On 16 August, the Ukrainian army launched a raid on Kursk, which lasted for 10 days without a decision on the outcome, and the Ukrainian army even announced the establishment of an interim administration. From a strategic point of view, this successful tactical raid by Ukraine is a rare event since the beginning of the war, but it is doomed to be a “lone wolf” operation with no impact on the overall situation, whose political significance is greater than its military significance and rather limited, and is not a turning point in the war, but a desperate attempt before the start of ceasefire negotiations.
On 6 August, the Ukrainian army entered the Russian Kursk Oblast from the northern border line in large-scale and regular units, occupying an area of more than 1,000 square kilometres, 35 kilometres deep and 40 kilometres wide, and taking control of 75 settlements within 10 days, forcing the Russian side to urgently evacuate some 120,000 inhabitants. Whereas Kursk and the border areas to the north and south of it, Belgorod and Bryansk, had previously only been attacked by irregular armed groups such as the “Free Russia Legion”, the capture and loss of part of the country by regular troops meant that Russia experienced a similar crisis for the first time since the end of the Second World War, a situation that was both humiliating and degrading compared to the small scale of the casualties.
Kursk suddenly became a new frontline for Russia and Ukraine and a new focus of global attention, described by the Western media as Russia’s biggest defeat since the beginning of the war. For the first time on the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield, a cross-border dogfight situation has emerged and Russia’s “weaknesses” and soft underbelly in intelligence gathering, strategic foresight, border defence and many other areas have been exposed. Repeated border raids by the Free Russia Legion and the insurgency of the Wagner Group, which easily approached the capital Moscow, did not lead to the optimisation of the Russian army’s defence system outside the main battlefield.
The capture of Kursk by the Ukrainian army has caused a sensation because the city is only 500 kilometres from Moscow. This distance directly explains why Russia has fought so persistently against NATO’s inclusion of Ukraine in its bloc. After five rounds of enlargement, Russia’s traditional ‘security borders’ have shrunk to more than 1,000 kilometres from Moscow, and therefore the constant approach of NATO’s military vehicles towards its western gate has become unacceptable to Russia.
Some observers exaggerate the military value of the Kursk breakthrough, believing that it will be a turning point in the Russian-Ukrainian war. In fact, Kursk is a “city of victory”, reminding NATO that the war against Russia is not easily won. During the Second World War, the Battle of Kursk broke out, Germany and the Soviet Union spent more than 8,000 tanks, more than 5,000 combat aircraft and more than 1.5 million soldiers, but in the end Germany failed and switched from strategic offensive to strategic defence, and the Battle of Kursk became the turning point of the Second World War.
Forbes.com reported that the Ukranian Army used four mechanised brigades and an air assault brigade, with a total strength of about 10,000 soldiers and 600 armoured vehicles. Although Russia remained momentarily passive, it did not panic and did not withdraw large numbers of troops for reinforcement from the Donbass battlefield, but instead withdrew and mobilised new forces to block the offensive. Analysts believe that if the Ukrainian army does not withdraw within two to three weeks, it will be cut off and surrounded by Russian troops, who are adept at drawing the enemy into a deeper and more circuitous battle.
After two and a half years of tough resistance, while Ukraine has consistently expressed a desire for peace talks, it has suddenly launched a remarkable offensive, and there are various interpretations of the tactical and strategic aims of this move. Ukrainian President Zelensky has stated that he wants to force the other side into peace talks by moving the war to Russian territory. This operation was the ‘demonstration’ of Ukraine’s new Chief of the General Staff, Oleksandr Syrskyi, in his first six months in office, and was decided independently, without informing the main allies, such as the US, Germany and the UK, beforehand. In a way, this shows that Ukraine no longer wants to be under the influence of NATO.
A comprehensive assessment reveals that the Ukrainian army’s raid on Kursk had several objectives: First, to boost the morale of its own soldiers and civilians by moving the war to enemy territory, to create panic and war fatigue on the Russian side, and to show NATO that the Ukrainian army is not ‘helpless’. Secondly, to change the passive situation on the Donbas front by redirecting Russian troops to the north, avoiding the real danger, in a kind of ‘weakening the enemy by luring fighters to the North’ strategy. Thirdly, defending some areas or controlling important facilities, forcing Russia to make concessions and gaining an advantage in peace negotiations, for example by controlling the nuclear power plant in Kursk and the Suja natural gas flow to Europe.
Over the past few months, the Russian army has carried out a strategic counter-offensive against Ukraine along the Donbass and has continued to advance the battle line. After two and a half years of war of attrition, Ukraine has come to the conclusion that it is absolutely impossible for NATO to confront Russia directly, if this “European version of the war in Afghanistan” continues, Ukraine’s losses will be even more severe. In addition, the uncertainty of the elections in the US White House and the advocacy by the Republican candidates and former President Trump and his associates Vance of NATO’s reconciliation with Russia, sacrificing Ukraine’s interests, shows that Ukraine cannot escape the fate of being “initially supported and then abandoned” and is therefore increasingly willing to accept peace talks. Whether it is to win Nato’s help and support or to start peace talks with Russia, Ukraine needs a victory to build a strong case.
Despite the loss of Kursk for a time and the embarrassment of Russian “carelessness”, Western observers are generally not optimistic about the risky offensive of the Ukrainian army, calling it a “big gamble”. Ukraine’s greatest weakness is that, due to its insufficient manpower, it does not have the capacity to open a second line of battle and is unlikely to be able to defend large territories for long. Moreover, an attack in depth could lengthen the front line, making it easier for the Russian army to cut off, encircle and destroy Ukrainian troops. Of course, such an eventual defeat in the war could have pushed more national and even foreign forces back in favour of ceasefire negotiations, perhaps to the satisfaction of the Kiev authorities.
War is a process in which comprehensive national power and the combination of various factors determine victory or defeat, not to mention the fact that the Russian-Ukrainian war is part of a complex and protracted Ukrainian crisis and the ultimate instrument of struggle. In the face of the Russian-Ukrainian war, many people are accustomed to assessing gains and losses in terms of “fairness”, ignoring the basic and decisive elements of the war, in particular the sources of war and the battlefield of the two sides; some people assess the Russian-US-European game in Ukraine in terms of values, ignoring the historical lesson that “your fate will be decided by your enemy”.
The reality of the Russia-Ukraine war, which has been going on for two and a half years, shows that Russia, which is engaged in historical confrontations with NATO and even the West and is trying to organise the security environment in Europe, will not easily give up its goal of “special military operations”. While NATO, led by the United States, does not dare to risk a direct military confrontation with Russia, the attempt to defeat Russia on its own territory through proxy wars is proving unsuccessful. The only way to stop the damage for all sides is to declare a ceasefire, end the war and seek peace through negotiations.
*Prof. Ma, Dean of the Institute of Studies for the Mediterranean Rim (ISMR ), Zhejiang International Studies University (Hangzhou). He knows the world affairs well, especially the Islamic and Middle East politics. He has worked for many years as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine and Iraq.
