Condensed points about the course of the ground confrontation in Gaza (the 46th day of the war on Gaza) on the verge of a temporary truce and the partial prisoner exchange deal
Khaled Yamani, PFLP official
The occupation is trying to establish new field facts before entering the four days of the truce (which can be extended), as the occupation army intensified its movement on the eastern border, in particular, east of Al-Maghazi and Deir Al-Balah in the central Gaza Strip and east of Khan Yunis in the south of the Gaza Strip, which witnessed violent clashes with advanced vehicles.
During the past few days, the occupation army carried out a tactical redeployment operation that included withdrawing a large portion of the vehicles from the streets of Gaza City (while maintaining concentration and control points at the main intersections), for several considerations, the most important of which is reducing the ongoing attrition of the vehicles and not leaving them vulnerable to being targeted by groups of resistance fighters. In addition to intensifying work on major axes that represent major battlefields where the occupation expects a strong presence of the resistance.
After the redeployment process, the occupation army strengthened its vehicles in the vicinity of Jabalia camp, where it imposed its siege from several axes, most notably the southern axis of the camp by advancing from the Al-Tawam and Al-Saftawi junctions to the Abu Sharkh junction on the outskirts of the Al-Faluja neighborhood, and the axis north of the camp by advancing from the Beit Lahia roundabout towards the roundabout, Sheikh Zayed and the surroundings of the Indonesian Hospital.
The population presence in Jabalia camp and the Beit Lahia project still represents an operational dilemma for the occupation army, and as a result, the bombing by enemy aircraft intensified, with raids using tons of explosives targeting neighborhoods and residential squares in the two aforementioned areas.
In the same context, and to push residents to flee Jabalia camp and the Beit Lahia project, the occupation deliberately bombed hospitals in the north, targeting the hospitals of the Indonesian, Al-Awda, and Kamal Adwan, and caused martyrs and injuries among the medical staff, the wounded, and the displaced.
The vehicles are moving slowly and gradually towards Jabalia camp, where the occupation expects fierce battles if it is stormed.
The occupation army has been trying for days to control major settlement sites in northern Gaza, most notably Tal Al-Rayes, Tal Al-Kashef, and Tal Al-Zaatar, as it did not stop implementing fire belts from military aircraft, artillery bombardment, shooting from helicopters, and sweeping operations with Quadcopter aircraft in preparation for storming them.
After failing to neutralize the nodes of resistance on the northern border in northern Gaza, especially the Beit Hanoun area, the occupation army deliberately circumvented it and reached the outskirts of Jabalia camp through other axes from the south and north of the camp.
On the level of the resistance: The resistance is still working according to the strategies of guerrilla warfare and urban combat, as it does not establish defensive lines to prevent the advance of vehicles to the targeted areas, but rather follows the pattern of raiding forces from weak spots that allow the forces and vehicles to be depleted from positions previously prepared by the resistance.
The resistance sent important messages about the cohesion of command-and-control systems, such as the resistance announcing precise details of the battles and raids in Beit Hanoun, Beit Lahia, and the neighborhoods of Gaza City, and broadcasting video clips from the field in various axes of ambushes and targeting of occupation vehicles and soldiers and the sheep of part of their equipment, in addition to missile barrages. The large and expanded attack that targeted the depths of the occupied territories, which is a confirmation in action, image and speech of the falsity of the occupation army’s claim that the resistance leadership has lost contact with the field, and lost control of the areas (strikes on the command, control and communication systems).
The resistance is still waging battles of attrition for the occupation’s vehicles and soldiers in the areas that represented the first axes of ground movement for the occupation army, especially the areas of Juhr al-Dik in the center and Beit Hanoun in the north, through various ambushes, during which tandem anti-armor shells, anti-personnel shells, sniping and clashes with firearms were used. Note that the occupation has searched these areas with various types of weapons and missiles since the first day of the aggressive war on Gaza.
The resistance diversified its tactics to exhaust the occupation army and raise the cost of its ground movement. It engages in clashes in an environment that allows maneuvering with urban warfare tactics despite the large volume of firefights and the scorched earth policy. The resistance used the guerrilla engagement tactic (martyrdom raids) for the resistance in places where the occupation army forces were stationed.
The average number of occupation deaths (officially announced) is 4 deaths per day, and the average number of vehicles targeted by the resistance that are completely or partially damaged is one vehicle every two hours, i.e. 12 vehicles per day, which turns every day of ground movement into days of continuous attrition for army vehicles.
Conclusion: The days of calm will represent an important opportunity to strengthen the steadfastness of citizens, especially those steadfast in the northern Gaza Strip (aid will enter all areas of the Strip without exception), and will give the resistance an important space to reorganize its ranks according to the new field realities and overcome any operational dilemmas created by the intense targeting over the course of a month and a half of bombing. Continuing, while the occupation army will try to invest the days of the truce in updating its goal bank and catching any security errors that the resistance or its leadership may fall into within the framework of the process of releasing prisoners held by the resistance, and the insurance and communication arrangements between the leadership and field levels.
The truce represents the greatest indication of the failure of the Zionist impulse, and of conviction. From the various components of the War Council, the military option will not succeed in liberating the resistance’s prisoners of the occupation, and that the international pressure resulting from the continuation of Zionist transgressions without achieving real operational achievements has begun to have an impact, although the occupation believes that this truce will provide a new margin for more crimes in the future. It gives a longer war life.
On the resistance level, the success of the partial deal represents an opportunity to strengthen the internal front of the resistance, and an important message about the cohesion of the leadership systems and their ability to engage in a negotiation process from a standpoint of strength and extract their demands despite the occupation’s procrastination as much as possible.
After the end of the days of calm, the occupation will work to increase field pressure and expand the area of ground movement, and the consolidation phase will be larger, targeting the strongest and most concentrated gatherings of the resistance, especially in the Jabalia camp, the Zaytoun neighborhood, and the Shujaiya neighborhood.
The occupation will increase the pace of ground maneuvers in the eastern strip of the southern Gaza Strip, and the eastern borders of Khan Yunis Governorate will witness the largest engagement arena in the southern region, in an effort to intensify pressure on the resistance and create a buffer strip along the eastern borders of the Strip.
