At 11:00 p.m. local time on March 20, I boarded Yemen Airways flight IY647, which took off in the rain from Queen Alia International Airport in Amman, the capital of Jordan. Meanwhile, air raid sirens were once again sounding in Israel to the west, as it was reported that the Yemeni Houthi forces had launched missiles at Tel Aviv, Israel’s largest city, which were successfully intercepted. More than two hours later, the Boeing aircraft carrying nearly 200 passengers flew at low altitude over the brightly lit Yemeni capital, Sana’a, and landed safely. Our local hosts drove us through long city roads to finally settle at the Shaba Hotel. With Ramadan more than halfway through, this mysterious Arab capital at the frontlines of war was at its liveliest and most bustling time of day. There were no signs of war — perhaps the night had masked the smoke and devastation of the battlefield. On the surface, the infrastructure in Sana’a appeared so outdated that it reminded me of Gaza, Palestine, where I was stationed 25 years ago.
In the early morning of the 21st, the Houthi forces claimed they had launched a “Palestine-2” hypersonic missile at Israel the previous day, successfully striking a military target south of Tel Aviv. It’s truly surprising that the Houthis — often dubbed the “slipper army” — are now capable of producing hypersonic missiles themselves. It’s a testament to the rapid advancement and widespread accessibility of modern technology. What was once exclusive to major world powers no longer holds a monopoly, evoking the sense of “the swallows of yesteryear’s noble halls now nesting among common folk.”
Houthi spokesperson Yahya Saree emphasized that this was the second missile attack launched from Yemen on Israeli territory within 24 hours. Observers noted that this was also the Houthis’ first strike on Israeli soil following Israel’s renewed airstrikes and partial ground raids in Gaza — actions that have already caused nearly a thousand Palestinian deaths.
Just prior to the attack on Israel, the Houthis had engaged in a direct confrontation with the U.S. Red Sea fleet — again sparked by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On March 7, the Houthis warned Israel that if humanitarian aid restrictions on Gaza were not lifted within four days, they would resume attacks on ships entering or exiting Israeli ports through the Red Sea. This coincided with the second round of ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas stalling. On the 10th, before the Houthi deadline expired, Israel preemptively announced a cutoff of electricity to Gaza to pressure Hamas. Consequently, the Houthis resumed their Red Sea ship attacks.
The Houthis’ support for Hamas and advocacy for the Palestinian cause naturally angered the U.S., which unconditionally backs Israel. Between March 15 and 19, under orders from President Trump, the U.S. launched its largest recent air assault on Houthi positions via the USS *Harry S. Truman* carrier group in the Red Sea, targeting their radar, air defense, missile, and drone systems. The strikes extended over Sana’a, the Red Sea city of Hodeidah, and the Houthi stronghold in Saada province near the western border. In response, the Houthis launched retaliatory missile and drone attacks against U.S. naval targets.
Amid all this, Israel swiftly resumed large-scale air and ground assaults on Gaza, reclaiming the “Netzarim Corridor,” which cuts off north-south traffic within the Gaza Strip. According to U.S. and Israeli media, Israel had informed the U.S. in advance of its plans to reignite conflict in Gaza and received open support from the Trump administration. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that the assault was “just the beginning.” With the renewal of conflict, the far-right factions that had exited Israel’s coalition government announced their return. Analysts believe Netanyahu is deliberately reigniting war to hinder the next phase of ceasefire talks, thereby preserving his fragile coalition, prolonging his political life, and avoiding accountability for the severe consequences of the Al-Aqsa Flood attack that had previously rocked Israel.
Before Trump returned to power, with Hamas and Hezbollah suffering heavy blows—especially after the unexpected fall of the Damascus regime—the geopolitical landscape of the Eastern Mediterranean underwent significant changes. The year-long “Sixth Middle East War” seemed to be nearing its end, and the focus of both sides in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the United States, the Arab world, and even the international community shifted toward the multidimensional reconstruction of Gaza. The Houthi forces even temporarily suspended their attacks on Israeli targets in the Red Sea region. However, the failure of the second round of ceasefire negotiations over Gaza and the outbreak of renewed fighting suggest that the “Sixth Middle East War” has not truly ended but has simply moved past an intermission and entered a new phase—with a change in the main battlefield and primary adversaries.
From Israel’s perspective, after more than a year of intense southern offensives, the Israeli military has essentially crushed Hamas. Following two months of focused campaigns in the north, it not only severely weakened Hezbollah but also unexpectedly caused the collapse of the Assad regime, leading to the complete fall of the northwest wing of the “Shiite Crescent.” The key goal of the third phase is to eliminate Hamas’s presence in Gaza entirely, and with the help of the United States, strike hard at the Houthis and Iran, both of whom strongly support Hamas.
From Hamas’s point of view, although it has lost most of its leadership and main combat forces, and the Palestinian people have paid a tremendous price, it has not lost its political foundation or its legitimacy in the struggle. Hamas remains the irreplaceable governing force in Gaza. After the first phase ceasefire, Hamas quickly mobilized thousands of police and security personnel to maintain public order—demonstrating its remaining strength and unwillingness to exit the political and historical stage. It is eager to remain in Gaza under the banners of “legitimate resistance” and the “Palestinian cause,” and participate in the political, security, and economic reconstruction of Gaza in this new era.
From the U.S. perspective, Trump does not want to be permanently tied to Israel’s war chariot. Yet, based on national interests, personal ties, and religious beliefs, he has no choice but to shield and support Netanyahu’s government and Israel. Therefore, Trump introduced the “Clear Gaza” plan to pressure the Palestinians and the Arab world. He has also launched heavy strikes on the Houthis to ease Israel’s burden, while publicly warning and threatening Iran—the so-called “ultimate backer”—in an attempt to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, cool down the Middle East, and ultimately reduce America’s involvement in the region.
From Iran’s perspective, the year-long “Sixth Middle East War” has led to two direct confrontations with Israel, nearly dragging the entire country into full-scale war. It has also seen severe setbacks for the twin geopolitical drivers of the “Shiite Crescent” and the “Axis of Resistance.” Iran has suffered a historic political and diplomatic defeat, with more than forty years of investment and influence—especially since the Arab Spring—lost almost overnight. This could undermine the legitimacy of its policies and governance. Over the past few months, Iran has maintained a hardline diplomatic stance—emphasizing support for Palestine and issuing warnings to Israel and the U.S.—which in turn has provoked Israel and the U.S. to “press their advantage” and try to defeat both the “Shiite Crescent” and “Axis of Resistance” through the Gaza war.
From the Houthis’ point of view, since their original goal was to establish an Iranian-style regime, they naturally adopted Iran’s political and diplomatic discourse. That means they must raise the Palestinian banner and align themselves with the Palestinian narrative to overcome the inherent disadvantages of being a Shiite militia. However, the Houthis also possess a level of confidence in their discourse that Iran lacks—because both Palestinians and Yemenis (including the Houthi tribes) are ethnically Arab. For a long time after their uprising began, the Houthis were preoccupied with survival and unable to involve themselves in other causes. Since the outbreak of the Yemeni civil war in 2014 and their rise in power, the Houthis remained focused on fighting the internationally recognized Yemeni government—backed by Saudi Arabia and the “Islamic Ten”—and had no capacity to engage with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Now, with the Houthis gradually controlling one-third of the country’s territory, two-thirds of its population and Red Sea coast, and major cities like Sana’a and Hodeidah—and having developed cruise missiles and drones capable of striking deep into Saudi Arabia and the UAE—their leaders’ vision has clearly expanded. Their ambitions have grown, and their geopolitical appetite is no longer what it used to be. Thus, after Hamas launched the “Al-Aqsa Flood” offensive in October 2023, the Houthis responded with military actions, officially joining the “Shiite Crescent” and the “Axis of Resistance,” opening a new front in the Red Sea outside the Eastern Mediterranean theater—forming the southern battlefield of the ‘Sixth Middle East War.’
From a certain perspective, the Houthi forces—who firmly believe that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun”—see their vast desert homeland of Yemen, full of tribes and known for its simple yet tough customs, as a second Afghanistan. With confidence in their military capabilities, they believe that the United States would never dare to send hundreds of thousands of troops for a ground invasion. Instead, the U.S. can only rely on long-range airstrikes, which not only do not harm the Houthis’ survival foundation, but actually serve as a form of publicity—elevating the Houthis in global public opinion as a new bastion of pan-Islamism and pan-Arab nationalism. This strengthens their political legitimacy, the perceived justness of their struggle, and the necessity of unifying governance and the state.
Although the Houthi movement rarely publicly links its support for the Palestinian cause, concern for Palestinian suffering, and promotion of the Palestinian narrative directly to its own ideals and ambitions, it can be inferred that such large-scale actions—at the risk of drawing fire and becoming enemies of Israel and the U.S.-led Western allies—are actually intended to force the international community, especially the Arab League, to recognize its effective governance in Yemen. It seeks acknowledgment of its leadership role in Yemen’s political reconstruction and a withdrawal of support for the exiled government. Even if the world does not accept a new Houthi-led regime acting alone, it should at least support a coalition government led by the Houthis—thus ending over a decade of war in Yemen and bringing stability to the Red Sea region.
From this angle, war and peace in Gaza are not just private matters between Palestine and Israel; they are part of the broader political dynamics of the Middle East—and even global politics. Resolving this complex chain of issues is no easy task. But at the very least, achieving a ceasefire in Gaza could deprive surrounding nations and political factions of their excuses and leverage, giving Middle Eastern leaders space to focus on key issues like development, cooperation, and prosperity.
As for the Houthis’ control over much of ancient Yemen—once known as the “Happy Land”—the country remains one of the poorest and most underdeveloped in the world. The Houthi forces have poured significant funds into developing missiles, drones, and various military technologies to “rescue” Palestinians hundreds of kilometers away, while their own people continue to live below the poverty line. This is not a choice any leader with national responsibility should make in terms of priorities. However, for revolutionaries and revolutionary parties, seizing nationwide power and establishing a unified government is likely their most urgent political desire and mission. The Houthi movement and its leaders can hardly resist the immense temptation of political power.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
