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Russia tests hypersonic missile Oreshnik in a show of strength amid Ukraine conflict

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On the evening of November 21, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced in a televised address that Russian forces had conducted a coordinated strike on Ukrainian military-industrial facilities. As part of the attack, Russia tested a new intermediate-range hypersonic missile, codenamed Oreshnik, which was not equipped with a nuclear warhead. Putin accused Ukraine of using Western-supplied weapons on November 19 and 21 to target Russian military installations, escalating the conflict into what he described as a “global confrontation.” He warned that any form of escalation would prompt Russia to take decisive retaliatory measures to safeguard its national security and territorial integrity.

In response, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Putin’s remarks indicated Russia’s intent to escalate the war further and broaden the scope of the conflict. Zelensky dismissed the accusations of using Western weapons, asserting that Ukraine had long utilized such systems in accordance with its right to self-defense under international law. Notably, Russia provided a 30-minute advance warning to the United States before the missile test. Subsequently, the U.S. Department of Defense expressed concern over the development, describing the test as a “troubling turn of events.”

The Oreshnik missile, capable of reaching speeds up to Mach 10, currently lacks any known countermeasure in missile defense systems. While Putin’s announcement clarified earlier Ukrainian claims about the use of intercontinental missiles with a range of 6,000 kilometers, it nonetheless sparked widespread alarm within the international community. By testing the Oreshnik missile in a combat scenario, Russia aims to signal its readiness to enforce its newly revised nuclear doctrine. This move is intended as a warning to Ukraine and NATO, underscoring Moscow’s willingness to potentially transition from a nuclear brinkmanship strategy to actual deployment, including the first use of nuclear weapons.

The conflict in Ukraine reached its 1,000th day on November 19, marked by an escalation triggered by Western support. On November 17, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France jointly announced they would no longer restrict Ukraine from using NATO-supplied medium- and long-range missiles to target Russian territory. In response, Ukraine launched six U.S.-made Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) on Russia’s Bryansk Oblast, with five intercepted and one destroyed.

The Biden administration and its allies are well aware of the risks associated with loosening restrictions on Ukrainian missile capabilities. On November 20, the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv issued an emergency closure, citing the likelihood of significant airstrikes and urging personnel to shelter in place. This precaution marked the first such measure by the U.S. since the start of the conflict, prompting similar actions by embassies from Italy, Spain, and Greece.

Although the missile strikes by Ukraine caused minimal physical damage, their symbolic challenge, potential threat, and humiliation carry significant strategic implications. Should such actions continue, Russia risks losing its frontline advantages, and the security of its mainland could deteriorate further. The ATACMS missiles, alongside the British Storm Shadow and French Scalp cruise missiles, possess ranges of 300 to 560 kilometers, placing Russia’s western border regions, occupied territories such as Crimea, and even the Black Sea Fleet within reach. If launched from Ukraine’s border areas, these weapons could potentially threaten Moscow’s outskirts.

In response to NATO’s easing of missile restrictions and Ukraine’s attacks on Russian territory, Putin approved a revised nuclear deterrence policy on November 19, setting unprecedented red lines for the use of nuclear weapons. According to this policy, Russia reserves the right to launch a nuclear strike if it or its ally Belarus faces significant conventional attacks threatening sovereignty or territorial integrity. The document also stipulates that any attack by a non-nuclear state, supported by a nuclear-armed state, will be considered a joint assault, and any attack by one member of a military alliance will be treated as an attack by the entire alliance.

This evolving scenario underscores the intensifying dynamics of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and highlights the potential for further escalation into uncharted territories of global security risks.

Russia’s nuclear brinkmanship policy, long a tool of strategic intimidation, now appears to have been unsheathed, explicitly targeting nuclear-armed nations such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, as well as NATO as a collective entity supporting Ukraine’s escalation of the conflict. Moscow has signaled the possibility of initiating nuclear weapon use, even without suffering a nuclear attack, citing the United States’ precedent for employing nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.

To ensure the clarity of its nuclear messaging, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov explicitly addressed Western leaders in English, describing the conflict as entering a “new qualitative phase of confrontation against Russia.” Lavrov emphasized the role of U.S. personnel and data in enabling Ukraine’s use of ATACMS missiles against Russian targets, invoking the 1945 U.S. nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as historical context.

In an apparent move to prepare for potential nuclear contingencies, Russia’s Civil Defense and Emergency Situations Research Institute announced on November 18 the mass production of modular, mobile shelters known as Cube-M, capable of protecting 54 people from nuclear explosions, radiation, and other threats. On November 20, Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of Russia’s Security Council and a former defense minister, inspected the Sarov Federal Nuclear Center in Novgorod Oblast to review developments related to the “special military operation.”

Tensions escalated further on November 21 when Russia accused Ukraine of deploying British-made Storm Shadow cruise missiles in an attack on Russia’s Kursk region. This marked Ukraine’s continued defiance of Russia’s warnings to avoid further lowering the nuclear threshold, prompting Moscow to conduct its first combat test of the Oreshnik hypersonic missile. This missile, which NATO currently lacks the capability to intercept, underscores Russia’s resolve to implement its nuclear brinkmanship strategy as more than mere posturing.

On the battlefield, Russia has made significant gains, including neutralizing Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and launching large-scale attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. These measures, timed with the onset of winter, are designed to exert maximum pressure on Kyiv to force concessions. Meanwhile, the Biden administration has accelerated military aid to Ukraine, lifting restrictions on long-range missiles just weeks before a potential transition of power in the White House.

The U.S. administration’s push to expand and escalate the conflict appears motivated by a mix of strategic objectives: reinforcing Ukraine’s capacity to sustain its resistance, gaining leverage in future negotiations, and solidifying a political legacy. Additionally, the strategy may serve to undermine the potential policies of a future Trump administration, complicating any attempt to de-escalate the war. Critics, including Donald Trump Jr., have accused the Biden administration of recklessly escalating the conflict, potentially paving the way for a third world war, driven by the interests of the U.S. military-industrial complex.

Should Trump reclaim the presidency, his administration is likely to revoke Biden-era missile permissions granted to Ukraine. However, the combined effects of Biden’s policy decisions and Ukraine’s high-risk military maneuvers could provoke Russia into intensifying its attacks, potentially shifting the battlefield dynamics in Russia’s favor before any Trump-led peace negotiations.

While Russia is unlikely to cross the nuclear threshold unless faced with dire battlefield reversals, recent signals indicate that Moscow is prepared to follow through on its threats. These include targeting Ukraine’s key decision-making centers or, in extreme scenarios, employing tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine. Such measures, even with controlled destructive capacity, would echo the United States’ decision during the final stages of World War II and underline the precariousness of the current conflict.

The trajectory of this war, therefore, depends not only on military developments but also on the political calculus in Washington, Moscow, and Kyiv. Any miscalculation could lead to irreversible consequences, marking a dangerous turning point in global security.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

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Chaos and reckoning on the streets of France

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The streets of France have turned into a stage not merely for anger against the government, but for a deep-seated mistrust of the state’s approach to security. The blurring of the line between peaceful demonstrators and looters, lingering questions over police conduct, and the media’s refocusing on the immigration debate are bringing the country to the brink of a political reckoning far deeper than a routine public-order crisis.

In France, a government does not have to wait for an electoral defeat to lose its legitimacy. Sometimes, slogans chanted in a public square, tear gas fired down a boulevard, crowds penned in at the exit of a cordoned-off street, and testimonies of unhindered looting in shops only hundreds of metres away suffice to expose just how fragile the bond of trust between state and society has become.

Events in Paris on Saturday, 17 October point to precisely such a political fracture. Planned demonstrations with the participation of student unions, trade unions, and the Yellow Vests were marked throughout the day by police crackdowns, disputes over march routes, looting in the city centre, and widespread criticism of the government’s perceived inadequacy. The scene that emerged by evening suggested that France was grappling not merely with an issue of public order, but with a burgeoning crisis of confidence regarding the state’s impartiality and political motives.

Whom does the state permit to take to the streets, whom does it obstruct, and which forms of violence does it intervene against, and to what degree? The answer to this question may prove decisive in understanding France’s current political impasse.

The shadow of 17 October 1961

It is impossible to view the date of these demonstrations as a mere coincidence on the calendar. On 17 October 1961, a peaceful demonstration in Paris supporting Algerian independence was brutally crushed by the French police. Scores of people were killed, with some demonstrators drowned after being thrown into the River Seine. The event remains etched in memory as one of the darkest chapters in France’s colonial history and state-sponsored violence.

Sixty-five years later, as police interventions, youth rage, and the state’s stance on the right to protest are debated once again on the streets of Paris on 17 October, the resurgence of this historical memory was inevitable.

This memory may hold a distinct meaning, especially for French citizens of North African descent. Yet it would also be a mistake to reduce all the young people taking part in the demonstrations to a single identity, immigrant origin, or political motivation.

To what extent has the French Republic truly reckoned with the legacy of its colonial past and the relationship its security apparatus maintains with diverse segments of society?

Looters on the streets, where are the police?

Individuals dressed in black and associated in the public eye with the Black Bloc broke into shops at various locations, damaged businesses, and engaged in looting.

While peaceful demonstrators marched under a heavy police presence, fierce criticism arose that looting in certain areas had been allowed to unfold unchecked.

It is striking that while 14,000 police officers were deployed across the capital during the Pope’s visit to Paris, only 10,000 officers in total were assigned across the whole of France for the demonstrations of 17 October.

To which areas were police resources allocated? Had intelligence services assessed the risk of looting beforehand? While a robust security presence flanked the routes of peaceful marches, why was the same effectiveness not demonstrated in safeguarding commercial districts?

The deployment of elite units trained to quell urban unrest, such as CRS 8, does not resolve these questions. On the contrary, the failure to contain the incidents despite the presence of specialized units calls the quality of planning and coordination into question.

A political reckoning extending from Marseille to Limoges

The debate in Paris soon reverberated across the country’s other cities. In a televised address, the socialist mayor of Marseille stated that he had requested police reinforcements from the government, yet the units dispatched fell short given the scale and requirements of the city.

The mayor’s most striking allegation was that while looters stormed Marseille City Hall, the Hôtel de Ville, police officers stood roughly 200 metres away and failed to intervene. Stating that he possessed security camera footage, the mayor affirmed that he would await the scrutiny of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry and demand an explanation from the government.

The mayor of Limoges likewise issued what amounted to an ultimatum to the government, demanding the reconstruction of the torched town hall and the full reimbursement of costs. According to the mayor, the government had failed to protect a public building and neglected to provide the police with the necessary resources and backing.

These statements emerging from two distinct cities demonstrate that a new confrontation over security policy has arisen between local authorities and the central government. How security resources are allocated, which risks are prioritized, and whether the warnings of local administrations are heeded must all be brought to light.

The deepening scrutiny over the administration’s stance was compounded by President Emmanuel Macron’s refusal to accept the resignation tendered by Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez. The rejection of the resignation raises the question of whether the executive aims to preserve the chain of accountability, or fears that a political reshuffle would only exacerbate the crisis.

In either case, the government faces a crisis of trust.

An eight-minute speech and unanswered demands

Macron’s roughly eight-minute televised address failed to meet expectations regarding the political dimensions of the crisis. The president announced that he would meet with student unions and that the prime minister would engage with political parties, yet he presented neither tangible decisions nor a comprehensive political roadmap.

Education spending, police violence, the Palestinian cause, anti-fascism, and backlash against the Macron administration appear to have ceased being disparate issues in the eyes of the youth.

To be sure, the true strength of a state lies not in silencing its people and streets, but in addressing legitimate demands. It must not be forgotten that institutions unable to adapt and change are destined to break.

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What is scale in foreign policy? How is success measured in foreign policy?

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By its very nature, foreign policy feeds into and draws nourishment from numerous, disparate, and varied fields. It is a domain with manifold and diverse inputs. For foreign policy is examined alongside a broad array of subjects, ranging from geography to history, economics to intelligence, and military might to public diplomacy, commonly termed soft power elements.

The capacity of the state, that is, the scale of the state, or in other words the aggregate of its elements of power (namely political, economic, military, and soft power components), is decisive in foreign policy. Geography is decisive in foreign policy. Commercial relations are decisive in foreign policy. Energy dependence on another country or countries, if present, is decisive in foreign policy. Foreign policy cannot be conducted in spite of these four factors.

There is more. A country’s capacity, its scale, does not increase overnight, from one day to the next. It requires planning. It requires national consensus. It requires time. It requires preparation. Nor are these enough. The regional and global environment, the conjuncture, and the international plane must also allow for it. The stance of allies and adversaries is, of course, also important.

For the international environment is, by its nature, complex. It is an environment rife with contradiction, turmoil, conflict, and tension. To draw an analogy, the person in the driver’s seat of foreign policy is not a motorist speeding along the road as they please. There are things they must not forget, rules they must obey, red lights, vehicles speeding up from behind, a truck moving ahead, and a heavy vehicle hurtling toward them from the opposite direction.

Success in foreign policy does not arrive simply because a politician we like has become foreign minister. For a foreign minister is only as effective as the power, capacity, and weight of their country. One must accept this plain truth.

Moreover, there are simple, straightforward questions that reveal whether foreign policy, which some find deeply complex and inscrutable, is successful or not.

There are undoubtedly ways to measure the effectiveness, prestige, influence, and success of foreign policy.

For instance, the number of countries that respect a passport, how many countries can be visited visa-free, and how many countries impose visa requirements and grant those visas only with great difficulty are important indicators of a country’s standing.

Let us take ourselves as an example. Which countries require a visa for the Turkish passport? Which ones do not? Is it easy for our citizens to obtain visas for the countries they primarily wish to visit?

Let us give another example from the Turkic world.

On the Cyprus issue, which we regard as a national cause across government and opposition, right and left, Kemalist and Milli Görüş adherents alike, how many countries have we succeeded in having recognize the TRNC? Why do the Turkic states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) not recognize the TRNC? Far from recognizing the TRNC, how do the Turkic states in Central Asia (Turkistan) explain to Ankara their developing relations with the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, which Türkiye does not recognize, their appointment of ambassadors, and their recognition of Southern Cyprus as the island’s sole legitimate government?

We must also ask this question, of course: What is the state of Türkiye’s bilateral trade with the Turkic states?

Let us give an example of the relationship between foreign policy and big capital.

In which countries are big capital circles, among the greatest supporters of the ruling bloc, winning major tenders?

In our country, across both ruling and opposition ranks, there is a political party order that supports Türkiye’s EU membership. Yet how much progress has been made on EU membership?

Why is US President Trump not keeping the promises he made to Türkiye at the NATO summit held in Ankara a few months ago?

How many contracts has the new regime in Syria, the al-Sharaa administration, awarded to Turkish companies for the reconstruction of its country?

Has the government in Libya that Türkiye supports paid the money owed to Turkish construction firms, outstanding for years?

How does Qatar, with whom our relations are very good, explain its developing ties, energy agreements, and joint military drills with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration, disregarding our sensitivities?

Who is the addressee of the harsh statements used in recent weeks by Azerbaijan, which we view as “two states, one nation”? To what extent does Azerbaijan share Türkiye’s policy on Israel? What does Türkiye think about the scale, depth, and intimacy of Azerbaijan-Israel relations?

These questions can certainly be multiplied.

Yet without taking into account the scale of the state and observing the criteria for measuring foreign policy, no sound assessment can be made.

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The era of corridor alliances in the Middle East

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In the Middle East, war is no longer waged merely to seize territory. The true contest turns on who will control the energy pipelines, trade routes, ports, and railways of tomorrow. Missiles may strike cities today, but the maps of the future are being drawn through transport and energy corridors.

In this context, interpreting Türkiye’s presence in the Mecca Alliance solely as military support for Saudi Arabian security remains incomplete; it fails to explain why two states that viewed each other with mutual suspicion until recently would take steps toward a cooperation close enough to constitute a shared destiny.

Alongside Saudi Arabia’s existential motives, Ankara’s participation in this alliance is anchored in a profound geopolitical foundation: to position itself within, and if possible at the very centre of, the Middle East’s reconfigured energy and transport corridors.

Today, it cannot be said that Riyadh and Ankara see eye to eye on every regional issue. The threat perceptions and priorities of the two countries do not, quite naturally, entirely coincide. On the geopolitical chessboard, partnerships do not always arise from identical agendas. When reasons are sufficiently compelling, particularly existential ones, they can override political differences and enable common ground along the same strategic path.

A new war of corridors unfolds in the Middle East

On one side lies IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor), planned to extend from India through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel to Europe. On the other stands the Development Road, which aims to link the Persian Gulf across Iraq to Türkiye, and onward to Europe.

These two undertakings are, of course, far more than mere transport projects. They represent two divergent geopolitical answers to where the future flow of trade and energy between Asia and Europe will traverse; for Türkiye, this issue is of vital importance.

If a corridor system taking shape to Türkiye’s south, beyond Ankara’s orbit, becomes permanent, Türkiye could forfeit not only an economic opportunity but also a substantial portion of its strategic centrality in the Middle East. It is through this prism that the Mecca Alliance must be evaluated.

Türkiye’s seat at the same table with Saudi Arabia signifies more than military solidarity. Riyadh and Ankara must sit together to avoid exclusion from the region’s emergent security and economic architecture, for the security of a corridor and the corridor itself are no longer separate matters.

The Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab, and the Suez Canal are links in the very same chain. A security crisis in one directly impacts the others. While the vulnerability of Hormuz makes alternative export routes for Gulf oil indispensable, instability across the Red Sea heightens the strategic cost of Suez.

Saudi Arabia’s alternative pipelines connecting its eastern oil fields to Red Sea terminals are therefore not merely energy infrastructure; they are strategic bypasses mitigating dependence on Hormuz.

For Türkiye, the Development Road fulfills the same function across a broader geography. Stretching from the Persian Gulf through Iraq to Türkiye, and from Türkiye into Europe, this artery possesses the potential to forge a new overland backbone connecting the Gulf to the Mediterranean and Europe. As security concerns in the Red Sea mount and the vulnerability of Suez deepens, the value of this route rises accordingly.

The Hejaz Railway: Revived once again

The return of the Hejaz Railway to the regional agenda signifies far more than mere nostalgia. Once linking Istanbul to Damascus, Amman, and the Hejaz, the railway served as one of the primary transport and logistical arteries of the Ottoman geography.

Reviving the idea of the Hejaz Railway could become the emblem of Türkiye’s drive to reimagine its historical transport connections between the Gulf, the Hejaz, and the Levant through modern rail, energy, and logistics networks.

The objective here is not to restore the past, but to transpose the strategic logic of that historical geographical linkage into the twenty-first century. For this reason, Türkiye’s role in the Mecca Alliance and the resurgence of the Hejaz Railway project must be viewed as components of the same overarching picture.

Corridors do not consist solely of energy pipelines. Railways, ports, highways, electrical interconnectors, logistical hubs, and security architectures are all facets of the same geopolitical grid, and safeguarding these networks requires political alliances.

Herein lies the strategic significance of Saudi Arabia and Türkiye sitting at the same table in Mecca, even at a juncture when their views on Syria diverge.

Ankara and Riyadh do not need to agree on every subject. Yet neither wishes to see the new map of the Middle East drawn to its detriment. Türkiye’s aim is not to build an anti-bloc against any specific country alongside Saudi Arabia; rather, the goal is to avoid exclusion from the future energy and trade systems of the Middle East, while securing a decisive voice in establishing their security architecture.

Hence, for Türkiye, the Mecca Alliance is far more than a simple defence pact. Securing the Development Road, shielding Gulf energy corridors, stabilising the Red Sea, rethinking connections across the Hejaz and the Levant, and bolstering trade corridors reaching Europe all intersect within this single strategic equation.

In this equation, Türkiye’s foremost advantage remains its geography. Ankara sits at the northern terminus of the overland routes linking the Gulf to Europe; within NATO; and at the crossroads connecting the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East.

Will Türkiye become one of the powers shaping the Middle East’s energy and trade architecture over the coming decades, or will it be reduced to a mere transit state traversed by routes designed by others? That question defines the true strategic significance of the Mecca Alliance for Ankara.

In the Middle East of tomorrow, it will be impossible to separate the corridor carrying energy, the security framework protecting that corridor, and the alliance constructing that security framework.

Whoever controls the corridor shapes commerce. Whoever guarantees the routes through which trade flows holds sway over the regional balance of power. This is the true dimension of the contest currently underway in the Middle East.

A succession of distinct and largely mutually exclusive ambitions are competing for dominance in the current climate: India’s linkage to Europe, the Gulf’s new economic horizons, Saudi Arabia’s alternative energy routes, the security crisis in the Red Sea, the strategic weight of Hormuz, and Türkiye’s aspiration to open outward to Europe via the Development Road. Ironically, perhaps, the conflict that will decide which corridor underpins global stability has already begun, and it will likely continue spreading to new fronts. Regrettably, the fires in our region appear poised to intensify long before they abate.

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