Reviewing the Halfway Progress of the Trump Administration’s Trade War

On July 31, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung confirmed that a trade agreement had been reached with the United States. U.S. tariffs on Korean automobiles will be reduced to 15%, and Korea will not further open its rice and beef markets to the U.S., but it has pledged to invest $350 billion in U.S.-controlled investment projects.

On the same day, the Trump administration agreed to extend the tariff agreement with Mexico for 90 days. Meanwhile, it threatened to impose a 25% tariff on India starting August 1 and announced it would not extend the final deadline for negotiations with other trade partners. Although the U.S. has not yet reached new agreements with major trading partners such as Mexico, Canada, India, and China, the trade war—considered epic in scale—can be said to be halfway through, with the Trump administration appearing to have won a superficial victory. However, there remain many uncertainties in the subsequent implementation.

Three rounds of the China-U.S. trade war have concluded without a final solution. On July 29, China and the U.S. concluded their third round of talks in Sweden. China’s Ministry of Commerce representative and Vice Minister Li Chenggang announced that, after a day and a half of negotiations, the trade teams from both countries had in-depth, candid, and constructive exchanges on major issues of mutual concern, based on the consensus reached during the June 5 call between the two heads of state. Li also emphasized that both sides would continue to promote the timely extension of the mutually suspended 24% tariffs and China’s countermeasures. The China-U.S. economic and trade teams will maintain close communication to promptly exchange views on trade issues and continue to promote stable and healthy development of bilateral trade relations.

On May 12, China and the U.S. held the first round of talks in Geneva and achieved a major initial result of “mutual tariff cancellation”: the U.S. promised to cancel 91% of the tariffs imposed under two executive orders on April 8 and 9; China reciprocated with a 91% cancellation; both sides agreed to suspend the 24% tariff for 90 days, retaining only 10% tariffs. This result provided a much-needed cooling down of the China-U.S. trade war that had flared up when Trump returned to office.

On June 12, the two sides completed the second round of talks in London, but no specific content was disclosed. The media only emphasized that the two sides had reached a consensus in principle on measures to implement the consensus of the leaders’ phone call and consolidate the results of the Geneva trade talks. The third round of talks held in Stockholm also did not yield any substantive breakthroughs, and both sides remain in a stage of bargaining and haggling.

While China-U.S. trade negotiations are moving forward with difficulty, the Trump administration has successfully broken through three major trade negotiation barriers within ten days, particularly reaching agreements with the EU and Japan, which can be considered symbolic victories. This has also created new pressure for China and other trading partners who have yet to compromise.
On July 28, the U.S. and the EU announced a comprehensive new trade agreement with a baseline tariff rate of 15%, covering key goods such as automobiles, semiconductors, and pharmaceuticals. The EU pledged to purchase $750 billion worth of energy products from the U.S. and added a $600 billion investment plan. This agreement marks a major compromise from the EU.

Previously, on July 23, the U.S. had reached a similar agreement with Japan, stipulating a uniform 15% tariff on most Japanese goods exported to the U.S., and Japan committed to a $550 billion investment in the U.S.

Although the U.S.-EU and U.S.-Japan tariff battles appear to involve mutual compromise, the U.S. has clearly benefited. For the EU, the 15% rate is significantly higher than the previous average of 4.8%, but lower than the punitive 30% the U.S. had threatened or the briefly implemented 20% rate. This “comprehensive uniform tariff” applies to most EU-manufactured goods, including automobiles that previously faced tariffs as high as 27.5%. For key sectors like pharmaceuticals, the U.S. also agreed to rates below 15% and retained the option for future interventions.

For Japan, although the 15% baseline tariff rate is slightly higher than the previously briefly implemented 10%, it is far lower than the 25% proposed by the U.S. before July. This tariff rate stabilizes Japan’s core automobile industry, which accounts for about one-fourth of its exports to the U.S., and has strategic significance for consolidating Japan’s manufacturing, especially the production and export of automobiles and auto parts.

The U.S. has obtained massive import or investment commitments from Europe and Japan. The EU has pledged to purchase over $750 billion in energy products from the U.S. in the coming years, mainly including liquefied natural gas, oil, and nuclear fuel. In addition, the EU has committed to an extra $600 billion investment in the U.S., covering infrastructure, energy system integration, and key industrial chain restructuring. Notably, the EU will also expand its military procurement from the U.S.

Japan has committed to a $550 billion investment plan in the U.S., covering sectors such as manufacturing, automotive supply chain expansion, infrastructure, and high-tech cooperation. In the automobile sector, Japan is accelerating localized production capacity in the U.S. to stabilize its strategic access to the American market.

The U.S. has further opened up the European and Japanese markets. Although the U.S.-EU agreement establishes a unified baseline tariff rate, several “zero-for-zero” exception lists were set, including aircraft and parts, semiconductor equipment, key raw materials, certain agricultural products, and specific chemicals.

Japan will also further open its market, especially for U.S. automobiles, rice, and certain agricultural products. This move responds to Trump’s longstanding complaint that “American products can’t enter the Japanese market.” Although Japan has not reduced tariffs on U.S. goods in this round of negotiations, by adjusting non-tariff barriers and loosening import quotas, it has in effect provided greater market access for U.S. goods. At the same time, Japan has retained regulatory authority over sensitive domestic industries, seeking policy flexibility within its concessions.

In 2024, the top ten U.S. trade partners by total trade volume are: Mexico, Canada, China, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan (China), Vietnam, the United Kingdom, and India. Before securing Japan, the EU, and South Korea, the U.S. had already handled the UK, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Considering that EU members such as the Netherlands, Ireland, Switzerland, Italy, and France are the 11th to 15th U.S. trade partners, the Trump administration’s trade war has already conquered half the battlefield. Only four tough “bones” remain: Mexico, Canada, India, and China.

Some therefore judge that “Trump has won big,” especially with his trade victories over the EU and Japan. However, legally speaking, the U.S.-EU trade agreement still needs approval from the legislative bodies of the 27 EU member states. So whether this agreement can allow the Trump administration to laugh to the end is still uncertain.

First, almost the entire political and public sphere in Europe is criticizing the new U.S.-EU agreement, especially in France and Germany. French Prime Minister Bérou called the 27th a “dark day” for Europe; far-right leader Le Pen said the EU had suffered a “political, economic, and moral defeat,” signing a “surrender document”; far-left leader Mélenchon called it a “total concession to Trump”; former PM de Villepin said the agreement was “unequal” and likened it to “tribute.” French officials in charge of industry and trade called the trade “unbalanced” and demanded a new round of negotiations. Germany’s Export Association said the deal poses a “survival threat” to many German traders; the Federation of German Industries criticized the EU for making “asymmetrical compromises.”

In addition, the Swedish finance minister accused the new U.S.-EU agreement of harming Sweden’s economy. Spain’s El País said the agreement reinforced U.S.-EU tariff inequality. Hungarian PM Orbán even mocked that Trump “ate EU Commission President von der Leyen for breakfast.” The European Parliament’s trade committee chair Bernd Lange slammed the deal as a “biased” transaction…

On the 28th, the European Commission issued a document stressing that the “handshake deal” between Trump and von der Leyen has no legal effect. The U.S. and EU have not finalized a formal agreement, especially around key points of divergence such as food standards, digital regulations, energy, investment, and steel and aluminum tariffs.

Although the opposition in Japan is not as fierce as in Europe, public opinion has still criticized the Ishiba government for sacrificing the rice bowl to protect the car wheel. Most benefits from the investment in the U.S. are seen to favor the American side. The latest poll by Kyodo News shows that about 78% of the public is dissatisfied with the agreement, with only 11% expressing support. Analysts believe the new U.S.-Japan agreement not only damages Ishiba’s political prestige and the LDP’s ruling foundation but also reminds Japanese society of the long nightmare triggered by the signing of the U.S.-Japan “Plaza Accord”—namely, Japan’s lost decade of growth.

Secondly, the implementation of U.S. terms may also be constrained by domestic political and legal challenges. The U.S. Federal Court of Appeals is about to hear a lawsuit concerning the legality of Trump’s taxation powers, and its ruling may shake the legal foundation of Trump’s foreign trade agreements. The U.S.-EU agreement fails to clarify the tariff treatment of American goods exported to Europe, showing that serious asymmetry still exists. The U.S.-Japan agreement has left the American auto industry dissatisfied, believing that it has not substantially improved the U.S. trade deficit with Japan, and the long-standing structural industrial contradictions between the U.S. and Japan remain unresolved.

Thirdly, although Europe and Japan have increased their investment in the U.S., reshoring of U.S. manufacturing faces structural bottlenecks. The Trump administration is vigorously promoting direct investment in the U.S. by Europe, Japan, and other allies—especially in key sectors like semiconductors, automobiles, batteries, and clean energy—to accelerate manufacturing reshoring and restructure the supply chain. However, in practical terms, this strategy faces structural bottlenecks in many aspects such as talent, culture, and regulatory systems, making it difficult to absorb the systemic costs of converting investments in the short term. The most fundamental constraint is the severe shortage of skilled labor in U.S. manufacturing. The gap in engineers and technicians directly limits the implementation of production lines. Cultural differences further intensify friction. The highly efficient execution systems of multinational companies are not suited to the loosely decentralized American management style, creating structural bottlenecks from construction to operation and weakening overall investment returns.

In summary, countries such as Canada, Mexico, and India will face increasing pressure from the U.S. and be forced to fight alone in confronting America’s all-around hegemonic coercion. The outlook for China-U.S. trade negotiations is also not optimistic and is bound to face difficulties arising from the U.S. shift from “comprehensive attack” to “focused attack,” including the Trump administration’s return to the full-pressure tactics of its version 1.0 era.

This week, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) plans to issue a travel health advisory to China due to a rise in “chikungunya virus cases” in China. At the same time, the Republican-controlled U.S. House and Senate announced that a congressional delegation would visit Taiwan in August. This comes right after the Trump administration refused the Taiwan regional leader’s transit passage, a maneuver reflecting both duplicity and inconsistency in U.S. Taiwan policy. It also sends an implicit warning to China: if it doesn’t make concessions at the trade negotiating table, the U.S. will open its geopolitical “Pandora’s box” and unleash a full array of tactics to disrupt China.

From a global and strategic perspective, China-U.S. relations—especially trade relations—are “too big to fail” and serve as the core links of the global industrial, trade, and value chains. China-U.S. trade volume is enormous, with high interdependence, strong economic complementarity, and significant structural differences. With many friction points, deep policy gaps, and strong competitiveness, the China-U.S. trade negotiations are bound to become the biggest, most difficult, and ultimately decisive battleground.

China remains the largest source of goods for the U.S., the biggest market for multinational investment and profits, and the largest consumer market for agricultural products. China not only possesses a vast domestic circulation market, but also retains tremendous external circulation potential. It also has multiple leverage points in its games with the U.S., Europe, and Japan. As the Trump administration secures agreements with other trade partners, it is likely to gain confidence and raise its demands, even using trade negotiations and geopolitical tools alternately or simultaneously to pressure China into making major concessions.

Given these trends, China must maintain strategic clarity, confidence, composure, endurance, and resilience. It must engage with the Trump administration using great wisdom, flexible strategies, and a combination of tactics—negotiating persistently, fighting without breaking ties—in order to ultimately defeat the Trump administration’s blind self-confidence, empty rhetoric, and excessive demands, and force it to recognize reality and accept a relatively fair and balanced bilateral trade agreement, achieving a truly win-win China-U.S. outcome.