Interview
‘The US doesn’t have a policy on Gaza, does not have a peace plan…’

Vali Nasr, former senior adviser to the US State Department, spoke to Harici: “The US does not have a policy on Gaza. The US doesn’t have a peace plan, does not have a ceasefire plan, does not have a long-term stability plan for the region…”
Vali Nasr is the Majid Khadduri Professor of International Affairs and Middle East Studies at Johns Hopkins-SAIS. Nasr, an Iranian-American, is one of the most prominent figures in the field of US-Iranian relations and US policies in the Middle East.
A former member of the US State Department’s Foreign Affairs Policy Board, Nasr served as Senior Advisor to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan between 2009 and 2011.
A nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations CFR, Nasr is the author of several books including, The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat, The Shia Revival and How Sanctions Work: Iran and the Impact of Economic Warfare.
Vali Nasr answered journalist Esra Karahindiba’s questions on the Biden administration’s position on the Gaza conflict, US Middle East policy, the role of Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the future of Gaza.
Before the Gaza war, there was news about an unofficial nuclear agreement between Iran and the United States. Is that agreement still in place or has Iran accelerated its nuclear work because of the Gaza war?
I don’t think the Gaza War has yet has a direct impact on the change of policy in Iran. But what the Gaza war did was to escalate tensions between the United States and Iran. So as soon as the Gaza War happened, the United States put a new freeze on the money that had gone from South Korea to Iran, the $6 billion in exchange for the release of American prisoners in Iran. And so, both countries have now are seeing an escalation of tensions between them. There have been attacks by Iranian backed forces in Syria and Iraq on American positions. And there have been American bombing of those same targets. Iran has said that it might sell advanced ballistic missiles to Russia. So, what we’re seeing is that is a gradual escalation of tensions between Iran and the US. If that escalation happens, then inevitably, it translates into Iran basically going back to a more aggressive nuclear policy.
‘If there’s population expulsion, the US would confront a much wider war in the region’
Although Iran is not in favor of the expansion of the war, the Houthis and Iranian-backed militias continue to attack US forces in the region. Do you think Iran will increase its influence in the region after the Gaza war? How will this affect the US policy in the region?
Three things here: One is that, yes, I don’t think Iran or Hezbollah or any other force in the region wants an expansion of the war but at the same time this access of resistance that includes Iran, Hezbollah militias in Iraq, in Syria and the Houthis and Hamas, they want to show support for the Palestinians. And they want to show that they are doing something while many other Arab countries are right now not doing anything militarily. They might be doing some things diplomatically but not militarily. So, partly they are making these attacks as a way of showing support for Hamas. But I also think it’s warning shots at the US. It’s not so much escalation as I think they want to sort of tell the United States that if Israel attacks without any kind of a restraint if it tries to completely finish off Hamas and Gaza, if too many Palestinians die, if there’s population expulsion that the US would, then, confront a much wider war in the region. So, I think we’re at that stage that both sides are sending signals. The Americans hit Iranian or militia positions in the region as a way of suggesting that they are prepared to counterattack. But I think the Houthis, Hezbollah militias in Iraq are also sending their own signals.
Secondly, I do think Iran’s position has become stronger because when the Palestinian issue becomes front and center for people across the region that’s an issue that Iran has always tried to rely on and has always championed. I think whereas other countries in the region, saw their interests best served by call and even having either secret or open relations with Israel. Abraham Accords, maybe normalization between Saudi and Israel, relations between Türkiye and Israel… These are all now jeopardized. So, the country that actually benefits most from this shift is actually Iran. And in the short run also Israel is now busy with Gaza as opposed to be being busy with Iran. The United States is now also busy with the Palestinian issue which until October 6, it thought that the Palestinian issue was over. I think Iran is been the big beneficiary of the region and some of the issues. That maybe people in the Sunni world, in the Arab world had anger towards Iran because of its support for the Assad regime in Syria. I think all of that’s forgotten. Now that everybody’s thinking and crying for the Palestinians, Iran or Hezbollah is seem to be on the right side for them. So, it’s a big success for Iran. Now, whether this translates into longer term benefit for Iran, it all depends. I’m not sure about that. Also, the future of us Iran relations in the region, I think, is it all depends on how this war ends, what kind of a vision the United States has for the end of the war, and what comes after this war. If after this war we see more escalation on the nuclear issue between Iran and the US, if we see increasing tensions between Iran and Israel attacks, semi-attacks and etc., then I think the region could be for a prolonged period of instability.
‘The only US policy of Gaza is to let Israel conduct the war’
The US allies in the Middle East did not support it on Ukraine. OPEC countries continue to cut oil prices. Now the US’s unlimited support for Israel has led to a further loss of credibility in the region. Do you think Washington has started to lose its political weight in the Middle East after the crises in Ukraine and Israel?
I think Ukraine was never central to the Middle East. It was a war somewhere else. So, people in the Middle East may have had opinions about it but it was never important to average Arabs, it was maybe more for Turks because Turks sit on the Black Sea and maybe for them is more important. But people, I would say, in Egypt or Jordan or or the Persian Gulf region, they didn’t sleep at night and wake up in the morning thinking about Ukraine. The governments were looking at basically what’s their interest. Saudi Arabia has oil interests with Russia. Türkiye has a balancing relationship, it has relations with Russia it also has relations with Europe. So, I think the Middle East basically reacted to Ukraine not based on what America wants but based on how to protect their own interests, how to basically be supportive of Europe but also be supportive of Russia. I think nobody wanted to be sucked into the Ukraine war in a direct way
I think Gaza is different. Yes, there is a lot of anger towards America’s moral stance on the Palestinian issue that the US basically has supported Israeli policy wholeheartedly and has not been critical on the number of people died in Gaza. But I think the larger issue is not the US’s moral credibility because I never thought that was very strong in the Middle East. I think people of the Middle East always thought that the US is biased towards Israel. They always thought that the US is Islamophobic. They were angry at the Iraq War. There were many reasons why the middle easterners had anger towards the US’ double standards in the Middle East. I think the critical credibility issue is lack of a US policy, because even the times when the United States was very unpopular for its moral stances, nevertheless it had a very clear sense of what it wanted to do and ability to deliver. But what we are actually seeing is that the US does not have a policy on Gaza. Its only policy is that they’re going to sit back and let Israel conduct this War based on it’s own objectives and however it wants to conduct the War. The US doesn’t have a peace plan, does not have a ceasefire plan, does not have a long-term stability plan for the region. That is where the credibility issue is because with a superpower its credibility doesn’t come from its moral position. It comes from its ability to construct policy and to implement policy. I think those are the issues that are now in doubt so if you asked any country and I don’t mean people in the street but you asked any government in the region what is American policy for how to end this war and how to make sure that the war doesn’t start and how to make things better bring stability back to the region, I don’t think they can answer.
‘Beijing visit of Arab leaders mean; we will invite China into the Middle East issues’
What that the reason why the ministers of the Arab countries visited China as the first stop on their trip to find a solution for Gaza. What do you think this means? Has the US failed in its policy of balancing China in the Middle East?
I think it was important. I think the more important issue is when Saudi Arabia decided to invite all the leaders of the Islamic and Arab countries together, and so for the first time, leaders of countries that don’t usually talk to each other like we’re all in the same place, in the same photograph, Iran and Egypt, Assad and Erdoğan. That was very significant. In other words, the first time that basically the region said “you know what, there is no American policy, we’re going to get together, and see how we can solve this.” So, I think that was the most important statement that they were not happy with where the US was going. Now they made the decision that they were going to visit the capitals of all of the five members of the security Council. But the significance was that they decided to start with Beijing, not end with Beijing. So, I think it was the significant part is that. But, and yes, I do think that not that they think that China can bring solution, but I think they want to signal their displeasure for lack of US policy by basically saying “we’re not only not going to cut ties with China, we’re actually going to try to invite China into the Middle East issues”.
‘The right candidate for the mediation is Saudi Arabia’
In your article for Foreign Affairs, you wrote that the United States could manage its relations in the Middle East through Riyadh, thereby easing its responsibility in the region. Is the model you propose compatible with the current Saudi foreign policy perspective, which is based on a multilateral win-win approach. How do you convince a country that has joined BRICS to return to a US-oriented model again?
I don’t think the Saudis can have to choose between this and that. In fact, that they have chosen BRICS. The fact that they have relations with Iran, they have relations with China, is exactly what makes Saudi Arabia the sort of the right candidate because a country that is very close to the United States only, then is not able to bring in Türkiye and Iran and other actors also into the picture which are very important for the stability of the Middle East. But Saudi Arabia increasingly has very close ties with America, but also has close ties with China, has close ties with Russia, has now built it relationship with Türkiye after many years of relationships being very cold and frosty, has rebuild its relations with Iran, has repaired its relations with Qatar and so. And also, it has some leverage on Israel because the Israelis still want normalization with Saudi Arabia so they sit in a right position to exercise this influence if the United States is willing to support that role and where the United States has greatest leverage is actually on Israel. When you want to cut a deal that would bring stability in the region, every actor in the region has to agree to it. Americans don’t talk to Iranians right now, so they cannot discuss this with Iran. The Chinese talks to Iranians. And the Saudis talk to Iranians. And the Chinese and the Saudis depend on one another at the same time. The Russians have to support this and not undermine it. Tehran and Ankara have the best relationship with Russia right now of getting it to beave. The Americans have the best relationship with Israelis. So, as a result, the US’s policy right now is only supporting an Israeli War. But if you actually want stability in the region, the stability will not come with just supporting Israel conducting the war. The stability will come by supporting a broader sort of a regional security agreement that everybody has to accept and agree to. And there is no single actor who speaks to everybody basically and also has leverage with Israelis as well. And Saudis can play that role.
‘None of the regional countries will want to take part in the Gaza’s reconstruction unless there is an agreement for a final settlement’
The Biden administration wants a revitalized Palestinian Authority to administer post-war Gaza, but Netanyahu said they would not accept that. “After the war, Gaza must be demilitarized under Israeli responsibility,” he said. What does this mean? What kind of political situation do you think awaits Gaza after the war? Can regional countries play an effective role in the reconstruction of Gaza?
It all depends on how and when the most of the war ends. If we thought about Ukraine, when the Russians went into Ukraine, they thought they’re going to take all of Ukraine. Then the Ukrainians thought, they’re going to win the war themselves and push Russia all the way out of Ukraine. Where we are is that neither side is winning. It’s a new reality. Right now, we’re in the middle of a war that where Israel thinks it can have everything. It can destroy Hamas, take over large parts of Gaza. So, it all depends on whether does it get its way or does the war stop somewhere else. So, it all depends on when and how this war stops. When does it end? Does it end in total victory by Israel or Israel is forced to stop the war at some point without winning total victory? Once the war stops, then there’s a question of what’s the order that can be negotiated for postwar. I think that’s where we don’t know what the case is going to be. I do think the countries in the region have a role in the future security of Gaza but also in reconstruction of Gaza. But it all again their involvement in Gaza will depend on what is the final scenario in Gaza. I don’t think anybody wants to go in to own a disastrous territory. Everybody wants to go in believing that there is an agreement between United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Türkiye, even Iran quietly from afar about a situation. Then, say, “okay, we can support that”. But if there is no internationally agreed situation for Gaza, then I don’t think any Arab country or Türkiye would want to go in a situation where there’s no international or regional support for. It’s a recipe for disaster. It’s similar to the situation in Syria. Because there is no agreement about the final end to the war in Syria. Countries are in Syria basically protecting their own military positions but there’s no agreement about reconstruction. So, I think you have to first have an agreement political agreement over what happens to Gaza when the war stops. That itself depends on how the war stops. And then, countries in the region would come in to support a final settlement of Gaza. They won’t come in before there is an agreement on a final settlement for Gaza.
‘YPG involves Americans more than Syrians’
Can you also comment about the frozen normalization initiative of Türkiye towards Syria? It’s now for a year and a half that we were discussing a lot if whether Bashar Assad and President Erdoğan will meet or not, whether the normalization will be fully applicable. But we see that now it’s frozen…
Repairing relations is going to take time because these two were on the opposite sides of the war and the war hasn’t even concluded completely. There is again much like we discuss about Gaza, there is no other final settlement, internationally recognized final settlement for the for the war in Syria. There is basically a de facto situation on the ground. “So, the fighting has stopped”, “Assad controls here”, “Turkish troops are there”, “Americans control this piece”, “Iranians control that piece”. But there is no sort of an agreement about the future. I think there are some big issues for Türkiye on the table. One is the future of Idlib, the other one is the future of YPG group which actually involves the Americans more than it involves the Syrians. Of course, Assad would want to see Turkish troops leave Syrian land. I mean any leader of an Arab country would say the same thing. But on the other hand, Türkiye also wants no more refugees to come to Türkiye. So, if they leave Idlib, and you know Syrian troops go into Idlib, and another million Syrians are pushed into Syria. That’s an issue. On the other hand, they actually want Assad to provide security guarantees that would allow many of the Syrian refugees in Türkiye to return home. Then, the question is also about the Kurdish movement in Northeast Syria, it’s military capabilities etc. So, I think we’re far apart on those things.
And then the other thing that’s happened is that the Gaza War has taken the attention off of the Syria issue. I think we were reaching a point where in a different kind of a Middle East setting, different kind of an American relations with the Middle East, it was possible to sort of imagine that there was a political space for even Americans to think differently about Syria, let alone Türkiye and Syria. So, we saw that the Arab world was getting closer to Assad in the sense of accepting him in the Arab League. But still the issue of returning; the Assad will not agree to the return of refugees until economic sanctions on are lifted so that they can actually feed the people who come back. The sanctions will not be going to be lifted it because of the United States will not lift them. So, everything is sort of in a way is tied together. So, things may move ever so slightly, but I think it’s going to be very difficult to untangle this in the short-term period.
‘Ukrainians don’t care about the motivations of the West as long as they get the support’
I want to ask you about the statements of David Cameron, the British Foreign Secretary. He was in Washington and he said “You spend an extra 10% of your defense budget, and with the courage of the Ukrainians, you destroy 50 percent of Russia’s pre-war defense equipment and people. Without losing the lives of the Americans and the British. This is a great investment.” Is this a type of confession that what is going on in Ukrainian land is a semi-proxy war?
I think for Ukrainians this is a real war. It’s about their territory. It’s no different for them than it was for Turks in 1921 when their country was being divided up and given to different European powers, when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk rallied the Turkish military to unite the Turkish Republic. For them, it’s an act of nationalism. But I think that what David Cameron said, unfortunately is exactly the way Putin thinks. He thinks that the Ukraine war is really a western proxy war. I think what David Cameron meant to say is to encourage the US Congress to continue to support the war by saying it’s a very small price to pay to keep Russia weak and prevent it from becoming a great power by keeping it busy in Ukraine. But it’s going to be read the wrong way to mean that the Ukraine war is a proxy war. But I don’t think that’s the reality. I think for the Ukrainians the war is real. They’re defending their territory. They need the Western support. I don’t think Ukrainians care about what motivates the West as long as they get the support. So, I mean how Ukrainians see the war is very different from somebody sitting in London or in Madrid or in Amsterdam or in Washington may see the war. For them it might very well be about keeping Russia weak. But for the Ukrainians it’s about protecting their country.