Michael Klare: My fear is an unconstrained nuclear arms race, with dangerous consequences

Prof. Michael Klare is a leading American scholar in international security, military affairs, and global resource politics. He is a Five College Professor of Peace and World Security Studies and served as Director of the Five College Program in Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College in Amherst, Massachusetts. His academic work focuses on U.S. defense policy, global militarization, the international arms trade, energy geopolitics, and the strategic role of natural resources in conflict and power competition.

He is the author of fourteen books, including Resource Wars, Blood and Oil, and Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet, in which he analyzes how competition over oil, gas, minerals, and other critical resources is reshaping global security and driving new forms of conflict. Prof. Klare is also widely known for his work on the militarization of climate change, great power rivalry, and the transformation of the military-industrial complex.

We talked with him about global armament and military developments, beginning with Venezuela.

Tunç Akkoç:

What is the real geopolitical rationale behind the operation in Venezuela, are energy resources, oil reserves, and strategic access to natural resources the primary drivers, rather than concerns over drug trafficking?

Prof. Michael Klare:

I agree that resources are important. But let me begin by noting that President Trump issued a new National Security Strategy a month ago. It lays out his vision for America’s status in the world. He sees the United States as the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere and asserts that the U.S. has the right to control events there and to extract its resources for its own benefit. This is a sphere-of-influence approach to world affairs. It assumes Russia and China will also assert their own spheres of influence, and that international relations will be defined by power relations among these three poles: the U.S., Russia, and China. Each with their own sphere of influence.

So I see the attack on Venezuela and the seizure of its president as an assertion of American dominance over the Western Hemisphere and an US intention to exploit the resources of the Western Hemisphere, in this case oil.

President Trump has said the United States, as the dominant power, has the right to intervene anywhere in Latin America where it feels it has a national security interest, either to extract essential resources or to exclude foreign influence, meaning Chinese, Russian, or Iranian influence. It is very clear the U.S. will now try to push China out of Latin America.

Tunç Akkoç:

Some call this a Monroe Doctrine–style approach. How will this shape global military competition? Do you expect these policies to accelerate a new arms race among major powers?

Prof. Michael Klare:

It is hard to see exactly how this will play out. Trump has moved key U.S. military resources from Europe and Asia to the Caribbean. There has been a reorientation of U.S. military power toward the Western Hemisphere. There is a huge military buildup in the Caribbean, including the most advanced U.S. aircraft carrier, the Gerald Ford, which had previously operated in the Mediterranean and off the coast of Africa in support of US operations in the Middle East. And now its in the Caribbean. This signals that Latin America has acquired higher geopolitical importance to the US, while the Middle East has diminished somewhat.

This may give Russia a freer hand in Eurasia. Putin could say, if the U.S. dominates the Western Hemisphere, Russia has the same right to dominate Eurasia. There is nothing in Trumps policy to contradict that. China might say the same about Asia. If I were in Taiwan, I would ask whether the U.S. is diminishing its support for Taiwan.

Tunç Akkoç:

As Germany and Japan expand their military capabilities, are we entering a new global arms race? How much are regional wars and crises accelerating this trend, and will the Trump administration’s national security strategy further intensify worldwide militarization and great power competition?

Prof. Michael Klare:

If the U.S. diminishes its presence in Europe or the Western Pacific, countries ask whether they need more arms to protect themselves. Japan is asking that question. Europe is saying it can no longer rely on the U.S. to defend it from Russia. This drives increased armament by Europe, Japan, South Korea and others. Because the U.S. is no longer present.

Another key element of the Trump doctrine is the pivotal importance of critical raw materials. This has a 19th-century feel, control over coal, iron, rubber then; now oil, rare earths, lithium, cobalt. The doctrine says the U.S. must have total control over the flow of critical materials. Hence Greenland, Latin America, Africa. This will lead to conflict with China and Russia. Negotiations over Ukraine are not only about territory but also about control of vital resources.

Tunç Akkoç:

Let’s turn to nuclear weapons. You wrote in your recent article, quoting a dialogue in a movie: “after the Cold War global powers worked to decrease reliance on nuclear weapons, but that era is now over.” What do you mean?

Prof. Michael Klare:

We are speaking on January 6. In exactly one month, on February 5, 2026, the last remaining arms control agreement between the U.S. and Russia, the New START Treaty (New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), will expire. After that, there will be no legal restraints on either side to increase their nuclear arsenals.

Tunç Akkoç:

Can you explain what the New START Treaty is?

Prof. Michael Klare:

It was signed by President Obama and then President Medvedev. It limits each side to 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads aimed at each other’s homeland. These can be deployed on ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles), submarine-launched missiles, road-mobile missiles, or strategic bombers. And there are inspection provisions to ensure compliance.

Tunç Akkoç:

Do you expect the agreement to be extended?

Prof. Michael Klare:

At this point, there are no negotiations underway. Putin has said he is willing to have that conversation, but the White House has not responded. There is pressure in both Washington and Moscow to go beyond the limits. Powerful military-industrial interests would like an expansion of each countries nuclear arsenals. I fear that will be the outcome.

Tunç Akkoç:

What are the consequences if the traety is not extended? Are we facing a return to unconstrained nuclear competition?

Prof. Michael Klare:

I would say yes! My fear is an unconstrained nuclear arms race, with dangerous consequences. Ten years ago, only the U.S. and Russia had large nuclear arsenals. That is no longer true today. Now China has a nuclear triad and it is expanding. Some argue the U.S. must expand its arsenal in order to deter both Russia and China, but any U.S. increase threatens Russia, which will respond. This creates a mechanism for ever-increasing armaments.

Tunç Akkoç:

On the other side, in the USA military-industrial complex and the defense industry are clearly undergoing a structural transformation. More specifically, how might the rise of Silicon Valley–driven defense firms like Palantir and software-centric warfare reshape the defense industry landscape?

Prof. Michael Klare:

This is a very interesting development that we are seeing in the US, but I think its also true in China and in Russia as well. Major military powers believe, that future wars will be fought with artificial intelligence and autonomous weapon systems; drones, unmanned vehicles, robotic tanks. They will be controlled by artificial intelligence. So there is an arms race under way now in AI and in robotics, separate from the historic arms race in nuclear weapons, aircraft and ships.

The technology behind these new weapons, AI and in robotics, does not exist in the traditional arms producers, the big companies like Boeing, Raytheon etc. In the USA, this technology resides in Silicon Valley companies like Palantir, Shield AI, and Anduril. The Pentagon has turned to Silicon Valley for assistance and this is creating a new military-industrial relationship with political consequences. Because Silicon Valley wants all kinds of priviliges. This new military industrial complex wields a lot of power in Washington; one of its primary advocates is the Vice President J.D. Vance, who worked with Peter Thiel, founder of Palantir. So there is a direct line between Silicon Valley and White House.

Tunç Akkoç:

Are we beginning to see structural tensions and competition between traditional defense contractors and emerging Silicon Valley technology firms within the military-industrial ecosystem, particularly in their relationships with the Pentagon?

Prof. Michael Klare:

Yes, there is a conflict. It’s a conflict in the courts, in the legal system, and in the political system, because these companies originally, Palantir and others, had no lobbyists, had no political influence, and they concluded that to increase their share of defense contracts they had to operate like the older companies. The older companies have armies of lobbyists to persuade Congress and the Pentagon and the White House to spend more money on their products. They have huge lobbying firms to advance their interests, and they have tailored legislation to favor the traditional contractors.

So now you see Anduril and Palantir and these other companies forming their own armies of lobbyists and lawyers to shift the flow of money from the older companies to the newer companies, to write legislation that favors the producers of artificial intelligence. And they’re having a lot of success at this. So there is a struggle, but it’s behind the scenes. It’s in the courts and in the corridors of Congress, in the lobbying firms and so on, but it is very intense.