You may be tired of reading, but I am not tired of writing, because the subject is of extraordinary importance. The last article I wrote on the issue of reconciliation with Syria in Harici was entitled ‘Et Tekraru Ahsen, Velawkane Hundred and Eighty’. Recently, President Erdoğan’s statements on reconciliation with Syria have given me hope again.
The reason I was more hopeful this time was that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who met with Russia’s special envoy to Syria, Lavrentiev, said he was in favour of a reconciliation process with Turkey within the framework of his country’s effective sovereignty over all its territories. When Erdoğan responded to a question about these statements with very positive and appropriate phrases, my hopes increased that this time it would go further. At least as important as these statements were the speeches of MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, who emphasised the need for reconciliation/agreement with Syria and a joint fight against terrorism. It has to be admitted that such speeches of Bahçeli are mostly like a declaration of the new policy of the government/state.
The content is very appropriate
When analysing the content of President Erdoğan’s response to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s statement, a number of points immediately stand out. For example, the absence of any poisonous element in Erdoğan’s words is striking at first glance. The absence of the word “regime”, for example, is in itself a very important difference. It goes without saying that this term, which until recently was constantly used by Turkish officials, has a very negative connotation on the other side. Years ago, when we had informal diplomatic meetings with Greece, we objected to their statements about the Turkish occupation of Cyprus and they objected to the Cyprus peace operation.
The statements that start with the word “regime” are also hurtful and critical remarks that are made for the Syrian side in order not to compromise, and I have always expressed this both in the Harici and on my social media account (@hasanunal1920). For example, after Erdoğan’s first meeting with Russian President Putin on Syria in Sochi in early August 2022, he said that Putin had always advised him to act jointly with Syria in the military operation against the PKK/PYD, that he was now of the same opinion, that there would be no permanent enmity between states and that he could shake hands with Assad, and although he continued to make similar statements in the following days, the bureaucracy at that time insisted on making statements such as “regime etc.”, almost undermining the process, which almost undermined the process instead of speeding it up.
This time, Erdoğan’s speech did not contain such elements, and his preference for the term ‘Syrian President’ in relation to Assad is also promising, because despite Erdoğan’s statements in early August 2022, the bureaucracy at that time still implied that we did not consider Assad and his government legitimate. I think and hope that Erdoğan’s insistence on calling the Syrian president this time removes all question marks.
Another important emphasis in Erdoğan’s speech was that we have no intention of interfering in Syria’s internal affairs. Following Erdoğan’s statement after the Sochi meeting with Putin, Turkish officials, especially the then foreign minister, talked about the need for a new constitution in Syria, starting with the word ‘regime’ and insistently referring to the opposition and questioning how they would participate in governance. In fact, what they were doing was tantamount to ignoring President Erdoğan’s statements on reconciliation/agreement in Sochi and in the following days. Turkey’s policy in 2013-2015 had nothing to do with our national interests.
To sum up, first there would be a cessation of hostilities, a new constitution would be drafted and imposed on Syria, Assad would step down and a new and provisional government would be formed in which the opposition would participate (even whether Assad would participate or not was a question mark for Turkey, Ankara was more inclined to say “maybe”), then elections would be held under the strict supervision of international observers and a new government would be formed according to the results. This policy had nothing to do with Turkey’s national interest, because imposing a new constitution on a national and unitary state like Syria would mean dragging it into a federation or forcing it into an unnamed federal structure. In such a structure, it was clear that the PKK/PYD would be one of the federal units.
However, we fought to prevent the PKK/PYD from becoming such a puppet unit/state, but as in this example, in a policy that has not been fully thought through, on the one hand you carry out armed struggle to protect national interests, and on the other hand you indirectly help the structure that you oppose with weapons to achieve what it wants. It was rather strange that some professional diplomats in charge of such a policy accepted these demands on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 2254, because while we rightly did not implement a series of UN Security Council resolutions on the Cyprus issue (pointing out Israel’s disregard for UN resolutions), treating this resolution as a divine order was in fact nothing more than watering down Erdoğan’s instruction to “reconcile with Syria”. In fact, according to this policy, the election of Assad should be prevented by the approximately ten million Syrians in our country and in Syria, together with the PKK/PYD, the population east of the Euphrates with the American forces and those living in the Idlib region, because these three large population groups outnumber those living under the control of the Syrian government.
Erdoğan’s statement that we do not intend to interfere in Syria’s internal affairs is both in line with our national interests and looks like a new policy proposal. In other words, we are giving up the fantasy of a new constitution for Syria, which removes one of the most important obstacles between us. This must also mean recognising how compatible the preservation of Syria’s national and unitary constitutional structure is with Turkey’s interests, because the risk of a Syria forced into a federal structure, in which the PKK/PYD would be a federal unit, disintegrating and threatening Turkey’s national integrity cannot be underestimated.
Looking forward
If President Erdoğan’s statement means a definite political change, it should not be watered down in the bureaucracy. Since Erdoğan said “we used to meet as a family, we will meet again”, he must not be talking about an ordinary and cold peace with Syria. In order to establish peace, the two states must first sign separate agreements on the return of refugees and the joint fight against terrorist organisations. There is no doubt that there are major problems in both areas. Therefore, in addition to the Memoranda of Understanding, it will be necessary to prepare working groups and make rapid progress.
The main problem at this point will be the political Islamists, the media and the official or unofficial pro-American groups that support the government. For example, they have been shouting ‘Assad wants us to leave Syrian territory’ for a long time, and they will continue to do so. But it is quite normal for the Damascus government to ask us to leave the areas under our control. What do you mean, the Syrian government did not want to leave its territory to us?
One of the biggest problems in the way of reconciliation is the creation of an air of conquest in Syria and the unrealistic air that has been pumped out by the government’s own media for years. However, our biggest advantage here is that these groups can quickly change their positions in the face of Erdoğan’s decisions and behaviour. The Americanists, both within the institutions and informally, are losing influence as multipolarity takes hold. This must be one of the advantages of rapprochement this time. In addition, the issue of rapprochement can be managed directly through leaders’ diplomacy, against the risk of being slowed down or watered down by leaving it to the bureaucracy this time, and the compromise/agreement can be given as instructions to the bureaucracy.
The end of the PKK/PYD
The normalisation of relations between Turkey and Syria means the end of the PKK/PYD. America’s open support for these terrorist organisations does not change this fact. Especially in a multipolar world, America’s attempts to establish a puppet state in the Middle East through these organisations and its attempts to change borders directly or indirectly cannot be sustained in a multipolar world. A reconciliation between Ankara and Damascus will have a psychological shock effect on the PKK/PYD and Washington, which are trying to hold on to the eastern Euphrates by carrying out a large-scale ethnic cleansing with the support of American troops, because until now this dirty duo has been acting on the assumption that Ankara would not give up its political Islamist policy and therefore would not reconcile with Syria, which they call Assad. As soon as Turkey reconciles with Syria, this assumption will begin to crumble like a skyscraper built on the foundation of a slum and will quickly collapse. Reconciliation with Syria will bring with it the opportunity to either coordinate operations against this terrorist organisation with Damascus, or to secure results through a policy of strategic patience that will cause the other side to leave without carrying out any operations.
