Following the conclusion of the Cold War in 1991 and the circulation of the Greater Middle East Project (later renamed the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative) in the 2000s, the United States never ceased to recite the following concepts: Preemptive strike. Controlled instability. Hybrid warfare. Asymmetric warfare. Liberating occupation. Humanitarian imperialism\u2026<\/p>\n
In this manner, US imperialism fabricated pretexts to invade nations it could not dismantle through psychological warfare, perception management, social engineering, clandestine warfare tactics, or fifth-column activities. It listed excuses. It claimed that its attacks and occupations were undertaken for the welfare of that country\u2019s people. It asserted that it was delivering human rights, democracy, and freedom to the nations it occupied. While invading its target countries, it naturally had another justification: The global war on terror. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the US utilized the conjuncture effectively and efficiently for its own ends. The concrete examples of this were the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.<\/p>\n
The US no longer cites human rights, democracy, or freedom when it attacks and occupies. US President Trump feels no need to conceal imperialist barbarism, piracy, banditry, or arrogance. He explicitly states that he has set his sights on the oil. He underscores that he does not care about international law. Indeed, this is what he did in Venezuela. Therefore, one must never forget the phrase widely used in the US: “It is the oil, stupid.”<\/p>\n
Soft power vs. hard power<\/strong><\/p>\n The days when the US deployed its soft power (culture, media, science, academia, art, sports, education, music, cinema, fashion, lifestyle, etc.) to establish hegemony, intending primarily to manufacture consent in the target country and desiring to maintain US leadership in this manner, are long gone. There are several reasons for this.<\/p>\n First, there is an erosion in the US capability to manufacture consent and in its soft power elements, just as there is in its economic and political power. Second, the elements and instruments of soft power are no longer as alluring; they do not yield the same premium as before. Third, a president who places no importance on soft power sits in the White House.<\/p>\n Furthermore, just as the US is not the US of old, the world is not the world of old. Anti-Americanism is very high globally. No one believes the lie of the “global struggle against terror” on the US tongue, nor its promises of democracy and freedom. The days of Pax Americana are behind us. The approach that the rulers of the US attempted to ground\u2014both politically and ideologically, as well as morally and religiously\u2014in the maxim “what is good for the US is good for the world” had already collapsed years ago. This is one of the reasons why Trump, who said during his presidential campaign that he would end wars, withdraw troops from the Middle East, and not send US soldiers to other countries, subsequently attacked Venezuela and committed piracy.<\/p>\n Moreover, Trump is considering the midterm elections in 2026. He is aware of the polarization within US society, the weakening domestic front, the chasm between wealth and destitution, the country\u2019s massive external debt, and the high foreign trade deficit.<\/p>\n The US certainly faces other impasses. For instance, it failed to drive a wedge between China and Russia. For instance, it could not prevent the shift away from the US dollar in foreign trade. It could not stop many countries from trading in their national currencies. For instance, it did not achieve the results it expected from the trade wars it initiated against China.<\/p>\n The two-and-a-half war strategy is left behind<\/strong><\/p>\n From the US perspective, the two-and-a-half war theory (fighting and occupying in two countries while maintaining a smaller-scale military force in a third, mobilizing other elements to change the regime) has been left behind. In its chosen target regions, it is increasingly mobilizing regional allies, terrorist organizations, and non-state actors.<\/p>\n The US desires to establish an order in the Middle East under the tutelage of Israel. It is pushing Israel to the forefront more than ever before. In Palestine and Lebanon, Israel has largely achieved its desires through genocides. In Syria, Israel is currently far more effective than in the past. Damascus has also accepted the occupation of the Golan Heights. Israel enters Syrian territory, plants flags, interferes in the country’s internal affairs, and bombs military facilities. Israel’s influence over the Barzanis in northern Iraq is also known. Since Iran is a far tougher nut to crack than Syria, the US actively supports Israel regarding Iran as well. It encourages and instigates opposition movements and street demonstrations. The US is satisfied with the Kurdish autonomous administration and the Barzani leadership in northern Iraq. Furthermore, by supporting the PKK\u2013PYD\u2013YPG\u2013SDF terrorist organization, the US exerts pressure on Turkey and Syria.<\/p>\n Against China, which it views as its primary adversary, the US is pushing regional countries, large and small, from Japan to Australia, to the front lines in order to encircle the country from its immediate periphery. It establishes alliances for this purpose. For instance; QUAD (US, Japan, India, Australia) and AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom, US) are such alliances. The US is organizing what are essentially “mini-NATOs,” sister alliances to NATO.<\/p>\n Countries of the Global South, those trying to distance themselves from the US in recent years and turning to develop relations with China and Russia, are naturally wary of US banditry. Medium and small-scale states expect, quite understandably from their perspective, China and Russia to be more active against the US. This expectation was not met in Libya or Syria. Nor was it met in Venezuela. In the event that the US attacks Iran once again, the probability of this expectation being met in Iran is also very low.<\/p>\n Confessions in the US strategy document<\/strong><\/p>\n The national security strategy document released by the US in December 2025 contained significant confessions. In essence, it stated that it is no longer the sole great power in the world, that there are other great powers, though it claimed to be the greatest. It indicated that it would focus on the American continent and implement the Monroe Doctrine (known by the discourse “America for Americans”). It emphasized that it did not care about the European Union at all, and indeed, did not like it. It admitted that it could not be effective everywhere in the world simultaneously. It expressed that because it could not risk competition with China in all corners of the world, from Central Asia to Africa, from the Middle East to Latin America, it would focus on the Western Hemisphere, the New World, its own continent. On January 3, 2026, by attacking Venezuela and kidnapping Maduro and his wife, Trump implemented\u2014in his own words\u2014the “Donroe Doctrine” through banditry, piracy, barbarism, and brigandage.<\/p>\n The fact that Venezuela, the country with the richest oil reserves in the world, sold 80 percent of its produced oil to China had long drawn the ire of the US. The US both usurped Venezuela\u2019s oil and precious metals and exerted pressure on a significant oil supplier of its greatest rival, China. It gained a measure of control over China’s oil imports. Indeed, following his act of piracy, Trump essentially said, “China shouldn’t worry, oil sales to them will continue.”<\/p>\n Will World War III break out?<\/strong><\/p>\n Under these conditions, the following questions come to the minds of many: Will the US and China fight? Will World War III break out?<\/p>\n Even if there is a very sharp, multidimensional, and comprehensive competition between the US and China, the two countries will not enter into a direct hot conflict. Moreover, there are several reasons for them not to do so.<\/p>\n First, the two countries possess very tight cooperation in commercial and economic terms. There is a large volume of trade between them. There are mutual investments. Second, both countries know that there would be no winner in such a war and that it would be very debilitating for the conflicting parties. Third, both countries possess nuclear weapons, which greatly reduces the probability of direct conflict.<\/p>\n Moreover, proxy wars are already underway between the US and China. There is technological competition, economic competition, scientific competition, and commercial competition. There is competition for influence in different countries. There is competition in cyberspace, in the virtual realm, in patent numbers, in software, in information technologies, and in the field of artificial intelligence\u2014and sharply so.<\/p>\n The Cold War era and today<\/strong><\/p>\n Another impasse for the US is this: It is waging a struggle against China that is more complex, more dimensional, and more arduous than the one it waged against the USSR during the Cold War. The USSR dissolved in 1991 without firing a single bullet. The Warsaw Pact collapsed the same year. The US, NATO, and capitalism declared victory. Today, China is different. It has drawn the necessary lessons from the USSR experience. It is challenging the US not ideologically, but primarily economically, technologically, and industrially.<\/p>\n Let us refresh our memories while comparing the competition of today with that of the Cold War era.<\/p>\n First, in the Cold War, ideologies, alliances, and the leading countries of those alliances were distinct. The world and Europe were divided accordingly. The Berlin Wall was the symbol of this division. Today, there are no ideological camp-formations in the world. Alliance relations are different. There are contradictions within alliances. There is fluidity between alliances. There are different tensions between alliances. Explaining the world is not as simple or easy as it was during the Cold War years. Neither politically, ideologically, nor geographically can a distinction similar to that of the Cold War era be made today.<\/p>\n Second, from the onset of the Cold War, the US was very powerful. In the years following World War II, it accounted for half of the world’s total production. In the 1960s, it produced 40 percent of global output. Today, its share in the world economy has fallen below 25 percent, to 22 percent. In calculations based on purchasing power parity, China has become the world\u2019s largest economy. In many sectors, in many areas of production, and in investments made in many regions, the EU has fallen behind China. The US knows this. This is one of the reasons for its anger. Because it cannot prevent it.<\/p>\n Third, alongside Cold War institutions like NATO, the US has very strong influence in organizations like the EU, the World Bank, and the IMF. Today, the EU’s influence is very weak. Against structures like the IMF and the World Bank, alternative institutions led by China have emerged. Furthermore, structures like the SCO and BRICS, and the Belt and Road Initiative, are important. All of these are structures that have been established, developed, and are developing despite the US.<\/p>\n Fourth, during the Cold War, the US had capitalized on the tension between the USSR and China, particularly between 1960 and 1989. Today, however, Russia and China relations are strong. Despite all its desires, the US failed to drive a wedge between the two countries. The US also failed to bring India into line to the extent it desired against China. Even if India experiences significant problems with China, it is too large a country to completely follow in the US\u2019s wake.<\/p>\n Fifth, it appears that the US-China competition will last longer than the Cold War.<\/p>\n Sixth, while saying “America First” and promising to make the US great again, US President Trump prioritizes hard power and economic-political pressures over the construction of hegemony based on soft power and the manufacturing of consent. He views investment in soft power as a waste of money and time. This preference draws a reaction in Europe. In the coming period, the problems Europe experiences with the US may become more pronounced. If the US attempts to acquire Greenland\u2014the territory of Denmark, a member of NATO and the EU\u2014by some means, the contradiction between the US and Europe will increase further.<\/p>\n In conclusion, in a period where the world is transitioning to a multipolar order and the US is prioritizing its own continent, tension will continue to escalate. Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, Panama, Iran, and Greenland are in the US crosshairs. Reactions against US aggression will also rise in different countries and in different dimensions. Interest in regional alliances will increase.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Following the conclusion of the Cold War in 1991 and the circulation of the Greater Middle East Project (later renamed the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative) in the 2000s, the United States never ceased to recite the following concepts: Preemptive strike. Controlled instability. Hybrid warfare. Asymmetric warfare. Liberating occupation. Humanitarian imperialism\u2026 In this […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":55,"featured_media":13159,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"gallery","meta":{"ep_exclude_from_search":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[7],"tags":[10067,15652,1295,12909,12888,3600,15653,15651,15379,1325],"class_list":["post-13158","post","type-post","status-publish","format-gallery","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion","tag-de-dollarization","tag-geopolitics-of-oil","tag-global-south","tag-monroe-doctrine","tag-multipolar-world-order","tag-proxy-wars","tag-regional-alliances","tag-soft-power-vs-hard-power","tag-us-imperialism","tag-us-china-competition","post_format-post-format-gallery"],"yoast_head":"\n