Interview
Who won the Israel-Iran war? Retired Rear Admiral Alaettin Sevim speaks to Harici
Although the 12-day Israel-Iran war appears to have concluded for now with a ceasefire through the intervention of US President Donald Trump, tensions in the region persist. This brief conflict has left many questions in its wake. Is the war truly over? Who were the winners and losers? Were Iran’s nuclear facilities really destroyed? Many questions are still being debated. We posed some of these questions to Retired Rear Admiral and Istanbul Kent University Lecturer Dr. Alaettin Sevim.
The US intervened in the Israel-Iran war on day 10 and by day 12, declared, “that’s enough, the war is over.” What is the significance of the US trying to enter and exit this conflict so quickly? Or was this a tactical maneuver or a diversion, much like Trump’s actions at the negotiating table?
In my opinion, America, and President Trump in particular, was not a strong supporter of this war. It did not want to intervene but was forced to do so. Consequently, an offensive was carried out in proportion to America’s technological sophistication and its weight in world politics. However, my belief is that this was a pre-notified offensive with minimized impact. This is based on the fact that the targeted nuclear facilities began evacuating two days prior, and even though this evacuation was observed and detected, the units supporting and carrying out the evacuation were not subjected to any attack. Similarly, I assess that Iran’s response to America—the attack on the air base in Qatar—also appears to have been a pre-arranged and mutually approved attack, given that it was pre-announced and targeted evacuated bases. Therefore, I believe that America, and President Trump in particular, did not want this war, that a limited intervention was carried out, and that this was met with an equally limited and pre-planned response, bringing the war to a ceasefire for the time being.
Do you believe this conflict has ended and that the ceasefire between Israel and Iran could be permanent? Or were the parties simply sizing each other up for the next conflict?
I believe it [the ceasefire] will hold for a while. The main determining factors here will be whether Iran continues its nuclear program and how much pressure Netanyahu might be under domestically in Israel. These are important issues. I believe these were the fundamental reasons for the war breaking out in the first place. If a de-escalation can be achieved on these fronts, I assess that the ceasefire will continue for at least some time.
There was constant talk of the conflict escalating into a regional war. In this context, a scenario like Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz was also mentioned. Do you see such a risk? Or do you think the risk of Hormuz being closed has passed for now?
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran could only happen if Iran is in a very difficult position and has no other choice left. What could that entail? For example, if Iran’s oil facilities are hit, its ability to export oil diminishes, the regime is endangered, the Iranian government is threatened, uprisings begin, and Iran is left with no other option, then the closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran could be on the table. Otherwise, it would be like shooting itself in the foot. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz would also affect Iran’s own trade. It is clear that its oil product shipments, especially to China, would be blocked. This is something that Iran and its allies would not want. Therefore, I assess that the closure of the Strait of Hormuz could only be considered at a point where the war has escalated significantly and Iran, having no other recourse, is willing to risk everything. I do not see this as possible in the near future.
In the Israel-Iran conflict, air forces and missile capabilities were the focus. However, important maritime trade routes from Hormuz to the Red Sea were also on edge. Could this have triggered tensions where navies might take the stage?
Yes, a key feature of modern warfare is the absolute necessity of air power. You cannot end a war with air power alone, but you will certainly lose a war without it. It has become clear that you must develop your air power in line with your objectives and your ability to deploy it against enemy air forces.
As for navies in the region, they are already on the stage. Navies have always had a presence in the region in recent times. They are still present. Depending on the escalation of the crisis, an increase in the naval presence in the region is possible. For example, in the most recent American offensive, cruise missiles launched from submarines were used. Therefore, we must always bear in mind that America and other nations have a visible and invisible naval presence in the region at all times, and that this presence can increase or decrease depending on how the crisis develops. But a naval presence will always continue in the region, whether through bases or through invisible assets like submarines.
How do you think China and Moscow viewed these interventions by the US and Israel? Can it be said that these two capitals were caught in a dilemma: trying to avoid a confrontation with the US while also protecting their ally?
It appears that Russia may have made some effort to limit the American intervention. Russia’s recent statements, in particular, have been noteworthy. For example, they stated that they had been informing Israel for a very long time that Iran did not have any capacity to develop nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Putin’s statement that the US intervention would affect regional and even world peace was also remarkable. China’s public statements, at least the ones we’ve seen, remained more low-key compared to Russia’s. But as an important ally of Iran, we see China taking Iran’s side, at least at the level of official statements or public declarations of support. Here, I assess that Russia, in particular, may have been trying to persuade America behind closed doors.
In conclusion, I assess that Israel gained an advantage through the damage it inflicted on Iran’s infrastructure and nuclear capacity, but that Iran won by not losing the war. I believe that Iran’s capacity to respond to Israel—its capacity for reaction—was underestimated, and it was a mistake not to consider that it could retaliate for such a long period, even if with long-range missiles. For this reason, in my opinion, Iran is considered a winner for not having lost this war.