Opinion
U.S. policy in the Middle East and aggression toward Iran
The United States continues to menace Iran. It is deploying naval armadas and additional military forces to the region to intimidate Tehran. Simultaneously, it aims to debilitate the country through economic sanctions and by lending support to domestic anti-government activities. However, it must not be forgotten that Iran—no matter how weakened it may become—possesses a state tradition, a profound institutional memory, an experienced military, and military technology that are incomparably stronger than those of Iraq or Syria.
There are, of course, significant reasons for the United States’ aggressive posture. In recent years, its influence—both globally and in the Middle East—has been waning; its hegemonic capacity is eroding, and its control over the strategic environment is weakening. The U.S. explicitly admitted as much in its defense strategy document released at the end of 2025. It no longer possesses the power to project force into every corner of the globe. It lacks the capacity to maintain occupying forces in two countries simultaneously. Yet, at the turn of the century, it did exactly that: occupying Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. It was capable of effecting regime change in three countries through “Color Revolutions”—as seen in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005).
The U.S. no longer commands such power. This decline is one of the drivers behind its fury and its emphasis on hard power. The U.S. failed to impede China’s rise or prevent Russia from rapidly recovering and expanding its influence. Beyond the growing footprint of these two powers in the Middle East, Washington was also unable to prevent the strengthening of their relations with Iran. The U.S. could not replicate in Iran what it accomplished in Iraq and Syria. Indeed, doing so would be exceptionally difficult.
For a considerable time, the U.S. has prioritized the containment of China, aligning its political, military, and diplomatic assets accordingly. Consequently, rather than intervening directly in Middle Eastern crises, it pushes its regional allies to the forefront. It demands that these allies seize the initiative. It prefers proxy wars, increasingly activating terrorist organizations and non-state actors. It resorts more frequently to social engineering, perception management, psychological warfare, hybrid warfare, and asymmetric warfare tactics. Its actions in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Iran, Yemen, and Sudan serve as proof of this shift.
Iran was the regional actor that benefited most from the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Iranian influence in Syria was already deeply rooted historically. Furthermore, Iran distinguished itself through its anti-Israel stance and its tensions with Saudi Arabia. As a result, Iran steadily increased its influence in the Middle East for years, up until a few years ago.
U.S. priorities in the Middle East
The United States is an imperialist state. Therefore, its priorities regarding the Middle East are numerous and diverse, encompassing geopolitical, strategic, and economic dimensions, as well as aspects related to the region’s rich energy resources and transit routes.
If one were to rank these priorities from the U.S. perspective, the security of Israel would always occupy the first position. Subsequent items would include the control of energy resources and routes, the encirclement of Iran, the reduction of Iranian influence, regime change in Tehran, the establishment of a Kurdish state, the rollback of China’s increasing influence, the halting of Russia’s growing weight, and the support of Saudi Arabia and the Arab nations it leads.
U.S. interest in Middle Eastern energy resources dates back more than a century. For instance, on May 31, 1919, the U.S. Department of State sent the following directive to all its diplomatic missions worldwide: “Wherever petroleum is found or is likely to be found, report on the status of control over those oil resources, prospects for development, and opportunities for U.S. participation in oil production there.” In other words, even then, the U.S. had set its sights on the Middle East, on Mesopotamia, and on the territories of the dismantling Ottoman Empire. On May 3, 1920, Bedford, an executive at Standard Oil of New Jersey, obtained the text of an agreement made on April 27 between France and Britain in San Remo to partition the oil in the aforementioned territories. He obtained this via French delegates in San Remo and transmitted the document to Washington through the U.S. embassy. Washington was furious. France was to receive a 25% share of Mesopotamian oil in exchange for its docility regarding British control. If the oil were to be operated by private companies, this share would remain 25%. Oil operated by private companies in this region would remain under permanent British control. It became clear that the U.S. had to act immediately to protect its rights in the Middle East. (Lawrence Evans, United States Policy and the Partition of Türkiye, 1914-1924, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1965).
When analyzing U.S. global and Middle East policies, the country’s imperialist character must always be taken into account. As an imperialist state, it seeks to access new markets and seize energy resources and precious minerals. Its priorities, threat definitions, objectives, and alliances are shaped accordingly. Looking at the post-World War II era, when the U.S. significantly increased its global weight, one observes the following: The bipolar order and the Cold War years had begun. Most colonies had gained their independence. Among these newly independent nations were countries exploited by Europeans since the 15th century, as well as those that had fallen under the sway of imperialism in the 19th century. These countries were not industrialized enough to be capitalist, nor did they possess a working class or class consciousness sufficient to adopt the socialist model. The majority of these countries were located in the Middle East and Africa.
During the Cold War, the U.S. viewed the USSR and communism as threats. It sought to prevent the development of anti-imperialist leftist currents and anti-imperialist nationalist movements within the Third World and among countries joining the Non-Aligned Movement. In the Middle East, the U.S. perceived Arab socialism—distinguished by its nationalist, anti-imperialist, pro-independence, and leftist character—as a threat. These movements in Arab countries were influenced by the tradition of the Committee of Union and Progress [CUP] in Türkiye, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and the Kemalist Revolution. The movement led by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt in the 1950s (his name derives from Djemal Pasha, one of the leaders of the CUP) and the Ba’ath movement [meaning “Resurrection”] which rose with similar claims in Syria and Iraq (though there are differences between the Syrian and Iraqi Ba’ath movements), unsettled the U.S. during those years.
The establishment of close relations between these Arab movements and the USSR also alarmed the U.S. In response, Washington supported Islamist movements in these countries to counter them. The “Green Belt Project,” aimed at encircling the USSR with Islamist regimes in Muslim countries, was activated during this period. Through this project, brought to the agenda in 1977 by Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Islamist currents were supported in Türkiye, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Saudi-U.S. relations developed further, and the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) in Egypt received significant support from the U.S.
Dimensions of U.S.-Iran tension
With the overthrow of the pro-American Shah of Iran in 1979 as a result of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the rise of Khomeini to power, the importance the U.S. attached to the Green Belt Project increased further. The U.S., which desired full alignment from the four countries within the scope of the Green Belt Project (Türkiye, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan), lost its influence in Iran when the Islamic Revolution took place in 1979. Immediately thereafter, it incited Iraq against Iran. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the Arab world (excluding Syria) and the West supported Iraq. The total loss of life for Iran and Iraq exceeded one million. The economies and industries of both countries suffered massive blows. Throughout the war, Western arms manufacturers sold vast quantities of weapons to both belligerents, as well as to countries with close U.S. ties, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan, the UAE, and Bahrain.
Iran is one of the pivotal countries of the region. Encircling Iran and changing its regime are among the United States’ priorities. To this end, it has been applying economic sanctions for years. It isolates Iran politically and diplomatically. It threatens and pressures the country militarily. It attempts to obstruct Iran’s nuclear activities. The U.S. views Iran as one of the greatest obstacles to a Kurdish state, which is intended to be established through the partitioning of four regional countries (Iraq, Syria, Iran, Türkiye). Israel, one of the U.S.’s two strategic partners (the other being the UK), is also in a state of constant tension with Iran; in 2025, the two countries launched air attacks against one another for 12 days. The two states view each other as existential threats. In recent years, Israel has dealt heavy blows to Iranian-backed Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The regime change in Syria and the increasing influence of the U.S. and Israel over Damascus constitute a major defeat for Iran.
The U.S. is also attempting to block Iran’s oil exports. It imposes sanctions—or threatens to impose them—on countries that trade with Iran. It has designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization and pressured the European Union to adopt a similar decision. The U.S. also pressures Egypt and Saudi Arabia to keep their distance from Iran, forcing the Gulf countries led by Saudi Arabia to take a stance against Tehran.
Will U.S. sanctions against Iran achieve their objective?
Iran has lost significant influence following the overthrow of Assad in Syria—a country where it had invested and provided massive support for years—and the successive blows dealt by Israel to Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Iranian-backed “Shiite Crescent,” the “Axis of Resistance,” and Iran’s proxy forces beyond its borders have suffered heavy losses. Currently, only the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen continue their struggle.
The sanctions and economic embargoes the U.S. has applied since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, its efforts to incite the public to rebellion against the regime, and its attempts to render PJAK (the Iranian extension of the PKK terrorist organization) more effective, have not yet yielded the hoped-for results. While attempting to encircle Iran, the U.S. has also sought to weaken it through proxy wars. Yet, following the U.S. occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran actually increased its influence in the region.
U.S. economic sanctions have been effective; they have hindered Iran’s technological development and dragged down its oil and natural gas exports. However, they have thus far failed to bring Iran to its knees. Poverty, unemployment, the high cost of living, corruption, and repression within the country have fueled anger toward the regime. Nevertheless, it has been observed that when faced with foreign intervention, the Iranian people set aside their grievances and ideological differences to defend their country against external threats. Furthermore, possessing nuclear deterrence is a goal upon which different political views in the country converge and agree.
In conclusion, Iran is a country with a strong state tradition and deep historical accumulation. It utilizes Persian nationalism, the Islamic Revolution, Shi’ism, anti-Americanism, anti-imperialist rhetoric, and enmity toward Zionism and Israel in its foreign policy—deploying each at the right place, at the right time, in the right dose, and according to the interlocutor. Even if Iran has taken heavy blows in recent years, the influence it has achieved as a regional actor, its alliance relations, military power, state structure, and national culture remain significant. One must not forget that despite anti-regime opposition and significant problems on the domestic front, Iran will resist the U.S., and even in the worst-case scenario, it remains a state incomparably stronger than Syria or Iraq.
Opinion
Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.
Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.
For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.
We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.
In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.
This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.
The Problem of Proxy Wars
During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”
Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.
The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.
However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.
The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.
In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”
The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.
Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.
At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.
These distinctions matter.
Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.
Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?
The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.
Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.
Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.
The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.
The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?
That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.
The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.
There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.
The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.
The Economics of Fear
The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?
Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.
One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.
A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.
This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.
More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.
The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.
When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.
America After Iran
In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.
The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.
The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.
The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.
This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.
The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.
The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.
America Is Changing From Within
The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.
The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.
Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.
They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.
This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.
A Dinner for Dialogue
One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.
We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.
The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.
Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.
Very often, it begins around a single table.
Istanbul’s Larger Message
The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.
The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.
This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.
The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.
It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.
Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.
For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.
The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.
For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.
It was not an attempt to erase differences.
It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.
At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.
Opinion
A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West
Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.
It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.
Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.
Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?
It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.
As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.
In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.
Opinion
Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria
At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.
This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.
US moves in the Mediterranean
Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.
Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.
The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.
Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.
Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.
Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?
Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.
Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.
So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?
Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.
Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?
In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.
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