Opinion
The Chinese Approach Behind the Trilateral Summit: It May Pay to Get Familiar with It Sooner Rather Than Later
The most important significance of this China-Russia-U.S. trilateral summit lies not in how many specific issues it has resolved, but in the fact that the meeting itself is a landmark event.
Looking back at international diplomacy over the past several decades, neither the G8 nor the G20 has ever seen a formal dialogue of this kind, with the leaders of China, Russia and the United States taking part directly in a meeting centered on their trilateral relationship.
Russia was once a member of the G8, but within that framework it always struggled to escape its structural differences with the other Western members. Much of the time, it had to contend with pressure from them. As for the G20, although the leaders of China, Russia and the United States have all attended its meetings, the three countries have never come together in this way.
This time is different. Three countries with the world’s most consequential military capabilities, nuclear arsenals and economic influence are beginning to explore a new way of communicating directly with one another.
For this reason, the value of the meeting should not be judged by how many specific disputes it has resolved. Complex international problems cannot be settled in a single meeting. What truly matters is that it has shown the world that the three major powers are willing to seek solutions together. Even if differences remain on specific issues, the three countries have at least established a platform in which they can discuss, coordinate and seek common ground.
Conversely, the fact that the summit directly addressed specific issues, including issuing an explicit warning to the International Criminal Court, also shows that this was not a diplomatic performance with merely symbolic significance. What is at stake is whether the major powers can reach some form of common position on concrete international affairs, and whether that position can have a practical impact.
The Agendas Behind the Reactions
There has been no shortage of opposition to the summit. But a closer look reveals that many of the criticisms have less to do with whether the meeting can bring benefits to the international community than with the political positions and interests of those making them.
In the United States, some media outlets with Democratic Party leanings seem to have one overriding objective: criticizing Trump. Whatever he does can be portrayed as political grandstanding, a diplomatic concession to Putin, or a betrayal of America’s traditional allies.
For some neoliberals who self-styled as global citizens, the future of the world seems to have only one acceptable form: the one that conforms to their own ideals. They are not genuinely concerned with how countries can find common ground amid conflicts of real-world interests. Still less are they willing to acknowledge that the international order might evolve in a direction different from the one they have imagined.
Europe’s reaction, meanwhile, stems largely from anxiety over Ukraine’s future and its reluctance to see Putin return to the center of international diplomacy.
But there is a fundamental reversal of perspective here. Russia is facing the entire NATO bloc, whose member states have continued to provide Ukraine with economic support, weapons and technological assistance. Despite the scale of this external backing, Russia has still managed to gain the upper hand on the battlefield. This in itself says a great deal about Russia’s strength and its standing in the international system.
Russia is certainly no longer the Soviet Union, but its power has never been something that can be measured simply by GDP. Although its economy is considerably smaller than those of the United States and China, the war has demonstrated its economic resilience. Russia also remains one of the world’s most important military and nuclear powers, a force that no international security arrangement can afford to ignore. The fact that the United States and Europe have been unable to defeat Russia has already proved the point. There is simply no need for Putin to gain a personal diplomatic platform to demonstrate Russia’s importance.
As for Ukraine’s future, it will inevitably be the product of coordination among the major powers and itself. European countries are, of course, free to continue supporting Ukraine. But if they believe that sustained assistance alone will enable them to determine the outcome of the war entirely on their own terms, they are probably indulging in an illusion. Ukraine’s sovereignty and security interests deserve respect, but that does not mean its future can be discussed without regard to the actual balance of power.
It is particularly worth noting that the summit has once again affirmed a basic fact: a direct military confrontation between nuclear powers is something all sides are determined to avoid. Nuclear deterrence is not simply conventional military power magnified. It fundamentally changes the risk structure of great-power conflict. It requires all sides to maintain their red lines amid competition and keep communication open despite their differences.
Those who subscribe to the Thucydides Trap may have the intellectual capacity to search old texts for supposed historical patterns, but they may lack a sufficiently sharp intuition for what nuclear weapons really mean in the modern world. Mechanically applying the power transitions of ancient city-states to competition among today’s major powers, or simply predicting that a rising power and an established power are bound to go to war, shows little real understanding of the distinctive conditions of contemporary international relations. Hopefully, this summit will prompt them to think again: less noise from historical analogies divorced from reality, and more understanding of the strategic environment in which we actually live.
In Asia, Japan’s reaction appears to have been particularly strong.
Japan fears being left out, but the source of its anxiety lies in its own actions. Japan is a defeated country of WW2, and its postwar international standing and security arrangements are rooted in a distinctive historical context. Today, it wants to continue relying on the United States for security guarantees while seeking greater autonomy within the U.S.-led order. It wants to profit from U.S.-China competition, yet repeatedly provokes China and Russia on regional security issues. At the same time, there are already people in Japan openly discussing the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons.
This contradiction—wanting both to remain dependent and to break free, seeking to profit from great-power rivalry while trying to reshape the regional security landscape—is drawing Japan into an increasingly complicated position.
If Japan is worried about being excluded from a new forum for great-power dialogue, it should first look to its own policy choices for the explanation. A country that repeatedly takes the initiative in creating tensions with its neighbors can hardly expect other major powers to put its concerns first when discussing regional security.
Another aspect worth noting is the way the three countries have approached the issues in the Middle East.
The Middle East is one of the most important geopolitical flashpoints in the world today, and the decision to start with energy issues is a particularly astute move. Energy is fundamental to the functioning of the global economy, and all three countries have direct interests in this area. Energy security, stable supplies and regional conditions offer common ground for discussion, while also providing a way to address broader questions of regional conflict, maritime security and the international political order. This does not mean that the three countries must adopt identical positions on the political stances about the region. Nor does it mean that the three major powers intend to decide the future of the Middle East among themselves. Rather, the starting point is to identify areas where their interests intersect and where common ground can be found.
This also shows that the trilateral summit is by no means a Yalta-style division of the world.
The Yalta Conference represented an arrangement of the postwar world by major powers on the basis of the balance of power created by military victory and occupation. What this summit represents is something different: three countries with enormous international influence seeking to identify areas for joint action despite their differing interests and positions.
These are two fundamentally different logics of international relations.
Why China Does Not Behave Like a Traditional Great Power
Outside China, many people still seem unable to understand one question: now that China is a major military and economic power, why does it not behave like the great powers of the past?
Why is China not in a hurry to carve out spheres of influence? Why is it not keen to use a military presence to control other regions, or to impose its own political system and values on other countries?
The answer lies in China’s own political and intellectual traditions.
The Chinese concepts of wangdao (rule through moral authority) and tianxia (all under heaven), together with the internationalist ideals rooted in communist thought, all form part of the way China understands international relations. China emphasizes resolving differences through consultation and reconciling the interests of different parties, rather than simply using power to divide countries into opposing camps. Something of this approach can even be seen in China’s domestic political system.
Take China’s legislative process, for example. It is not plainly a matter of holding a vote and passing a bill with a simple majority or a two-thirds majority. Before legislation is introduced, extensive research is conducted and opinions are solicited. During the legislative process, proposals are discussed and revised repeatedly. Before a formal vote, efforts are made to build the broadest possible consensus. The aim is not merely to get a bill passed, but to ensure that the final text wins the approval of as many deputies to the National People’s Congress as possible.
This does not mean that China’s legislative system is free of disagreement, or that every law receives unanimous approval. But it does reflect a political approach different from one based on competition for a majority: the aim is to resolve differences as far as possible before a vote, rather than treating the vote itself as the only means of resolving them.
The trilateral summit reflects a similar way of thinking. Its main objective is not to demand that countries choose sides, but to seek common ground. Rather than first dividing countries into camps and then discussing possible cooperation, the idea is to start with issues of shared concern and look for areas where progress can be made together.
Of course, China’s geopolitical thinking is also grounded in a very deep reservoir of historical experience.
Over the course of thousands of years, China’s territory gradually expanded to the geographical limits within which it was relatively feasible to exercise effective control. In a sense, it reached the limits of what it could readily govern. The dynasties of China’s past were not without ambitions for further expansion, nor did they never attempt to project power over greater distances. But China’s historical experience repeatedly demonstrated that expansion beyond a country’s actual capacity for governance and logistical support could become a heavy burden. Administering frontier regions, conducting long-distance military campaigns and waging sustained wars abroad all consume enormous national resources. Once those costs exceed what a country can bear, they can accelerate the accumulation of internal tensions and even set the country on the path to decline.
Dreaming of carving up the world is easy. But turning that dream into reality requires the ability to project power on a scale commensurate with those ambitions. And the ability to project power can itself generate further impulses to expand: maintaining existing control requires more resources; protecting established interests brings additional security commitments; and preventing a decline in influence can lead to an ever-widening scope of intervention. This logic can easily spiral out of control, turning the dream of expansion into a nightmare of national over-extension.
The rise and fall of the European powers since the Age of Exploration offer repeated evidence of this. The Chinese have, of course, taken notes.
I do not believe China’s geopolitical thinking can be explained entirely in terms of realist calculations. As noted above, it has much deeper historical, political and intellectual roots. But perhaps, at this stage, a realist perspective is the most useful way for others to understand China’s position.
China does not lack the ability to participate in international affairs, nor does it lack the resolve to defend its own interests. The key point is that China does not believe that expanding its influence must entail establishing spheres of influence, or that international affairs can only be resolved through competition for power among the major countries.
From Trilateral Consensus to Regional Consultation
Of course, emphasizing consultation among the major powers does not mean that three countries can make decisions on behalf of the rest of the world.
On the contrary, when the three countries seek to coordinate their efforts on specific regional issues, China can be expected to insist that the countries concerned be involved in the consultations. The three powers may reach a consensus on broad principles concerning issues of shared concern, but they should not impose any regional arrangements on that consensus alone. The sovereignty, interests and wishes of the countries in the region must still be respected.
China has already facilitated a number of rounds of diplomatic talks in the Middle East. The results have varied, but these efforts have brought about some tangible changes. The restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, brokered by China, is one notable example. The significance of such diplomatic efforts is not that China decides the region’s future on behalf of the countries involved (nor could it ensure peace once for all) , but that it provides an opportunity for countries that once found it difficult to communicate to return to the negotiating table.
In this sense, what China hopes to promote is not a club in which three major powers jointly manage the world, but a model of international relations built on coordination among major powers, with regional countries taking part in the process and consensus gradually expanded through consultation.
One final point, from a realist perspective. There is a popular expression in China that refers to China, Russia and the United States as the “top three” among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.
This is, of course, not an official diplomatic term, but it reflects an intuitive understanding of the current balance of power in the world. Britain and France still hold permanent seats on the UN Security Council, but their overall national strength and international influence have changed considerably from what they were in the era of colonial empires.
In a sense, the international standing of Britain and France is a legacy of the colonial era. The traditional geopolitical thinking of the United States and Russia, meanwhile, is a combination of the logic of global expansion pursued by colonial powers and the superpower rivalry that took shape after World War II. China’s rise has brought a different kind of international relations practice into the picture.
China cannot change the long-established thinking of the United States, Russia and other countries overnight. But perhaps, in the future, the international community will gradually become accustomed to China’s approach to consultation and see it play a role in an increasing number of international affairs.
Some have questioned whether this kind of trilateral summit can happen again. I would argue that the question is not so complicated. Now that such a forum has emerged, and now that it offers the three major powers an opportunity to communicate directly and seek common ground, what future U.S. president, regardless of party affiliation, could easily turn down the opportunity to take part?
