President Erdoğan’s visit to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), the messages he conveyed there for the recognition of the TRNC and his announcement that he would be back on the island on the anniversary of the Happy Peace Operation (July 20, 1974) are important in many ways. First of all, it is completely correct and accurate in terms of continuing the tradition that every prime minister/president who takes office makes his first foreign trip to the TRNC (the second one being Azerbaijan). In addition, having been adopted since the election of Ersin Tatar as the TRNC President in late 2020 and materialized by Türkiye especially with Erdoğan’s statements, the reiteration of the two-state solution has also revealed what kind of policy will be followed on Cyprus after the elections. Erdoğan’s speeches delivered in Cyprus on July 20, 2021 and at the UN General Assembly the following year (September 20, 2022), in which he called on all countries of the world to recognize the TRNC and ensured that the TRNC was admitted as an observer member to the Organization of Turkic States (Hungary has the same status in the OTS), constituted the main axis of the Cyprus policy. Although during the election campaign, the opposition’s foreign policy spokespersons gave the impression that they would revise this policy, these possibilities seem to have completely disappeared since they lost the elections. Erdoğan’s recent statements have only reinforced this policy.
While two-state solutions are generally accepted in the aftermath of decolonization when one of the nations living in a country/region does not recognize the sovereignty of the other or when there are different sovereignty claims over a piece of land, as in the case of Israel-Palestine, the Western world has been making extraordinary efforts for decades to prevent such a solution in Cyprus. The essence of the Cyprus issue, spearheaded by the US and the UK, and with the involvement of the European Union due to Türkiye’s mistakes, is the effort to remove Türkiye from the island, and it is the Collective West that has been trying to accomplish that through many ways and means to this day. However, while the rapidly emerging multipolarity is leading to a gradual/relative decline in the power of the Western world, it is exponentially increasing the importance of a medium-sized country like Türkiye, and thus seems to allow Ankara’s policies to achieve results in many issues, especially in the Cyprus issue.
RUSSIAN INITIATIVE FOR RECOGNITION OF CYPRUS
It is futile to expect the Collective West to be sympathetic to the solution of the Cyprus issue. The Western world only accepts new situations and developments or adapts itself to the new situation when a situation arises that it cannot influence. Therefore, the fact that Türkiye and/or the TRNC authorities have made statements about a ‘two-state solution on the basis of sovereign equality’ will not persuade Western states; it will only force them to face new realities.
It is impossible to solve the Cyprus question with Western formulations, since it is the Collective West that has complicated the issue in the first place. The fact that the Greek Cypriot side has been admitted to the EU under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, representing the whole island, has completely eliminated the possibility of solving the problem in line with the sovereign will of Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriots, since for the US and the EU, and for Greece and the Greek Cypriots acting with their support, any solution means the effective establishment of the sovereignty of the Greek Cypriot state over the whole island, which the Greeks consider to belong to them, including the territory of the TRNC. Thus, the entire island of Cyprus will become an EU territory and the opportunity to become a NATO member will be sought. On the other hand, since Türkiye and the TRNC insist on the ‘two sovereign states’ thesis, it does not seem possible to solve the problem at the negotiation table. Since there will be no war unless circumstances dictate, there is no doubt that the struggle of the parties to insist on their current positions and to impose their own conditions on the other side will continue in a world that is evolving towards multipolarity.
In a multipolar world, the Collective West is diplomatically opposed to Türkiye and the TRNC’s ‘solution on the basis of two independent sovereign states’ thesis, but is also aware that their ability to exert pressure on Ankara is considerably diminished. It is not only impossible for the Collective West to put pressure on Türkiye, one of the medium-sized states that play an important role in shifting or even contributing to changing the balances alongside the superpowers that have decisive power and capabilities in a multipolar world, but it is also clear that there will be a significant increase in the number of states that will not yield to the pressure of Western states that have been keeping a tight grip on all states for decades, for example, in preventing the recognition of the TRNC, and we have already started to see examples of this on many occasions. The complete collapse of the assumptions of the Western propaganda machine from the early days of the Ukraine war that Russia would soon be brought to its knees by sanctions and arms aid to Ukraine, and that China would be brought into line, has brought many states in every continent of the world to the point of being bolder against the Collective West. But all this does not automatically lead to the recognition of the TRNC. In this multipolar world, where many developments that would have been unimaginable during the Cold War and in a unipolar world order are possible, it is necessary to develop official, semi-official and unofficial policies for the promotion of the TRNC in each state individually and to keep them constantly updated.
Russia is one of the states where intensive efforts should be made to promote the TRNC, since Moscow’s old arguments for a one-state solution in Cyprus no longer have anything in its favor. For example, a solution to the Cyprus problem under a single state, under the Annan Plan or any other model, would automatically make the island an EU territory. Since such a solution can only be achieved through/as a result of Türkiye’s handshake with the US, the UK and the EU, a solution to the Cyprus problem would not only be contrary to Moscow’s national interests, but would also harm Russia’s overall strategic posture, as it would result in Türkiye’s further alignment with the Collective West. In the case of Cyprus, while Russia is engaged in a war in the former Eastern Europe and now in Ukraine and Georgia, taking the risk of using nuclear weapons to prevent NATO’s expansion, it would be condoning and even supporting the EU and NATO to turn a very important island with the capacity to control a very important region of the world such as the Eastern Mediterranean into EU and NATO territory. On the other hand, while during the Cold War the Soviet Union and later the Russian Federation wanted the Turkish-Greek rift within NATO to continue to deepen, a Russia that now supports a one-state solution in Cyprus would be harming its own strategic interests, as such a policy and the outcome would directly and significantly contribute to solidarity within NATO. In short, the one-state solution model does not serve any of Moscow’s interests.
On the contrary, a two-state solution would put an end to the possibility of the entire island becoming EU and NATO territory and would serve Moscow’s strategic interests by deepening the Türkiye-Greece rift within NATO. Moreover, such a solution would prevent Türkiye from becoming an outpost of the Collective West against Russia, and Türkiye, remaining in NATO, would continue to criticize the West’s anti-Russian policies and maintain its economic, commercial, political and even military relations with Moscow. The fact that Greece and Greek Cypriots have acted as the spearhead of the Collective West against Russia since the Ukraine war has also facilitated this process.
So how can this outcome be achieved? Ankara’s declaration of a two-state solution in Cyprus alone may not be enough to achieve this outcome. While we expect that Azerbaijan will recognize the TRNC after the peace treaty with Armenia (it could be before), this issue will also need to be discussed with Russia at the highest levels. For example, the fact that the Syrian issue, one of the most troublesome problems between Russia and Türkiye, has entered the stage of being resolved largely through Moscow’s mediation may facilitate the discussion of this issue between Ankara and Moscow. In any case, as part of a compromise with Syria, Syria should be asked to recognize the TRNC while Türkiye transfers the territories under its control to the sovereignty of the Damascus administration and a full compromise is reached on other issues.
If Ankara reaches a peace and compromise in Syria in return for a TRNC agreement/reconciliation with Moscow, which is also in its own interest, it will result in Russia crowning its military successes with a diplomatic victory, which will give momentum to Ankara-Moscow relations and greatly break the will of Greece and the Greeks to fight. The Western world will not be able to do more than a few ‘we do not accept’ statements and Türkiye will force Greece and the Greeks to face the realities of multipolarity by getting Azerbaijan, the Turkic World states (except Uzbekistan at first), Pakistan, most of the Arab World countries with which we have normalized our relations, and many other states with which we provide humanitarian aid and have good relations to recognize the TRNC. Let us not forget that the fault lines of multipolarity pass through this geography. If we make the building strong, that is, if we set up the game in accordance with the spirit of multipolarity, we will get results and the ghost buildings built by the Greece-Greek Cypriot side on the power of others will collapse. Why not?
