Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis travels to Ankara today to discuss a new chapter and a positive agenda with Greece. Technically, this is the counterpart of President Erdogan’s visit to Athens in recent months, but it does not look like an ordinary return visit. The Greek prime minister was interviewed by a Turkish newspaper (Milliyet, 12 May) and President Erdogan by a Greek newspaper (Kathimerini, 12 May). The tone of both leaders is cautious and attentive. Obviously, they are trying to achieve ‘something new’.
As someone who has been closely following the Turkish-Greek tensions, crises and periods of détente from time to time, I have no intention of adding water to the cooked pot; however, since I do not know exactly what the cooked pot is, for whom, how and by whom it is being cooked, I would like to share some of my concerns and my thoughts/evaluations on how these problems, which I have been pondering for years, can be resolved.
First of all, it is necessary to analyse why and how this period of softening was reached. As you may recall, after a series of crises in the second half of 2020 (the Idlib crisis with Russia in January-February 2020 and the Libya crisis with Egypt in the summer of 2020), we found ourselves in a full diplomatic-military crisis with Greece. As a result of the wrong and ideological foreign policy that we have been insisting on for years, we have turned the whole region against us, made enemies of countries like Egypt and Israel, which have always been neutral in the Greek-Turkish issues, and even made Athens dream of taking us on militarily. Why not?
How and why did Greece go from confrontating Turkey in the Aegean to confront Turkey today?
If Turkey clashes with Egypt over Libya – a very serious scenario in the summer of 2020 – and Israel supports Egypt in the armed conflicts, why should Greece not carry out a fait accompli operation in the Aegean against Turkey, which seems to be feuding with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates at the same time? Moreover, in such a scenario, even France could ‘sell’ Greece enough Rafale fighters overnight. Even Armenia could have extended its front against Azerbaijan through Tovuz, and Turkey could have been shown the error of its ways. When the 15 July coup attempt took place in the summer of 2016, Athens complained that it was not sufficiently prepared to carry out such a military operation. I should also note here that in those years, when I tried to explain that such isolation was contrary to the spirit of the art of foreign policy and that we needed a serious review, I was subjected to a lot of lamentations by the so-called foreign policy experts (!).
In the end, Ankara had to realise that the flawed policies it insisted on pursuing, as if it were a finalist in a competition to create the best example of the worst foreign policy, were unsustainable. The rapid transformation of normalisation between Turkey and Russia into ‘rapprochement’ led to the historic victory of Azerbaijan, which Turkey had fully supported in the forty-four-day war, while Ankara quickly restored its relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and even Israel. What is more, it did so in the space of a year. Although Syria remains the limping leg in this series, its remarkably balanced and cautious policy towards the upcoming Ukrainian war, especially since the second half of 2021, has once again shattered Greece’s crude dreams.
For Mitsotakis and Greece, an adventure in the Aegean against a Turkey that has restored its relations with Egypt and Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean, opened new and clean pages with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and improved its relations with Russia in every field, while Athens’ relations with Moscow plummeted during the Ukrainian war, would have been literally suicidal. There is no doubt that Athens has studied what happened to Armenia when it attacked Tovuz. President Erdoğan’s statement that “we can come suddenly one night” should not be taken lightly. This is where the 2023 earthquake came to the rescue. Just as in 1999, this time Greece sent rescue teams, and both the Turkish and Greek media seized on the issue, making it the beginning of a positive agenda and a new page in politics.
New risks in a new period
In Turkey, where the Greek issue is not a serious agenda in domestic public opinion, decision-makers are always at ease when they talk about reconciling with Athens and solving the problems, because the problems with this country are not used to make a premium in our domestic politics. Even during the time of this government, which made foreign policy a domestic agenda, this issue was not used very much. But that is not the case with Greece. In what can be called an abuse of democracy, every party and every government has used the issue of Turkey to the hilt, publicising every problem with its content, Greek theses and red lines.
As a result, a negotiation process based on give and take has become almost impossible for Greek governments. That is why Greek governments always cling to this excuse. The worst thing is that Europe and America, which often mediated these negotiations, flattered all the politicians/decision-makers by saying ‘you are a big state, don’t compare yourself with Greece, you can be more generous’. This should not happen this time. If there is to be a positive agenda with Greece – and Athens knows very well that the reality of the multipolar world is in favour of Turkey and against Greece – then we should not allow our problems with Greece to be addressed within the Turkey-EU agenda or based on Turkey’s EU membership perspective, as if it actually exists. In short, the problems should be addressed through bilateral negotiations and outside the framework that has so far been polluted/poisoned by the Turkey-EU acquis.
As Dendias said in Ankara, the issue for Greece is simple: Ankara must recognise Greek Cyprus as the Republic of Cyprus, as enshrined in the EU-Turkey acquis through the efforts of Athens and with the complicity of all EU member states that do not want Turkey to become a member, and accept that the only problem in the Aegean, in line with Greek theses, is to refer the issue to the Hague Court of Justice or arbitration to determine where the continental shelf runs between the easternmost Greek-dominated islands and the Turkish mainland. Other issues, such as Greece’s claim to 12 miles of airspace in violation of international law, the arming of islands with non-military status, islands with undetermined status in the Aegean, the issue of adjacent islands and rocks, etc., are all fabricated by Turkey in order to open Greece’s rights to discussion, and Greece refuses to negotiate on these issues.
Wouldn’t it be nice to create appeasement?
It may be possible, but it also involves serious risks. For example, if we can achieve a détente with Greece in the Aegean, without compromising an inch on our thesis that the Cyprus problem should be solved on the basis of two states, so much the better! But such a détente should not take place if, as we have always done, we show unnecessary courtesy by saying that we should not frighten or offend Athens, and if we accuse each other internally of being those who want a solution and those who do not want a solution, And if we start accusing each other internally as those who want a solution and those who do not want a solution, because it will lead to compromising the steps to be taken towards the recognition of the TRNC, as well as justifying the thesis of the pro-federationists within the TRNC that ‘we told you so, Turkey will say a few words about two states and then take a step back’.
It should not be forgotten that in the last century of the Empire, Greece always managed to win both when it was at odds with the Ottoman Empire and when it was friendly with it. The reason for this is that Europe often took a pro-Greek stance. Atatürk put an end to this cursed period. After the Second World War, Ankara was always vigilant on the Cyprus issue and the Turkish-Greek problems that spread from there to the Aegean and did not allow the West to take initiatives in favour of Greece. However, it must be admitted that this policy could be maintained until the second half of the 1990s, when the EU issue was sold to Turkey through a massive media campaign, and in the two decades that followed, Turkey’s Cyprus and Greece policies were almost turned upside down within the European Union process. The recent caution and the advantages and benefits of multipolarity should not be wasted on a non-existent EU perspective.
