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‘Russian agents’ controversy in Azerbaijan: Why are former ministers under fire?

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Erkin Öncan — Journalist

While not currently a major topic in the Turkish press, a debate concerning alleged “Russian agents” has been ongoing in Azerbaijan for some time. Media outlets close to the government, in particular, have been discussing a supposed group of “Russian agents.” It is even claimed that this “agent group” was the primary reason for the closure of the “Russian House,” which was officially shut down due to “lack of legal registration.”

Notably, this group allegedly includes high-ranking figures such as former Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov; Ramiz Makhdiyev, a close associate of Haydar Aliyev known as the “grey cardinal”; former Head of National Security Eldar Makhmudov; former Minister of Culture Abulfas Garayev; and former Minister of Youth and Sports Azad Rahimov. [Note: Grey Cardinal is a term used for people who have great power and influence behind the scenes, but are not very visible in public].

What happened?

Earlier this month, the pro-government Azerbaijani news agency Qafqazinfo reported that “a network serving Moscow’s interests has been identified in the country” and that “the activities of Rossotrudnichestvo (Russian House) in Baku have been suspended.”

Other pro-government media outlets quickly disseminated the news, asserting that the individuals in question received instructions from Russian intelligence and attempted to influence socio-political processes in Azerbaijan through a network of agents.

Although Qafqazinfo presented the news with the caveat, “However, the information reaching Qafqazinfo leaves no doubt that such a structure really exists,” there has been no official statement confirming the launch of any investigation into the matter.

Another press organization, however, reported the veracity of the “spy group” allegations with these statements:

“The fact that these people are no longer on duty does not mean that the relations have disappeared. There are still those who go to the representative of Russian intelligence and receive instructions, send false messages to our society, and try to create division.”

Political scientist Natig Miri, speaking to Crossmedia.az, claimed that Russia’s “spy network” strategy is not unique to Azerbaijan but is employed in “almost all embassies and consulates”:

Natig Miri said, “However, it is not limited to political elites. There are also such people among the leaders of non-governmental organizations, media outlets and political scientists. In a sense, they are trying to ‘wash Russia’s hands’. In Azerbaijan, it is imperative to identify, expose and remove such persons from their positions in the government and society.”

“The man who writes has no mind”

The accused individuals have vehemently denied the allegations. Mammadyarov responded to the claims by stating, “Some people have a stomach ache. The man who writes has no mouth.” Mammadyarov further questioned, “I was educated in Ukraine, Russia and the US. Does this mean that they should call me an agent of these countries?”

The crash of AZAL’s Embraer 190 aircraft on December 25 near Aktau, Kazakhstan, during a Baku-Grozni flight, reignited tensions between the two countries.

Azerbaijani officials had confirmed the claim that the plane was attacked by the Russian “Pantsir-S” air defense system in the incident, which resulted in the deaths of 38 people. Although Russian President Vladimir Putin apologized to Azerbaijani leader Ilham Aliyev for the incident, it highlighted how relations, which have fluctuated in the post-Soviet period, could escalate into open tension.

Due to historical ties and geopolitical dynamics, Azerbaijan’s relationship with Russia is constantly evolving, sometimes strained but difficult to sever completely. Relations between the two countries are founded on pragmatism and a balance of interests.

However, two significant issues distinguish Azerbaijan, a former Soviet country, from its peers: Russia’s position in the Karabakh Crisis and relations with Israel.

In certain respects, the same alignment found in every former Soviet country also applies to Azerbaijan. A significant portion of the nationalist and liberal sectors in Azerbaijan, similar to Georgia and Ukraine, are inclined to shed the Soviet past and establish closer ties with the West. This makes it easier for these forces to align with Western-backed political groups.

On the other hand, the Karabakh crisis, which has persisted since the 1990s and was “recently” resolved in Azerbaijan’s favor, has resulted in a prolonged Russian military presence in the region. Although the Azerbaijani government has not voiced any serious objections to Russia’s political and military presence, this presence has consistently been a source of unease for the government’s electoral base, namely the nationalist/conservative segments of the country.

In other words, regarding Russian relations, the Azerbaijani government has consistently allowed its electorate and affiliated media outlets to express sentiments that it cannot officially voice due to its current balancing strategy. This serves the dual purpose of appeasing domestic politics and sending an unofficial message. This dichotomy is often observable in Turkey’s foreign policy as well.

Relations with Israel

Azerbaijan’s strategic partnership with Israel, or rather, Israel’s interest in Azerbaijan, is naturally linked to Azerbaijan’s geographical location in the South Caucasus, its proximity to Russia and Iran, and its oil reserves.

The fact that Azerbaijan represents, to put it mildly, “an alternative” to Russia and Iran in the region is a well-known fact, even if it is not often explicitly stated.

However, this relationship does not entirely sever Baku’s dependence on Russia, even though it irritates Moscow and Tehran. In the first six months of 2024, the volume of trade between the two countries more than doubled, increasing 2.5 times to exceed $8.3 billion.

Azerbaijan’s share in foreign trade volume with Russia in 2024 is 10.1%, its share in exports is 4.4%, its share in exports of non-oil/gas products is 34.6%, and its share in imports is 17.2%.

While the media discussed “Russian agents” in Azerbaijan, Azerbaijani leader Ilham Aliyev, on February 11, approved an agreement signed in late 2024 to expand the North-South corridor linking Iran and Russia through Azerbaijan. The 2024 bilateral agreement provides for the modernization of road and rail infrastructure to accommodate growing trade volumes.

In another meeting held three days ago in the Iranian capital, Tehran, Azerbaijani, Russian, and Iranian officials reportedly agreed on a plan to construct the Rasht-Astara railway on Iranian territory.

Russian companies remain active in Azerbaijan’s energy and infrastructure projects, while Baku provides Moscow with a transit corridor for the transportation of gas and oil. Simultaneously, however, Azerbaijan aims to reduce its dependence on Russia by developing alternative routes through projects such as the Southern Gas Corridor and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline.

From the perspective of both Russia and Azerbaijan, the current relationship is characterized by a partnership of interests. Considering the figures, it can be inferred that the discussions regarding “Russian influence” in Azerbaijan are primarily directed at domestic public opinion rather than Russia for the time being, and that the “Russian agent” accusations against senior officials reflect internal political calculations.

Diplomacy

South Korea pulls part of embassy staff from Ukraine amid POW dispute

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The South Korean government has decided to withdraw part of its embassy staff from Ukraine.

According to the Yonhap news agency, Foreign Ministry spokesman Park Doo-sun cited the Kyiv administration’s failure to take “positive steps” in the dispute that began with the leak of information concerning the handover of North Korean prisoners of war as the justification for the move.

The spokesman also listed the ongoing threat of air strikes, which complicates the safety of diplomats, among the reasons.

Following the withdrawal of part of the personnel, essential diplomatic contacts will continue under the leadership of the charge d’affaires ad interim to Ukraine. All consular staff tasked with protecting South Korean citizens will remain in Ukraine.

Prior to this move, the Seoul administration decided on 8 October to withdraw its ambassador. The Foreign Ministry stated at the time that it was ready to continue consultations with Kyiv to resolve the emerging issues constructively.

Tensions between the two countries began with a speech delivered by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the United Nations General Assembly in September.

Zelenskyy announced that two captured soldiers from the North Korean army had been handed over to South Korea.

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung, meanwhile, accused Kyiv of breaching a confidentiality agreement.

Lee said the disclosure of this information endangered the prisoners’ families and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Seoul expects a public apology

Dmytro Lytvyn, an adviser to the Ukrainian president, denied the existence of a confidentiality agreement.

The South Korean Foreign Ministry summoned Ukrainian Charge d’Affaires Andriy Veshkin on 28 September and issued a note of protest against Lytvyn’s remarks.

President Lee Jae-myung warned in a statement on 2 October that they would take additional measures against Kyiv if Ukrainian authorities did not acknowledge the agreement and make a public apology. Lee stated that Ukraine itself had initially requested that the transfer of the prisoners be kept confidential.

Ukrainian Foreign Ministry spokesman Heorhii Tykhyi said the dispute stemmed from differing interpretations of the confidentiality regime.

Tykhyi noted that Seoul, based on its constitution which recognises the entire Korean Peninsula as its own territory, requested that the prisoners be handed over “like its own citizens”.

Describing the handover as a “gesture of goodwill”, Tykhyi stated that they were conducting closed-door negotiations to resolve differences of opinion.

Ambassador Park Ki-chang returned to Seoul on 10 October. According to a report by The Korea Times newspaper citing the ministry, recalling the ambassador served as a diplomatic protest against the leak of information regarding the prisoners.

The newspaper wrote that South Korea had last taken a similar step in 2008 by withdrawing its ambassador to Japan.

Moscow warned foreign diplomats

On 3 October, the Russian Foreign Ministry reiterated its warning to foreign nationals, including diplomatic mission staff, against remaining in Ukraine.

The ministry recalled its advice to leave Kyiv, citing ongoing strikes against military targets.

The ministry noted that those who failed to heed the warnings would bear responsibility for the potential consequences.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said in a statement on 24 September that they had no information regarding Kyiv handing over two North Korean prisoners of war to Seoul.

Peskov, noting that prisoner matters fall under the authority of the Defence Ministry and intelligence services, said, “Contacts through the special services are continuing.”

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Diplomacy

Ex-BND head Hanning tied to former Mossad chief amid spy inquiry

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August Hanning, who led Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND) between 1998 and 2005, was arrested on 6 October on allegations that he obtained roughly 2,000 classified agency documents and used them during contacts with intelligence officers from a foreign state.

Accused of high treason and espionage on behalf of a foreign intelligence agency, the former spy chief is alleged to have procured the documents from former BND employee Manfred D.

Prosecutors stated that the leaked records included internal briefing notes presented to senior German officials, though the Berlin government has not yet publicly disclosed which country received the classified data.

According to an exclusive report by Jake Green for The Cradle, seized email exchanges revealed extensive ties between the arrested Hanning and former Mossad director Danny Yatom.

The correspondence shows that the two former intelligence directors built an ongoing network of contacts following their public service, combining commercial ventures, efforts to secure political influence, and intelligence links.

This dynamic has triggered debate that using personal connections and official access for private gain has left Germany’s intelligence apparatus vulnerable.

Intelligence notes for 10,000 euros and campaign proposals

According to the reviewed emails, Hanning told Yatom in a 2018 message that he could prepare an “overall assessment based on information obtained from senior German officials and intelligence agencies” concerning an unidentified candidate.

The former BND head committed to completing the report by 13 July in exchange for 10,000 euros.

Contacts between the two men subsequently expanded to cover domestic political processes in Germany. Ahead of the September 2021 federal election, Yatom asked Hanning to approach leading candidates.

Describing CIY Global as a “political campaign company”, the former Mossad chief noted that he aimed to introduce its capabilities to German politicians, and he mentioned his intention in the same exchange to transfer documents concerning a cybersecurity firm.

Cybersecurity partnership and surveillance operations across Europe

The partnership between Yatom and Hanning reached beyond political lobbying initiatives into the cybersecurity sector.

Hanning reportedly served as a consultant for World Health Energy Holdings, a cybersecurity company linked to Yatom.

Firms of this type, established or managed by former intelligence personnel, provide commercial platforms on the international market for Israeli-origin surveillance, cyber intelligence, and political influence capabilities.

The operational presence of private Israeli-based surveillance technologies across Europe has recently entered judicial records through scandals in Poland, Spain, and Greece.

Polish prosecutors announced on 12 October that data collected under the previous government via Pegasus spyware against political opponents had been transferred out of the country, adding that manufacturer NSO Group maintained access to the technical infrastructure.

In Spain, the 2022 CatalanGate investigation established that at least 65 people, including politicians, lawyers, and civil society representatives, were targeted using Pegasus or Candiru software, with Citizen Lab researchers publishing strong evidence linking the operation to Spanish authorities.

In Greece, the surveillance operation targeting journalist Thanasis Koukakis and Member of the European Parliament Nikos Androulakis was determined to have used Predator software, linked to Intellexa, a company founded by former Israeli intelligence officer Tal Dilian.

In the German espionage investigation, the traffic between Hanning and Yatom involving paid reporting, contacts with electoral candidates, and commercial partnerships does not yet provide conclusive legal evidence regarding the final destination of the roughly 2,000 classified documents.

Nevertheless, the disclosed correspondence gives German investigators a concrete line of inquiry to assess whether classified state secrets reached commercial networks tied to Israeli intelligence.

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Diplomacy

Trump dismisses US envoy to Greece Kimberly Guilfoyle

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US President Donald Trump has dismissed Kimberly Guilfoyle, the US ambassador in Athens, following serious press reports concerning her conduct.

White House Press Secretary Katie Zacharia told reporters during her first briefing that Guilfoyle had been asked to resign.

“She was doing a good job, but we didn’t like what we read in the press,” Trump said. “She was not a member of my family. I think she dated my son a long time ago.”

In a social media post, Guilfoyle stated: “These claims are unfounded, and I will resolutely defend my name, reputation, and integrity.” She added that she was particularly proud of the embassy’s work.

According to Kathimerini, her removal came as no surprise in Washington. Days of successive disclosures and vigorous exploitation of the matter by Democrats had been inflicting political damage on the White House ahead of the sensitive midterm elections.

The US State Department was instructed not to comment, with crisis management transferred entirely to the White House.

Reports indicate that most of the president’s team swiftly favoured Guilfoyle’s dismissal, while Secretary of State Marco Rubio was reportedly uneasy with the demonstratively warm public welcome she had staged for him.

Democrats on the House Foreign Affairs Committee have called for an investigation.

“Her resignation does not absolve her of responsibility,” the lawmakers wrote, adding: “While American families struggled to make ends meet, she used her position as a Trump administration official to enrich herself.”

Chargé d’Affaires Josh Huck will assume ambassadorial duties until a successor is chosen.

Meanwhile, Guilfoyle’s departure is expected to cause delays in agreements between Greece and the US.

These include the so-called “Rubio package”, comprising approximately $4 billion in arms deals finalised only days before the secretary of state’s arrival.

Several procedural steps still remain before the contracts can be signed.

In Athens, opposition parties are demanding answers. Dimitris Mantzos of PASOK called for a detailed briefing on the agreements reached during Rubio’s visit.

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