The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the prominent national leader of Hamas and head of its political bureau, was not just a military operation. Its objectives were complex and posed exceptional risks to efforts to end the war, regional security and the implementation of the post-Beijing reconciliation agreement. It could also challenge the internal stability of Hamas. The ongoing conflict between the occupying state and the Palestinian resistance requires careful analysis beyond attempts to minimise the impact of this incident.
It can be seen as an extension of Israel’s military effort to achieve, in the words of Prime Minister Netanyahu, “absolute victory”. This effort works on many levels: tactically, it aims to weaken Hamas’ political capabilities at home and abroad, thereby undermining its external ties and organisational cohesion. It also involves weakening its ability to organise attacks and operationally dismantling Hamas’ military and political infrastructure. Strategically, it aims to impose comprehensive security arrangements on the Palestinians. In the aftermath of the war, all of this is aimed at preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state by further separating Gaza from the national project, perpetuating the geographical and political division that has existed for more than 17 years since the division of Palestine following the armed conflict between Hamas and Fatah in 2007.
Therefore, the assassination targeted Ismail Haniyeh not because of his military or political role, but because he represented the unity of Hamas internally and externally and was widely accepted within the movement. Haniyeh also represented an important political symbol, as he was a former Palestinian prime minister and his government enjoyed considerable credibility in the Palestinian Legislative Council at the time.
From this perspective, Tel Aviv saw Haniyeh’s continued leadership as a threat to Israel’s war strategy aimed at dismantling him. It can be argued that Israel’s calculation in assassinating Haniyeh was not only to avenge Hamas or neutralise its political or military role, but rather to target Haniyeh’s very existence, which preserved Hamas’s internal unity. This policy of selective assassination, both internally and externally, deepens Hamas’s dilemma in managing its complex internal affairs and makes the situation more difficult to manage given the geopolitical disparities in Gaza, the West Bank, the Diaspora and other countries, each with different legal, security and political realities.
In this context, it is clear that Israel has allowed the war to continue and escalate by flatly rejecting any agreement with Hamas, especially after the assassination of a key figure involved in negotiations with the movement. After several attempts to force Hamas to withdraw from the negotiations, which Hamas did not abandon, it seems that Israel’s aim from the beginning was to use the “negotiations” as a cover to prolong the war, to gain time to impose irreversible field and political realities and to appease the Israeli public opinion, which demands an agreement between the Palestinian resistance and Israel on the exchange of prisoners.
The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh and the announcement of the assassination of other Hamas military and security leaders, including the general commander of the Qassam Brigades, Mohammed Deif, are part of a strategy aimed at undermining the possibility of reaching an agreement to end the war. This means that the war will continue and possibly escalate into a regional conflict, reflecting a tacit American rejection of the principle of “heroic flexibility” espoused by Iran’s new leadership under President Massoud Pezeshkian, who is interested in improving relations with the West and seeking to avoid a war of attrition or open confrontation with the United States.
The most dangerous aspect of this scenario, however, is that such a full-scale regional war, which Iran has so far sought to avoid, would be strongly desired by the Netanyahu government, backed by Washington, and would put the Palestinians under severe pressure. While it is clear that Israel is not seeking a ceasefire or a temporary truce with Hamas, the humanitarian risks in Gaza would be doubled and the repercussions of the planned regional war could spread to the West Bank, where the occupation aims to create a situation of collapse and chaos through economic siege and various security instruments.
In this context, and in relation to the reconciliation efforts, the assassination of Haniyeh may have been aimed at preventing the implementation of the Beijing agreement. Haniyeh was known to have played an important role in unifying Hamas’ stance behind the agreement and reaffirming its strong commitment to its contents. With Haniyeh’s death, Hamas is preoccupied with organising its internal affairs, which may affect its ability to make progress in implementing the terms of the agreement. Breaking reconciliation agreements is one of the main objectives of Israeli policy, as Israel seeks to prevent the Palestinians from rebuilding their political system and maintaining the legitimacy of their institutions.
This Israeli approach was clearly demonstrated by the Knesset’s majority rejection of the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, coinciding with the International Court of Justice’s decision declaring Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories captured on 4 June 1967 illegal. This move dealt a blow to Israel’s efforts to undermine the chances of establishing a Palestinian state based on Palestinian unity and unified representation, which it seeks to undermine by encouraging and perpetuating Palestinian division and creating a political vacuum in the West Bank and security chaos in Gaza in order to reshape reality according to its own security and political standards.
Returning to Haniyeh’s assassination, the delay in filling the vacuum created by his absence as head of Hamas’ political bureau could lead to the risk of a leadership crisis within the movement, which could directly affect the movement’s ability to implement the terms of the Beijing agreement, particularly those relating to the formation of a national unity government or an interim leadership framework. This move could frustrate attempts by the occupiers to impose an alternative in Gaza or create a political vacuum in the absence of President Mahmoud Abbas.
While recognising the potential difficulties in agreeing on a successor to Haniyeh, who is a point of balance between the different power centres within Hamas, the movement is known for its flexibility and strong structure, which allows it to overcome these difficulties. However, the main challenge remains the prevention of any external interference with negative agendas against the movement. This underlines the importance of having allies and friends within Hamas who can help create a conducive environment for a smooth leadership transition and isolate harmful interference.
Similarly, forces interested in the Palestinian people can help absorb and contain the pressure on the Palestinians to prevent the implementation of the Beijing agreement, which strengthens Palestinian unity and their position against Israel’s regionally and internationally supported attempts to weaken and marginalise them.
If Hamas were to agree on a successor to Ismail Haniyeh and the PA were to move quickly to form a national unity government with the support of pro-Palestinian forces, these steps would strengthen the Palestinian position and frustrate Israeli plans to undermine the Palestinian national movement. The solidarity shown during the funeral of Ismail Haniyeh, which revealed many positive indicators on the Palestinian scene, is a fulcrum for reorganising the internal situation and discrediting Israeli pretexts. Regional solidarity and international attention to Palestinian demands can provide an important opportunity for the Palestinians to achieve their national goals and transform their sacrifices into political results that serve their interests and promote security and stability in the region.
