Dr. Daria Isachenko, a researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, spoke to Harici.
Isachenko’s research focuses on Türkiye-Russia relations, regional cooperation and alliances in Eurasia, regional and interstate conflict and regional politics in the Caucasus and the Black Sea.
Answering the questions of journalist Esra Karahindiba, Isachenko evaluated the “importance” of Türkiye for NATO in the Black Sea, Ankara’s balancing policy in the Russia-Ukraine war and the possibility of conflict in the Caucasus.
Turkish Naval Forces Commander Admiral Ercüment Tatlıoğlu, in a recent statement, announced that they do not want NATO and the USA in the Black Sea and once again confirmed their commitment to the Montreux Convention. While the Ukrainian war continues, how would you interpret this remarkable statement from Ankara? Is a NATO without Türkiye possible in the Black Sea?
This statement relates to Ankara’s concept of regional ownership in the Black Sea. Behind this idea is Türkiye’s sense of responsibility for security and stability in the Black Sea region. There have already been a number of formal initiatives that fall under the regional ownership, such as maritime missions like the BlackSeaFor and Black Sea Harmony. Since the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022, many have questioned whether regional ownership is still viable, but I think we should look at this concept more broadly. After all, the Montreux Convention itself can be seen as part of this approach, because it prioritises the littoral states of the region, so NATO’s presence in the Black Sea is not possible without Türkiye.
‘For Russia and Ukraine, the benefits of a partnership with Türkiye outweigh the costs’
While Ankara avoided taking sides in the Russia-Ukraine war, on the one hand, it did not participate in Western sanctions against Russia, but on the other hand, it provided weapons support to Ukraine, such as the unmanned aerial vehicles. Continuing its relations with both countries, Türkiye also carried out mediation efforts. How do you evaluate this policy of Ankara, called balance diplomacy?
There are two key ideas in the triangular relationship of Ankara-Moscow-Kyiv. One is indeed the idea of balance, of Ankara’s being able to maintain the relationship with both. The other idea is mutual necessity; this is especially relevant for Moscow and Kyiv. After all, both Russia and Ukraine accepted Türkiye to host talks in March 2022, and both have accepted Ankara’s leading role in the Black Sea Initiative. Especially Ukraine has expected a different kind of balance from Türkiye, but after all neither Kyiv nor Moscow have any other choice because their relationship with Türkiye is too valuable. In other words, for Russia and Ukraine, the benefits of a partnership with Türkiye outweigh the costs.
‘Consultation mechanism can be seen as a conflict prevention tool’
How do you think Türkiye-Iran relations will transform with the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in the Caucasus, which is one of your areas of work? There are occasional tensions in the region with Azerbaijan on one side and Iran on the other. Do you see the possibility of these tensions turning into conflict?
I think the countries of the region are aware of the consequences if tensions turn into conflict, which is why a regional platform, 3+3, was established after the second Karabakh war in 2020. The idea behind this initiative has been to bring together Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia together with their neighbours – Türkiye, Russia, and Iran – to deal with the questions of security and transportation links in the region. Georgia does not participate so it is de facto 3+2. In any case, this platform as a consultation mechanism is in itself significant, and can be seen as a conflict prevention tool for Türkiye-Iran relations.
