‘Washington now has turned a new page in relations with Ankara’

Matthew Bryza, Former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, spoke to Harici: “Washington now has turned a new page in relations with Ankara and is working together more with Ankara on difficult issues in the Middle East where frankly Türkiye’s expertise is so deep and in many cases deeper than that of the United States.”

Ambassador Matthew Bryza has a twenty-three-year career as a US diplomat. His final assignment was as US ambassador to Azerbaijan from February 2011 to January 2012. From 2005 to 2009, Ambassador Bryza served as deputy assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia, with responsibility for the South Caucasus, Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, and Eurasian energy. Ambassador Bryza simultaneously served as the US co-chair of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) Minsk Group, mediating the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and as US mediator of the Cyprus, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia conflicts.

Matthew Bryza answered our questions on the developments in the Middle East, the Russia-Ukraine war and Türkiye-US relations.

Let’s start talking about the recent regional developments between Israel and Iran. The main question is now how Israel is going to answer Iran’s retaliation act.  What should we expect?

Right now, as we sit here, there’s a debate going on in the so-called war cabinet in Jerusalem about that very question. It seems a foregone conclusion that Israel will respond. It feels it must respond in some way so that it demonstrates to Iran that there’s a cost a price to be paid. You can’t just send over 300 projectiles toward Israel and not suffer any cost. So, I think that Netanyahu is not going to pay attention to President Biden’s advice which is to as Biden said “take the win”, “you suffered a humiliating blow to Iran by knocking out of the sky”. Over 99% of what was sent toward Israel reached there. “Take the win and move on and celebrate Passover and quiet things down”. Now, I think, across the political Spectrum in Israel, all Israelis even on the left, want Israel to respond.  But neither Netanyahu, nor I think, now the vast majority of the members of his cabinet want a regional war. They don’t want a war with Iran. So, I think they’ll look for a way to respond maybe against Iranian military in installations, not targeting the personnel but maybe the infrastructure, they could launch a cyber-attack, they’ve done it in the past. But I think it will be some sort of limited physical response most likely that from Israel’s perspective reduces the risk of a regional war or an all-out war between Israel and Iran.

Do you expect any assassination? Because this is actually a tradition of Israel when it comes to assassinate Iranian, sometimes politicians, sometimes academicians who are working on nuclear?

They did do that with the nuclear scientist although of course Israel denies it. I have no idea what they’re actually thinking about but I would be surprised at this point if they return to using assassinations as a tactic.  Because I think now that Iran has set a new precedent and sort of opened Pandora’s box by attacking Israeli territory from Iranian territory. I think, on the Israeli side, there has to be a calculation about frankly how much bigger might the Iranian response be this time.  You know, Iran sent one wave of attack granted; it was in three different components, there were drones and there were cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. But the targeting was limited and it doesn’t seem that the Iranians targeted civilian infrastructure. And the Iranians gave plenty of warning so that Israel’s friends and allies could be ready to help Israel shoot down the incoming missiles.  Next time who knows if that’s what’s going to happen; Iran could send a much bigger strike. And it could do it without any warning and could really inflict damage then on the civilian population of Israel. So, I think, the Israeli leadership is considering that and doesn’t want to do anything that would push Iran over the threshold to really go after Israel’s population. So, I would be surprised if assassinations were part of the response.

So, what do you expect as Israel’s response?

Well, as I was saying, I think they could launch limited missile strikes on Iranian military infrastructure. It could be on the infrastructure that was used to attack Israel and they could launch a cyber-attack as they reputedly have done in the past.

And what do you think, really, they postponed this response?

Well, I think they’re debating at the top level of the government and the war cabinet. You know it’s now been publicized that the most moderate member of the so-called war cabinet Benny Gantz initially wanted Israel to strike back right away against Iran and in a forceful physical way. And it was reportedly Netanyahu, the prime minister who said “no, let’s discuss, this let’s debate and figure out again how we can send a strong signal to deter Iran but without causing a wider war”. So, I think that either they’ve just been trying to figure out what to do or well trying to agree on what to do. And maybe be Passover is coming.

Türkiye was actually tracking these recent developments very closely. Nobody was on screen talking about what Iran should do or what Israel should do. After the incident, we heard that Ministry of Foreign Affairs was actually between two countries not to increase the tension. This has nothing to do with Iran’s retaliation but it is putting a position indeed. President Erdoğan also said that the thing has not started with Iran targeting Israeli soil. What happened in Damascus was that Israel targeted a diplomatic mission belonging to Iran. And international community did not raise its voice enough to condemn the violation of the Vienna Conventions.  This is one of the first points of President Erdoğan, followed by another statement. He was resembling Hamas to national forces of Türkiye which was fighting against the invader forces. And he said that “because of saying this, I will pay a price”. How do you think President Erdoğan’s definition of Israeli administration and Netanyahu as “bloodthirsty” and blaming them as the main responsible for the anxiety provoking tension on the night of April 13? And how do evaluate these statements?

My understanding is that Washington did ask Minister Fidan and Türkiye’s Foreign Ministry to deliver message to Iran before it launched the missile strike asking Iran not to respond in a dramatic way. And in fact, the Turkish government publicly said similar things.  So, I think Washington now has turned a new page in relations with Ankara and is working together more with Ankara on difficult issues in the Middle East where frankly Türkiye’s expertise is so deep and, in many cases, deeper than that of the United States.   It’s nothing new for President Erdoğan to speak positively about Hamas.  He’s done that since I was working way back when in the White House 2001 to 2004 and then when I was back at the state department in two between 2006-2009, he continuously spoke positively about Hamas as a liberation movement.

So, this is not something which is going to impact relations between Türkiye and the US.

No, and I’m making the argument quite the opposite. The relationship is improving between Türkiye and the United States now. So, Washington expects President Erdoğan to make those sorts of statements, doesn’t like them. But I think they respect President Erdoğan’s right to have whatever view he has. It’s been my view for a while that President Erdoğan would like Türkiye to be able to play not only a mediation role but maybe even be a guarantor of whatever political settlement comes out of this horrible war at some point, who knows when. And if you go back to the early weeks after the October 7^th Hamas attack on Israelis, Hamas even said that Türkiye and president Erdoğan had played an important role in the freeing of some hostages from Thailand. So, clearly there’s a useful role that Türkiye can play. I think Washington is starting to appreciate that. So, no matter how harsh President Erdoğan’s rhetoric is as long as Türkiye wants to help bring about a ceasefire and then a lasting political settlement afterward.  I think Washington will value that.

You said that the relations are improving already. We have solved F-16 crisis so that’s number one thing for Türkiye. While Pentagon officials frequently emphasize the importance of Türkiye for NATO.  And one of the crisis, now, has been resolved.  However, Washington support for YPG continues. And that’s one of the main problems which is going to stay at the of the agenda for Ankara. Still messages are being given that bilateral relations have entered a new phase.  But nothing is changing regarding this terror issue. I mean the US doesn’t consider YPG as PKK’s Syrian branch as Ankara does. How does Washington position Ankara in the tension in the Middle East given that YPG is one of the problems actually in the Middle East, which is in Syria and directly producing problem for Türkiye, let’s say, in the border?

Well, one person’s terrorist group is another person’s liberation group.  As you mentioned before President Erdoğan calls Hamas a liberation force but it clearly committed terrorist atrocities against so many Israelis.  It has committed terrorist acts.  I personally believe that the YPG is a terrorist organization. It is the PKK.  It just happens to be in Syria. The United States has been violating its own policy of not working with one terrorist group against another one in a very disingenuous way. And I know for a fact that when the United States was first deciding in the Obama period to work with the YPG. They totally disingenuously decided to rename it as the Syrian Democratic forces, knowing the YPG is a terrorist organization.  So, that was an instance of really bad faith. So, why did that happen? The reason that happened is twofold. One is that the United States didn’t have anyone else willing to go on the ground and fight ISIS rather than US soldiers. And frankly if YPG or PKK terrorists or soldiers, whatever they want to call them, are willing to fight and die rather than American soldiers. That’s a good deal from Washington’s perspective. The other problem, though, is ignorance in Washington about Türkiye in general. As great and big and powerful a country as this one is, as Türkiye is, it’s not known very well in the United States. And it’s the realm of specialists basically rather than general experts on foreign affairs.  General experts on foreign affairs they all have an opinion about Russia, China, Middle East but not many of them know anything about Türkiye. So, the debate has been manipulated in the United States against Türkiye often by various diasporas present in Washington. And they’ve persuaded the foreign policy elites not inside the state department or White House but in think-tanks and journalism that Türkiye is targeting not a terrorist organization in terms of the YPG but all Syrian Kurds. It’s crazy how very educated smart people have been manipulated and they don’t differentiate between YPG and the peaceful Kurdish population in Syria. So, that problem is going to fester for a while but what is true is that both capitals have decided to improve relations. The F-16 issue we should keep in mind, it wasn’t sort of a crisis that came up on its own. It was an attempt by the United States to offer a way to deescalate the dispute which was a political crisis between Ankara and Washington over Türkiye’s purchase of S-400s the air defense system from Russia. And then the US is kicking out Türkiye of the F-35 fighter program.  So the idea was “okay, let’s find something that Türkiye already has.”  A very capable weapon system F-16s and get help Türkiye procure more of those and then use the money that had already spent on the F-35 program to buy something else it needs. That was a de-escalatory step by the United States.

Actually this wasn’t among my questions but you said that maybe the diplomats and the bureaucrats in the US  do not know enough about Türkiye.  Maybe, they do not know what is true what is false in the region. Intellectuals and journalists… What should Türkiye do about that? Because Türkiye is not just a Middle Eastern country. And it’s not Syria, it’s not Egypt or whatever. But the thing is, I mean Türkiye and the US are allies in NATO.  How comes this image or the true information, correct information were not being able to be imposed among your intellectuals and diplomats and state workers. What is the reason for that? And as a policy recommendation as finding you as a former diplomat I would like to ask you.  What would you recommend to Türkiye to come up with that?

Why is there not a high level of expertise on Türkiye in elite circles of foreign policy intellectual circles? It’s they’ve been focusing on other countries as important as Türkiye seems to us.  It doesn’t seem that way in Washington sometimes. And part of the reason why that’s the case is what I mentioned before about diaspora organizations who manipulate, feed distorted information into the debate. And that problem grew worse in recent years, especially, you remember back in 2020 in the summer.

You’re mainly referring to Armenian diaspora and FETÖ.

FETÖ, Armenian American diaspora and Greek American diaspora… And really FETÖ

has done a great job in cultivating members of Congress and even state legislature and bringing them on trips to Türkiye and feeding them and funding them… So, the debate got distorted and then as I was saying, will you go back to the summer of 2020 when there was such great tension in the Eastern Mediterranean, understandably Ankara said “enough is enough”.  “Nobody’s listening to us. We’re just going to flex our muscles in the Eastern Mediterranean and exercise our rights.” And then these organizations and then France, in particular President Macron used that Turkish exercising of the country’s rights to say this: “See, Türkiye is provocative. It’s ignoring international law, it’s violating international law”. And then that created a firestorm of misunderstanding to  President Erdoğan’s credit after Angela Merkel intervened in July or August of 2020, Ankara de-escalated in the Eastern Mediterranean. As you remember, it pulled out it’s oil and gas exploration ships and they haven’t come back to the Eastern Mediterranean. And then, since then Türkiye has launched a diplomatic campaign to improve relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE as we all know about.  And it is playing a constructive role in Azerbaijan with the membership in the peacekeeping Observation Center together with Russian forces which are withdrawing now by the way. So, what Türkiye needs to do, I think, is what it’s doing: be active and constructive and avoid putting itself in a position where Türkiye’s, let’s say, I don’t want to say enemies but foes, want to take advantage and manipulate the story to say that: “See, this proves that Türkiye is aggressive and untrustworthy.”  So, be constructive as Türkiye is doing now.

So, going back to Erdoğan’s statements regarding Hamas, he said that “I am telling all these, but I know that I’m going to pay a price.”  What do you think about the price he talking about? Is he referring to the reactions of the US or what?

I don’t know. I don’t know what was in his mind then. But I don’t think he has to worry about any reactions from the United States. I mean the Biden Administration is putting a lot of pressure on Netanyahu to stop murdering civilians in Gaza. So, strategically, I think at the moment, Türkiye and the US are on the same general page even if President Erdoğan’s rhetoric is very harsh against Israel or supportive of Hamas. So, I don’t think he’ll pay any a price. He may, I don’t know, what he maybe, he’s worried, he’s going to get criticized by the media in western countries. But he doesn’t really care about that.

Would you comment about Türkiye’s trade restrictions on Israel?

So, if we think back to the Mavi Marmara incident back in, I guess, it was June of 2010. That led to a real breakdown in relations between Türkiye and Israel.  But in the decade that followed, the level of trade between the two countries increased by over 200%, more than doubled. So, even though the diplomatic and political relations were terrible, the trade continued.  In fact, Israel imports much of its crude oil via the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline. So, there’s a vital continuing economic link between Türkiye and Israel. I think private business and state companies in Türkiye wanted to keep on profiting from trade with Israel.  But now, I guess it’s gotten to a point where the government here felt too much pressure from the opposition and internally and even from the MHP for example to be harder on Israel and not to allow for business as usual.  Meaning, letting the trade just continue as it always had been.  So, now, I mean already before Türkiye imposed this prohibition on, I think, 54 categories of products to Israel. Already since Israel’s attacks on Gaza, trade had decreased by like 20, 21, 21.5%. So, already going down. Now, the difference is private companies will not be able to export certain products to Israel. I don’t think that’s going to be that consequential for the Israeli economy because, I don’t have in my head what all the products area. But there’s jet fuel. There are other sources of that.  There’s marble and some other manufactured goods. So, you know Türkiye wasn’t a huge trading partner for Israel and vice versa.

Israel is a small trading partner for Türkiye but politically it’s a significant gesture by Türkiye.

I’ve got a few questions on NATO.  NATO plans to build a 10,000 strong base in Romania and a 5,000 strong base in Bulgaria. What are the risks of an increased alliance presence in the Black Sea?  How do you see Türkiye’s role in this?

I look at it the opposite way.  I think without that sort of us NATO military presence in the Black Sea the security of Türkiye and all the Black Sea countries and all of us will be much lower because of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. If Russia is able to continue and quote unquote “win” which means it’s able to hang on to Crimea, it’s able to hang on to Donbass and move beyond that to attack Odessa, it will keep going. It will go on to Moldova. It will move back in a bigger way into Georgia. And I am convinced it will move into one of the Baltic states.  I used to run a think tank in Tallinn, Estonia and after Russia’s previous invasion of Ukraine in 2014 we were very focused on how Russia might do something similar in a NATO member state as it did in in Crimea and Donbas, which is to say we’re not invading and we we’re just there’s some little green men that are occupying some administrative centers. It’s not the Russian military until Putin admitted it was the Russian military.  So, if he was able to do that in, let’s say, Eastern Estonia, he could take NATO territory under control, deny that Russia is doing it, and then later say, “yes, it is”, “it is we who are there”.  And then NATO has to decide “Do we want to have a nuclear war potentially with Russia over some small bit of territory in whatever Eastern Latvia?”   And in that case NATO’s Article 5, the collective security pledge is dead. So, then that will have a huge impact for all of NATO including Türkiye.  If Russia attacks and captures Odessa, the economy of Ukraine will be devastated. And if it goes on to Moldova, the security risks in this part of the world will be huge. So, the presence of US military forces in Romania and Bulgaria will send a powerful deterrent to Russia saying “If you keep going, we will come after you.”

Talking about Ukraine, the war fatigue has set in other Western countries. Is it time for negotiations, do you think or should we expect a new escalation of the war?

Well, Putin clearly doesn’t want a real negotiation. He wants to keep up the war and Zelensky doesn’t feel politically ready for it either.  He feels that it’s not what the Ukrainians want. So, the parties have to decide whether or not they want.

Do you think Zelensky is really deciding by himself? I don’t mean he is controlled but most of the time we observe that he’s directed by the US actually. I mean, what I’m asking is as long as the West is going to finance Ukraine, the war will continue, right?

Yes, I do, of course, he is. He is democratically elected. Who’s controlling him?  No, that’s ridiculous. That’s Russian propaganda. And as long as Russia continues to make its entire economy focused on invading a country and occupying it, the war will continue. Russia’s violating international law. Stop the Invasion.  It had no reason to invade Ukraine. There’s no reason at all. So, if it stops the Invasion, then everything will be fine. So, no, the United States as you said is not controlling Zelensky. It’s not urging them to go forward. It’s trying to respond to the Ukrainian people’s request and demand that the United States provides assistance. So that they can fight and not be exterminated which is what Putin has said he wants to do. He said he wants to exterminate Ukraine as a country. And we see the war crimes that Russia has committed already, abducting children.  Putin is indicted for war crimes, right? So, abducting children the horrible atrocities in the beginning of the war, north of Kiev in Bucha and elsewhere. So, I don’t know why anyone would expect that if Ukraine just said “okay, we stop fighting”, Russia would say “oh good, we want peace”. They will keep going.

Do you really think that this is a frozen war now or do you expect an escalation?

I expect that Russia will continue escalating and Ukraine once it gets I think it will get this assistance, it will then be able to stop the Russian escalation and will increase its attacks on Russian military targets.

Okay, let’s also talk about Russia and Türkiye relations mainly on energy.  Russia says that it may carry out joint studies from time to time to make Türkiye as an energy hub for Europe. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated this several times. Especially considering the energy bottleneck that Europe faced after the Ukrainian War, wouldn’t Türkiye becoming an energy distribution center benefit the western conflict?

It would that’s long been a goal of US foreign policy. I worked on it beginning back in 1998 to help Türkiye diversify its suppliers. It helped Türkiye diversify away from its dependence on Russia. By the way, it was deep corruption in Türkiye in the government then that allowed the Blue Stream (Russia to Türkiye) pipeline agreement to happen. It was approved by a former minister of state without informing the foreign ministry of Türkiye or the General Staff because of corruption. And I know for a fact. I know the people involved they were getting paid huge amounts under the table by Russia to create this pipeline that perpetuated Türkiye’s dependence on Russian gas.  Same thing is happening now. So, for Türkiye, from my perspective, it would be great if it really was an energy transit and an energy trading hub whereby it was receiving natural gas from multiple directions from Azerbaijan, from Iran, liquid natural gas from anywhere, from the United States, from Qatar, from Nigeria, from Algeria and of course some Russian gas. And I think, that’s president Erdoğan’s vision. That’s not Putin’s vision. Putin’s vision is to make Türkiye a hub or a transit route for Russian natural gas. I’m on the board of the biggest private natural gas distribution company in Bulgaria. So, I watch Bulgarian politics very closely. Right now there is a huge political scandal in Bulgaria because the secret agreement was leaked whereby the Bulgarian government together with the government here agreed that Turk stream would be a way for Russia to expand its natural gas imports to Hungary and to Serbia looking ahead to when the EU has said it’s going to stop taking natural gas from Russia in 2027.  And so, Türkiye has to decide where does it want to be on this debate.  Does it want to be facilitating Russia through these secret and often corrupt agreements for bigger pipeline capacity? Or does it really want to be a trading hub where everybody gets to compete and not in a way that undermines the European Union’s own decisions on not taking more Russian gas. That’s a tough decision. It’s not for me to say. That’s Türkiye’s decision.

You’re talking about so many things which might be undisclosed for some other people.  Can you give more details on that?

Yes, I can send you articles. And right now about the debate happening in Bulgaria.  So just you can go online and look at the Bulgarian news services. Or there was just a major public hearing about the agreement between BOTAŞ on one side and then BulgarGaz and Bulgartransgaz. So, all state-owned monopolies which does what, which monopolizes the interconnection of natural gas pipelines between Türkiye and Bulgaria, and doesn’t allow any private sector competition to get into the movement of gas from essentially from Türkiye into the EU. For Türkiye, for BOTAŞ that’s good because it’s good business for BOTAŞ, it’s a state monopoly. For Russia, it’s essential. It’s the way Russia is going to have a back door to keep bringing natural gas into the EU after 2027. Because private companies like the one I work with we want to bring in non-Russian natural gas.  We want to have competitive trading or even there could be some Russian natural gas but there needs to be non-monopolistic use of all this infrastructure. So, you could look that up there was a there public hearing two weeks ago on this in Bulgaria by think-tanks and by journalists.  But the debate is Raging right now in Bulgarian politics. There’s a brand-new caretaker government and there’s a big argument over these arrangements right now.

You were the ambassador to Azerbaijan and you lived in Baku. So, I want to talk about Southern Caucuses and the tensions there. While the Armenian administration expands its relations with the EU and the USA and at the same time Azerbaijan continues to be a good partner for Europe especially in the field of energy, as we’re speaking now, considering  Russia and Iran as factors what is Washington’s basic plan in South Caususes?

I was also the US mediator between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the Karabakh conflict and oversaw our relations with the region for a long long time.  I think number one thing what Washington wants is peace, a peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia. And it has publicly repeatedly said “we’re happy as Washington to play the role of a mediator or facilitator, we don’t have to, what matters to us is that somebody’s playing that role”. Charles Michel of course the European Council president has done a great job of that. So, the desire of the US is the peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia and then agreement to define their international border which they’ve never done since the Soviet Union collapsed. At the same time, as you said, the United States and EU are responding to Prime Minister Pashinyan and his Foreign Minister Mirzoyan statements recently:  Number one: Armenia doesn’t want to be in Russia’s military alliance anymore, the Collective Security Treaty Organization. It, I think, incorrectly believes that the Russian peacekeepers on the ground in Azerbaijan were obligated to come to Armenia’s defense during the Second Karabakh war in 2020 and then last September when Azerbaijan finally regained all of its territory that had been occupied by Armenia.  I actually don’t think Russian peacekeepers had any obligation to get involved. Nonetheless, politically it’s become the point that Pashinyan is saying we want to leave the Russian Military Alliance. Armenia is going to join the International Criminal Court which obligates it to arrest Vladimir Putin if he’s ever on the territory of Armenia. And Pashinyan and the Foreign Minister of Armenia have said we want to join the European Union.  If you remember back to the Maidan in Ukraine in 2014, it was Ukraine’s desire to join the European Union or 34:15 at least to sign an association agreement that kicked off all of this craziness two wars and two Russian invasions.  So, it’s a very risky thing that Armenia’s leadership is doing right now saying “we want to be with Europe, we don’t want to be with Russia”. A lot of people in Armenia hate that, Russia hates that, and so Russia responded in the last couple of days by saying “we’re going to remove our peacekeepers from Azerbaijan”.  “Armenia now you’re on your own”. So, Armenia’s leadership is making a strategic choice to be with quote unquote “the West”.

Azerbaijan’s leadership is more careful.  It was the leader for four or five years of the non-aligned movement. It does not aspire to join any or align with any block neither with Russia nor with Iran nor with the West.  And, so, I understand why in Azerbaijan, people are upset that the US and the EU are now saying “okay, Armenia, you can come our way but Azerbaijan has decided to stay on its own.”  So, it’s actually Azerbaijan is getting what it wants. It’s being respected as a good partner of the European Union as you said, 35:20 respected as an independent non-aligned country.  As long as it has a peace treaty with Armenia and Armenia can’t threaten militarily. As long as Armenia finally implements its pledges to open up all the transport corridors linking Armenia with Azerbaijan and Armenia with Türkiye, Azerbaijan should be happy. I think it will be once there’s a peace treaty and once there’s a border agreement defining the border.

One of the main things are now is Zengezur Corridor. Do you believe it’s going to happen? Because Armenia besides Iran, they are just resisting this not to happen.

Well, Pashinyan is not resisting it, but his political opponents are. He is opposed by the so-called Karabakh Clan, former leaders from Karabakh as well as nationalists and the Dashnaktsutyuns, so-call Armenian revolutionary front who want conflict with Azerbaijan. They benefit personally either through money or political support as long as the conflict with Azerbaijan is unresolved. Some of them want to recreate the medieval state of Greater Armenia which means taking territory from Eastern Türkiye, from Azerbaijan, from Iran.  I think that’s crazy but some of them really want to do that.  And some of them again are just opportunistic and they get money from emotional members of the diasporas whether it be in Russia or France or the United States who think “yes, we need to resurrect that great old medieval homeland of Armenia”.   Clearly those revanchist forces in Armenia are not gone, they’re still there but they’re weaker and weaker with every day.

The last question about Georgia. So, do you think the EU is opening doors to Georgia because now they were given the candidacy status? I talked to Toivo Claar, the special representative for South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia. He says that this is not really going to happen in near future. So, what is your take? Georgia is also in between between being a post-Soviet country and a European country.

So, Georgia was a vibrant democracy before 2012 and clearly had chosen the Western path. It wanted to be a member of NATO, it wanted to be a member of the European Union. And over 80,5% of the population of Georgia still wants those two things. But its current government does not want those things.  Its current government wants to have strong relations with Russia. It’s therefore canceled some big infrastructure projects that would have helped Georgia integrate with Europe whether it be the Anaklia port in Western Georgia or the Caucasus online internet service provider privatization.  Both projects would have helped Georgia again connect its economy in many different ways with that of the European Union. When a year or so ago, when Ukraine and Moldova were offered EU candidacy status Georgia was not. And that’s because of deep dysfunctionality in Georgia’s political system.  And then the Georgian government made some pledges to enact some reforms and then the European Union said “okay, now you can be a candidate”.  But now the main issue that the Georgian government agreed to accept which was not to have or not to move forward a Russia’s style of agent registration rule is back on the political agenda. So, now the Georgian government has said “we promised the EU we wouldn’t do this, we’re going to do it anyway.”   “We’re going to push forward this foreign agent registration act.” So, the European spokespersons have now come out even Charles Michel in recent days saying “Georgia can’t possibly be on a European path if it’s going to take steps like this.” So, I think it’s derailed again the Georgian aspirations which the population overwhelmingly wants to join the European Union is derailed for now. And there’s a political stalemate in Georgia.

As far as I guess, now Georgia is going to be going through the process where Türkiye is going through in the past, four decades now, just pending.

Pending but it’s different.  I mean, I think there are a lot of European leaders who don’t think Türkiye should ever be a member of the European Union because of their anti-Turkish feeling.  It was (Jacques Delors) former, leader of France who said famously in late 70s, early 80s, “European Union is a Judeo-Christian organization.” Georgia doesn’t have that problem right and Georgia is much less known. I think there is strong general support for Georgia to become closer to the European Union within the European Union.  What’s more controversial is Georgia’s membership in NATO with Germany having historically been opposed to that.  Because Germany’s afraid of Russia. Germany is such a double standard. They say “well, we don’t want a country that has a territorial dispute with Russia becoming a member of NATO because that could bring NATO into conflict with Russia”. But Germany itself had a territorial dispute with Russia when it became a NATO member. It was called East Germany which was occupied by Russian military forces.