The repercussions of Operation Aqsa Flood, launched by Hamas against Israel on Saturday, continue to unfold. Israel, caught off guard by the sheer scale and coordination of Hamas’ largest operation, hastily declared war and has since imposed a complete blockade on Gaza. Israeli Defence Minister Gallant lamented, “Gaza now lacks electricity, food, and fuel.” Israeli Energy Minister Israel Katz further announced the suspension of Gaza’s water supply.
The question arises: Why did Hamas initiate this operation at this particular moment, and could these clashes escalate into a regional conflict? Dr. Selim Sezer offers his analysis of the Aqsa Flood operation for Harici and counters the propaganda in Turkey that justifies Israel’s actions against the Palestinians.
‘It appears no coincidence that this operation coincides with the fiftieth anniversary of the Yom Kippur War’
Why did Hamas launch this operation, and what are its objectives? Why now?
While we currently lack comprehensive data to provide a definitive answer, one thing is clear: this process is far from reaching a swift resolution. When it ultimately concludes, we should not expect a return to the status quo as of October 7, 2023.
This ongoing process marks an unprecedented chapter in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict since 1948. The closest parallel can be drawn to the Yom Kippur War of 1973, initiated when Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel to reclaim territories lost in 1967. The synchronicity between the Aqsa Flood operation and the fiftieth anniversary of the Yom Kippur War is too conspicuous to dismiss.
Initially conceived as a ‘breaching operation’ to break the 18-year Gaza blockade and secure the release of prisoners, Hamas militants swiftly seized control of numerous settlements, starting with Sderot. Their movement hints at a potential West Bank corridor. Beyond these ground developments, the overarching political objective appears to be asserting Palestinian will, which Arab states have long ignored, and resisting an 18-year blockade and over half a century of occupation through active engagement. While reclamation of lost 1948 territories is in progress, its long-term consequences remain uncertain. However, it is evident that whatever unfolds, the status quo will inevitably shift.
‘Hamas returns to the Axis of Resistance’
Can we conclude that Hamas has rejoined the ‘Axis of Resistance’?
Historically, Hamas was part of the so-called ‘Axis of Resistance’, a coalition of states and non-state actors opposing the US and Israel, centered around Iran. However, Hamas distanced itself from this alliance after 2012, particularly due to its support for Syrian rebels and the relocation of its Political Bureau from Damascus to Doha.
This policy shift did not enjoy unanimous support within Hamas, leading to significant divisions between the political and military wings and even within the political wing itself. Yet, recent meetings, notably in Beirut, suggest that Hamas has rekindled its ties with Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah. The Aqsa Flood operation appears to confirm Hamas’ definitive return to this alliance.
‘Regional conflict looms’
While outcomes remain uncertain, how might the Hamas operation reshape the region’s overall dynamics?
Firstly, many Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, may be compelled to halt or at least slow down their ongoing normalization processes with Israel due to public discontent. Despite official abandonment of the Palestinian cause by Arab states and their leaders, their populations are unlikely to support improved relations with Israel, especially under current circumstances.
The potential entry of Iran and its various militias into the conflict may escalate it into a broader regional conflict. While Hezbollah might not engage directly due to Lebanon’s internal dynamics, reports of border skirmishes in the north are emerging.
Efforts by Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey to de-escalate and establish a ceasefire or reconciliation are expected, but their success remains uncertain at this early stage.
One plausible outcome is Israel’s failure to regain control of border areas, resulting in de facto Palestinian control of surrounding territories—a possibility, albeit a remote one.
Lastly, a growing number of Israelis have recently emigrated from the country, with this trend likely to accelerate. This may challenge Israel’s policy of demographic supremacy, potentially undermining a fundamental pillar of the Israeli state.
How did Palestinian territories shift to Israeli control?
A common misconception in Turkey suggests that Palestinians sold their land to Jews. Could you clarify this historical narrative?
It is crucial to address this misconception, as it is not supported by historical evidence. The transformation of Palestinian land into Israeli territory is a complex historical process. In the mid-19th century, the Ottoman Empire introduced private land ownership in Palestine, leading some merchants, mainly from Beirut, known as Sursuks, to purchase extensive agricultural land. By the early 20th century, they began selling land to Zionist settlers at inflated prices.
Palestinian peasants resisted these land sales, with their concerns reaching the Majlis-i Mebusan in 1911. However, land transactions continued, sometimes involving impoverished Palestinian farmers forced to sell their small plots. Importantly, the land sold remained Ottoman territory, granting buyers only the right to cultivate it without political control.
In 1917, Great Britain militarily occupied Palestine, establishing a mandate administration that encouraged Jewish immigration and land transfers. Despite these efforts, by 1947, Jews held only 8% of Palestinian territory. The UN Partition Plan of November 29, 1947, allocated 55% of Palestine to the Jewish State. Israel’s establishment in May 1948 exceeded the partition plan’s boundaries, capturing 78% of the land by the January 1949 armistice. In the 1967 Six Day War, Israel occupied the remaining 22%.
This historical narrative dispels the notion of ‘Palestinians selling their land.’
From anti-refugee sentiment to anti-Arabism
Why do you believe Turkish public opinion often focuses on Hamas’ actions while overlooking Israel’s isolation, violence, and ethnic cleansing? What factors contribute to legitimizing Israel’s actions ‘against the Arabs’?
Several factors contribute to this skewed perception:
First, the public tends to equate all Palestinian organizations with Hamas, ignoring the diversity of groups involved in the conflict.
Second, there’s a tendency to categorize Hamas as part of a broad ‘jihadist’ category, akin to ISIS, even though these groups have significant ideological and operational differences.
Third, the growing anti-refugee sentiment in Turkey, fueled by historical myths, has evolved into anti-Arabism, leading to support for Palestinians primarily because they are perceived as fellow Arabs.
Lastly, some segments of society conflate the Palestinian issue with the Turkish government, assuming that opposing the government entails opposing the Palestinian cause. This explains the surprise generated when leftist parties declare their support for Palestinian movements, challenging this association.
