On January 17, Hamas and Israel formally signed a ceasefire agreement reached two days earlier, which took effect on January 19. This marks the closest attempt to a successful ceasefire in the Middle East since Hamas launched the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation, which triggered Israel’s intense retaliation and ignited the “Sixth Middle East War” over 460 days ago.
The international community widely welcomes the ceasefire between Palestine and Israel, and Yemen’s Houthi attacks on Israel are also expected to cease, the “Sixth Middle East War” may finally come to an end. However, the ceasefire remains a fragile prelude to peace. Without addressing the historical disputes between the two sides and implementing the “two-state solution,” every ceasefire is merely an interval before the next conflict or war.
According to reports, through multiple rounds of mediation by the United States, Qatar, and Egypt, Hamas and Israel reached a three-phase ceasefire agreement. The first phase, which started on January 19, will last 42 days and includes a complete and total ceasefire by both parties, the withdrawal of Israeli troops from densely populated areas in the Gaza Strip, the release of 33 detainees by Hamas in exchange for the release of hundreds of Palestinians detained by Israel, and the allowance of large-scale humanitarian aid into Gaza.
The details of the second and third phases of the agreement are to be disclosed after the implementation of the first phase. These include permanent ceasefire negotiations, the return of detained personnel’s remains by Hamas, and the initiation of large-scale reconstruction in the Gaza Strip.
Despite the United States, Qatar, and Egypt guaranteeing and overseeing the ceasefire agreement, the implementation of the second and third phases depends on the execution of the first phase. Israel has requested the right to veto the list of Palestinian detainees to be released, and Israel’s security cabinet has delayed approving the first-phase agreement. Additionally, Israel’s far-right security minister has threatened to resign. These developments underscore a severe lack of mutual trust between the two sides, internal divisions within Israel, and the constant risk of the ceasefire agreement being torn apart or disrupted.
Hamas claims the ceasefire agreement is a “great victory for the heroic resistance of the Palestinian people and their indomitable spirit over more than 15 months in Gaza.” Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard also called it “a great victory for Palestine.” Analysts believe such statements are intended to lie to others and also themselves. Compared to previous Middle East wars, this “Sixth Middle East War,” which lasted 15 months and involved more than a dozen regional and external countries and actors, left no true winners. It resulted in a multi-party loss, with only degrees of defeat differing among parties.
Was Hamas or Palestine the victor?
The facts suggest otherwise. The Palestinian people, particularly those in Gaza, suffered immensely under Israel’s over-a-year-long military siege and economic blockade. Nearly 50,000 people died—most of them women and children—over 100,000 were injured or disabled, critical infrastructure was destroyed, and the ecological consequences are far-reaching. Survivors teeter on the edge of life and death. In short, during the war, Gaza became a living hell for civilians, who endured unimaginable suffering. This marks the third catastrophic disaster since 1948 for Palestinians, with unprecedented losses in life and material. Even low-level economic reconstruction and societal recovery will require decades.
Hamas’s strategy of provoking Israel with militant attacks drew disproportionate retaliation, bringing the Palestinian cause into the global spotlight and isolating Israel as never before. Yet, this was achieved at the cost of enormous sacrifices and disasters for Palestinians. It has further entrenched both sides in a vicious cycle of hatred, violence, and bloodshed.
Is Israel the winner of this war?
The facts suggest otherwise. As the strongest military power in the Middle East, Israel appeared to excel in its “seven-front combat,” fighting with overwhelming odds and inflicting fatal blows on Hamas and Hezbollah in Lebanon, shattering the “Resistance Axis.” However, most of these adversaries are non-state actors whose manpower, equipment, and foreign support cannot compare to Israel, which benefits from long-standing U.S. aid and military readiness. Despite this, Israel failed to eliminate Hamas’ remnants, had to resort to high rewards to secure the return of its detained personnel, and ultimately accepted prisoner exchanges and a ceasefire to resolve the crisis. This war has been a political and economic failure for Israel, costing many lives, destabilizing the nation, damaging its international image, and losing it the support of global public opinion. It even led to its Prime Minister and former Defense Minister being labeled “war criminals” by the International Criminal Court.
If neither Israel nor Palestine emerged as winners, did any other parties involved in the war benefit and become winners? In my view, there were no winners at all. Even for those perceived as winners, a dialectical and long-term perspective is needed.
The United States is undoubtedly a major loser
For the first time in the Middle East conflict, the superpower lost the initiative, playing a marginal role, neither decisive in war nor peace. The U.S. not only lost its decision-making and leadership authority in Middle Eastern affairs but also became a “hostage state” to Israel. It was passive throughout the year-long conflict, offering rhetorical support and military aid but unable to influence the war’s course. In previous Middle Eastern wars, the U.S. had been the dominant power:
– In the 1948 First Arab-Israeli War, the U.S. orchestrated two ceasefires, helping Israel defeat five Arab nations.
– In the 1956 Suez Crisis, the U.S. forced Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw, solidifying its foothold in the Middle East.
– During the 1967 Six-Day War, the U.S. fully armed Israel, enabling its victory over the Soviet-backed Arab bloc.
– In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the U.S. provided emergency military aid to Israel, turned the tide, and initiated “shuttle diplomacy” to secure a ceasefire and disengagement.
– In the 1982 Lebanon War, the U.S. ensured Israel’s military success before again leveraging diplomacy to save the PLO leadership while removing them from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict frontlines.
Iran is also a major loser
As the dual engine of the “Resistance Axis” and the “Shiite Crescent,” Iran was neither willing nor able to protect Hamas and Hezbollah from devastating military strikes. It also failed to shield Yemen’s Houthi rebels from airstrikes by the U.S., U.K., and Israel and eventually abandoned Syria’s regime. These failures have significantly weakened the “Resistance Axis” and the “Shiite Crescent,” with Iran’s influence historically contracting to the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia. On two occasions when Iran directly confronted Israel militarily, it preemptively notified Israel to minimize losses, wary of provoking uncontrollable escalation or bringing disaster upon itself.
The “Sixth Middle East War” exposed Iran’s hesitancy and weakness in critical moments. It revealed a self-serving pragmatism prioritizing national and ethnic interests, underscoring that Iran lacks both the moral authority and the capability to fulfill its ambitions as a regional power. This misalignment between its aspirations and actual strength suggests Iran is not ready for the “crown” it seeks to wear. The war also nullified half a century of Iran’s investments and efforts in revolutionary Islamic diplomacy. Iran now faces potential domestic scrutiny over its foreign policy, strategic effectiveness, and even the legitimacy of its regime, which could impact its political stability.
Russia is certainly another big loser
Russia also abandoned the Bashar regime during a critical period, easily relinquishing its last Middle Eastern strategic asset, giving up what it had preserved with significant military and diplomatic resources a decade ago. The Bashar regime was easily and unexpectedly toppled during the Palestine-Israel conflict, showing that as Damascus’ foremost ally, Russia has completely lost its standing as a first-class geopolitical and military power. Its weakness in strategic intelligence, judgment, intervention, and coordination capabilities is strikingly evident. Losing Syria signifies that Russia no longer has the capability to handle two regional wars simultaneously, nor the ability to act as a world-class power exerting influence in the Middle East.
The United Nations: Another major loser
The United Nations also proved powerless in the face of the “Sixth Middle East War,” becoming severely marginalized and even humiliated and provoked by Israel multiple times. Draft resolutions from the Security Council urging a ceasefire between Palestine and Israel were repeatedly vetoed by the United States. Even when reluctantly passed, neither side implemented them. Israel frequently questioned the legitimacy of the United Nations, repeatedly urged the Secretary-General to resign, discredited UN missions, and openly insulted UN peacekeeping forces. Historically, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 181 in 1947, granting Israel its “birth certificate” and sowing the seeds of the Palestinian problem. Between 1948 and 1982, despite being manipulated by major powers and caught in opposition and division, the UN was still able to broker ceasefires among warring parties and pass famous Security Council resolutions, such as Resolution 338 in 1967 and Resolution 242 in 1973, forming the legal foundation of the “land for peace” framework in the Middle East peace process.
Turkey’s role: A winner?
Some may argue that Turkey emerged as the biggest winner from this war. This is incorrect. Superficially or in the short term, Turkey indeed supported the rebel forces in toppling Bashar and seemed to gain a larger voice in the reconstruction of the new Syrian power structure, as well as suppressing and encircling the Kurds. However, as a regional power, Turkey’s deep involvement in Syrian affairs has plunged it further into the Middle Eastern quagmire, inevitably intensifying its rivalries and frictions with Israel, Saudi Arabia, other Arab countries, Russia, Iran, and even the United States. This situation risks reviving the “multi-problem” nightmare Turkey experienced after the “Arab Spring,” leading it to once again face the consequences of being stonewalled on multiple fronts.
The broader implications
On October 7, 2023, when “The Al-Aqsa Flood” launched a successful textbook-style attack on half of Israel via air, land, and sea, no one expected it to evolve into a large-scale, prolonged, multi-party, and devastating “Sixth Middle East War.” No one foresaw that Israeli leaders would be globally wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes. Nor did anyone anticipate that the Syrian government, which had survived a 13-year war to retain power, would collapse so quickly, becoming the most unexpected loser.
From the perspective of global and historical development, the biggest loser of the Palestine-Israel conflict is the peace, development, prosperity, and progress of the entire region. This large-scale multi-party loss is not about the gains or losses of one nation or territory but represents the collective success or failure of dozens of countries and hundreds of millions of people. Across the continents, there is no other region as “cursed” or “toxic” as the Middle East, which has been mired in friction, conflict, and chaos for so long. Likewise, no other people on Earth have had to witness, day after day, year after year, and generation after generation, bloodshed, killing, death, and destruction as their daily reality and even their life’s fate, relying on violent exchanges to sustain national and economic development.
Although the ceasefire after the twists and turns of the conflict deserves celebration, as it embodies rationality and humanity far more than continued slaughter, providing all sides with a chance to breathe and hope for survival, if the parties involved do not fundamentally heal their deeply entrenched zero-sum mindset, violent philosophies, and jungle rules, peace in the Middle East will remain out of reach. This cradle of human civilization is destined to become one of history’s greatest failures.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.