Trump administration’s Russia-Ukraine policy hits a dead end

On July 23, the third round of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine concluded successfully in Istanbul, Turkey. Both sides agreed to exchange 250 prisoners of war each and also agreed to exchange more than 1,200 prisoners in the near future. Additionally, Russia proposed the establishment of three working groups on political, humanitarian, and military issues, which Ukraine accepted. On the same day, both sides completed the exchange of 500 prisoners. This progress shows that after U.S. President Trump’s attempt to quickly end the Russia-Ukraine conflict failed, Russia and Ukraine have regained control of the negotiation process.

As Russia and Ukraine exchanged a new batch of prisoners and expressed willingness to continue with a fourth round of negotiations, the U.S. announced the approval of a $322 million military aid package to Ukraine, aimed at strengthening Ukraine’s air defense and armored vehicle capabilities. Continuing military aid to Ukraine not only reinforces the shift in the Trump administration’s Russia-Ukraine conflict policy, but also indicates that the U.S.’s dominant intervention over the past six months has reached a dead end.

However, the Trump administration seems unwilling to play a marginal role in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and is instead seeking to pressure Russia indirectly. On July 21, U.S. Treasury Secretary Bessent said in an interview with CNBC that the U.S. intends to include China’s energy purchases from Russia and Iran in the scope of negotiations.

Analysts believe Bessent’s remarks indicate that the U.S. is trying to steer U.S.-China negotiations toward geopolitics and China-Russia/Iran relations, aiming to achieve a “three birds with one stone” effect through so-called “secondary sanctions” and “long-arm jurisdiction”: to pressure China into importing more U.S. energy and balance bilateral trade; to leverage China’s energy import structure to tighten the economic noose around Russia and Iran; and to reap geopolitical benefits for the U.S.

Disregarding U.S.-China and U.S.-Iran relations, the U.S.’s inclusion of Russian energy exports—especially to China—into U.S.-China trade talks is essentially an attempt to block Russia’s main energy export route, force concessions on the Russia-Ukraine issue, and boost U.S. energy exports and the Trump administration’s policy success.

After losing the European market due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, China became Russia’s main energy buyer, making China-Russia energy trade a key foreign exchange source supporting Russia’s economy and war capability. In 2024, total China-Russia trade surpassed $244.8 billion, doubling from $190.271 billion in 2022, with energy trade reaching $113 billion, a 20% increase from 2023.

Statistics show that 47% of Russia’s oil exports, 44% of coal exports, and 21% of natural gas exports are destined for China. As of June 2025, China’s imports of Russian energy accounted for 38% of Russia’s monthly export revenue. According to the Moscow Exchange, the share of RMB in Russian foreign exchange trading jumped from 1% before the war to 99.6%, with daily trading volume exceeding 70 billion RMB. Clearly, the Trump administration’s targeting of China-Russia trade—particularly energy—is striking at Russia’s “Achilles’ heel.”

On July 14, Trump declared during a meeting with NATO Secretary General Rutte that if Russia fails to reach a peace agreement with Ukraine within 50 days, the U.S. will impose a 100% tariff on Russia and implement so-called “secondary sanctions” on countries maintaining trade with Russia.

It is well known that Russia was not originally a major trading partner of the U.S. Before the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the highest trade volume between the two countries was about $50 billion—roughly one-tenth of Russia’s trade with Europe. After the conflict broke out, Russia-U.S. trade almost completely ceased. Therefore, the Trump administration’s threat of a tariff war with Russia has no practical significance. However, imposing “long-arm jurisdiction” and “secondary sanctions” on countries that maintain trade with Russia—especially its main partners—could strike a fatal blow to Russia’s energy exports and drain its war potential.

After half a year in power, the Trump administration changed course to impose indirect “bloodletting” sanctions on Russia, which not only reflects the chaos and disorder of its Russia-Ukraine policy, but also shows that its quick-fix strategy has reached a dead end. It further reveals a lack of systemic thinking and deep planning behind the policy, and that once it hits a hard wall, it turns into a reckless and desperate act of bullying.

Before his election, Trump boasted that he could easily end the Russia-Ukraine conflict overnight after taking office. Once in power, he immediately made the conflict a diplomatic priority, not only swiftly seeking to improve U.S.-Russia relations, but also abandoning European partners and pressuring Ukraine to cede territory in hopes of a quick resolution. When this impulse-driven, transactional diplomacy—aimed at securing U.S. hegemony by sacrificing other countries’ interests—failed, Trump, with his blunt style and polarized thinking, poured all his anger onto the “disappointing” Russia.

On one hand, the Trump administration adjusted its original policy, continued military aid to Ukraine, and pressured European NATO members to raise their defense budgets to 5% of GDP to shoulder more security responsibilities. On the other hand, it pushed European partners to purchase more U.S. arms for the Ukrainian battlefield. These actions indicate a policy reversal from the original “pro-Russia, anti-Europe, abandon-Ukraine” stance to a new direction of “alienate Russia, draw in Europe, and support Ukraine.”

This “pendulum-style” shift in Russia-Ukraine policy proves the Trump administration’s diplomacy lacks strategic vision, long-term planning, and systemic thinking. It is essentially a short-term, reactive approach—treating the symptoms, not the root causes—aimed more at fulfilling campaign promises and serving election politics, rather than considering the overall U.S. interest or global strategy. Precisely because of its unreliability, neither Russia nor Ukraine could follow the White House’s lead. Instead, both handle the war based on their own interests, power dynamics, and battlefield conditions.

The “Afghanistanization” of the Russia-Ukraine war—that is, its protracted and deadlocked nature—has become the general trend that is difficult to reverse in the short term. On the battlefield, Russia has gained overwhelming advantage, controlling most of the territory outlined in its objectives and gradually expanding its military dominance in hopes of forcing Ukraine and Europe to accept the reality. Strategically, although Ukraine is running out of manpower, it still controls nearly half its territory and can continue resisting. NATO allies, especially Germany, the UK, and France, are increasingly showing determination and practical actions to support Ukraine until the end.

Thus, the decisive power in the Russia-Ukraine war has returned to the European continent—back to the battlefields and negotiation tables of Russia and Ukraine. The U.S. has become a non-decisive factor. The Trump administration clearly will not follow the Democratic Party’s strong pro-Ukraine policy. Instead, it can only rely on trade talks, economic sanctions, and “long-arm jurisdiction” to contain Russia. This indirect, non-military approach to “saving Ukraine” involves major interests of Russia’s energy trade partners like China and India, and the complex dynamics of U.S.-China and U.S.-India relations—ultimately making it difficult for the Trump administration to fully achieve its goals.

In other words, the Trump administration’s new Russia-Ukraine conflict policy is like distant water that cannot quench present thirst when it comes to fundamentally changing the battlefield situation. In the end, Ukraine and its European partners are left with no choice but to engage in a strategic struggle with Russia: maintaining a proxy war with controlled intensity, while also seeking direct negotiations to achieve damage control for Ukraine and a de-escalation or even cessation of the entire conflict.

On July 23, Ukrainian President Zelensky emphasized that “the priority of the Istanbul meeting is to prepare for a leaders’ summit… Ukraine hopes for further opportunities to advance matters with Russia and will never waste any chance.” This shows that Ukrainian authorities have realized that resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the war ultimately depends on the two national leaders reaching an agreement. Russian Presidential Assistant Medinsky stressed after the third round of Istanbul talks that a leaders’ summit can only happen after full discussion of the agreement. “A leaders’ meeting should be the final punctuation to the agreement, not a place to debate the details as we’re doing now.”

It takes the person who tied the bell to untie it. Ultimately, the Trump administration’s Russia-Ukraine war policy serves America’s immediate interests, rather than addressing the fundamental interests and long-term relations of Russia and Ukraine themselves. The war and conflict between Russia and Ukraine essentially depend on the contest of strength, will, and wisdom between Moscow and Kyiv. The general outline of the war’s future is already surfacing: Ukraine is unlikely to join NATO or recover lost territories; the most probable outcome is adopting an armistice model similar to the Korean War, where both sides sign a ceasefire agreement along the current line of contact, leaving the issue of border changes to be resolved slowly by future generations and time.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.