Interview
‘We want to be prepared to fight back from the first day ourselves’
Nele Loorents, former Representative of Estonian Defense Ministry to Estonian Embassy in Washington, spoke to Harici: “We really believe in collective defense and Article 5. But at the same time, we understand that in the worst-case scenario, there is this timely factor. So, we really want to be prepared to fight back from the first day ourselves.”
Nele Loorents joined the International Center for Defence and Security (ICDS) as research fellow in December 2023. Prior joining the ICDS she had a long-term career as a civil servant at the Estonian Ministry of Defence. Since 2000 she pertained to the fields of Defence Investments, as well as Defence Policy and Planning.
Nele Loorents answered journalist Dr. Esra Karahindiba’s questions Esntonia’s defense policy and the Russia-Ukraine war.
You’re working for the defense ministry for 23 years now and you know you remember the period just post-Soviet and now. Can you briefly tell me what is the summary of the transformation you witnessed all these years in defense policy of Estonia? And you can also talk about the Baltics because you have similar experience with neighbors.
I think what is really important from our perspective is that when we gained our independence, it was immediately crucial for us to completely cut off from the Russian legacy. So, we completely started from scratch with everything. We restructured our defense to be more applicable to the western militaries.
Obviously, from the first day, we had a strong determination to join both NATO and the EU as we understood that for a small nation like Estonia, and also other Baltic states, it was essential and existential to gain membership in larger organizations. That’s why we worked heavily in the first years of our independence to be applicable to join NATO and the EU. We were very conservative in all our actions.
We tried to follow all the requirements and rules set by different organizations as we requested to join them. Economically, the first years of our independence weren’t the easiest, especially due to the fact that we started from scratch. But at the same time, we had a great opportunity to put into leadership a younger generation who just maybe came from universities and already had a western mentality.
So, it helped us a lot that we didn’t have to change the existing system, but we were allowed to build up our society in a way that we thought would be most beneficial for our future and long-term independence effort.
For Central European countries and beyond that, European countries having borders with Russia act as a type of buffer zone metaphorically. How does this make you feel personally as a defense advisor for many years? And how does it impact your policies?
What do you mean by buffer zone?
Now, Ukraine, by Russia’s claim, is in this position because Russia told Ukraine not to come close to NATO and the EU. Ukraine didn’t listen to that because it’s a sovereign country, decided to make its own decision. And now that’s the situation. It’s just being in a buffer zone between Russia and the Europe. It’s like you have the fear and you want to be brave at the same time and you don’t know the result.
I am not sure if it’s the right word to call this Eastern flank a buffer zone. But anyway, Russia has always been our neighbor. And we haven’t had any kind of positive feeling about Russia’s ambitions towards politics or overall their historically claimed regions.
Every now and then, Russian politicians say something about how they see the Baltic states still being historically part of the big Russian empire. And there has always been interest to keep the Baltic states in Russia’s sphere of influence. So that has always been the case.
We never thought there would be any change in Russia’s attitude towards us. And we have developed our defense in a way that we are independently prepared to defend our country. It has been very visible throughout the years how much Estonia, for example, has been investing in defense overall.
Estonia has invested more than two percent in defense since 2015, which is exactly the NATO criteria. But this was the year after Crimea happened. So, we immediately started to react to the situation in very relevant terms.
And it really increased during the Prime Minister Kallas term.
Yes. And now, during the past two and a half years since Ukraine’s full-scale invasion, we have made several decisions to raise our defense budget even more. Right now, the level is 3.2%. There is a commitment by the government to spend more than three percent at least for the next four years. And I think what is even more important is what you are doing with that money.
How do you distribute this money?
In our case, we are spending almost half of the defense budget on procurement and developing new capabilities, which is, I think, in NATO terms probably the highest percentage of all.
Which are the main countries you are procuring defense items from?
Oh, there are a lot of different partners. If we speak about bigger capabilities like medium and long-range fires, then obviously from the U.S. we are procuring HIMARS systems, from Germany the IRIS-T systems. There are quite many partners all over Europe to procure ammunition.
Estonia is one of the biggest procurers of ammunition at this point in Europe, which might seem surprising considering how small we are. But as I said, we really want to be prepared and we really believe in collective defense and Article 5. But at the same time, we understand that in the worst-case scenario, there is this timely factor.
So basically, any kind of reinforcement by Allied forces takes some time. So, we really want to be prepared to fight back from the first day ourselves. That’s why we are investing a lot in possible conflicts, if they happen in our region.
We are investing a lot into our territorial defense. We have also raised our wartime readiness quite significantly during the last year. I think it’s one-fourth, so it’s right now about 40,000 reserves on wartime readiness.
Lots of exercises ongoing, lots of SNAP taxes ongoing. There is a lot of effort put into this overall societal approach to increase the resilience of society. So, there is quite a significant effort actually ongoing currently in order to be prepared if something would happen in our region.
How many percent of your population is Russian? My question would be how they would react to a possible conflict with Russia because it’s their origin, as in all other countries you have Russians. And how do you manage this policy? They’re Estonian citizens but they’re Russian, so do they participate in exercises. Do you have a public questionnaire, like what is the reaction of Russian-origin citizens to the tensions?
I think we currently have about 30 percent of ethnic Russians. Many of those have been very well integrated into Estonian society already, so that’s not a relevant question for the majority of ethnic Russians. But obviously, we have some regions where there is still some pro-Russian mentality.
Yes, like the northeastern part of Estonia, we have this part where the majority of the population is Russian. What has been surprising from our part is, or from the governmental parties, that in the past two years we have made quite many different steps in order to decrease this possible Russian hybrid influence on our ethnic Russian population. We have removed some of the old monuments which were reminders of the Russian and Soviet times and where some people still went to celebrate special days.
And it seems or it was visible that the reaction by the population or Russian ethnic population was less than actually expected. It was expected to be much more restless, but there was very little. Obviously, we can speculate about the reasons for that. But I guess one of the reasons is that especially the younger generation understands that if they are really trying or following this Moscow approach, then they might be influenced by that. They might be the ones who are actually in Ukraine fighting, or their opportunities in Europe to study or work or engage more in that way will be limited or totally cut off.
So, I think the younger generation is more inclined towards the West and trying to disconnect more from this Russian political approach. And I think the older generation is just getting to an age where their voice is maybe not so heard anymore. So that’s probably one of the things.
Going back to the previous question, I would ask you about the distribution of your budget and you talked about having several different sources. So, Türkiye is one of them. I think you were working with Baykar about UAVs. So, can you tell us the level of your cooperation, your procurement, because Baykar was very effective in Ukraine, providing UAVs to the Zelensky government and it was praised for their support. What’s your level of relations with Baykar?
Because I am not exactly an official in procurement at this point, I really don’t know how close the relations with different enterprises are at this point. But I know that in our Ministry of Defense and also our procurement organization, there are really close relations with all NATO allies. And Türkiye most certainly is one of those countries where we try to find more opportunities for further cooperation.
I think what is pretty important also about the Estonian population distribution is currently the level of Ukrainian refugees, because we have more than five percent of our population as refugees from Ukraine. I guess this is really visible also if you walk on the streets and go to the shops and schools and so on, that there is quite a lot of work Estonia is also currently doing in order to integrate those people into our society, because we really don’t know how this terrible situation in Ukraine is.
I want to talk about Suwalki Gap. For Baltic countries, for you, for Lithuania, and Latvia too, that’s a critical issue. Near Kaliningrad, Politico magazine called Suwalki as the most dangerous place on earth. Russian officials are not really mentioning Suwalki. Except once Lukashenko of Belarus hinted something about Suwalki Gap. But from Russia, I don’t hear anything. Why, for Baltic countries, is it at the top of the agenda?
I would say that for Estonia, maybe this Suwalki problem has always been a little bit less relevant than in the case of Lithuania and Poland because it’s really like their borderline. And obviously, the Suwalki problem or this challenge includes also this Belarusian contribution. It means that really then Russia has to leverage Belarusian cooperation or leverage their sources.
So, there are maybe some questions about that also. But during the past two years, there have been significant changes, I would say, in this problem because NATO has made quite significant decisions, but as well they’re having national developments which address this problem. I would bring out just a couple of those which are, I think, very important in order to mitigate this challenge.
First of all, it’s a question about Allied presence. In Madrid, it was decided that NATO will increase in all the needed states, the level of presence up to that brigade. And now, already, there has been a decision made that there will be a brigade in Lithuania, there will be a brigade in Latvia, and obviously, more presence means that there is more power in order to react immediately. So, you don’t have to reinforce as many land forces through the Suwalki gap as you had needed in case you have just battle groups. So that’s the first thing.
The second thing that was decided was to set up this new NATO command structure in all the Baltic states and to decrease the command structure level to the level of divisional size of command structure HQ. Which means that basically, you don’t have to have all the forces in place from the first day, but you have in place a working command structure which is able to reinforce all the needed forces in case of crisis. And the third thing, which I would say is maybe the most crucial thing, is the joining of Finland and Sweden to NATO. Because this basically closes the Baltic Sea to be like an internal NATO sea more or less.
And it enables us to move very quickly with air and navy assets if there would be some kind of NATO’s navy and air assets to Baltic regions if needed. So even if there would be some kind of leap in moving land forces through the Suwalki gap, you can close this gap with other assets like air force, navy, and that probably lessens…
So, I think these are like three most important things decided. And the fourth thing, which is related directly to the NATO element, is the new regional plans. And although the plans themselves are restricted and we don’t have the full visibility of what has been decided in there, I am quite certain that it has played through the scenario also of Suwalki gap.
And there are really these structures in place in order to act in case of Suwalki gap, this kind of closeness would happen. So, these are like four things in NATO terms. But also, as I said, there is this national approach and Estonia is currently investing a lot into our own defense.
We are investing heavily in longer-range fires; missiles and rockets. And the aim is actually to keep the adversary out of our country, not to give him the opportunity to cross the border at all. So, I think this is also a really important aspect if we speak about Suwalki gap challenge as a general.
You also have an unratified border agreement with Russia, yes? Can you talk about that?
There is not really much to tell. There are some details which we still haven’t been able to kind of sign. But I think what is important is that last year Estonia and all other Baltic states have made a lot of effort into securing the borderline. So, we are really fencing our borderline with Russia. We are building the bunkers on the borderline in order to be also prepared in any case scenarios. And I think this is really what is important.
So, the paperwork doesn’t matter. The borderline is there anyway. It’s not ratified, but we implement it. We still implement and there is a clear understanding of where the borderline is.
Other than Suwalki and the border issue, what do you think Estonia has as a risk or danger?
Well, Russia is obviously a danger. Or may threaten Russia. There is no dispute about that. And in Estonia’s case, obviously the landline with Russia is much shorter than in other Baltic states because we have this lake Peipus on the borderline. Well, Finland is like in the north and there is a big sea in between. But I think the eastern border having this big lake in between gives us more visibility of how the troops are moving. So, there are just like a couple of places where actually Russians can cross the borderline, like on land terms. And it’s from our perspective, obviously gives us the opportunity to control those spots more than it would be to have the landline throughout our borders. I guess, that’s quite an important aspect also.
And what do you think former Primer Minister Kaja Kallas will change in the European Union, like foreign policy direction or these measurements, precautions? Because you have all of these threats and you have the experience of Russia. For Estonia, I think this is a very important role internationally. What do you think she’s going to bring?
I really think, this is my personal opinion, that there won’t be really a big change, of course, in the European Union due to that. Because Kaja Kallas and her kind of approach has been very clear and visible throughout the past years when she has been the Prime Minister. And in the international sphere, I think her judgment of the situation has been very highly valued.
So, I really think that she has to change the course of the European Union in any way because there have been many Estonian initiatives in the European Union already, which are on the way to be implemented in many ways.
Interview
Daniel Davis warns US strategy fails against Iranian defense grid
Retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel and military analyst Daniel Davis discussed the US military operation against Iran, decision-making mechanisms in Washington, US-Israel relations, transformations in modern warfare doctrine, and the global balance of power in an interview with Harici Media.
Answering questions of Harici Editor-in-Chief Tunç Akkoç regarding the Iran war, retired Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Davis stated that the US administration lacks an achievable military strategy on the ground. Davis said: “I would say the US has a desire, not a strategy. It wants to subjugate the Iranian side, corner them, seize control of the Strait of Hormuz, prove they pose no threat to anyone in the region, and ensure they never possess nuclear weapons. That is our desire. But there is no strategy to achieve any of these goals.”
Drawing on his past military experience, Davis detailed the geographical and technical challenges on the ground: “As a soldier with direct combat experience, having gained combat experience in some of these mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan, for example, I know that many of the mountains inside Iran belong to the same mountain category. I knew what a difficult military task it would be to conquer a country as large as most of Western Europe, where such mountain ranges cover the entire western front. Therefore, I knew you could do nothing on the ground. However, I also knew that you could not subjugate a country with this kind of defense capacity and of this nature through air power alone.”
Pointing out that Iran’s defense infrastructure spans many years, Davis continued: “You cannot do this, especially when they have anticipated this for twenty years and made all kinds of preparations by constructing underground caves, production facilities, and storage facilities, and developing production capabilities for their unmanned aerial vehicles and missiles. There is no way you can defeat them. Because such facilities were designed not only to withstand all our strike missiles, such as Tomahawk, Jasmine cruise missiles, PSM, or ATAC, but also to survive. Most are capable of surviving nuclear explosions as well. I have been inside some of these here in the US. I have been in some physically located beneath a mountain. I know they were specifically designed when constructed to withstand the largest nuclear weapons the Soviet Union might possess. The ones there are of the same kind. If you know before embarking on an act of starting a war that the enemy is this large, possesses these types of defenses, and everyone knows these are resistant to our non-nuclear conventional munitions, why would you start a war to force them into something you clearly cannot achieve?”
Addressing the assumptions behind the war decision, Davis said: “I think this is a fantasy stoked by Benjamin Netanyahu. It was said, ‘If we assassinate their leaders, the same thing will happen as happened to Maduro in Venezuela. You went there, captured him, and disabled him; when you did that, you took control of the entire government, they basically handed the country over to you, and the same will happen here.’ Anyone who thinks Venezuela is like Iran has paid attention to nothing. The culture, history, religion, experiences, and everything that has transpired over the last 47 years are radically different from those in Venezuela, and you do not have an insider to facilitate the process as we had in Venezuela. But President Trump appears to have thought this way.”
“When he started the war on February 28, he sealed our fate; we lost this war”
Pointing to inconsistencies in US President Donald Trump’s decisions and the trajectory of the operation, Davis stated: “This situation is proof that he is stuck. Because, in my view, when he started the war on February 28, he sealed our fate. We lost this war. Even if it is ongoing right now, there is no logical way for us to win it. Because we cannot eliminate the trump card held by the Iranian side.”
Stating that military pressure mechanisms are insufficient, Davis explained: “We still have our missiles, aircraft, aircraft carriers, and all such elements. That is why it appears feasible. It is thought, ‘Maybe if we make a good enough deal, or put enough pressure on them, or impose a blockade and leave the public in a dire enough position to change the government’s mind.’ This is a fantasy. This is the only thing President Trump has. Because if he were acting based solely on military reality, strategic reality, and cultural and religious reality, he would know this was an unwise move, but he does not know.”
Describing Trump’s negotiation approach and the breakdown of the reached agreement, Davis used the following expressions: “He is a transactional individual who wants relationships resolved overnight. For example, during the memorandum of understanding period, this duration was to be 60 days. After starting the war, no achievable military objectives remained. Whatever your desires were, you can no longer reach them because you have confronted reality. Now he is trying to find an exit route, but even within this understanding, he cannot arrive at a rational and consistent perspective. Any rational person would think that when the memorandum of understanding was signed on June 17, it provided him with an exit route. You implement the terms of this memorandum, the crisis is resolved, the dual blockade is lifted, and the Strait of Hormuz could reopen.”
Addressing the clauses of the agreement text and subsequent developments, Davis said: “The terms Trump signed stated that Iran had administrative control of the Strait of Hormuz but could not demand any transit fees for 60 days. Iran accepted this, but accepted only one condition: the ‘for 60 days only’ stipulation. Subsequently, they publicly announced that they would collect fees later, but not during these 60 days. The US was not mentioned in the text in any way. We had no say. The authority to decide how operations would run was left to Iran together with Oman. We gave them 30 of the 60 days to prepare their plan for this. But after four or five days passed, the US suddenly declared a new southern corridor together with Oman.”
Detailing the process of reversing the decision, Davis noted: “While a step to reopen the strait had been agreed upon, traffic had risen to approximately one-third of pre-war levels, and many shipments had passed directly on the first day, Trump personally turned back this development toward finding a reasonable exit route from the unfolding disaster. According to reports from some sources in Washington, he came under intense pressure from pro-war figures in his inner circle and those on the Israeli side. He backed down under this pressure and modified the terms by inserting himself into the fifth paragraph. He never made Israel implement the first paragraph, which covered Lebanon and envisioned a ceasefire on all fronts. We did not even give them 30 days; we intervened before five days had passed. Trump has a goal, fails to reach it, puts forward another condition, and then withdraws that as well. He is very easily manipulated; he reaches a decision, then someone speaks with him, and he changes his mind.”
Recalling that a similar situation occurred in relations with Saudi Arabia, Davis said: “He said he made a great deal with Saudi Arabia, and the next day he changed the condition by saying, ‘as long as they sign the Abraham Accords.’ Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, announced that this was not part of the agreement and had never been discussed. This situation shows that President Trump constantly makes concessions when pressured. On this basis, how can any agreement be reached with the US? This situation means that no military or diplomatic exit point remains because he does not permit it.”
“Control is no longer an economic matter; it is a national security imperative”
In response to a question about whether a mutual exit opportunity remains from the current impasse, Davis said: “We had the memorandum of understanding; we had secured this agreement. However, President Trump and his Secretary, Scott Bessent, said, ‘as long as it is a deal we like, we want a new deal.’ You already had a deal; what deal are you talking about now? Why would the Iranian side negotiate a new deal that differs from an agreement made two months ago? This is completely illogical. The Iranian side holds military superiority through its missile cities and half a dozen alternative methods to control the strait. As their official authorities stated on social media, control of the strait is no longer merely an economic matter; it is a national security imperative because it is the only tool with which they can balance their American adversary, who is far stronger militarily.”
Evaluating the impact of the oil crisis, Davis stated: “Strategic Petroleum Reserves are declining. This situation has prevented a crisis so far, but it cannot cover products like jet fuel, diesel, and fertilizer. If it continues this way and the problem is postponed, the reserves will be depleted one day, and economic activity cannot be sustained without oil. Pressure is on President Trump, and the Iranian side is aware of this. They know the blockade will harm them, but they have calculated that they can endure much longer and deeper pain than our side. This is an existential matter; they know that if they surrender their only trump card to an unpredictable president, they will be attacked again later.”
“Reflexive support for Israel in society has been broken”
Touching upon relations between the US and Israel, Davis said a clear divergence has begun in American society. Davis noted: “In the past, across all segments of society and all generations, it was reflexively said, ‘Of course we are pro-Israel, they are our democratic ally.’ This situation continued until the Gaza process following October 7. Israel was attacked on October 7, and no one found it strange that it responded. However, what happened afterward created problems. Israel used this opportunity to destroy the Gaza Strip, increase pressure in the West Bank, bring in new settlers, and discuss annexation.”
Describing the rift between political elites and the public, Davis explained: “There is a major divide in America. Elites are unaffected by genocide or the killing of women and children in the West Bank and Gaza; they close their eyes, arguing that Israel is an ally. However, the eyes of the American public are not closed. They see human suffering on social media and do not carry the memorized assumptions of the past. These elites are not merely bought with money; for decades, they genuinely believed that our interests and Israel’s interests were one and the same. In their minds, saying something negative about Israel is equivalent to saying something negative about the US. Younger generations in particular, and a growing portion of all generations, recognize that our interests are not the same.”
Drawing attention to the cost of the war to the US, Davis noted: “We elected President Trump to apply the America First principle, not Israel first, Britain first, or Germany first. There is anger against those who sacrificed America’s needs by entering the war. According to figures reflected in the public domain, at least 600 Americans were injured; according to what I have heard, this number is over a thousand. Money has been spent, our facilities have been damaged, and our aircraft destroyed; around 40 to 50 of our aircraft were damaged or destroyed. Our bases were ruined and will likely never be rebuilt. We have also lost our geopolitical influence in the region. I doubt that relations with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait can return to their former state. Because the foundational assumption of this entire structure was that we could protect them; we could not even protect ourselves.”
“We are still living as if it were 1992”
Evaluating the shift in military technology, Davis stated that the US has lost its traditional military superiority. Davis said: “A large number of people in America are still living as if it were 1992. The Soviet Union had just collapsed, China was a peasant army developing militarily and economically, and we held absolute dominance following Operation Desert Storm. We are no longer in 1992. The Russians corrected their mistakes after the initial phase of the Ukraine war in 2022; they became a much stronger land force, missile, and drone force. China, meanwhile, reached immense technological and industrial capacity.”
Explaining the current situation through the example of Iran, Davis said: “We thought we could crush Iran like a fly, but we could not do so due to their missile cities and technologies. If we cannot eliminate Iran, what can we do against China or Russia, which possess power far beyond that? We have fallen behind in categories such as hypersonic missiles and the new Oreshnik missile. When I saw the Bayraktar TB2 vehicles used by the Turks in the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan war, as someone with an armored unit background, I understood that the nature of war had changed. The US, meanwhile, talks about producing 300,000 drones by 2030. In an environment where tactics change every six weeks on the Ukrainian and Russian battlefield, our systems remain extremely slow. Ukrainian soldiers mocked the tank platoon manual published last year, saying that with these methods, one could not survive on the battlefield for even ten minutes.”
“The idea of containing China is a fantasy”
Criticizing the US military approach toward China, Davis evaluated: “There is talk of a strategy to militarily contain China. Will you prevent their activities within their own borders, their technological developments, or the expansion of their military? You cannot stop a country with a strong economy and a massive population. We can achieve no result other than entering a war with China in the Asia-Pacific region and losing it. China’s shipbuilding capacity is approximately 200 times ours; they are vastly superior to us in artillery ammunition, aircraft, and missile production. Our methods left over from the Cold War no longer work. What we need to do is keep our own defense strong and ensure deterrence, not spend billions of dollars in the region to establish forward bases that will be hit.”
Touching upon the potential for diplomatic relations between the two countries, Davis said: “I think President Trump personally knows that going to war with China is unwise. However, the Pentagon and the military-industrial complex view China as a constant enemy, demanding more budget, more bases, and more missiles every year. No one considers diplomacy. Yet we can develop peaceful, stable relations with China based on mutual benefit, even if not friendly. Regarding Taiwan as well, I think leaders realize after seeing what occurred in the Middle East and Ukraine that help will not come, and they will adopt a more cooperative stance by withdrawing independence rhetoric. China does not want to start a war; it desires a model similar to Hong Kong. Even if a conflict breaks out in the worst-case scenario, it is between China and Taiwan; the US should not choose to join the war and lose.”
Emphasizing that the arms lobby inside the US maintains its power, Davis stated: “The military-industrial complex remains extremely powerful and holds all levers of power. They maintain control through members of Congress, the media, and public relations networks; I see no sign that this structure is weakening.”
“They did not want someone who would tell the truth about Israel”
Providing information about the process surrounding the cancellation of his appointment within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Davis recounted the issue in these words: “When Tulsi Gabbard came to me and asked me to become the number three executive in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, I said I would be honored to serve my country. However, I stated that I had openly opposed the policies pursued by Israel since October 7 and the war in Gaza and Lebanon, and that these views might not be welcomed within the administration. She thought my accurate past analyses would compensate for this situation. One of my duties was to present the daily intelligence briefing to the president.”
Describing the stage at which his candidacy was withdrawn, Davis said: “Articles against me appeared in the Israeli press and American media. I never hid my views; I said Benjamin Netanyahu’s policies were harming Israel and dragging us down as well. I advocate the ‘America First’ principle, but there are many people within the administration who say ‘Israel First’ and have zero tolerance for any criticism directed at Netanyahu. They did not want someone who would tell the truth regarding Israel. The process expanded following posts by figures like Laura Loomer. On the day I passed the CIA polygraph test and was set to begin duty, Susie Wiles was informed that I had put the president in a difficult position regarding the Russia-Ukraine war. While Trump was saying there would be a ceasefire, I stated on my program that Vladimir Putin would not agree to a ceasefire given his current advantage. Although I stated that I supported a ceasefire, this was made a pretext, and my appointment offer was withdrawn,” completing the interview.
Interview
Quincy Institute expert says the United States had no plan B
In an interview with Harici Media, Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, stated that global unipolarity is coming to an end, transitioning into an increasingly multipolar order.
Parsi addressed shifting global power dynamics, US foreign policy toward China, structural domestic pressures in Washington, and the strategic miscalculations surrounding the ongoing US conflict with Iran.
Parsi noted that while many analysts declare the arrival of a post-American world, the transition will not be an abrupt moment. Instead, he described a phased emergence where it becomes clear that no single superpower possesses deterministic influence over global affairs.
Parsi observed that many governments have been slow to internalize this reality or adjust their policies accordingly, creating the superficial illusion that a unipolar system remains intact. “Whether it’s fully multipolar or other configurations, we can be debated. What I think is clear is that the unipolarity is coming to an end,” Parsi said.
“Unipolarity is an aberration, an abnormality”
Regarding Washington’s readiness for a multipolar world, Parsi asserted that the US political establishment remains unprepared and has historically denied the shift. He recalled that during the first two years of the Biden administration, describing the world as multipolar was dismissed as a Russian propaganda narrative.
However, Parsi highlighted a shift under US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who stated in a February 2025 interview that unipolarity was an anomaly. Parsi explained, “He actually went further. He said that unipolarity is an aberration, an abnormality, a historical accident. If you believe that it’s a historical accident, if you believe that it’s an abnormality, then I think it comes from that, that any effort to try to restore unipolarity should be rejected.”
Addressing US policy toward China, Parsi noted that despite the summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, there is no structural indication that Washington views Beijing as a potential partner rather than a rival.
He contrasted the Biden administration’s aggressive posture—which assumed an existential struggle for dominance—with the Trump administration’s softer but poorly planned approach.
Parsi argued that neither power can decisively defeat the other, making mutual coexistence and co-governance essential to avoid a catastrophic zero-sum confrontation.
“An effort to indefinitely contain China is a recipe for disaster”
Parsi rejected the feasibility of military containment against Beijing, warning of severe consequences. “I think an effort to indefinitely contain China is a recipe that will bring about great power competition and a confrontation between the US and China that is going to be completely disastrous,” Parsi stated.
He observed that despite significant US strategic errors, such as the conflict with Iran, China has exercised restraint rather than exploiting American vulnerabilities. Parsi argued that if Beijing were dead-set on aggressive power competition, it would have acted differently.
Economically, Parsi argued that containing China through tariffs or Soviet-era containment models is a losing proposition.
Unlike the Soviet Union, which maintained an isolated economic model, China is deeply integrated into global trade and serves as the primary trading partner for most nations, including those in Latin America such as Brazil. Parsi emphasized that economic containment is unviable against a state with such vast global integration.
“This confrontation will be the deadliest conflict in human history”
Evaluating the risk of the “Thucydides Trap,” Parsi criticized the Washington foreign policy establishment for its structural inability to envision peaceful coexistence.
He noted that the political culture in Washington is built around zero-sum competition and conflict rather than diplomatic management.
Parsi emphasized that while historical precedents exist, humanity is not bound to repeat them, particularly when the stakes involve existential risks. Parsi warned that an unmanaged confrontation between the US and China “would be the deadliest conflict in human history if it is allowed to happen,” threatening human survival itself.
Parsi attributed this narrow strategic focus to structural domestic forces, particularly the US military-industrial complex and influential lobbying groups. Working alongside the grand strategy of liberal hegemony, these forces require US military dominance worldwide, especially in Asia.
Parsi explained that institutional inertia makes it extraordinarily difficult for Washington to alter its strategic trajectory.
“The US had an unrealistic plan A and no plan B”
Turning to the conflict with Iran, Parsi asserted that Washington lacks a coherent strategy, having relied on an unrealistic plan that failed within the first three days.
He stated that the US expected a swift regime collapse or surrender within four days, but faced horizontal escalation from Iran, including threats to the Strait of Hormuz and regional strikes.
“The United States had a very unrealistic plan A and no plan B, and it’s been stuck in that situation ever since,” Parsi said, adding that Washington has been improvising and executing tactical operations without strategic success.
Parsi attributed President Trump’s shifting decisions on Iran to this absence of strategy and his personal demand for immediate results. When military action failed to yield swift progress, Trump turned to diplomacy, only to lose patience within three weeks and resume military strikes. Parsi questioned whether the global community could afford a superpower acting in such an erratic manner.
“Without Israel’s push, there would not have been a war with Iran”
Addressing Israel’s role, Parsi stated that Israeli pressure was a decisive factor in driving US policy toward confrontation with Iran.
“Without Israel’s push, there would not have been a war with Iran. Without Trump agreeing to the Israelis, there would not have been a war with Iran. Both of them were needed,” Parsi remarked, noting that Israeli efforts since 1995 elevated Iran into a primary US national security concern disproportionate to actual US interests in the region.
Parsi identified a growing divergence between US and Israeli interests in the Middle East. While the US benefits from reducing its regional military footprint of 50,000 troops, Israel requires continuous US military presence and intervention to maintain a favorable regional balance of power.
Parsi noted that this divergence has created a visible rift between Washington and Tel Aviv following the poor execution of the war and subsequent diplomatic maneuvers.
“Israel’s standing amongst the American public has plummeted”
Parsi highlighted a major shift in American public opinion regarding Israel, noting that sympathy for Palestinians has surpassed sympathy for Israel across almost every demographic category, except Republicans over the age of 65.
He attributed this decline directly to Israel’s military actions in Gaza and its perceived role in drawing the US into a disastrous war with Iran, which mirrored earlier public grievances over the Iraq War.
Regarding a resolution to the conflict, Parsi stated that a dignified exit for both the US and Iran remains possible, though the window is narrowing due to personal hostility and political miscalculations.
Finally, addressing Trump’s political image, Parsi clarified that Trump was never strictly anti-war, but rather anti-risk.
He explained that Trump entered the conflict because Israeli officials convinced him that war with Iran posed little risk and would be concluded within 100 hours. Parsi concluded that had Trump not been misled into believing the operation would be a swift success, he would not have initiated it.
Interview
Why did Trump step back from a decision to launch a new attack on Iran?
Conflicting statements from the US and Iran regarding the potential resumption of diplomatic negotiations have emerged, while ongoing tensions in the Strait of Hormuz have once again brought global energy concerns to the fore.
Addressing these developments on the Harici live broadcast of Strategic Compass, international relations scholar Prof. Dr. Hasan Unal and Alptekin Dursunoglu, journalist, author, and Editor-in-Chief of Yakin Dogu Haber (YDH), evaluated the internal, regional, and strategic dimensions of the conflict. The discussion focused on the shift in Iran’s military doctrine, the political strain within the US administration, the economic vulnerability of Gulf monarchies, and the broader realignments reshaping Middle Eastern geopolitics.
Why did Trump step back from a decision to launch a new attack on Iran?
Opening the discussion, Prof. Dr. Hasan Unal offered a sharp critique of the political rhetoric originating from Washington, contrasting executive declarations with the tactical outcomes on the ground. Unal argued that public statements made by former US President Donald Trump increasingly lack analytical consistency, complicating efforts to decipher official US strategy.
“He has reached a point where he tells more lies than the daily meowing of stray cats,” Unal remarked during the broadcast. “I do not know which part of his statements we ought to analyze, but if we evaluate him within a broader framework, it becomes possible to reach certain conclusions.”
Unal described the military confrontation between Washington and Tehran as an uneven cycle of escalation, noting that US forces continue to suffer casualties and incur immense financial costs without altering the strategic baseline. “The situation has effectively transformed into something like a defeated wrestler who never grows tired of wrestling; America repeatedly approaches and confronts Iran, yet the outcome is obvious from the outset,” Unal stated. He added that American military personnel are being deployed into conflict zones where national interests remain obscure: “I am certain that American soldiers there largely believe they have no personal interests at stake… and that it serves at most the interests of Israel.”
Dursunoglu contextualised the current phase of hostilities as part of an extended campaign, comparing the recent clashes to a second round of a broader regional conflict following earlier engagements in 2025. He noted that despite assertive claims from Washington regarding the destruction of Iranian military infrastructure, operational continuity on the Iranian side forced a shift in US messaging.
Reflecting on official declarations from US Central Command (CENTCOM) and executive statements following intensive strikes, Unal highlighted the internal contradictions in Washington’s narrative: “Trump claimed Iranian naval forces were sent to the bottom of the sea, the air force beyond the atmosphere, and the ground forces deep into the magma. Yet suddenly he declared, ‘I have forgiven Iran,’ while CENTCOM figures suggested they had reached ‘target saturation’—as if there was simply nothing left to hit.”
Is Iran insisting on its conditions regarding the Strait of Hormuz?
A central focus of the analysis was Iran’s response mechanism following the breakdown of initial ceasefire frameworks. Dursunoglu highlighted a significant structural transition in Tehran’s military posture, moving from traditional reactive containment to proactive deterrence across multiple theatres.
Dursunoglu pointed out that during the escalation, Iran did not restrict its target matrix to immediate points of contact. Instead, Iranian forces conducted strikes against US installations and logistical networks across the region, including facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, and Oman.
“Iran’s traditional defence doctrine was defensive and based on proportional retaliation,” Dursunoglu explained. “However, after the US halted strikes, Iran proceeded to target assets in Jordan and Kuwait without immediate prior attacks on those specific vectors. This indicates that Iran has begun executing preemptive strikes, effectively adapting its strategic posture.”
Unal underscored the severity of these strikes on regional logistics, noting that Iranian counter-strikes targeted the port of Aqaba and airport infrastructure in Jordan, alongside American operational facilities in the Gulf. “According to the accounts, Iranian forces began hitting American installations in Gulf states and Jordan within minutes of initial strikes, effectively neutralizing the operational depth the US relied upon,” Unal noted.
The operational status of the Strait of Hormuz remains a decisive point of leverage. Under previous draft frameworks negotiated through Omani mediation, administrative oversight of maritime traffic through the Strait was slated to transition to Iran in coordination with regional littoral states. However, subsequent US efforts to establish an independent naval corridor along the Omani coast triggered a fresh wave of Iranian interdictions.
Dursunoglu outlined the ongoing negotiations surrounding the maritime passage, noting that attempts to bypass Iranian oversight proved unviable for commercial shipping. Under the latest proposals under discussion via Omani channels, incoming maritime traffic into the Gulf would pass through Iranian-designated corridors under Iranian authorization, while outgoing traffic would proceed along Omani coastal waters following notification and approval.
“If an agreement is finalized on these terms, it represents an explicit recognition of Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz by the US regime,” Dursunoglu said. He noted that while initial terms provided free passage during a temporary 60-day window, long-term frameworks anticipate structured administrative mechanisms for commercial vessels. Unal added: “Whether designated as transit fees, environmental charges, or security provisions, formalizing maritime oversight secures a permanent structural advantage for Tehran.”
Under what conditions will negotiations begin?
The economic ramifications of maritime disruption have also altered the calculations of Gulf export nations. Following attempts by Saudi Arabia to engage Ansar Allah (Houthi) forces in Yemen, retaliatory actions against critical infrastructure—including the Yanbu crude oil pipeline on the Red Sea—severely constrained alternative export routes.
“By drawing Yemeni forces back into active conflict, Saudi Arabia inadvertently placed its secondary export avenues under direct fire,” Unal observed. “The vulnerability of the Yanbu pipeline demonstrates that reliance on the Gulf cannot be bypassed easily, effectively increasing regional dependence on stability within the Strait.”
Beyond the maritime domain, the broadcast addressed heavy Iranian military engagements in northern Iraq, targeting opposition groups including the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), Komala, Pak, and Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK) along the Erbil-Suleimaniyeh axis.
Dursunoglu and Unal noted that cross-border strikes destroyed substantial ammunition depots established near border regions, followed by reported ground operations conducted by specialized Iranian units.
“Iranian special forces executed targeted ground operations across the border,” Dursunoglu stated, pointing to secondary explosions captured in operational footage as evidence of extensive pre-positioned armaments.
Unal noted that these operations underscored the strategic limitations of non-state actors aligned with Washington: “The expectations placed on armed factions in northern Iraq collapsed when confronted with direct military pressure. The narrative that these groups could serve as an internal wedge against Tehran proved to be a costly miscalculation for US planners.”
Reports indicating the start of a repositioning of US personnel and heavy military equipment from bases in Iraq and the Gulf toward Jordan and Israel were identified as a direct consequence of this vulnerability. “US forces are consolidating toward Jordan and Israel because their facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait sustained structural operational damage,” Dursunoglu observed. “When a state can no longer defend its forward command centers—such as the 5th Fleet infrastructure in Bahrain—it is forced to retreat to secondary defensive perimeters.”
How effective is the pressure from Gulf countries for negotiations?
Concluding the evaluation, Unal and Dursunoglu examined the broader diplomatic landscape, focusing on security dialogues among regional powers, including Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. Both analysts agreed that any sustainable security architecture in the Middle East must incorporate Iran rather than seek its exclusion.
“How can you construct a new regional order by excluding the very nation that demonstrated the capacity to neutralize external military dominance?” Dursunoglu questioned. “An architecture that relies on Western guarantees or Israeli alignment fails to address the underlying security dynamics of the region.”
Unal reflected on the historical trajectories of Turkish foreign policy, criticizing past ideological approaches that fuelled regional fragmentation and sect-based antagonisms. He noted that realpolitik dictates close functional coordination between Ankara and Tehran despite historical differences.
“Iran’s resistance ultimately prevented the imposition of a security framework dictated entirely by external actors,” Unal concluded. “Responsible analysis requires recognizing that stability in the Middle East cannot be achieved through foreign intervention or regional fragmentation, but through direct, autonomous security coordination among the region’s core nations.”
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