In May 2026, Donald Trump visited China again for the first time in nine years. After several years of sustained tension in U.S.-China relations, the trip finally brought a long-absent atmosphere of d\u00e9tente.<\/p>\n
Following the talks, both sides announced that they had reached \u201cimportant consensuses\u201d across multiple areas, creating the impression that China and the United States were stabilizing relations once again.<\/p>\n
It was, undoubtedly, a successful show.<\/p>\n
The problem is that, for Trump, it came far too late.<\/p>\n
Over the past several years, America\u2019s strategic judgment toward China had been built upon a fundamental miscalculation: Washington consistently believed that China would eventually yield under pressure. As a result, the United States continuously escalated its measures \u2014 from tariff wars to technological blockades, from semiconductor export restrictions to supply-chain decoupling.<\/p>\n
But China\u2019s actual performance under pressure has already demonstrated that this assumption was totally wrong.<\/p>\n
In the field of large AI models, China and the United States have already formed a genuinely \u201cbipolar\u201d structure. US remains extremely powerful, of course, but China is no longer merely a perpetual follower. Whether in reasoning capability, industrial deployment, or domestic ecosystem development, China has already built a sufficiently massive system of its own.<\/p>\n
And after the \u201cMay 7 air battle,\u201d the world realized more directly than ever before the systemic advantages and real combat capabilities of China\u2019s military industry.<\/p>\n
The Russia-Ukraine war also led many people to recognize that China possesses the world\u2019s largest drone production capacity, a complete electronics industrial chain, and low-cost rapid iteration capabilities.<\/p>\n
Combined with the technical barriers surrounding rare-earth refining, this means that even if the United States now recognizes the importance of supply-chain security, it will still struggle to replicate China\u2019s capabilities.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, China\u2019s nuclear arsenal has continued its long-overdue expansion, further reshaping the global strategic psychological balance.<\/p>\n
Even more subtle are the changes in soft power.<\/p>\n
The rise of phenomena such as \u201cChinamaxxing\u201d does not necessarily mean that Western societies genuinely embrace Chinese values. What it does indicate, however, is the spread of a certain realism: more and more people are beginning to acknowledge that the Chinese model is, at the very least, capable of delivering stability, prosperity, and functioning public life.<\/p>\n
For Western societies long trapped in aging infrastructure, deindustrialization, and deepening social fragmentation, China is no longer merely an abstract \u201cthreat.\u201d It has become an unavoidable point of comparison.<\/p>\n
China\u2019s leadership is clearly well aware of the growth of both its hard power and soft power.<\/p>\n
Therefore, much like in recent years, Beijing was naturally willing during the summit to send signals of stability and achieve certain practical outcomes. But there was never any possibility that China would make major strategic concessions merely for the sake of maintaining relations.<\/p>\n
The clearest example was the Boeing order.<\/p>\n
Markets had previously circulated rumors that China would purchase 500 Boeing aircraft, and many interpreted this as a symbol of Trump\u2019s \u201cdiplomatic victory.\u201d Yet the final number that emerged was only around 200 aircraft. Such deals are usually structured as long-term frameworks implemented over many years.s. After the news broke, Boeing\u2019s stock price actually fell sharply, as markets realized that Beijing\u2019s offer was far below expectations.<\/p>\n
The same applies to semiconductor purchases.<\/p>\n
Even if the two sides reached partial agreements, enormous uncertainty still surrounds how many high-end American chips Chinese companies will ultimately purchase in the future. The reason is simple: nobody knows whether the U.S. government will reverse course again. After years of repeated policy swings in Washington, Chinese companies have developed profound distrust. For many Chinese firms, continuing domestic substitution may be more expensive, but at least their fate remains in their own hands.<\/p>\n
And all of this ultimately affects the issue Trump cares most about right now: given America\u2019s current economic situation, the midterm elections are, for Republicans, almost hopeless.<\/p>\n
Had Trump moved quickly after winning the 2024 election \u2014 using his strong political position to restore close relations with China, suppress hawkish factions within his party, stabilize global trade, reduce domestic inflation, and ease economic pressure on ordinary Americans \u2014 he might genuinely have had a chance to avoid a disastrous midterm outcome.<\/p>\n
But if he had truly been capable of doing that, he would not be Trump.<\/p>\n
Trump\u2019s political-economic worldview fundamentally remains stuck in the late twentieth century. His understanding of manufacturing, tariffs, and trade deficits carries what can only be described as a \u201cliving fossil\u201d mentality. He sincerely believes that tariffs can force capital and industry back into the United States.<\/p>\n
Thus, after his sweeping victory, Trump naturally launched a global tariff war.<\/p>\n
And the consequences gradually became visible.<\/p>\n
Several local elections in 2025 had already foreshadowed the warning signs for the midterms. American voters\u2019 anxieties over inflation, debt, cost of living, and social disorder would not disappear simply because of diplomatic press conferences. In American politics, international affairs have always been difficult to turn into electoral gains \u2014 but relatively much easier to turn into political disasters.<\/p>\n
Many American presidents have imagined that foreign-policy victories could reverse domestic decline. Very few have succeeded.<\/p>\n
Even Trump had stopped after succeeding in Venezuela in 2025, he might only have accumulated some political prestige, and little more than that. Venezuelan oil could never rapidly restructure the American economy, nor quickly improve the lives of ordinary voters.<\/p>\n
Worse still, Washington subsequently drifted into another dangerous line of thinking. Some had long believed that action against Venezuela could serve as preparation for a future strategic escalation against Iran.<\/p>\n
On paper, the logic appeared \u201creasonable\u201d: first secure new oil supplies, then move in the Middle East.<\/p>\n
The problem is that the real world is not a strategy game.<\/p>\n
Restoring Venezuelan oil production requires time. Infrastructure must be rebuilt. Transportation and refining systems require investment. But Trump could not wait. He preferred to believe those who sold him unreliable intelligence and fantasies of \u201cquick victory,\u201d convincing him that a war with Iran could end like a clean surgical operation.<\/p>\n
The outcome was precisely the opposite.<\/p>\n
The Middle East crisis triggered energy volatility, financial panic, and global market instability, further intensifying America\u2019s domestic difficulties and public anxiety, while making the already bleak midterm outlook even worse.<\/p>\n
The Iran war also thoroughly exposed the weaknesses of American military power: strategic misjudgment, declining morale, insufficient industrial capacity, and dependence on rare earths for military production \u2014 merely one vulnerability among many. China, of course, saw all of this clearly.<\/p>\n
So when Trump now arrives in China, what people are really witnessing is a form of delayed realism.<\/p>\n
He has finally realized that the United States cannot confront everyone at once. He has finally realized that the world will not automatically retreat simply because America raises its voice. And he has finally realized that, just like last time, China will neither yield nor collapse under pressure \u2014 and on the opposite that the United States now greatly needs China\u2019s help in stabilizing the situation.<\/p>\n
But by now, it is already too late.<\/p>\n
Beijing is naturally happy to see a temporary easing of China-U.S. tensions, because stability itself serves China\u2019s interests. However, China also clearly understands that the uncertainty of American politics has not disappeared. Nobody can guarantee what Trump may become after the midterm elections \u2014 nor whether future American administrations might once again overturn the agreements reached today.<\/p>\n
Therefore, the true significance of this visit may not lie in what it changed or brought.<\/p>\n
Rather, it lies in what it symbolizes: even a political figure like Trump has finally been forced to begin accepting the realities of a new era.<\/p>\n
*Shaoyu Cen<\/em> When the U.S. Plays with Fire, China Watches<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\nDeputy Editor In Chief at Guancha, Shanghai based media
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