On December 18, just ten days after the fall of Syria’s capital and the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the opposition, which had not yet firmly seized power, gained preliminary recognition and acceptance from all adversaries. This rare “political favor” is dazzling and even somewhat difficult to comprehend. Not to mention that Russia and Iran, which were still directly confronting opposition forces ten days ago, suddenly reversed their stance and reconciled with their long-standing enemies. Even the United Nations, the United States, and the European Union, which had previously designated the main opposition force, the “Liberation of Syria” Front, as a terrorist organization, reversed their policies, selectively forgot their long-standing crimes, and quickly engaged with them face-to-face. They are now prepared to collectively promote the construction of a “New Syria” under the framework of UN Resolution 2254.
If the new round of Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which has lasted for more than a year, has profoundly reshaped the Middle East landscape, then “Syria War 2.0,” as the “black swan event” of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, will further accelerate this transformation.
The latest round of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict erupted on October 7 last year, triggering the “Sixth Middle East War.” This war is a genuine hybrid war, encompassing Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s “Seven-line Combat,” as well as what I define as the “Eighth Front,” which is Israel’s civil and military confrontation with the United Nations.
I support the term “Sixth Middle East War” because, in terms of its duration, scope, participating forces, casualties, material losses, and impact on global security and stability, this war qualifies as a large-scale regional war, fundamentally different from the five Middle East wars between 1948 and 1982.
The first five Middle East wars began with the partition of Palestine in 1948. At that time, World War II had just ended, and the Cold War structure had yet to form. The United States and the Soviet Union, which had rapidly ascended to superpower status by leading the world in defeating the fascist Axis powers, sought to use the Palestine issue to expel the three traditional hegemons – the Ottoman Empire, the British Empire, and the French Republic – from the Middle East, thereby establishing a new regional order and power structure.
Meanwhile, the number of newly independent Arab states emerging from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire was limited and lacked unity. As a result, Palestine was forcibly partitioned and handed over to the Jewish people as compensation for Europe’s long-standing persecution and massacres against them. The establishment of Israel constituted a great injustice to the Arab nations and the indigenous Palestinians because, for nearly two thousand years, Jews had not been the dominant indigenous population of Palestine. However, under the auspices of the United Nations, the great powers imposed the “State of Israel” on the Arabs, particularly the Palestinians, whom we are familiar with today.
In 1956, the Suez Canal War broke out, and the United States and the Soviet Union jointly thwarted the joint invasion of Egypt by Britain, France, and Israel. This further weakened the declining British Empire’s control over the Eastern Mediterranean region, particularly the Suez Canal. Subsequently, the 1967 “Six-Day War,” the 1973 “Yom Kippur War,” and the 1982 “Lebanon War” were all proxy wars between the US and the Soviet Union for dominance in the Middle East. Arab countries either followed the Soviet Union in an attempt to recover lost territory or stood by as spectators, pursuing self-preservation. However, Israel was, without a doubt, the “Middle Eastern orphan.”
The historical context and factions involved in the “Sixth Middle East War” have undergone a complete and transformative shift. More than 40 years after the end of the Cold War, Russia, as the successor to the Soviet Union, has seen its strength significantly weakened by focusing on the Russia-Ukraine battlefield. Meanwhile, the United States, as in the previous three Middle East wars, spares no effort in supporting and defending Israel. The vast majority of Arab countries remain on the sidelines, avoiding entanglement in this new war centered around Israel. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE even assisted in defending Israel during Iran’s airstrike in April.
In the “Sixth Middle East War,” Israel’s primary opponent is no longer a coalition of Arab nations but the “Axis of Resistance,” which bears a far stronger pan-Islamist hue than pan-Arab nationalism. The Pahlavi dynasty of Iran, which stayed out of the first five Middle East wars, has long since passed. The Islamic Republic, which came to power through the 1979 revolution, has long engaged in proxy and shadow wars with Israel, driven by its dual motivations of Islamic revolutionary ideology and the ambition to become a Middle Eastern superpower. However, through Israel’s bombing of Iranian diplomatic facilities in Syria and the assassination of Hamas leaders in Tehran, Iran was forced into the open and directly involved.
Since 1973, Syria had maintained a cold peace with Israel and lacked the capacity to confront Israel alone. Moreover, after 13 years of civil war, Syria was fragmented and could only passively serve as the battleground for the Israel-Iran confrontation. Two state actors, Iran and Syria, along with four non-state actors – Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq – collectively assumed the main role in resisting Israel, forming what is known as the “Axis of Resistance.”
At the same time, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France continued to defend Israel by imposing sanctions and containing Iran and Syria. Through limited military operations, they targeted and restrained the Houthis in Yemen and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, carefully avoiding escalation and expansion of the conflict, especially to prevent being dragged into this century-defining war in the Middle East.
Meanwhile, peripheral actors such as the “Liberation of Syria” alliance and the “Syrian National Front” supported by Turkey seized the opportunity in the later stages, becoming involved in this new Middle Eastern war, which initially had little to do with them. They easily reaped significant benefits, unexpectedly toppling the Bashar al-Assad regime.
The “Sixth Middle East War” unfolded in three major phases. The first phase lasted for a full year until September, with Gaza as the primary battlefield, where Israel focused on the “southern campaign” against Palestine. The second phase, lasting from September to the end of November, saw Israel shift focus to the “northern campaign” against Lebanon, targeting the leadership and forces of Hezbollah, destroying its infrastructure, and cutting off its strategic route to Iran through Syria.
The third phase, from late November to December 9, saw Israel reach a ceasefire with Hezbollah while completely destroying its land routes to and from Syria. Simultaneously, Israel carried out heavy bombardment of Syria’s northwestern military frontlines, causing the already weakened and demoralized Syrian army to collapse. This cleared the path for the mixed opposition forces, which had been planning an offensive for six months, allowing them to accelerate the disintegration of the Damascus regime.
The “Sixth Middle East War” led to the collapse of the Assad regime, surprising all parties involved. Perhaps Israel only intended to use opposition forces to further reduce the Damascus regime’s control and weaken the “Shia Crescent” and the “Axis of Resistance.” The opposition forces did not anticipate their adversary’s vulnerability, nor did they expect that Russia and Iran, which were supporting Assad, would be so depleted. Alternatively, it is possible that through Turkey and the framework of the “Astana Process,” the three parties had already negotiated a deal, ultimately collaborating to bring an end to the Assad regime.
The sudden collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime took both the United States and Israel by surprise. As a result, the U.S. deployed heavy weaponry, including B-52 strategic bombers, to launch intense airstrikes against the remaining forces and controlled areas of ISIS. Meanwhile, Israel exerted maximum effort to completely destroy Syria’s defense forces, which it had tolerated for decades, to prevent them from falling into the hands of the new regime. Israel also expanded its illegal occupation of the Golan Heights, advancing closer to Damascus to deepen its defensive buffer zone.
The reason is simple – the “Liberation of Syria” alliance originated from Al-Qaeda, with its ideology rooted in “Jihadist Salafism.” The U.S. and Israel are seen as its natural strategic and ultimate enemies, regarded as the “forces of evil” and the “new crusaders” that must be completely eradicated. Compared to the Assad regime, which sought to reclaim occupied territories, and the Iranian Islamic government, which aimed to expand its geopolitical influence through Middle Eastern issues, the answer to who poses the most dangerous and deadly threat is evident.
The “Sixth Middle East War” has triggered a chain reaction, leading to a “Syrian Civil War 2.0.” This has resulted in the unexpected victory of Al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch, the global enemy, marking a shocking and ironic twist. However, the strange aspect of this new Middle Eastern war is that the new rulers, who captured Damascus and declared it an “Islamic victory,” openly announced that they would not consider Israel an enemy. They expressed no intention to initiate new conflicts but instead showed willingness to establish normal relations with all parties, focusing on stability, development, and improving livelihoods – as if demons had transformed into angels overnight.
The “Sixth Middle East War” appears to be nearing its end and may conclude with Hamas releasing hostages and reaching a long-term ceasefire with Israel. The “Shia Crescent” is already crippled, the “Axis of Resistance” is in full retreat, and the Damascus regime has shifted allegiance. With Trump, a staunch supporter of Israel, about to take office, media attention on the Middle East will shift from Gaza, the starting point of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, to Damascus. The world will scrutinize whether the new regime can stabilize its base, quickly reconcile with the international community, including its former strategic adversaries – the U.S., the West, and Israel – and establish an inclusive transitional government under UN Security Council Resolution 2254. The goal will be to restart the constitutional amendment process and eventually build a new Syria where multiple ethnic groups and sects coexist, balancing the interests of all parties.
In theory, the transformation of a Syria that has been “torn apart” does not depend entirely, or even primarily, on the will of the new rulers in Damascus. Rather, it hinges on the bargaining between the United States, Turkey, Russia, Iran, Israel, and even the Gulf Arab states, which had been previously sidelined from the Syrian chessboard but are now reengaging. This reflects the historical reality that small countries cannot independently determine their own futures. It is an inevitable result of great power competition in the Middle East and a fundamental obstacle to the systematic resolution of Middle Eastern issues.
The apparent winners of the “Sixth Middle East War” are Israel and Turkey, as they have expanded their influence and control over Syria. However, this also heightens competition and friction between the two, adding a new layer of Israeli-Turkish rivalry to the traditional Israel-Arab and Israel-Iran conflicts. In the long run, this will inevitably increase the financial and resource burdens on both countries, potentially turning their regional expansion policies into a new quagmire.
The apparent losers of the “Sixth Middle East War” are Russia and Iran, as they have lost a key Middle Eastern hub where they had long exerted independent influence and deep control. For Russia, this reveals its limitations in opening a second front and highlights its declining influence as a global power. At least in the Middle East, Russia is now reduced to the role of an ordinary player, struggling to maintain a military base presence.
For Iran, the loss exposes the fatal weakness that its geopolitical ambitions far exceed its national strength. Losing the western flank of the “Shia Crescent” after over 40 years of effort, as well as the weakening of the “Axis of Resistance,” forces Iran to contract its sphere of influence back to the Tigris-Euphrates region. This severely undermines Iran’s ambitions to reconnect the Syrian corridor and extend its reach to the Eastern Mediterranean.
However, for Russia, losing Syria may not be a crippling blow. It merely represents the loss of a once-premier geopolitical and diplomatic stronghold. Russia can instead focus on the Ukraine war to preserve existing gains and seek some form of balance with the United States. Russia may even shift its diplomatic and strategic priorities toward Eurasia and the Global South to expand its influence and construct a new world order.
For Iran, the dual blow to its leadership of both the “Shia Crescent” and the “Axis of Resistance” not only constitutes a severe military and diplomatic failure but also risks domestic political fallout. Reformists and moderates may hold conservatives and hardliners accountable, further fueling public anger and dissatisfaction. This presents an unprecedented challenge to the long-standing rationality of Iran’s foreign and strategic policies.
In this sense, the ripple effects of the “Sixth Middle East War” will extend beyond Syria. They could destabilize Iran’s political system, pushing it to a difficult crossroads: should Iran continue its decades-long Islamic revolutionary policy of denying Israel’s legitimacy as a sovereign state, or should it gradually adjust its national strategy and dilute its revolutionary ideology? By adopting a more pragmatic stance, Iran could engage with the Middle East peace process, improve the overall geopolitical climate, and ultimately push Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab territories. This could lead to comprehensive regional peace, reconciliation, and cooperation, paving the way for mutual stability, development, and prosperity.
For Palestine, especially for radical forces like Hamas, the third major catastrophe, which has lasted over a year, has inflicted severe damage on the Palestinian people. Whether they can seize the opportunity presented by the Beijing reconciliation and sincerely unite under the unified leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) will be crucial. Through genuine negotiations, Palestinians could reclaim Gaza, the West Bank, and share East Jerusalem. This represents the second historical window for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the 1993 Oslo Accords and serves as a critical moment and strategic opportunity for the survival of the Palestinian nation.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
