, completely utopian. It was never a realistic option for a very simple reason. As we discussed in yesterday’s conference, European integration was established in the post-colonial era to unite the medium-sized powers of Europe at a time when all of them, including the largest like France and the UK, were losing their former significance. They created this format—European integration, the European Community.

The Soviet Union, and subsequently Russia, is a nuclear superpower. We can have various discussions about the Russian economy and its many problems, but Russia is a nuclear superpower. A nuclear superpower cannot be part of a structure like the European Union. And a nuclear superpower cannot be part of NATO unless it is the United States.

Therefore, I believe both Gorbachev and those who followed this idea were completely detached from reality when they discussed the issue. However, this matter was taken very seriously on the Russian side.

For a long time—I think probably until Putin’s Munich speech—Russia sincerely wanted to be part of such a structure, perhaps not a “Common European Home,” but something like a “Broader European Space.”

No one could formulate what this space might look like, because the European Union never saw Russia as a potential candidate country for the EU, and of course, Russia would never stand in line to join the European Union. However, there was an idea that it could be done differently—a structure like a common space with shared economic regulations…

But what happened showed that it is impossible to expect this in a situation where deep-seated, long-standing geopolitical differences exist. This began to erode in the 2000s, collapsed in the 2010s, and completely exploded in the 2020s.

To cut a long story short, I believe we should view this idea merely as an historically significant period that is now behind us and will never return. In other words, this model is no longer valid.

In that case, what model is possible? Because the problem of security architecture continues between Europe and Russia, and particularly between Russia’s eastern border and the Europeans. Europeans say there is a Russian threat. Russia, on the other hand, states that it faces security issues due to NATO expansion, seeing such expansion moves by NATO every five or ten years. In this case, what kind of realistic scenario can we expect?

First of all, I do not know what the realistic scenario is, because we are in a highly unique and unpleasant situation where a major war is ongoing, in which Russia is directly involved and Europe is indirectly but very actively involved.

I think the hypothetical model could be a modified version of the “peaceful coexistence” principle from the Cold War era. This model consists of sides of the continent that are essentially heavily armed and approach one another with extreme suspicion.

If we can reach this stage, it would be a great success at this early phase. Because so far, we cannot even envision such a thing. We see that the European side—which has the Americans behind them, though in a strange way right now—is not ready to accept the establishment of such a more-or-less equal balance.

This is because the idea of a “strategic defeat” of Russia is still on the table. This idea did not materialize in 2022-2023 when it was the official position of the EU. It is mentioned less frequently now, but they still believe that Russia must be defeated through military, economic, and similar means, and they are not in the mood to rearrange a kind of balance. Therefore, I do not know when or how we can achieve this.

Nonetheless, as I mentioned, this picture would be an ideal one for the coming historical period. However, it must also be noted that we cannot expect the restoration of the Cold War model, because today’s Europe is not the Europe of 40 years ago. And Europe is now part of a much larger space, namely Eurasia, which also includes the Middle East and the Far East.

As you mentioned, we cannot build a European security architecture without taking into account that this is part of a much larger security architecture—or lack thereof—located partly in Eurasia and affected by the US-China rivalry. At this point, I fear we cannot expect a luxury such as a stable security order for Europe.

How do you evaluate Türkiye’s geopolitical position, especially recently? For example, should Russia be concerned about Trump’s pressure on Türkiye regarding issues like energy?

Of course, Russia should be concerned, because we understand perfectly well that the United States is the most powerful actor, capable of exerting almost unlimited pressure on any country. This is one side of the coin.

The other side, which is very important for both us and Türkiye, is that the limits of this pressure’s effectiveness are also visible. In other words, the United States can do extremely unpleasant things to other countries, but the more they increase this pressure, the more other countries begin to research how to avoid it, how to bypass it, perhaps officially approving what the Americans want while unofficially doing different things.

This is a characteristic of today’s world. In this world, we see that no one—whether it be large countries like the US and China, or countries like Russia, India, and Türkiye—can establish a hegemonic relationship with another.

On the Russian side, there is another issue, because we must re-evaluate our place in the post-Soviet geography of Eurasia. This geography is clearly changing, partly due to reasons like Türkiye’s more active policies. But this applies to everyone. Including the United States…

You see, Trump is a bit restless. He is trying to do different things, to put pressure on different countries. He sees that these countries do not necessarily do what he wants; even if they say wonderful things about him and praise and congratulate him, they ultimately do what is in line with their own national interests.

Returning to your question, I think Russian-Turkish relations will always be very complex, as there are many areas where our interests do not overlap. However, what matters is that in both Moscow and Ankara, both sides are aware of how important and fundamental this relationship is.

In my view, Türkiye’s relationship with Russia is, in practical terms, even more important for Türkiye than its relationship with the US. This does not mean the US is less important as an actor, but from a practical standpoint, Russia is here, and Russia’s presence is a major factor in many issues of interest to Türkiye, and vice versa.

That is why we are obliged to find compromises, and I can say that so far, it has worked. We will address this in the next session. To me, the fact that this relationship has worked so well for over 10 years is actually a surprise.

Is it possible to change the nature of Turkish-Russian relations? Because many experts define this relationship with a famous term: pragmatism. Do you think it is possible to move this relationship from a tactical level to a strategic level?

I don’t think so. I don’t think there is a need to try to change it, either. Because, again, I don’t know what will happen 20 or 30 years from now. No one can predict that. Perhaps we will encounter a completely different Eurasian picture. But at this point, pragmatism is the only strategy that works.

If we try to build something more solid that is strategically valid, it would harm Türkiye. Because we understand very well how important Türkiye’s relations with the US and NATO are.

At the same time, Türkiye is brave enough to act very flexibly and independently in matters where its own interests differ from those of the Americans or Europeans. Therefore, I think this is the only model available for now, and we should not break something that works for the sake of obtaining something “better.”