On August 29, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Jake Sullivan, the U.S. President’s National Security Advisor, in Beijing and gave an important speech on China-U.S. relations. Earlier that day, Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, also met with Sullivan. This high-profile reception reflects China\u2019s significant emphasis on maintaining stability in China-U.S. relations as Sullivan concluded his first three-day visit to China. However, on the same day as Sullivan\u2019s visit, the U.S. announced sanctions against some Chinese entities and individuals involved in trade with Russia and revealed plans to implement new tariffs on China. This combination demonstrates that the Biden administration’s policy towards China remains a \u201cnew bottle with old wine\u201d and a \u201ccarrot and stick\u201d approach, with the \u201cstick\u201d being bigger and the \u201ccarrot\u201d smaller, which does not help improve bilateral relations.<\/p>\n
Sullivan’s visit to China is noteworthy for three reasons: First, this visit, which was invited by Wang Yi, \u00a0director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, marks the fourth strategic consultation between China and the U.S., following previous meetings in Vienna, Malta, and Bangkok. Second, Sullivan\u2019s visit to China for the first time in nearly four years shows that China-U.S. relations under Biden have warmed up slowly and to a limited extent. Third, the fact that the U.S. National Security Advisor visited China after an eight-year hiatus indicates that strategic trust and institutional dialogue mechanisms between China and the U.S. have seriously deteriorated and become dysfunctional; this is not solely the responsibility of one American party or faction but a collective responsibility of both Democrats and Republicans.<\/p>\n
Nevertheless, adhering to China\u2019s philosophy of good intentions and \u201cdoing our best and waiting for the outcome,\u201d and in the spirit of Xi Jinping’s famous statement that \u201cthere are thousands of reasons to improve China-U.S. relations, but no reason to worsen them,\u201d as well as implementing the consensus reached at the China-U.S. summit in San Francisco last November, China invited the U.S. security official to continue strategic communication. Throughout this process, China has consistently and coherently maintained its stance.<\/p>\n
During the six sessions of strategic communication totaling eleven hours after Sullivan\u2019s visit, China-U.S. relations, sensitive issues, and major international and regional hot topics were discussed, and some concrete agreements were reached, including timely video calls between the two countries’ military region leaders. Both sides, in their post-communication reports, acknowledged that there were many differences and disputes but deemed the process to be \u201ccandid, substantive, and constructive.\u201d<\/p>\n
Analysts point out that Sullivan\u2019s visit to China at the end of Biden’s term has a significant mission of facilitating an invitation for Biden to visit China, thus filling the diplomatic gap created by the President\u2019s lack of a visit to Beijing, providing the Democratic Party with a bargaining chip for the White House race, and boosting Vice President Kamala Harris\u2019s chances of success. China-U.S. relations have always been a focal point in U.S. elections, and Trump has recently begun discussing his future China policy. Even if Biden does not visit Beijing, maintaining stability in bilateral relations during this critical two-month period could at least prevent the Democratic Party from losing ground in this area.<\/p>\n
However, Biden has become a “lame duck” president by not seeking re-election. Although he still holds decision-making power in foreign policy, Biden is unlikely to fundamentally alter his hardline China policy or change his hypocritical diplomatic style; thus, China is not obliged to meet his visiting expectations. Furthermore, considering the uncertainty of the White House’s future occupant and China\u2019s principle of non-interference in U.S. internal affairs, China is unlikely to invite Biden and reward him in this way.<\/p>\n
Biden’s China policy is a mix of Obamaism and Trumpism. Although the initial three-part framework of \u201ccompetition, confrontation, and cooperation\u201d was adjusted to \u201cinvestment, alliances, and competition\u201d early in his administration, the underlying tone and essence of weakening, limiting, and containing China have not changed. While the Trump administration preferred direct confrontation with China, the Biden team is more adept at using gloves and forming alliances to counter China.<\/p>\n
In terms of strategic security, the Biden administration continues to build and reinforce a \u201cfence with four posts\u201d strategy to contain and encircle China. This strategy consists of the Indo-Pacific Strategy and its four main pillars: the U.S.-Japan-India-Australia Security Dialogue (QUAD), the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral alliance, the U.S.-UK-Australia nuclear submarine alliance (AUKUS), and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). Additionally, the Biden administration places great importance on the toolization, expansion, and globalization of NATO and views China as its number one strategic competitor.<\/p>\n
In terms of trade and technology exchanges, the Biden administration has inherited the high tariff policies from the previous administration, implemented measures to restrict investments in China, and exerted extensive efforts to contain Chinese high-tech and innovative companies like Huawei and TikTok. It has also imposed strict controls on Chinese students studying in the U.S., aiming to maintain a decisive technological advantage over China.<\/p>\n
Moreover, the Biden administration has used the Russia-Ukraine crisis to levy new accusations against China and impose new restrictions. Specifically, it has tried to disrupt and hinder China-Russia trade using financial hegemony, disregarding Russia\u2019s strong resilience to sanctions. On August 23, just before Sullivan’s visit to China, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced a new round of sanctions, targeting 400 entities and individuals, including those from China, for evading U.S. sanctions on Russia. The U.S. continues to wield a new \u201cbullying stick\u201d against China, while the \u201ccarrot\u201d presented by Sullivan during his visit is relatively weak and disproportionate. The dual-role performance of Sullivan and Blinken is a typical example of Biden\u2019s diplomatic style.<\/p>\n
As the White House race heats up, Biden and the Democrats are facing Trump and the Republicans, who vow to resolve the Russia-Ukraine conflict swiftly. This highlights the anxious reality of the war’s prolonged duration and Ukraine’s slim chances of victory. Such a situation inevitably accelerates U.S. attempts to create problems in China-Russia relations and trade, making it challenging for the U.S. to fulfill its promise of \u201cresponsibly managing\u201d China-U.S. relations, and even causing it to go in the opposite direction.<\/p>\n
Sullivan\u2019s visit, within the tense framework of China-U.S. relations, was merely an insignificant stabilizing measure and a performative process. China must consider how to address the risk of adding new wounds to old ones in China-U.S. relations, especially as the U.S. continues to exacerbate issues and worsen bilateral relations by using the Russia-Ukraine conflict to provoke new China-U.S. conflicts.<\/p>\n
*Prof. Ma, Dean of the Institute of Studies for the Mediterranean Rim (ISMR ), Zhejiang International Studies University (Hangzhou). He knows the world affairs well, especially the Islamic and Middle East politics. He has worked for many years as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine and Iraq.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" On August 29, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Jake Sullivan, the U.S. President’s National Security Advisor, in Beijing and gave an important speech on China-U.S. relations. Earlier that day, Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, also met with Sullivan. This high-profile reception reflects China\u2019s significant emphasis on maintaining stability in China-U.S. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":40,"featured_media":5260,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ep_exclude_from_search":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[7],"tags":[1454,2883,2882,1104,875,2881,319,503,2706,1326,536,781],"class_list":["post-5256","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion","tag-biden-administration","tag-china-policy","tag-chinese-president-xi-jinping","tag-competition","tag-containment-policy","tag-decoupling","tag-donald-trump","tag-headline","tag-indo-pacific-strategy","tag-us-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan","tag-us-presidential-elections","tag-us-china-relations"],"yoast_head":"\n