Why China will not provide military aid to Iran

In June 2025, Israel and Iran engaged in a 12-day conflict. During that period, the author was attending an international conference in Istanbul on major-power competition in the Middle East, where many questions were raised about why China does not provide military aid to Iran. Today, as Israel and the United States have once again launched attacks against Iran, this question has resurfaced. In fact, for anyone with an understanding of China’s diplomatic principles, national interests, views on international norms, attitudes toward war, and China-Iran relations, it is not difficult to comprehend why China has adopted such a position. While China will not directly take part in the war against Iran or send troops to fight, it will offer support and fulfill its responsibilities as a major responsible country. At its core, China’s approach is to promote peace talks, provide support without engaging in conflict, and safeguard sovereignty and stability.

I. China’s diplomatic principles determine that it will not provide military aid to Iran.

First, China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace, adhering to partnership rather than alliance and not targeting any third party. China has drawn lessons from history, especially the great-power rivalry during the Cold War, where alliances sometimes became liabilities for major powers, dragging them into confrontation and war. Although China and Iran maintain a comprehensive strategic partnership, they are not military allies, and partnership is not equivalent to “alliance” in the Western sense. Therefore, China and Iran have no mutual defense treaty, and China bears no legal or moral obligation to provide military aid.

Second, China strictly abides by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, including non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs and opposition to resolving disputes through force. If China were to provide military aid to Iran, it would amount to taking sides and deeply intervening in regional conflicts, which runs counter to the fundamental norms of China’s diplomacy.

II. China’s national interests dictate that it will not provide military aid to Iran.

At present, a key priority for China in the Middle East is advancing the high-quality development of the Belt and Road Initiative. China is well aware that deepening engagement with Middle Eastern countries under the BRI is a vital pathway to further develop China’s western regions, upgrade its opening-up, accelerate Eurasian connectivity, and strengthen the trend of globalization. Therefore, China desires a Middle East that is peaceful, stable, and prosperous. Under no circumstances will China provide direct military aid, as this would escalate conflicts, drive up oil prices, and adversely impact China’s economic and energy security. Furthermore, warfare in the Middle East would endanger China’s overseas assets, disrupt supply chains, and threaten the safety of Chinese nationals abroad.

More importantly, China has no intention of engaging in great-power rivalry with the United States in the Middle East, nor does it seek to replace the U.S. position there. Moreover, while the U.S. maintains numerous military bases and troops across many Middle Eastern countries, China has not a single soldier stationed in the region. Providing military aid to Iran would mean a direct, head-on confrontation with U.S. forces, dragging China into an all-out military rivalry with the United States. This runs completely counter to China’s commitment to strategic autonomy and its bottom line of security.

III. International rules also prohibit China from providing military assistance to Iran.

First, relevant UN Security Council resolutions impose strict restrictions on the transfer of conventional weapons to Iran, and offensive weapons may not be supplied without authorization. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China strictly abides by UN sanctions and arms control policies.

Second, China maintains good relations not only with Iran but also with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and even Israel in the Middle East. China pursues a balanced diplomatic strategy in the region. It will not deliberately intervene in the Middle East, disrupt the regional balance of power, trigger an arms race and chain reactions of conflicts, and undermine its overall strategic arrangement.

Third, China has always adhered to the three principles of arms export, which prohibit the supply of lethal weapons to conflict zones. China’s three principles on arms exports are statutory criteria enshrined in the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of Arms Exports and the Export Control Law, and are among the strictest rules governing global arms trade. They are:1, to contribute to the legitimate self-defense capability of the recipient country; 2, not to impair the peace, security and stability of the region and the world at large; 3, not to interfere in the internal affairs of the recipient country. These three principles are not diplomatic rhetoric, but red-line provisions implemented across the entire chain from approval and production to export and traceability.

IV. The current development of China-Iran relations and Iran’s perception of China also do not support China in providing Iran with unrestricted and all-round support.

First, there are still many pro-Western and pro-U.S. factions within Iran that hold strong illusions about the United States and the West. For many years, Iran has repeatedly hoped to reach new agreements through negotiation and compromise to have sanctions lifted, sometimes even at the expense of China’s interests.

Second, Iran’s current predicament is largely due to its own economic difficulties. Although China and Iran signed a 25-year cooperation agreement, under which China sought to deepen bilateral ties through economic cooperation, the implementation and effectiveness of the agreement have been significantly undermined. This is due to Iran’s own problems: it tends to favor European and American enterprises, and also its domestic investment environment carries huge risks.

Third, Iran has long positioned itself as a standard-bearer in the global chessboard, often using cooperation with China as a bargaining chip in its rivalry with the United States. It demands China’s unconditional support for its anti-U.S. stance without fully taking into account China’s overall diplomatic arrangements.

In recent years, the international relations community has frequently discussed the so-called “China-Russia-Iran strategic triangle”. However, due to the huge gaps in national strength and divergent strategic goals among the three countries — especially Iran’s capacity constraints — such a “strategic triangle” is not a realistic concept.

On March 8, 2026, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi answered questions from Chinese and foreign reporters on issues related to “China’s Foreign Policy and External Relations”. In response to questions concerning the situation in Iran, Wang Yi quoted two profound and enlightening ancient Chinese maxims.

One is: “Weapons are instruments of harm and must be used with the utmost caution.” This not only articulates China’s position of advocating a ceasefire and an end to hostilities but also serves as an appeal: for an immediate halt to military operations, to prevent the situation from escalating in cycles, and to avoid the spread of conflict beyond its borders.

The other is: “When benevolence and justice are not practiced, the balance between offense and defense shifts.” This points out that major powers ought to uphold fairness and righteousness, and contribute more positive energy to peace and development in the Middle East.

Recently, there have been calls for China to provide military support to Iran, but these are essentially urging China to fall into a trap that could trigger wider confrontation, even a world war. The situation in the Middle East is highly complex and intertwined, and history is replete with lessons of major-power military intervention. China maintains strategic composure, refuses to be dragged into proxy wars or a new Cold War, and stays committed to resolving issues through the United Nations and multilateral frameworks. This is not weakness; it is wisdom based on long-term considerations and the common interests of all humanity.

The Western debate over whether China is “standing by and letting Iran suffer” reflects a clash between two fundamentally distinct concepts of international relations and approaches to crisis management. One side is accustomed to dividing blocs by force and resolving disputes through military means. The other advocates dialogue over confrontation, partnership over alliance, and win‑win results rather than zero‑sum games. In the war‑torn Middle East, the latter voice may not sound “dramatic” or “radical” enough, yet it is likely the only hope to prevent more bloodshed and help the region break free from the cycle of vendetta and retaliation.

China’s decision not to provide military aid to Iran is a comprehensive embodiment of upholding principles, safeguarding national interests, abiding by international rules, and assuming due responsibilities. This does not mean China will stand idly by amid the crisis facing Iran. Instead, China adopts a stance of “urging peace without entering the war, and supporting without engaging in conflict.” Diplomatically, China has opposed unilateral sanctions and military adventurism on various occasions including the United Nations, and pushed for a ceasefire and negotiations. Economically, China has ensured the stability of energy and trade channels, and used local currency settlement to offset the impact of Western sanctions. Morally, China has firmly supported Iran in safeguarding its national sovereignty and legitimate rights and interests, and opposed external military interference. Such a position not only serves China’s long-term interests but also best contributes to regional peace and stability.

Yang Chen
Associate Professor & Executive Director, Center for Turkish Studies, Shanghai University