The UN Security Council’s Gaza plan and US-China cooperation in the Middle East

On November 17, the UN Security Council reached a rare consensus and adopted Resolution 2803, a comprehensive governance plan for the Gaza Strip proposed by the United States. Through the full implementation of the “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict” (Trump’s 20-Point Plan) put forward by the Trump administration, the aim is to maintain the ceasefire in Gaza, restore humanitarian aid, promote reconstruction and economic recovery in Gaza, and lay the foundation for restarting the “two-state solution.” Since neither China nor Russia voted against it, this marks a very rare moment in the more than two years since the outbreak of the “Sixth Middle East War,” with all five permanent members of the UN Security Council maintaining a unified stance. It is expected to help shape a new pattern in Israeli-Palestinian relations, bring new hope for Middle East peace, highlight the United States’ strong geopolitical shaping capability, and reflect China’s rapidly evolving policy adjustment and strategic approach to Middle Eastern hotspot issues.

When draft Resolution 2803 (with the Trump 20-Point Plan as an annex) was submitted for a vote among the 15 Security Council members, it received 13 votes in favor, with China and Russia abstaining, allowing it to pass and become a document representing the highest will of the international community, carrying irresistible legal force and binding obligations on all UN member states. This bridges the long-standing divisions and confrontations in the Security Council over the Gaza conflict and the Russia-Ukraine conflict over the past two to three years, demonstrating the flexibility and appropriate compromise of major powers—particularly China and Russia—when addressing Middle East crises.

Resolution 2803 stipulates the establishment of a Peace Board (Board of Peace, BP), an entity with international legal status, as a transitional administrative body to supervise the Palestinian Authority (PA) in completing its reform plan, ensuring that it can safely and effectively regain control of Gaza and create conditions for Palestinian self-determination and statehood.

The resolution authorizes the creation of an International Stabilization Force (ISF), which, under the unified command of the Peace Board and in cooperation with Israel, Egypt, and newly trained Palestinian police forces, will ensure border security, dismantle military and attack facilities, promote demilitarization, protect civilians, and secure humanitarian aid corridors. Funding will come from voluntary contributions and a dedicated trust fund, with the World Bank and other financial institutions participating in reconstruction financing. The operations of the Peace Board and the Stabilization Force will be subject to international oversight, with progress reports submitted to the Security Council every six months. The mandate is valid until the end of 2027. Countries participating in the Stabilization Force must be approved by Egypt and Israel, and the mission can only end once Israel deems that appropriate demilitarization and the elimination of threats have been achieved.

The overall objective of the resolution is to achieve ceasefire, reconstruction, stability, and peace in Gaza under international coordination, thereby laying the foundation for long-term peaceful coexistence between Palestinians and Israelis and for the future construction of a Palestinian state. Although the resolution does not emphasize whether the international stabilization force will be responsible for disarming Gaza’s armed groups, including Hamas, nor does it clearly define its organizational structure, mandate, or participation criteria, it contains positive indications that the Palestinian Authority will effectively and safely administer Gaza after reforms. Considering Israel’s strong resistance to the United Nations, Resolution 2803 downplays the role of the UN and the Security Council in active involvement or oversight, though it does mention them.

After the adoption of Resolution 2803, Hamas—long-term controller of the Gaza Strip—expressed dissatisfaction, condemning the resolution for attempting to impose international trusteeship over Gaza and potentially advancing a governance plan favoring Israel. It explicitly rejected any form of international trusteeship, foreign military presence, or the establishment of international bases in Gaza, arguing that such arrangements would directly violate Palestinian national sovereignty.

Israel, on the other hand, demonstrated divided perceptions and stances. Israeli President Herzog praised it as “a rather incredible moment in world politics, a situation that only President Trump could have brought about, and of course, he also brought back all our hostages. We must create a hopeful future, and I hope that this Security Council resolution, along with civic activities and new initiatives… will bring some positive results.” However, Prime Minister Netanyahu and right-wing and far-right factions expressed dissatisfaction, arguing that the resolution contains the possibility of allowing the establishment of a Palestinian state and does not clearly mandate the complete disarmament of Hamas or full demilitarization in Gaza. Netanyahu asserted that regardless of how difficult the future may be, Gaza must be “demilitarized” and Hamas must be “disarmed.”

Regarding this U.S.-led draft resolution supported by several Arab and Islamic countries, China and Russia—who allowed its passage through abstention rather than veto—each issued clarifying remarks afterward to emphasize their reservations or dissatisfaction.

China’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Fu Cong, stated that the Security Council must ensure a lasting ceasefire, address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, and begin reconstruction, but expressed “deep concern” over the unclear structure and mandate of the Peace Board and International Stabilization Force.

Fu Cong said that China believes the draft pays too little attention to Palestine and fails to explicitly affirm Palestinian sovereignty and the “two-state solution.” “The draft resolution does not reflect the basic principle that ‘Palestinians should govern Palestine.’ Gaza belongs to the Palestinian people, not to anyone else,” he said, expressing concern over the resolution’s failure to “ensure the effective participation of the UN and its Security Council.” He stated that due to these concerns and regional positions, China cast an abstention vote.

Russia’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Nebenzya, stated that Russia could not support the draft, arguing that it undermines the framework of the “two-state solution” and improperly grants the “International Stabilization Force” peacekeeping authority, effectively making it a party to the conflict. In addition, Nebenzya warned that the draft could serve as a cover for the United States and Israel to conduct “experiments” in the occupied Palestinian territories. He also recalled previous U.S.-driven initiatives that ran counter to their declared objectives.

Objectively speaking, although China and Russia pointed out many ambiguities and inappropriate elements in the draft resolution, their decision not to veto it indicates that both countries generally recognize the positive intention of promoting a ceasefire in Gaza, restoring humanitarian assistance, and focusing on postwar reconstruction and long-term arrangements, despite the imperfect path to implementation. In other words, faced with more than two years of disaster in Gaza, accepting this U.S.-backed plan—which attempts to consider multiple interests yet still favors Israel—amounts to “choosing the lesser of two evils.”

Since the “Sixth Middle East War” was triggered by a new round of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in October 2023, it has expanded from the Israeli-Palestinian arena to the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. More than ten regional states and external powers have become involved. The conflict ultimately led Israel and the United States into direct war with Iran, the unexpected collapse of the Syrian government, and Qatar being bombed by Israel despite its innocence. Warfare has erupted across the Middle East, with flames spreading in all directions. Most distressingly, 2.3 million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip have endured an unprecedented national catastrophe. The civilized world has witnessed the killings and genocidal acts committed by one of the most brutally behaving state actors.

During this period, because the United States repeatedly blocked and vetoed ceasefire proposals, continually “handing knives” to Israel and even directly acting as an accomplice to its militarism, the battlefield in the Middle East kept expanding and slipping out of control. Only when it eventually backfired on core U.S. interests and international reputation did the Trump administration introduce the “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict” (Trump’s 20-Point Plan). Through strong pressure on Israel’s right-wing factions, a partially incomplete ceasefire in Gaza was finally achieved, paving the way for the Security Council to consider a new governance framework for Gaza and a new configuration for Israeli-Palestinian relations.

Frankly, this draft resolution represents the result of strenuous diplomatic effort and extensive mediation by the Trump administration and only managed to gain broad support with difficulty. Inevitably, it is filled with loopholes, deliberate ambiguities, and a lack of detail, constituting a peace roadmap that must address the concerns of all parties—an unavoidable “rushed solution.” Therefore, dissatisfaction from the parties involved, especially the bitterly opposed Israel and Hamas, is entirely expected, as both sides currently adhere to zero-sum thinking on several issues.

Resolution 2803, which reflects Trump’s Middle East foreign policy—particularly his approach to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—passed smoothly in the Security Council. This reflects the international community’s consensus and determination to end Gaza’s suffering as soon as possible, restore peace between Israelis and Palestinians, and ultimately implement the “two-state solution.” It also represents a diplomatic victory for the United States in leading Middle East peace efforts, shaping the regional order, and demonstrating its status and influence as a superpower. It may help offset the frustration and distrust Middle Eastern states have felt toward the U.S. due to a series of previous policy failures.

In addition, the endorsement of the Gaza governance plan through a Security Council resolution strengthens and continues Trump’s Middle East policy from version 1.0 to 2.0. During his first term, Trump—marked by a distinctly pro-Israel stance—broke long-standing taboos of previous U.S. administrations by moving the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, introducing the “Deal of the Century,” which unilaterally compromised core Palestinian interests, cutting off contact with the Palestinian Authority, drastically reducing or completely halting humanitarian aid to Palestinians, withdrawing from UNESCO (which was considered sympathetic to Palestine), and successfully pushing four Arab states to sign the Abraham Accords with Israel, thereby expanding the pro-peace and reconciliation camp in the Middle East.

In his second term, Trump inherited a Middle East already engulfed in war. While ensuring U.S. leadership, he provided Israel with unwavering and unlimited support, even jointly striking Iranian nuclear facilities with Israel. At the same time, he worked to prevent the expansion of war, to limit its intensity, and to keep the United States out of a new quagmire. This included ultimately reaching a ceasefire agreement with Yemen’s Houthi movement, advancing normalization with post-transition Syria, and exerting pressure on multiple parties—including Israel—to prevent further regional destabilization, particularly to achieve a Gaza ceasefire as quickly as possible. Trump also successfully brought Kazakhstan into the Abraham Accords, expanding the Middle East peace process into Central Asia and into Muslim-majority states beyond the Arab world.

The adoption of Resolution 2803 marks a new milestone, indicating that the United States has once again become the key external power in Middle Eastern diplomacy and that Washington has returned to a central decision-making position in regional affairs. This will undoubtedly enhance the United States’ global political influence and leadership, strengthening its presence and discourse power in the Middle East. A few days earlier, under U.S. leadership, the Security Council adopted a resolution on November 14 extending sanctions on Yemen, condemning Houthi attacks, reaffirming the arms embargo, and adding new maritime inspection measures.

At the moment the UN Security Council voted on Resolution 2803, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman made a highly publicized visit to the United States and may receive “U.S. ally” treatment, including the purchase of F-35 fighter jets. Prior to the outbreak of the “Sixth Middle East War,” Saudi Arabia and the United States were actively negotiating a military alliance. Washington’s conditions required Riyadh to normalize relations with Israel and drastically reduce economic, technological, and military cooperation with China. The Gaza war and the resulting unprecedented humanitarian disaster caused a major reversal in Saudi positions, with Riyadh reiterating that the Palestinian issue must be resolved first before Saudi-Israeli reconciliation can occur. As the Gaza ceasefire takes hold and U.S.-led reconstruction begins, the future direction of Saudi-U.S. and Saudi-Israeli relations has drawn close attention.

Observers have also noted that in 2023 China successfully mediated an end to the seven-year rift between Saudi Arabia and Iran, creating a diplomatic sensation and astonishing the world. In 2024 China facilitated a broad consensus among 14 Palestinian factions in Beijing. At a time when the United States was preoccupied with elections and unwilling to engage deeply in Middle Eastern affairs, international opinion exclaimed that China’s diplomacy in the region had become powerful, dynamic, and highly productive, and that Beijing seemed to have replaced Washington as the diplomatic decision-making center of the Middle East.

However, subsequent major developments in the Middle East delivered heavy setbacks to China’s regional diplomacy: Hamas leader Haniyeh, who participated in Beijing’s reconciliation talks, was openly assassinated by Israel in Tehran; Syrian President Bashar al-Assad—whose regime had survived with China’s support—was unexpectedly overthrown; Iran, which had signed a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement with China, lost large portions of its sphere of influence; Russia, China’s “comprehensive strategic coordination partner for the new era,” was forced to abandon Syria, its only Cold War asset in the Middle East; China had to conduct large-scale evacuations from Syria, Israel, and Iran; China’s efforts to build a high-quality Belt and Road Initiative with Middle Eastern states suffered from the effects of war; the Red Sea route—China’s main trade corridor to Europe—faced severe security threats, increasing trade costs.

Recently, as new opportunities have emerged in the Middle East and China-U.S. relations have gradually stabilized with multiple agreements reached at the Busan summit, China has significantly adjusted its policies and strategies regarding regional hotspots. This includes actively seeking cooperation with the United States on the Gaza ceasefire and Red Sea governance and twice abstaining to allow U.S.-led Security Council resolutions to pass. Most notably, China rapidly shifted its stance toward the Syrian transitional government, received its foreign minister for the first time, and issued a joint communiqué outlining the future of bilateral relations. These new developments indicate that China’s Middle East diplomacy is becoming more flexible, adapting to changing circumstances and evolving conditions.

Looking ahead, with the Middle East moving in a positive direction and China-U.S. relations continuing to stabilize, China will keep consulting and cooperating with the United States on regional governance. It will also work to explore its potential and leverage its strengths in promoting Syria’s comprehensive reconstruction, Gaza’s postwar administration, ending Yemen’s “one country, three governments” situation, and restoring Red Sea maritime security, helping create a new landscape of peace and stability in the Middle East.

The saying “even an impartial judge struggles to settle family disputes” applies. China’s strength in the Middle East lies in its lack of deep entanglements with any party to the conflicts and its ability to communicate with all sides, especially various Palestinian factions and parties within Yemen. However, the challenge remains that internal reconciliation and integration—whether in Palestine or Yemen—are extremely difficult and complex. This means China’s regional diplomacy, particularly its mediation efforts, will require greater wisdom, determination, and investment.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.