Editor’s note: Speaking at the East-West Forum held in Istanbul on September 26, Michael von der Schulenburg, Member of the European Parliament and former Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, offered striking assessments of the European Union’s current trajectory. Schulenburg stated that the Union, established after World War II to build peace, has now abandoned this mission and surrendered entirely to a war-driven rhetoric. He pointed out that Europe, while grappling with structural challenges such as scarce resources, high energy costs, deindustrialization, and a demographic crisis, has been left confronting a ring of active conflicts along its borders. Emphasizing that Brussels has lost its capacity for diplomacy and mediation, the senior diplomat stated that the 27 member states lack the flexibility and collective will to sit at the negotiating table with Russia.

I’m not an academic, as you said. I’m coming from the real world of wars and peace, and I spent all my life outside Europe, actually, but the last two years I spent in the European Union, and I’m quite shocked what I see there. The European Union, as you know, was founded after the Second World War as a peace project.

A peace project, not to repeat the Second World War, bring countries together in Europe, but also reflect to the outside world that there is a sort of peaceful integration where you don’t have to have war. That has completely changed. When I listen today in the Parliament or on the line, actually, war is the main theme of the debate now in the European Union.

I would now characterize the European Union as an organization that is in complete denial of reality, of complete denial of reality, and therefore is completely unable to do any policy. And when the question here in the seminar is whether there is a contribution to the new world order, it will surely not come from the European Union.

Let me just make some comparison, which is closer to my job. When you compare the European Union to the United States, China and Russia, then the European Union is surrounded by most of the wars in the world, active wars. No other of these countries have so many wars around them. And even we have the problem that the United States starts wars like the Iran war and others, and they withdraw over the Atlantic.

But the consequences of the wars will stay next to the European Union. I think about Iran, I think about the many wars Israel does, from Syria to Lebanon to West Bank, Gaza. But I think also about the war between Yemen and Saudi Arabia. And then behind them, there’s all these conflicts in Africa, Mali and so on, and of course, Sudan. And the worst, of course, for us is the Ukraine war, because it’s on our own continent.

When you compare the European Union to the other three powers, you also realize that we are probably the place which have the least natural resources. We have a huge demographic problem. We have a demographic transition in our country, which we like not to speak about, but it will have an enormous influence. We have the most expensive energy. We have lost our comparative advantage. We have deindustrialization. And of course, we now lose what actually made Europe so special in the world, our social system.

You would assume that the European Union, and with this one, I don’t mean only the institution, but also the member states who have created what they call a common foreign and security policy would have be very strong because they would have to react to what happens around them.

Oh, forgot the United States, of course gripping now Greenland because I think that the agreement they just signed is the first step of taking over full control of Greenland. I mean we should not have any. And that’s a European territory. I mean what does the European Union does they have no foreign policy, they have no security policy, at least not that I can detect. They have a lot of political statements. They’re usually full of rearm Europe that we have to finally to become a military power. And they are full of moral.

And you know, in the UN we say always who speaks about war, moral wants war and those who speak about interest look for a solution. There’s nothing speaking about interest in the I can detect in the European Union. So it’s very, very worried. You know, this whole moral. Of course somebody who always thinks that I’m the moral superior is always very close to hypocrisy. And it’s actually sometimes really painful to listen to all these arguments.

But in a sense we have no policy to something which is actually for the European Union, for its future life threatening all these conflicts around them. You cannot speak to anybody. We don’t see anywhere we sit on the table of negotiations. Nowhere we have a proposal, nowhere we try to interfere on saying maybe we can mediate or anything.

There’s nothing of the sort anymore. And despite the fact that the foreign service alone of the European Union not to speak about the member states cost $1 billion a year, $1 billion. I don’t know what they do. I’ve met them in the field. I have no clue what European diplomats do. Anyway,

the most important thing is of course Ukraine. I mean it’s in our continent. If you are in such an insecure situation as we are, I mean the first thing one should come to mind that we need peace on the European continent. Then maybe we can also deal with the others.

Having peace in the European continent means that we have to talk to Russia, we have to negotiate, we have somehow to find a solution to the conflict. But we can’t. We are so blocked in ourselves that we were unable, we would be unable to have a negotiating position with Russia because the 27 countries cannot agree on a changed policy.

They cannot agree on what person should do in negotiations and they would never agree to give this person a certain flexibility people need when they do peace negotiations. And even if you think the E3 take the lead, the interest of the E3 is so completely different that it will not that is even more dangerous because the British would hate anything which is peace with the east because they look to the Atlantic and they see this since 1850, I think, as a great danger.

Germany would be the greatest profiteer from these things, but behaves, of course, irrational, most irrational. And the British would. The French would probably also not like it because the link to Russia and things like this would be of enormous economic and political benefit for you. So we don’t have anything.

What I want to say conclude with this whole thing is that the European Union will be a factor of instability in the world for a long time to come. I think as we go along, it will have also instability within its own borders. It is very sad to say. So the peace project of the European Union has been lost. And this loss of peace, we will all have problems that will make future generations suffer. Thank you very much.

East-West Forum in Istanbul to debate multipolarity and global order

Editor’s note: Prof. Zhang Weiwei, Director of the China Institute at Fudan University and former interpreter for Deng Xiaoping, evaluated the imperatives of a multipolar world and China’s global role as a “civilization-state” at the East-West Forum held in Istanbul on September 25-26. Highlighting China’s distinct framework that integrates ancient history with modern capacity, Prof. Zhang underscored the tangible benefits that meritocracy, public order, and a peace-oriented approach deliver to global stability. In contrast to the Western posture that legitimizes military interventions and polarizes the world, he stated that frameworks such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and ASEAN transform Eurasia into an arena of peace and development. Pointing out that Chinese philosophy sets the threshold for resorting to war at the highest level and centers on forging consensus out of conflict, Zhang noted that maximum restraint is exercised even in border disputes.

Well, I will try to present my view on this whole topic of the world in transition and China as a civilizational state as mentioned in the outline of the program for the conference.

As we all know, I think the world is already multipolar. If you look at the size of the GDP of four BRIC members, it’s already larger than G7; yet the multipolar world order is not yet born.

So that’s something we try to produce and shape, including our foreign East-West Forum here.

Well, here comes to the role of China. China is indeed a unique country and can make important contribution, perhaps already made very important contribution to a new global order, more fair and more just order.

How to define a civilizational state? It is an amalgam of the world’s longest continuous civilization with a super large modern state. I try to summarize this into four supers: Super large population, super large territory, super long history and super rich cultures. All these four supers, each of which is a blend of old and new, Asian and modern.

For instance, if you talk about the large population; yes, China has always been a populous country since ancient times, yet this population is very well educated.

Every year we produce more scientists and engineers than the Western countries combined. Same with this vast territory: It’s our inheritance from history, yet it’s also very modernized, connected with first-rate infrastructure, the best railway system, best highway system and best digital infrastructure. 5G into every village, no exception. Super long history, it’s also a combination of old and new.

If you look at China’s political system, if the Western system is about election, the Chinese system is about selection plus election: selection from the Chinese tradition and election we adapt from the Western tradition.

Same with super rich culture. If we talk about political culture, the most important priority in China is people’s livelihood. First, it’s very much Confucianism: Whatever you do, the state has to deliver to improve people’s livelihood, both in material terms and non-material terms.

An inaccurate analogy—very inaccurate, just for reference—would be something like dozens of Islamic nations or countries today have amalgamated into one nation with a centralized government, with a very modern economy and speaking the same language. Yes, it’s also a highly developed economy, but it’s one nation. Or another inaccurate analogy, which is not politically correct: Like the Roman Empire has continued to this day with all these different countries uniting into one and speaking Latin.

Yet in the case of China, with a very strong philosophical tradition, we treasure peace, peace above all. Most important thing; highly modern, but also from Asian tradition. This will be a kind of nation-state, a civilizational state, as I try to explain to you.

And now we look at the international order; let’s say we try to build a kind of new order much better than the one we have, from unipolarity to multipolarity. First, let’s look at the ideas or philosophies: In what way does China differ from the United States? Vastly different. For instance, if you look at the Chinese political philosophy, it’s never about “divide and rule”, it’s always about “unite and prosper”. Within China we practice this way, outside China in the world we do the same.

“The Chinese case is friend or potential friend”

And in terms of strategic policies for the United States or the Western philosophy in general, it’s “friend or foe”. You’re either a friend or enemy. But the Chinese case is “friend or potential friend”. In other words, you have a much longer view, longer vision as a civilizational state.

And then it’s very different from the trigger-happy United States. If you look at China’s history, China has the highest threshold for the use of force among the major powers. Of course, China has very clear red lines; this is very important. But also this is strongly influenced by Sun Tzu’s famous book The Art of War: The idea is you try to subdue your opponents or enemy without actual fighting.

So you have this philosophy, and then you have this philosophy of friend and potential friend; you can have already avoided so many wars, you can prevent a lot of wars from happening.

This is the way China handles this philosophical part. Of course, the most important thing is humanity: Humanity has won, rather than “on the table or on the menu”. This philosophy China rejects categorically; it’s very much against Chinese conscience.

Now when we talk about a shared future for mankind or one humanity, some people say it’s idealistic: How do you put this into practice, how to make this into something tangible? I was asked by an American scholar in Xiangshan Forum about this question: Why did Chinese leader Xi Jinping present this whole Global Governance Initiative at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization rather than the United Nations, a more serious forum?

I said it’s very, very simple to understand: Because the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is the embodiment of these four initiatives Xi Jinping has raised—on development, on security, on civilization, on governance. Exactly four pillars of Shanghai Cooperation; that’s my summary.

Now the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has become the world’s largest regional cooperation organization in terms of population, in terms of landmass and in terms of the results. It’s already larger in GDP than the G7.

Same with ASEAN; if you look at China’s partnership with ASEAN, it’s based on the same four pillars. As a result, China now contributes every year 30% to world economic growth; ASEAN produces roughly 7 to 8%.

With this kind of China-ASEAN cooperation, we contribute to close to 40% of global economic growth. Then you look at this whole Eurasian landmass, from Russia to Central Asia, to China, to Southeast Asia: This huge landmass has been a land of peace and development for the past five decades. It’s so important.

In many ways I say, if China had adopted the Western so-called liberal democracy system, maybe China had already produced a Donald Trump and the Third World War had already occurred. With the Chinese political system, as Professor Jeffrey Sachs said, you have the only adult in the room who can make rational decisions about the world, about China, about global affairs.

And finally, just to make a small comment on this practice: If you look at these regional organizations and what they have achieved as a result, both Central Asia and Southeast Asia were described as a “geopolitical curse” for many decades for understandable reasons—complicated geography, complicated religious traditions, complicated different political systems.

Yet today we can see with very high pride that they are geopolitical bonuses. Central Asia used to be landlocked countries; now they are land-linked. With this kind of positive note, China as a civilizational state has produced both ideas and practices for a possibly better world to come.

If you look at the opinion surveys done by reputable opinion survey agencies, what value Chinese treasure most is public order. That’s a vast country the size of 100 European countries put together; and so China hates the word “anarchic”.

So when we talk about the multipolar world order, if you look at the official language, it’s called a more just, orderly public order.

With China, ASEAN, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, it’s already possible to foresee—from a Chinese perspective—a future more benign, more just, and fairer international order to come.

I do want to discuss a bit about this China-Philippines case: If China were behaving like the United States, with China’s military power today we could dismantle the Philippine military force within 24 hours. But we did not do that; in whatever problems, we only use, at maximum, water cannons.

Even in our border clash with India, it’s not at all what other major powers would do; it was only fist fighting between soldiers, and then issues are being resolved gradually. At this moment the China-India leaders met each other and relations became more normalized. I hope the world will do better.

“In the Western so-called universal values, they never mention peace”

And now I want to make one or two points here. One is concerning liberal values.

If you look at Xi Jinping’s Global Governance Initiative, he mentioned what is called the common values—six of them: Peace, development, fairness, justice, democracy, and freedom. What’s most important is that peace is top on the list.

Because when you mention Western so-called universal values, they talk about human rights and democracy, but they never mention peace. In other words, the West reserves the right to use military force on Global South countries.

This is totally wrong; we don’t accept this. Peace is at the top of the list of these common values, and I think it is appreciated by most countries and most peoples in the world. Peace is number one.

And second, each civilization has its own values. But now we have the United Nations Charter, which is the broadest common denominator we can share.

When China says we should reform this current international order, we mean we should return to the United Nations Charter, which is the post-World War II arrangement that most countries accept.

With this “rules-based order”, it’s not the United Nations Charter; it’s the so-called liberal values dictated by the United States and the European countries—lieutenants of the United States—imposed on others.

Look at the Arab Spring: Millions died, hundreds of millions lost their homes and became homeless, and yet they don’t feel guilty. “We can do whatever we want because of this liberal order we promote.” We reject that categorically.

I was with Russian friends talking about the origin of the Ukrainian crisis; of course we think there is a problem with NATO’s eastward expansion. Five rounds of expansion.

I said: If you had stopped after four rounds, this crisis could have been avoided. As far as China is concerned, I don’t know why Russia tolerated five rounds of expansion; China would not even allow a single expansion into Asia.

Germany is systematically expanding its cooperation with Israel in the military, police, and cybersecurity spheres.

Agreements formally signed at the beginning of this year are currently being implemented. The “Cyber Pact and Security Pact”, concluded in January, provides for closer cooperation between the respective police forces as well as the establishment of a “Cyberdome” in Germany.

Berlin hopes that security cooperation with Israel will deliver “practice-based know-how from a country with a high frequency of military operations”.

Another agreement signed in February enables a major intensification of military cooperation, with the objective of making the Bundeswehr (German Armed Forces) practically “war-ready”.

The stated aim is for Israeli ground forces to transfer capabilities and experience gained in Israel’s past and present wars to the German military.

Through its “unrivalled expertise in ground operations”, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is assisting the Bundeswehr in “adapting to an increasingly volatile global environment”.

“The most important partner outside NATO”

According to an analysis published by German Foreign Policy, German-Israeli military cooperation, much like collaboration in arms production, dates back to the late 1950s.

During that period, West German military personnel began training Israeli soldiers in the operation of German weapon systems delivered under a secret agreement.

Sporadic records document joint military training involving German mountain infantry from the 1980s onwards.

From 1998 onwards, exchange programmes for officer candidates were introduced alongside “regular meetings at the general staff level”.

Official German government data indicates that between 1984 and 2014, “up to 493” Israeli military personnel, including officers, took part in training and other programmes conducted by the Bundeswehr.

In return, 254 German soldiers were sent to Israel for military training programmes and exercises.

It remains uncertain whether these figures reflect the full extent of the cooperation, as military collaboration with Israel is generally kept secret, as noted in a Federal Government response to a parliamentary inquiry in the Bundestag.

Furthermore, German-Israeli cooperation is by no means limited to ground forces. Since 2017, the German Air Force has participated in multiple bilateral exchange programmes with the Israeli Air Force within the framework of the “Blue Flag” exercises.

Speaking on behalf of his service branch in 2022, the Chief of the German Air Force, Ingo Gerhartz, stated that the IDF was the military’s “most important partner outside NATO”.

IDF prepared the German military for operations

The intensification of German-Israeli military cooperation has been pursued systematically since the 1990s.

The growing proximity of bilateral ties was confirmed in 2002 by retired Lieutenant General Helmut Willmann.

Serving as Chief of the German Army from 1996 to 2001, Willmann was tasked, among other duties, with institutionalising links between his units and IDF ground forces.

Willmann argued that because the Bundeswehr was undergoing a transformation from a “peacetime military into an operationally ready force”, the German side “naturally” sought to establish “contact with armed forces that have more experience than us in this field”.

In his assessment, it was obvious to everyone that “cooperation with the Israeli military naturally provided us with professional advantages”.

In 2014, for example, a training visit to Israel by German military personnel was announced—though it took place with a delay in 2015—under which soldiers were to study urban and tunnel warfare.

The Bundeswehr underscored the armed forces’ intense interest in the “specific operational experience of the Israeli armed forces”.

Commenting on increasingly close military relations with Israel in October 2021, Colonel Juergen Haffner, the Defence Attache at the German Embassy in Tel Aviv, confirmed that “the Bundeswehr has an incredibly close interest in the IDF, and vice versa”, adding that the frequency of reciprocal visits was “incredibly high”.

War preparations continue in Europe

Today, as the Bundeswehr faces the requirement to become “war-ready” without delay, cooperation between the German armed forces and the battle-tested IDF is being further expanded.

On 20 February—eight months after Israel’s initial war of aggression against Iran and several days prior to a second wave of US-Israeli attacks on the country—Lieutenant General Christian Freuding, the current Chief of the German Army, and Major General Nadav Lotan, the Commander of the Israeli Ground Forces, signed a cooperation agreement designed to link the ground forces of both nations closely across four domains.

The plans encompass joint “training and exercises”, “joint capability development”, the “sharing of operational principles”, and “exchange programmes, especially for junior officers and officer candidates”.

Following the signing of the agreement, Freuding was reportedly briefed by Lotan on “tactical lessons learned from the current war”. Which Israeli war this referred to remained unspecified.

The report noted that, through the IDF’s “unrivalled expertise in ground operations”, it is helping the Bundeswehr “adapt to an increasingly volatile global environment”. Their cooperation was described as forming a “highly effective alliance”.

Cyber pact and security pact advance

Beyond armaments and military matters, Germany and Israel are also deepening cooperation between their law-enforcement and cybersecurity agencies.

On 11 January, German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu signed a “Cyber Pact and Security Pact” to this end.

One dimension of this agreement on “digital defence” involves measures to intensify cooperation between the police forces of both countries, which is already considered very close.

The accord also aims to advance improvements in “unmanned aerial vehicle detection and defence”, realise the “establishment of a joint artificial intelligence and cyber innovation centre”, and support “information exchange and networking regarding a Cyberdome”.

According to the Interior Ministry, this Cyberdome is a “semi-automated system for the detection, analysis, and response to cyberattacks”.

Whether “response” entails retaliatory cyberattacks against an alleged adversary remains unclear.

Overall, according to a government statement, Interior Minister Dobrindt hopes that “the exchange of information with Israel will provide practice-based know-how from a country with a high frequency of operations”.