Timofey Bordachev: Trump is serving the cause of peace

Timofey Bordachev, Program Director of the Valdai Discussion Club, spoke to Harici: “Trump has already done a great service to international peace by making our relations very, very predictable.”

Timofey Bordachev is the Program Director of the Valdai Discussion Club, one of Russia’s leading think tanks, and an academic advisor to the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the Higher School of Economics (HSE) National Research University. He completed his Master’s degree in European Politics and Administration in Bruges in 1997 and earned his PhD in Political Science from St. Petersburg State University in 1999.

Actively producing ideas on international relations theory, contemporary world politics, Russia-European Union relations, EU foreign policy, Eurasian economic integration, and international security, Bordachev is also the author of numerous books and research articles published in Russia and abroad.

Bordachev states that the unipolar world order has definitively come to an end and that the future has transformed into a multipolar structure where every country looks after its own interests. Emphasizing that a single superpower cannot provide order in this new system, Bordachev argues that middle-range powers are developing the capability to control tensions among themselves as foreign intervention decreases.

Stating that Russia’s nuclear rhetoric is a message intended solely for diplomacy with the West rather than the whole world, Bordachev predicts that Western efforts to pull Russia to its side against China will fail because they cannot offer a proposal strong enough to disrupt this pragmatic relationship. According to Bordachev, thanks to the “predictable” policies brought by US President Trump, the possibility of a direct war between Russia and the West is “very low,” and in this context, Trump has “served international peace.”

We asked Bordachev our questions during the meeting organized by the Valdai Discussion Club in Istanbul in November.

Thank you for your time. My first question is simple. It is also the title of this conference: Where are we going? Toward a kind of order, or a multipolar disorder? Do you have an easy answer to this, or what is your perspective on the future?

I think the goal is not to find a solution, but to discuss. The purpose of our meeting is to explore opportunities and limitations together. No one in the room has a prescription. This is not the Munich Security Conference, where our Western partners try to convince everyone that there is only one truth. In this room, there are many truths.

Therefore, we can say, if not how it will look, at least how it will not look. It will certainly not be a unipolar structure dominated by a single power. And we know what rules it will be based on. It will be based on the fundamental rule that every country will want to serve its own interests first, regardless of self-important superpowers. These are very important structural features of the future international order. And at the least, we know the general coordinate system in which we will operate. This is already a great success—a success confirmed and verified by the discussions during this conference.

When you look at history, is it possible to establish a world order or international law without the might of a superpower? Is there a similar example in history?

Never… The European order in the 18th and 19th centuries was supported by five competing powers: Russia, the Austrian Empire, the German Empire, France, and Britain. Then, in the 20th century, Europe collapsed, America emerged, and Russia survived. Now, China has emerged as well.

Currently, we have three superpowers in this world. Therefore, I do not think that today’s international system—namely order and law—where so many states look after their own interests, can be supported by a single power or a limited group of powers. It is absolutely impossible. And this, of course, makes the situation more complex, as it is much easier to live in slavery than to live in freedom. But we live in freedom.

In your speech, you mentioned that middle-range powers, small states, or such nations do not recognize any definition of a hegemon and do not want to see a dominant power over their foreign policy; they want freedom. But when we look at the relations between middle-range powers, for example, there are many contradictions between Türkiye and Iran. There are many contradictions and problems between Pakistan and India. Even though these countries align under an umbrella like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, we have seen war between Pakistan and India. In this case, how can they solve their problems among themselves when there is a conflict of interest? There are many routes, many pipeline projects; India wants to reach Europe via a different path than what the Chinese offer. We face many contradictions of this kind. At the end of the day, the simple question is: How can these states find common ground to solve problems without any war?

Look, the last major war we saw in this region was the Iran-Iraq war, nearly 50 years ago. Since then, we haven’t seen major wars. I mean, I’m talking about truly large-scale wars. Like the Iran-Iraq war or Russia’s war in Ukraine these days. Therefore, the region is quite peaceful. If you compare it with the past and, for example, with Eastern Europe, the region is very peaceful.

You are saying this is an advantage, right?

It is not an advantage. It is an indicator…

An indicator of what?

Political culture… There may be border clashes between Indians and Pakistanis. But they did not escalate these into a major war between them. Why? That is an interesting question. That is the most interesting question: the limits of escalation. I feel that most middle-range powers, even larger ones like India, have managed to control escalation.

For example, the less intervention we see from superpowers like the United States, the more maneuverability regional powers have to control escalation among themselves.

In your speech, you said that power politics no longer works and mentioned that this is a good thing. In that case, why does the Kremlin feel the need to remind the rest of the world that Russia has destructive nuclear weapons? We have heard such statements from the Kremlin many times—statements like “We are warning you, we are warning the West, we have destructive weapons,” or things of that nature. Why does Russia feel the need to remind the world that it possesses these destructive weapons?

Not the world. The West. This is not a message to the rest of the world. It is a message to the West.

So, are you saying there is nothing to fear in, say, Kazakhstan or Türkiye?

Certainly. This is a message to the West. This is a part of our diplomacy with the West. And the Westerners do the same. They use different words, but they do the same. These are relations that have nothing to do with you.

I see.

Don’t worry.

Yes, thank you. Finally, there is a big debate in the West: Is a policy that pulls Russia to the side of the West and positions it against China possible? Could there be such a new policy shift? Some Western think tanks have been discussing this since the Ukraine war.

They have nothing to give us… They have nothing to give even to the Indians. I was discussing this with my Indian colleagues, and my question was: What could the US give you that is of such fundamental importance that it would reorient your policy of cooperation with Russia? The Indians said, “Nothing.” The problem with the West is that it has exhausted its resources that hold great value for the rest of the world.

We are all pragmatists. Türkiye, Russia, China—everyone is extremely pragmatic… Therefore, we see that the West is no longer a source of new development. Fewer and fewer investment sources, fewer technology sources, fewer sources of stability. But unfortunately, from time to time, it is a source of instability.

That’s why I don’t think all these complex plans, like positioning Russia against China, will work. Because first and foremost, we value the most peaceful border we have with China. I mean, a very large border with a great nation…

But during the Cold War, there was a conflict between China and the Soviet Union.

Very minor conflicts. Essentially nothing. So, that is the first argument. The second argument is that neither China nor Russia thinks the West could offer something valuable enough to break China away from Russia or Russia away from China.

Yes, my last question. What is the percentage of the possibility of a direct conflict between Russia and the West, namely NATO?

I think it is very low right now. With Trump, it is very low. Trump brought a lot of predictability. I think Trump has already done a great service to international peace by making our relations very, very predictable.