It should be noted with concern that the talks between the deputy foreign ministers of Türkiye and Syria scheduled for March 15-16 in Moscow, which were supposed to pave the way for normalization between Ankara and Damascus, have been postponed. Based on the media reports, it is possible to conclude that the postponement was due to statements made by Syrian President Assad to the Russian press.
In this statement, Assad underlined two issues in particular. The first is Türkiye’s withdrawal from Syrian territory, which it controls, and the other is Ankara’s refusal to support groups seen as terrorists by the Damascus government. If we really want to normalize relations with Syria, we need to consider these demands.
GRADUAL WITHDRAWAL FROM SYRIAN TERRITORY
First, it is very useful to make this analysis by putting ourselves in the position of the Syrian and Damascus governments and then focusing on what we want to achieve with normalization with this country. For example, how long do we want to stay in the territory we control in Syria? If we are not opposed to these territories coming under Syria’s full and effective sovereignty, and if it is only a question of timing or timetable, the problem can be overcome. For example, why is it not possible for the Syrian state to gradually appoint administrators to the lands we control and to integrate these lands into its administrative system within the framework of a certain calendar when an agreement is signed with the Damascus government in line with our expectations from Syria (return of asylum seekers and joint fight against terrorism)? More precisely, why not consider signing another agreement with the government in Damascus to cede these territories to Syria’s direct and effective sovereignty once we have reached a compromise with Syria on issues such as the return of asylum seekers and the updated implementation of the Adana Agreement?
Accordingly, once a common ground on the asylum seekers and the Adana Agreement is found, Türkiye would sign an agreement committing to cede these territories to Syria’s direct sovereignty, and a timetable could be set for how this would happen gradually. While Turkish security forces maintain a presence in those areas, Syria could appoint administrators, teachers, doctors, and other civil servants there, and the Damascus government could also consider sending teams to liaise with Turkish security forces. As a result, the process of integrating the public institutions and administration in these regions under the de facto control of Türkiye into the Syrian system and the registration of border crossings by Turkish and Syrian customs officials could be initiated. Trade between the two countries would be recorded and taxed. During such a transition, Turkish security forces would gradually leave the region, at which time the Adana Agreement, already updated, would come into effect and Türkiye’s most important security concern would be addressed. Syria, on the other hand, could reincorporate its territory into its sovereignty. It may be possible to develop a complete win/win strategy.
IF OUR GOAL IS NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM SYRIAN TERRITORY…
If our goal is not to withdraw from the territories we control, then the scenarios are different, and it is already impossible to return asylum seekers and to fight terrorism jointly with Syria on the basis of the Adana Agreement. If our aim is to impose a political solution on Syria, as some of our senior officials insisted until recently after President Erdoğan announced his intention to normalize relations with Syria and meet with Assad after his meeting with Putin in Sochi on August 6, 2022, all this brainstorming should be discarded. According to these senior officials, who use the highly offensive and toxic word ‘regime’, the way to reconcile/normalize with Syria is to bring a new constitution to this country. In other words, we seem to want a named or unnamed federal constitution that changes the constitution of the country in a national-unitary structure and replaces it with autonomous regions. Until recently, the same senior officials were even talking about reconciling the ‘regime’ and the ‘opposition’.
Apart from the fact that such an expectation is not at all compatible with the realities in both the field and the international arena, it can be observed at first glance that it does not serve Türkiye’s national interests. For example, if instead of transferring the territory we control directly to the effective sovereignty of the Syrian state, we want to keep it under the effective control of the groups that we call the Syrian National Army (SMO) and act together with us, we will transform this country into a federation that includes autonomous regions, even if it is possible, let alone Syria or even Russia will not accept it. Wouldn’t we then be playing into the hands of groups in Idlib that we also consider terrorists and, more importantly, the PKK/PYD terrorists who, together with the U.S. forces, are carrying out large-scale ethnic cleansing in the east of the Euphrates and seizing the region? Because a Syria with autonomous regions is the final solution that both groups ultimately want, at least for now. What national interests does such a result serve in Türkiye? We have to ask this question openly and answer it from the point of view of national interests, because the future of certain groups that have emerged as a result of the mistakes, we made during the war, has come to take precedence over the national interests of Türkiye.
There is no national interest to be gained from the Turkish media’s psychologically motivated treatment of the issue, such as ‘Assad has put forward unacceptable conditions for the summit’, because the idea of ‘let’s actually take Aleppo, let’s be on the safe side’ lies behind that logic. And in fact, it reflects a mindset that does not want to compromise with Syria, which it sees as Assad. A mindset that laments, ‘If Russia had not been so involved, we would have overthrown this Assad regime long ago’… Accordingly, it is a way of thinking that assumes it is possible and right to impose at least some conditions on the Assad regime, which we have failed to overthrow, and that it is possible and right for us to exert constant pressure on the ‘regime’ through the SMO, to which we will de facto hand over the administration of the territories we control…
THE HEAVY PRICE OF NOT WITHDRAWING FROM SYRIA
However, when we analyze them carefully, they all contain seriously dangerous and harmful elements for Türkiye’s national interests. Although not possible under the current conditions, if the SMO will become the security forces of the regions we currently control when we force Syria out of its current national-unitary structure and force it into a federation with autonomous regions, HTS and PKK/PYD will position themselves as security forces in Idlib and PKK/PYD regions that will turn into autonomous regions. In such a scenario, Türkiye will not be able to gain any benefit, and this state structure will pave the way for the disintegration of Syria in the next step, because it can be said that Syria, which the Western world, especially the U.S., does not want to remain within its current borders and favors its division into three if possible, will not survive in the medium term and its division into independent states according to federal borders will be inevitable.
After all, in an international environment where the federal structures of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union have disintegrated one after another, and where the disintegration of states such as Spain and even the United Kingdom (UK) seems quite possible, it is inconceivable that a federal Syria, which would be the scene of provocations and power struggles by the U.S. on the one hand and Israel and other states on the other, would survive. Well, even if the SMO-controlled territories of a disintegrating Syria want to join Türkiye, can it be a reasonable and logical policy for Türkiye’s national interests to pave the way for the PKK/PYD to become an independent state in this way? It cannot be because Türkiye needs neither land nor additional population. In such a scenario, it should be noted that it is quite predictable the Arab world, which is increasingly normalizing its relations with Syria, will react and act together against Türkiye, which has seized or is trying to seize the territory of an Arab state. In such a case, it is highly likely that the UN Security Council would unite against Türkiye.
What needs to be done is to pave the way for the Erdogan-Assad summit as soon as possible. We need new thinking for reconciliation and normalization, discarding the ideas that underpin old wrong and destructive policies. Two agreements with Syria on the return of refugees and the joint fight against terrorism should be signed before the quadrilateral leaders’ summit including the participation of Russia and Iran. When updating the Adana Agreement, in addition to the PKK, the PYD, YPG and all their derivatives should be included in the text, and jihadist groups, which Syria considers terrorist organizations – some of which we also consider terrorist – can be added to that text. In addition, a timetable for withdrawal will be agreed upon, with Türkiye guaranteeing that it will hand over the Syrian territory under its control to the effective sovereignty of the Damascus government. It would be much more appropriate to concentrate on the extraordinary investment, reconstruction and trade-economic benefits that such a reconciliation of the two states would bring to both sides, and to try to secure Syria’s recognition of the TRNC based on the normalization of relations. On the contrary, every attempt and every delay will continue to impose a huge financial burden on both the current government and the state/nation.
