In an exclusive interview with Harici Media at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, IRAM President Assoc. Prof. Dr. Serhan Afacan evaluated the critical negotiation process between the Iranian and US delegations. Afacan noted that the reciprocal threats regarding the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, coupled with the Trump administration\u2019s “condescending” rhetoric, have once again escalated regional tensions. While emphasizing that the nuclear issue is not technically insurmountable, he stated that Iran is seeking concrete security guarantees and a foundation for permanent peace before offering concessions.<\/p>\n
He further observed that the US military presence in the Gulf remains difficult to use as a bargaining chip due to sovereign rights and entrenched regional alliances. Addressing Israel\u2019s “disruptive” role in the process, Afacan highlighted Washington\u2019s struggle to maintain a delicate balance between restraining its ally and pursuing diplomacy with Tehran. Ultimately, he predicted that despite the anxieties caused by the ongoing military buildup, both sides will likely avoid a return to full-scale war in the short term to avert an “apocalyptic” conflict.<\/p>\n
As we know, we are currently at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, but alongside the forum itself, negotiations between the Iranian and American delegations are ongoing. Pakistan’s mediation is at play here; it has been a factor throughout the interval, and I believe bilateral contacts are still continuing. However, from what we can observe at present, there is a distinct ambiguity regarding whether the Strait of Hormuz will be reopened. We are essentially discussing two different blockades: one imposed by Iran and one by the United States. Although Iran claimed to have lifted its blockade, the US announced its intention to maintain its own. Consequently, according to the latest reports, Iran has declared it will resume its blockade in response. Based on the impressions you have gathered from the Iranian delegations and groups here, how do you evaluate the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz and the efforts toward constructing a general ceasefire?<\/strong><\/p>\n To begin with, there is what I would call a “Trump problem.” I say this because yesterday, on April 17th\u2014at approximately 3:25 or 15:30 PM\u2014the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, made a statement. He asserted that “as long as the ceasefire conditions hold, the strait has been completely reopened”\u2014explicitly using the word “completely”\u2014to commercial vessels, tankers, and the like. Yet, roughly three hours later, the Tasnim News Agency, one of Iran’s leading state-aligned outlets, criticized Araghchi. They argued that his statement was erroneous and that the matter had been misrepresented. Their rationale was that it was ill-advised to suggest such absolute freedom of movement while Trump maintained his current posture. Subsequently, as is well known, the US President remarked, “Iran opened it; this is a great victory,” expressing this in his characteristically unique rhetorical style. He added, “We will maintain the blockade. It will remain in place until Iran accepts a long-term agreement. If they do not, we will strike again.” This, naturally, rattled the Iranian establishment once more. The Iranians do not accept Trump’s condescending tone, nor do they believe there is any justification for it. Their sentiment is: “We have not been defeated, so why is Trump approaching us in this manner?” Consequently, early this morning, a statement was issued from the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters\u2014the joint operations center that directs Iran\u2019s military activities, overseeing both the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the regular Army (Artesh). They declared: “As long as this blockade persists\u2014that is, as long as the US prevents entry to and exit from our ports\u2014we have closed the strait once again.” Thus, tensions have escalated once more.<\/p>\n From what we can see, Trump’s statements create the perception that Iran is retreating on several fronts. More accurately, Trump himself claims this. He particularly emphasized the nuclear issue, stating, “We will seize that enriched uranium, which we have already effectively turned to dust.” He suggested that an agreement is near. While perhaps not confirming the exact content, the Pakistani side also indicated that common ground has been reached on nearly eighty percent of the issues. Based on your general impressions, do you believe the Iranian side is inclined to back down on certain points, particularly regarding the nuclear program?<\/strong><\/p>\n Let us look at it from the Iranian perspective. I do not believe Iran’s entire position is correct, but I find the US position to be slightly more flawed\u2014to provide a diplomatic answer. Iran\u2019s view is that Trump is attempting to win at the negotiating table what he failed to win on the battlefield. They maintain: “We will not allow this; we have suffered immense damage and losses, and we will not permit such an outcome.” In this sense, they are using the Strait of Hormuz as leverage. In fact, during a recent meeting with Iranian officials, I asked: “Are you using Hormuz as a diplomatic lever, a bargaining chip? If so, that is understandable; it creates pressure on the US within international markets, and Iran could use it as a negotiating tool. Or do you truly intend for this status to be permanent?” They insist it will be permanent and that they will not change it. To be frank, I do not find that plausible. Suppose the US and Iran agree on a permanent ceasefire or even a cessation of hostilities. If Iran receives the guarantees it seeks\u2014and we are speaking hypothetically\u2014it would be compelled to reopen Hormuz. We heard T\u00fcrkiye’s position yesterday from President Erdo\u011fan, who stated: “We advocate for the freedom of navigation. Ships must be able to pass. The states of the Persian Gulf should not be imprisoned within the region; their access to the high seas must not be obstructed.” So, the Hormuz issue remains central. The nuclear issue, however, is intriguing for a specific reason: traditionally, Iran\u2019s position on this is well-defined. According to the official stance\u2014setting aside instances where Iran may have muddied the waters or acted erroneously\u2014Tehran claims: “We are not pursuing nuclear weapons. Our nuclear technology is entirely for peaceful purposes.” They often cite the religious fatwa, don’t they? The argument is that weapons of mass destruction are\u00a0haram<\/em>\u00a0(religiously forbidden), and the Supreme Leader has issued a decree to that effect. Therefore, they claim they have no such intention. However, there is a problem of Iran\u2019s own making: recall that in May 2018, during his first term, President Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)\u2014the nuclear deal signed in July 2015 that took effect in January 2016. He then began imposing sanctions. This deal was between Iran and the P5+1\u2014the permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany. While the US withdrew, the other parties remained. Iran\u2019s position then became: “I am adhering to my obligations, but I am not receiving the promised benefits; thus, the agreement loses its validity for me.” This became the core of the dispute between Iran, the US, and the other signatories. In January 2020, Trump ordered the killing of Qasem Soleimani. In November 2020, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh\u2014often called the “Qasem Soleimani of the nuclear program”\u2014was assassinated. Following these events, the domestic debate in Iran intensified, leading them to enrich uranium to sixty percent, accumulating approximately 400 kilograms of it. This is the crux of the debate. But the issue there is this: when negotiations resumed in Muscat on February 6th, moving between Muscat and Geneva for two rounds, the Iranians claimed to have devised a formula. They suggested they could dilute the sixty-percent enriched uranium, thereby lowering the enrichment level. At the time, it was suggested that the material be transferred in its entirety to another country, perhaps Russia. The Iranians were non-committal, essentially saying, “Let us see what we receive in return before we finalize our position.”<\/p>\n Would that be a solution that satisfies America?<\/strong><\/p>\n Certainly. The US insists that the material must be removed from Iran. Tehran would never give it to the US directly, but Russia played a similar role in the previous agreement. Recently, after an American aircraft was downed and US personnel were lost\u2014as I recall from a few weeks ago\u2014the Iranians constructed a narrative. They claimed that the US operation was actually an attempt to seize those 400 kilograms from the facility, likening it to a failed mission reminiscent of Jimmy Carter\u2019s “Operation Eagle Claw.” They framed it as though this administration had bungled it just as Carter did.<\/p>\n Do you think that is a high probability?<\/strong><\/p>\n We have no evidence. This is the Iranian narrative, and they have been unable to substantiate it. Is it possible? It is. The US President might have wanted to be able to say, “We went in, we took it, and we got out.” It is a possibility, but without proof\u2014which Iran has not provided and the US has naturally denied\u2014it remains speculative. Consequently, as I see it, the nuclear issue is not unsolvable. Iran is not saying, “I will never give it up,” or “It will stay at sixty percent enrichment indefinitely.” They are looking at what they will gain. The question then is: What does Iran want? First, not just a ceasefire, but a permanent end to this war. Second, some form of guarantee that they will not be attacked again. I say “some form” because how would that be structured? Would there be third-party guarantors\u2014perhaps China or Russia? That seems unlikely. Would there be a UN Security Council resolution? How effective would that be? At one point, there was even talk of a non-aggression pact between the US and Iran. This is one dimension of the issue. So, while there is significant tension, I do not believe the nuclear issue is insurmountable. Iran mentioned they went to Islamabad, and they were supposed to go again, though recent reports need verification. I doubt they will refrain from going; I expect they will continue to probe the US position. This is one of those issues where Iran could shift its stance depending on what it can gain at the table, especially since they traditionally maintain they are not seeking to produce nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n One of Iran’s primary demands was the closure of American bases in the Gulf countries. Iran has struck these bases significantly, and it is said that the damage has reached a point where operations can no longer continue. However, we are trying to understand this: Does the US currently view its military presence in the Gulf as a bargaining chip? Do you see a retreat as a possibility?<\/strong><\/p>\n It is highly unlikely. First of all, this is not strictly Iran\u2019s concern. Iran\u2019s interest in the matter is that “these bases are being used against me.” That is their claim, and it was the justification for their strikes across these countries. Whether those nations open their territory to US bases is entirely a matter of their own sovereign rights. Thus, it returns to the same core issue. Iran says: “Give me a guarantee that you will not attack me again.” If such a guarantee were established\u2014which is difficult, though not impossible\u2014then the existence of those bases would no longer directly impact Iran. Iran could certainly ask the US to “withdraw the buildup.” Given the blockade and the military fortification that occurred leading up to February 28th, demanding a de-escalation from a war footing is a legitimate request. But the decision regarding those bases does not belong to Iran. The Iranians are well aware that the US is not going to uproot an investment it has maintained since the end of the Second World War. Furthermore, if I may add, from the perspective of the Gulf and Arab nations, these US bases are viewed as a security guarantee. They see them as part of their military cooperation with the US They are not asking for them to be dismantled. Ultimately, some of the largest US bases in the world are in this region, such as Al Udeid in Qatar. So, while Iran may voice this demand, it carries little practical weight; it is not a decision Iran can make.<\/p>\n Israel continued its operations in Lebanon for a while, even as Trump and Iran were at the table. There is considerable uncertainty here. Pakistan and Iran both claimed Lebanon was included in the agreement, but America denied this. Now, Donald Trump\u2019s statements have taken on a harsher tone, almost reprimanding Israel. He said “enough is enough” and even used the phrase “I am forbidding it.” When we look at the historical fluctuations between Trump and Netanyahu, we have seen similar intensities\u2014regarding Syria, Gaza, and even during Trump\u2019s first term following the assassination of Soleimani. Given this complex, up-and-down relationship, are his current actions an attempt to shift the blame onto Israel for the deteriorating situation? Or is there a genuine breakdown in the relationship between the US and Israel?<\/strong><\/p>\n A fundamental breakdown seems unlikely. There have been conjunctural periods where US-Israel relations soured\u2014recall the end of the Obama era; Obama and Netanyahu famously disliked one another. I doubt Trump is particularly fond of Netanyahu either; as the saying goes, “two acrobats cannot perform on the same rope.” Even though Israel’s security is a US “red line” and a fixture of foreign policy that is increasingly criticized even within the US\u2014with people asking why they defend Israeli interests so staunchly when they don’t always align with their own\u2014this relationship is structurally unlikely to change. It is also inaccurate to view the US as solely the “giver” in this relationship. The US gains an unwavering ally like Israel in the Middle East. Relations with all other countries can fluctuate; we saw this even with T\u00fcrkiye\u2014two NATO allies engaged since the Marshall Plan, yet we have seen how strained those ties can become. So, the US clearly derives benefit here. The problem, however, is this: when the ceasefire in Lebanon was announced, it wasn’t just Netanyahu who was displeased; the opposition was as well. The entire Israeli state apparatus leans toward a “let us strike” posture. Even if Trump were to be rid of Netanyahu, those behind him are not doves. In Israel, the prevailing paradigm is hawkish and aggressive. The public also supports these strikes; that is the reality. There is neither a significant political movement nor a public demand in Israel that would push the US to act differently. In this sense, what I see is Trump saying, “I will handle these issues with Israel and Iran differently.” Israel responds with, “Fine, try it, but you won’t get results.” Israel will always be a complicating factor here. At the slightest opportunity, they could strike Iran, and they can always strike Lebanon. Much of America\u2019s difficulty stems from this: they are negotiating with Iran while simultaneously trying to keep Israel on a leash. This is likely a major reason for the fluctuations in the process. When Trump claims, “I struck Iran, I devastated them, I extracted massive concessions,” he is speaking not only to his domestic audience but also to Israel, saying: “Look, I have achieved through my own power what you were trying to achieve through other means.” Therefore, unless he can secure major concessions on the table\u2014such as the nuclear issue, Hormuz, or Iran\u2019s regional policies\u2014Israel remains a threat to strike not just Lebanon, but Iran itself.<\/p>\n A final question: Do you believe we will see a return to war?<\/strong><\/p>\n At this moment, I do not believe so. I am observing the reflexes of the parties involved. Of course, there have been many sudden shifts in this process. I have always said candidly: when the war began on February 28th, as things moved between Geneva and Muscat, I thought negotiations would continue a bit longer despite the US buildup. I knew war could break out eventually, but I expected another round or two of talks. The parties themselves were saying as much. Thus, predictions are not always a hundred percent accurate. Currently, the US is engaged in a massive buildup; just yesterday, colleagues in Qatar were telling me the scale of it is incredible. The local population is even becoming uneasy because the US is positioning troops near residential and civilian areas…<\/p>\n Indeed, when speaking with friends in Doha, there is a prevailing sense of anxiety that Iran might strike civilian areas, citing the presence of US troops. No one believes the US has “lowered its bayonets”; that is not the prevailing view. Thus, the risk of military escalation is visible. However, in the behavior of the parties, I observe this: if conflict breaks out hereafter, it will move toward a near-apocalyptic scenario. We have heard exaggerated, unseemly threats about “returning to the Stone Age,” but the reality of striking infrastructure\u2014energy, water, and the like\u2014would see Iran retaliate in kind across the Gulf. I do not believe either side truly wants to take that risk. I don’t find these fluctuations and mutual tensions particularly unusual at this stage. My assessment is that there does not appear to be a return to war, at least in the short term.<\/p>\n Thank you very much.<\/strong><\/p>\n And thank you. My pleasure. Be well.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" In an exclusive interview with Harici Media at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, IRAM President Assoc. Prof. Dr. Serhan Afacan evaluated the critical negotiation process between the Iranian and US delegations. Afacan noted that the reciprocal threats regarding the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, coupled with the Trump administration\u2019s “condescending” rhetoric, have once again escalated […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":31,"featured_media":14541,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ep_exclude_from_search":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[174],"tags":[3014,503,660,10962,17972,288,812,927,866,17973,531,409,1192],"class_list":["post-14540","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-interview","tag-gulf","tag-headline","tag-hezbollah","tag-hormuz-strait","tag-iram","tag-iran","tag-israel","tag-lebanon","tag-qatar","tag-serhan-afacan","tag-syria","tag-turkiye","tag-united-states"],"yoast_head":"\n